Metaphor, figurative language and translation Some Essential Questions

1
Metaphor, figurative language and
translationSome Essential Questions

• Stefano Arduini

2
Introduction new directions and essential
questions

• Over the last twenty five years some radical
  rethinking has taken place in linguistics,
  particularly on some of the basic principles in
  which linguistics research since the 1950s has
  been grounded.

3
Why is generative grammar no longer useful?
4
How has newer research redefined the nature and
scope of meaning and cognition?
5
Generative Grammar

• Language is a biological phenomenon
• Innate universals
• