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Detecting Network Intrusions via Sampling : A Game Theoretic Approach INFOCOM 2003

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Flow Flushing and Cut Saturation were evaluated on a simulated network ... Flow flushing and Cut saturation consistently performed significantly better ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Detecting Network Intrusions via Sampling : A Game Theoretic Approach INFOCOM 2003


1
Detecting Network Intrusions via Sampling A
Game Theoretic ApproachINFOCOM 2003
Murali Kodialam
T.V. Lakshman
Bell Labs, Lucent Technologies
  • Presented by Boris Margolin

2
Introduction
  • The authors present a simple model of intrusion
    detection, consisting of
  • A network
  • An intruder who sends a malicious packet to a
    node in the network
  • A defender who uses packet sampling on links in
    an attempt to detect this intrusion

3
Problem Definition Network Set-Up
  • Network G (N, E)
  • N set of nodes in the network
  • E set of unidirectional links in the network
  • n nodes
  • m links
  • ce capacity of link e
  • fe traffic flowing on link e
  • Pvu set of paths from node u to v
  • mi traffic flowing along a path Pi
  • Muv(w) Maximum flow between nodes u and v
  • w represents the edges to be used
  • Cvu edges in the minimum cut between u and v

4
Problem Definition Network Intrusion Game
  • Two Players of the Game
  • Intruder
  • Defender
  • Both know network topology and flows
  • Intruders Objective
  • Inject a malicious packet from attack node a in
    order to attack target node t
  • Defenders Objective
  • Sample this packet as it goes along some edge
  • Constrained by a maximum sampling rate

5
Problem Definition Network Intrusion Game
6
Players Strategies
  • For the Intruder
  • Pick a distribution over paths to get the
    malicious packet from from a to t with max
    probability
  • For the Defender
  • Choose a sampling rate on each link, keeping the
    total under the sampling bound, to maximize
    detection probability
  • In the paper, the defender chooses sampling
    probability, which is equivalent.

7
Intruders Strategy
8
Defenders Strategy
9
Equilibrium
  • Intruder pick a distribution of paths that
    minimizes the value of the defenders best
    detection strategy
  • Defender pick detection probabilities to
    minimize the value of the intruders best evasion
    strategy
  • Zero sum game with a single value for both
    players. Solve as an optimization problem.

10
Solution of the Game
  • The value of the game is ? BMat(f)-1
  • value is the expected number of detections of a
    malicious packet, equivalent to the probability
    of detection in this case
  • Intruder strategy
  • send the packet along paths with probability
    proportional to the path flow
  • Defender strategy
  • sample along mincut edges with probability
    proportional to the edge flow
  • (mincut solvable in time O(NE2) )

11
Example Solution
B5, a1, t5, Minimum Cut 11.5 units
12
Routing to Improve the Value of the Game
  • The defender might be able to raise the detection
    probability by rerouting flows
  • Defender is constrained by required flow over K
    source-destination pairs.
  • s(k) - source node for commodity k
  • d(k) - destination node for commodity k
  • b(k) - amount of demand (bandwidth) that has to
    be routed for this source-destination pair

13
Routing Heuristics
  • Optimization problem is now non-linear and
    intractable
  • Some heuristics
  • Minimize maximum link utilization
  • the control heuristic
  • Flow-flushing
  • In effect, maximize a sort of negative flow
    between a and t.
  • Cut saturation
  • pick some cut and minimize flow across it
  • Its not clear how these do against optimal
    routing!

14
Flow Flushing
  • c link capacity, f flow on the link
  • Easy to show that
  • Mat(f) Mat(c - f) ? Mat(c)
  • since l.h.s. is a feasable set of flows.
  • Minimize Mat(f) by maximizing Mat(c - f)
  • Represents a flow problem with K1 commodities,
    including the additional commodity between a and
    t
  • Find maximum feasible flow between a and t using
    bisection search

15
Flow Flushing Algorithm Example
  • Maximum flow Mat(f) 9.95 units
  • Game value ? 5 / 9.95

16
Cut Saturation Algorithm
  • Pick an a - t cut and attempt to direct flow away
    from this cut
  • can start with mincut given prior routing
  • To solve
  • introduce two new nodes, s and t, connected to
    cut
  • introduce a new commodity flow between them
  • again use bisection search to find max feasible
    flow

17
Cut Saturation Algorithm
18
Cut Saturation Algorithm
  • Maximum flow Mat(f) 8.0 units
  • Game value ? 5 / 8

19
Variants
  • Replace a and t with sets of nodes that the
    intruder can choose from
  • Solution is equivalent to previous problems with
    an added source and destination
  • Intruder can choose source, but routes are along
    shortest path
  • Eliminate all edges except tree from set A to t
  • Its now possible to compute mincut in linear,
    rather than polynomial time.

20
Experimental Results
  • Flow Flushing and Cut Saturation were evaluated
    on a simulated network
  • Five (!) different routing problems were
    considered
  • For each, game value for the min link
    utilization, flow flushing, and cut saturation
    heuristics were calculated
  • Flow flushing and Cut saturation consistently
    performed significantly better than Min link
    utilization
  • Neither was clearly superior, especially given
    the small number of trials

21
Experimental Results Network
22
Experimental Results
Flow Flushing
Cut Saturation
Min Link
(Max-flow is shown, so higher is better for
defender)
23
Effect of Capacity on the Value of the Game
  • Experiments also done on effects of capacity
  • When the network has more capacity, Defender has
    more freedom to reroute flows
  • reflected in lower max utilization
  • Results show the performance of flow flushing is
    significantly dependent on spare capacity
  • cut saturation performance apparently not tested
  • No details of tests...

24
Capacity vs. Max Link Utilization
25
Capacity vs. FFA Max Flow
26
Discussion
  • Relatively easily implementable advice
  • Paper was used to promote sampling products!
  • Is the model presented helpful to defenders?
  • Could make all external traffic go through a
    single link
  • How hard is it to examine all packets in
    real-time?
  • Is the malicious packet a good model of an
    intrusion?
  • Results are similar to
  • Two-person Zero-sum games for network
    interdiction, by Washburn and Wood, published
    1995
  • Derived max-flow / min cut strategies for drug
    interdiction
  • Allocation likewise proportional to inverse
    probability of detection.
  • Flow flushing and Cut Saturation are introduced
    by this paper.
  • How close are heuristic results to optimal?
  • Experimental results seem like an afterthought
  • Few experiments
  • Do experimental results hold for other
    topologies?
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