IS3513 Information Assurance and Security

1
IS3513 Information Assurance and Security

• 530-645 PM
• Robert J. Kaufman
• Background
• Syllabus and Class Schedule
• Student Background Information
• Email robert.kaufman_at_utsa.edu

2
Student Background Information(email to me)

• Name
• Reliable email address
• IS/CS background
• Security background if any
• Why you are taking this course
• What do you expect out of this course

3
Syllabus

• Assumed Background
• It is assumed that students in this class have a
  basic understanding of Operating Systems and
  Networks and that they have access to the
  Internet and a UNIX- or Windows- based PC.
• Textbook
• Principles of Computer Security, Conklin, White,
  Cothren, Williams, and Davis, McGraw Hill, 2004.
  ISBN0-07-225509-9
• Good Reference
• Hackers Beware, Eric Cole, New Riders
  Publishing, 2001, ISBN0-7357-1009-0.

4
Syllabus -- grading

• Graded Assignments
• The grades for this course will be based on a
  standard 70 C, 80 B, 90A grading scheme.
  The final grades will be based on the following
  graded assignments
• Paper 1 100 points
• Lab 1 100 points
• Exam 1 100 points
• Exam 2 100 points
• Lab 2 100 points
• Lab 3 100 Points
• Lab 4 150 Points
• Final Exam 250 points
• TOTAL 1000 points

5
Who relies on computers?

• Transportation Systems
• Personal and corporate financial records and
  systems
• Banking and financial institutions
• Hospitals and the medical community
• The public telephone network
• Air Traffic Control
• Power systems and other utilities
• The government and the military
• Just about everybody

6
NSAs First Major Policy Address Focused On The
Need For More Cyber-Security

• "The very technology that makes our economy so
  dynamic and our military forces so dominating
  also makes us more vulnerable."
• Computer reliance is the soft underbelly of
  American national security
• US high technology firms need to join with the US
  government to fight cyber terrorism

National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice
We are talking about a collaborative partnership
between the public and private sectors that is
unprecedented in our history
7
Solar Sunrise
January 1998 tensions between the U.S., the UN,
and Iraq are on the rise. Hussein has expelled
the UN inspectors. UN discussing renewing
military action.
February 4 AFCERT detects additional intrusions
8
Solar Sunrise
- Turned out to be 2 teenagers in California and
their mentor in Israel - Involved systems owned
by the Air Force, Navy, NASA, DOE, MIT and
several others - At least 47 FBI agents were
involved in this case as well as individuals
from the OSI and members of the Israeli Ministry
of Justice - Exploited a known bug in Solaris,
sniffed passwords - 500 systems involved,
thousands of passwords compromised.
9
Citibank

• Probably the largest and most famous publicly
  acknowledged theft
• Occurred in 1994
• Vladimir Levin, a 30-year old Russian hacker
  stole more than 10M
• All but a few hundred thousand dollars recovered
  
• The actual dollar figure lost was minimal to an
  organization as large as Citibank, what was more
  important is how this affected peoples
  impression of the bank. How many accounts were
  lost as a result of this public incident?

10
Worcester Airport

• Occurred in early 1997
• 14 year old hacker broke into a NYNEX digital
  loop carrier system through a dial-in port
• The individual, who called himself jester,
  disrupted telephone service for over 600
  residents of Rutland, Mass as well as
  communications at Worcester Airport
• Communication to the tower and emergency services
  was disrupted as well as the main radio
  transmitter and an electronic system which
  enables aircraft to send a signal to activate the
  runway lights

11
Omega Engineering

• Timothy Lloyd was convicted in May 2000 of
  causing an estimated 12 million in damages to
  his former employer.
• Back in 1996, Lloyd discovered he was about to be
  fired
• He planted a logic bomb that systematically
  erased all of Omegas contracts and the
  proprietary software used by the companys
  manufacturing tools.
• Lloyds act of insider cyberterrorism cost Omega
  its competitive position in the electronics
  manufacturing market. At Lloyds trial, plant
  manager Jim Ferguson said, We will never
  recover.

12
And probably the most widely known security
problem

• In March 1999, David Smith, a New Jersey
  resident, released the Melissa virus. The
  estimated damage it caused 80 million.
• In May 2000, 23-year old Philippine college
  student, Onel de Guzman, released the Love Bug
  virus which proceeded to cause an estimated 8
  Billion in damages worldwide.

13
Information Intrusion Threat
CNN, 8,9,10 Feb 00
Cyber-attacks batter Web heavyweights
CERT/CC, Carnegie Mellon, Apr 01
Reported Incidences
30000
25000
buy.com
20000
15000
5 May 00
FBI investigates 'ILOVEYOU' virus millions of
computers affected
10000
5000
0
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Love Bug caused an estimated 8 billion in
damage. WP, 11 May 00
War in Kosovo cost the United States 6.7
billion. UPI, 2 Feb 00
14
Some Attack Statistics

• In January, Riptech announced it had culled more
  than 128,000 attempted attacks on 300 Riptech
  customers over six months. And in March,
  Predictive Systems amassed more than 12 million
  malicious-looking events from 54 sensors around
  the world in just three months. (That's about 90
  attempted attacks per second)
• The Riptech study found 30 percent of all attacks
  came from computers in the U.S. next was South
  Korea, at 9 percent. In fact, five of the top 10
  sources of attacks were computers in Pacific Rim
  countries. In terms of intensity (attacks per
  Internet user), Israel far outdid any other
  nation.
• From Missed Opportunity By Scott Berinato,
  www.cio.com, Apr 2002

15
Hack Attack New Global Way Of War
Washington TimesApril 23, 2001, Front
Page China Warns Of Hack Attack
To date, Chinese hackers already have unlawfully
defaced a number of U.S. web sites, replacing
existing content with pro-Chinese or anti-U.S.
rhetoric. In addition, an Internet worm named
"Lion" is infecting computers and installing
distributed denial of service (DDOS) tools on
various systems.
Collateral Damage May Soon Have A New Definition
16
You have to have security, or else

• 1999 CSI/FBI Computer Crime Security Survey
• 521 security practitioners in the U.S.
• 30 reported system penetrations from outsiders,
  an increase for the third year in a row
• 55 reported unauthorized access from insiders,
  also an increase for the third year in a row
• Losses due to computer security breaches totaled
  (for the 163 respondents reporting a loss)
  123,779,000
• Average loss 759,380

17
You have to have security, or else

• 2000 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey
• 643 security practitioners in the U.S.
• 90 reported computer security breaches within
  the previous 12 months
• 70 reported unauthorized use
• 74 suffered financial losses due to breaches
• Losses due to computer security breaches totaled
  (for the 273 respondents reporting a loss)
  265,589,940
• Average loss 972,857

18
You have to have security, or else

• 2001 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey
• 538 security practitioners in the U.S.
• 91 reported computer security breaches within
  the previous 12 months
• 70 reported their Internet connection as a
  frequent point of attack (up from 59 in 2000)
• 64 suffered financial losses due to breaches,
  35 could quantify this loss.
• Losses due to computer security breaches totaled
  (for the 186 respondents reporting a loss)
  377,828,700
• Average loss 2,031,337
• Source Computer Security Institute
  http//www.gocsi.com

19
And the hits just keep coming

• 2002 CSI/FBI Computer Crime Security Survey
• 503 security practitioners in the U.S.
• 90 detected computer security breaches
• 40 detected penetrations from the outside
• 80 acknowledged financial losses due to breaches
• 455,848,000 in losses due to computer security
  breaches totaled (for the 223 respondents
  reporting a loss)
• 26 reported theft of proprietary info
  (170,827,000)
• 25 reported financial fraud (115,753,000)
• 34 reported intrusions to law enforcement
• 78 detected employee abuse of internet access
  privileges, i.e. pornography and inappropriate
  email use
• Source Computer Security Institute
  http//www.gocsi.com

20
And coming

• A 2003 FBI/CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey
  revealed the following
• 60 had a security breach in the last year.
• 78 detected employee abuse of internet
  privileges.
• 85 admitted to being infected by a computer
  virus.
• Average loss from insider access was 300,000
• Average loss due to virus attack 283,000
• Average loss from Telecom eavesdropping is
  1,205,000
• Average loss from outsider penetration was
  226,000
• The average reported loss from net abuse was
  536,000
• Source Computer Security Institute
  http//www.gocsi.com

