Anthropomorphism and analogy

1
Anthropomorphism and analogy

• Anthropomorphism defined as the tendency to
  wrongly attribute human qualities and
  characteristics to nonhumans
• The issue of anthropomorphism lies at the heart
  of considerations of emotional and cognitive
  continuity between humans and animals
• Human-animal relationships are based upon the
  negotiation of similarities and differences
  between ourselves and other animals

2
Anthropomorphism as a problem

• Anthropomorphismrepresents a form of
  intellectual laziness. In its most extreme case,
  anthropomorphism results from the failure to make
  species differentiations. In this regard, very
  young children or pet owners whose animals have
  become family members are likely candidates for
  such attributions. Davis, 1997
• Anthropomorphism must take its slice of the
  blame for a sort of malaise that has lately
  afflicted the subject of ethology as a wholeI
  think we can be confident that anthropomorphism
  will be brought under control, even if it cannot
  be cured completely. Although it is probably
  programmed into us genetically as well as being
  inoculated culturally that does not mean the
  disease is untreatable. Kennedy, 1992

3
The argument from analogy

• There is a causal relationship between mental
  states and behaviour, such that the former cause
  the latter
• The mental causes of our behaviours can be
  ascertained by introspection
• If other species display similar behaviours to
  our own, then the psychological causes of those
  behaviour must also be similar

4
Problems with the AFA

• Behaviours that are physically similar may have
  different cognitive causes, e.g. emotional
  expression in humans and chimpanzees
• Analogous circumstances may not produce similar
  mental experiences in different species
• What do we mean by analogous?
• How to make the leap from behaviour to thought?
• The debate about anthropomorphism concerns the
  extent to which we over-analogise, ie our
  analogies at times may be too anthropocentric
  (e.g. do ants have a concept of death?)

5
Bigger problems with the AFA

• If mental experience is essentially private and
  subjective, how can we really know whether the
  behaviour of other species is directed by
  thinking
• One solution has been to assume that we can only
  objectively study behaviour itself
• Leads to mechanistic image of animal behaviour
  animal may appear to be behaving intelligently
  but there may be no conscious intention involved
• Woodlice appear to seek dark places but any
  biological or manmade machines that reflexively
  move in the light and stop moving in the dark
  will tend to congregate in dark places.
  Shettleworth, 2001

6
Anthropomorphism as folk psychology

• If we cannot study subjective mental life in an
  objective way, then drawing psychological
  analogies between humans and animals may be seen
  as folk psychology
• Folk psychology denotes the application of an
  everyday commonsense reasoning to explain
  behaviour, and is often seen as unscientific
• In attributions of mindedness, pet owners often
  attribute intent and purposiveness to animal
  behaviour
• Anthropomorphism may be seen as a pragmatic
  strategy to help us interpret the actions of
  animals (and even objects)

7
Objective and subjective accounts of animal mind
Objective Subjective Detached Involved Quant
itative Qualitative Reason Experience Mechano
morphic Anthropomorphic Professional Lay
8
Anthropomorphism and relationships with animals

• Attributions of mindedness in dogs (Sanders,
  1993) owners regarded their dogs as objects,
  toys, or creatures whose ostensibly human
  characteristics are (actually) the result of
  anthropomorphic projection on the part of
  overinvolved owners (p 220). But he suggests
  that as minded participants in the relationship,
  the attribution of these characteristics worked
  in context of the relationship
• Objective and subjective accounts in primate
  research Wieder (1980) objective descriptions of
  experiments on chimp cognition contrasted with
  rich subjective accounts of animals personality,
  emotion and awareness given by chimpers

9
Is anthropomorphism inevitable?

• Specific anthropomorphism (assumption that
  animals possess most human traits) can be
  distinguished from generic anthropomorphism
  the ascription of (a general) purposefulness to
  higher animals, ie animals are aware of what they
  are doing, but it does not imply that
  psychological experiences are necessarily exactly
  the same in animals as in man. Asquith, 1984
• Is the adoption of a generic anthropomorphism
  necessary for the construction of human-animal
  relationships?

10
References

• Allen, Cognitive relatives and moral relations.
  To access this online, go to http//cogprints.ecs.
  soton.ac.uk/ and search for Colin Allen.
• Asquith, P. (1984). The inevitability and utility
  of anthropomorphism in description of primate
  behaviour. In R. Harre V. Reynolds (eds.), The
  Meaning of Primate Signals (pp138-174).
  Cambridge Cambridge University Press
• Davis, H. (1997). Animal cognition versus animal
  thinking the anthropomorphic error. In (eds.)
  R.W. Mitchell, N.S. Thompson H.L. Miles,
  Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals. NY
  State University of New York Press.

11
References

• Kennedy, J.S. (1992). The New Anthropomorphism.
  New York Cambridge University Press.
• Sanders, C.R. (1993) Understanding dogs
  Caretakers attributions of mindedness in
  canine-human relationships. Journal of
  Contemporary Ethnography, 22, 2, 205-226.
• Shettleworth, S.J. (2001). Animal cognition and
  animal behaviour. Animal Behaviour, 61, 277-286.
• Wieder, D.L. (1980). Behavioristic operationalism
  and the life-world chimpanzees and chimpanzee
  researchers in face-to-face interaction.
  Sociological Inquiry, 50, 75-103
• Serpell, J.A. (2002). Anthropomorphism and
  anthropomorphic selection beyond the cute
  response. Society and Animals, 10, 4 available
  at http//www.psyeta.org/sa/sa10.4/serpell.shtml

12
Readings for next session

• Allen, C. Bekoff, M. (1997). Species of Mind
  The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology.
  Cambridge, Mass. The MIT Press.
• Allen, C. Bekoff, M. (1997). Cognitive
  ethology slayers, skeptics and proponents. In
  (eds.) R.W. Mitchell, N.S. Thompson H.L. Miles,
  Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals. NY
  State University of New York Press.
• Costall, A. (1998). Lloyd Morgan and the rise of
  fall of Animal Psychology. Society and Animals,
  6, 1. Full text available at www.psyeta.org/sa/s
  a6.1/COSTALL.html
• Jamieson, D. Bekoff, M. (1996). On aims and
  methods of cognitive ethology. In M. Bekoff D.
  Jamieson (eds.), Readings in Animal Cognition.
  Cambridge, Mass. And London MIT Press.
• Ristau, C.A. (Ed.) (1991). Cognitive Ethology
  The minds of other animals. Hillsdale, N.J.
  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
• Anything by Donald Griffin

13
For next session

• As part of our discussion next week about animal
  awareness, we will consider some of the work on
  animal language. The followign website details
  some interesting claims made concerning
  budgerigar language ability and intelligence
• http//www.budgieresearch.homestead.com/
• For next week, Id like you to listen to some of
  the recordings on the site and make brief notes,
  thinking about the following questions what do
  you feel the recordings can tell us about the
  experience and mental awareness of budgies? What
  kinds of difficulties are there with this type of
  work? What kinds of issues are most important in
  evaluating evidence for the linguistic ability
  and awareness of other species?