21
A sampling of activity from a security perspective

• March 1999 - EBay gets hacked
• March 1999 - Melissa virus hits Internet
• April 1999 - Chernobyl Virus hits
• May 1999 - Hackers shut down web sites of FBI,
  Senate, and DOE
• June 1999 - Worm.Explore.Zip virus hits
• July 1999 - Cult of the Dead Cow (CDC) releases
  Back Orifice
• Sept 1999 - Hacker pleads guilty to attacking
  NATO and Gore web sites
• Oct 1999 - teenage hacker admits to breaking into
  AOL
• Nov 1999 - BubbleBoy virus hits
• Dec 1999 - Babylonia virus spreads
• Feb 2000 - several sites experience DOS attacks
• Feb 2000 - Alaska Airlines site hacked
• May 2000 - Love Bug virus ravages net
• July 2001 Code Red Worm
• Sept 2001 Nimda Worm
• Jan 2003 Slammer Worm

22
Attacks on the DoD

• In 1999, a total of 22,144 "attacks" were
  detected on Defense Department networks, up from
  5,844 in 1998, Air Force Maj. Gen. John Campbell,
  then vice director of the Defense Information
  Systems Agency (DISA), told Congress in March
  2000.
• In 2000 through August 4, a total of 13,998 such
  "events" were reported, according to Betsy Flood,
  a spokeswoman for Arlington, Virginia-based DISA,
  which provides worldwide communication, network
  and software support to the Defense Department.

23
DISA VAAP Results
P R O TECTION
D E T E C T I O N
REACTION
24
Government Focus

• NSA Executive Agent for Information Assurance
• Committee on National Security Systems
• National Information Assurance Acquisition Policy
  
• National Security Telecommunications and
  Information Systems Security Policy (NSTISSP) No.
  11

Reference http//www.cnss.gov/policies.html
25
Statutes and Policy

• Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA), 1996
• Federal Information Security Management Act
  (FISMA), 2002
• OMB Circular A-130
• DoDD 8500.1 Information Assurance
• DoDI 8580.2 IA Implementation
• DoDI 5200,40 DoD Information Technology Security
  Certification and Accreditation Process
  (DITSCAP), 1997

26
FISMA

• The Federal Information Security Management Act
  of 2002 (FISMA) is contained within the
  E-Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347),
  replacing the government Information Security
  Reform Act (GISRA).
• FISMA, effective throughout the federal
  government, places requirements on government
  agencies and components, with the goal of
  improving the security of federal information and
  information systems.

27
FISMA Purpose

• Provide a framework for enhancing the
  effectiveness of information security in the
  federal government. This means protecting
  information and information systems from
  unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
  modification or destruction to ensure integrity,
  confidentiality and availability.
• Provide effective government-wide management of
  risks to information security.
• Provide for the development and maintenance of
  minimum controls required or protecting federal
  information and information systems.
• Provide a mechanism for effective oversight of
  federal agency information security programs.

28
DoD IA Policy

• All IA or IA-enabled IT must be compliant with
  NSTISSP 11
• DoD Info Systems must be DITSCAP certified
• DoD Info Systems must be assigned a mission
  assurance category
• IA shall be a visible investment in all
  portfolios
• IA requirements included in all info system
  acquisitions or
• upgrades

29
Certification
A comprehensive evaluation of the technical and
non-technical security features of an AIS and
other safeguards, made in support of the
accreditation process, to establish the extent to
which a particular design and implementation
meets a set of specified security
requirements. NSTISSI 4009
30
Accreditation
A formal declaration by a designated approving
authority (DAA) that an AIS is approved to
operate in a particular security mode using a
prescribed set of safeguards. NSTISSI 4009
31
DOD Information Technology Security Certification
and Accreditation Process DODI 5200.40 (1997)

• DITSCAP
• Life cycle approach to Certification and
  Accreditation (CA)
• Establish a DoD standard infrastructure-centric
  approach
• Protects and secures the entities compromising
  the Defense
• Information Infrastructure

32
DITSCAP Phases

• Phase I Definition
• System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA)
• Phase II Verification
• SSAA Compliance Verification
• Phase III Validation
• Realistic Evaluation of Integrated System
• Phase IV Post Accreditation
• Operational Monitoring

33
Common Criteria
34
Policy

• NSTISSP 11
• National Policy Governing the Acquisition of
  Information Assurance (IA)
• and IA Enabled Information Technology Products
  that protect Information
• Technology Products that protect national
  security information
• Effective 1 July 2002, all COTS IA and IAEnabled
  products must be
• evaluated by
• - International Common Criteria Mutual
  Recognition Arrangement
• - NIAP Evaluation and Validation Program
  (CCEVS)
• - NIST FIPS validation program
• Does not specify any particular evaluation level
  (EAL) for a product
• for a product
• Does not require a Protection Profile to be used

31
35
Policy

• DOD Directive 8500.1, 24 OCT 2002
• All IA or IA-enabled products incorporated into
  DoD information
• systems must comply with NSTISSP 11
• Products must be satisfactorily evaluated and
  validate either
• -- Prior to purchase or
• -- As a condition of purchase the vendors
  products will be satisfactorily
• evaluated and validated
• Purchase contracts shall specify that product
  validation will be
• maintained for subsequent releases

-
36
Common Criteria Version 2.1

• International vs. U.S. standard
• U.S. Canada, France, Germany, U.K. Russia.
• ISO Standard 15408, Evaluation Criteria
  forInformation Technology Security (June 1999)
• Provides common vocabulary for describing
  requirements and product features
• Validated products listed
• http//niap.bahialab.com/cc-scheme/

-
33
37
CC Benefits

• Specification of security features and
  assurances based
• on an international standard
• Evaluation methodology based on an international
  
• standard leading to comparability of test
  results
• Security testing laboratory expertise assessed
  by
• recognized national bodies quality technical
  oversight
• provided by government experts
• Testing results recognized by many nations
• Reduced testing costs to sponsors of evaluations

38
CC Terminology

• Target of Evaluation (TOE) - An IT product or
  system and its associated administrator and user
  guidance documentation that is the subject of an
  evaluation
• Protection Profile (PP) - An implementation
  independent set of security requirements for a
  category of TOEs that meet specific consumer
  needs
• Security Target (ST) - A set of security
  requirements and specifications to be used as the
  basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.

36
39
Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL)

• EAL NAME TCSEC
• EAL 1 Functionally tested
• EAL 2 Structurally Tested C1
• EAL 3 Methodically Tested and Checked C2
• EAL 4 Methodically Designed, Tested and
  Reviewed B1
• EAL 5 Semi-formally Designed and Tested
  B2
• EAL 6 Semi-formally Verified Designed and
  Tested B3
• EAL 7 Formally Verified Designed and Tested
  A1

TCSEC Trusted Computer Security
EvaluationOrange Book
40
CA Summary
Processes Requirements Categories
DITSCAP
DoD 8500.2
MAC I, II, III
DIACAP
NIACAP
DoDIIS
DNI CA
DCID 6/3
PL 1,2,3,4,5
NISCAP
NIST SP800-37
NIST SP800-37
NIST SP800-37
ISO 17799
ISO 17799
41
What are our goals in Security?

• The CIA of security
• Confidentiality
• Integrity
• Availability
• (authentication)
• (nonrepudiation)

42
The root of the problem

• Most security problems can be grouped into one of
  the following categories
• Network and host misconfigurations
• Lack of qualified people in the field
• Operating system and application flaws
• Deficiencies in vendor quality assurance efforts
• Lack of qualified people in the field
• Lack of understanding of/concern for security

43
Computer Security Operational Model
Protection Prevention
(Detection Response)
44
Proactive vs- Reactive Models

• Most organizations only react to security
  threats, and, often times, those reactions come
  after the damage has already been done.
• The key to a successful information security
  program resides in taking a pro-active stance
  towards security threats, and attempting to
  eliminate vulnerability points before they can be
  used against you.

45
Types of Vulnerabilities

5
46
Vulnerability Sources

fired employee

foreign intelligence agents

disgruntled employee

terrorists

subverted employee

criminals

service providers

corporate raiders

contractors

crackers
6
47
Summary

• Administrevia
• Course Introduction
• Basic IA principles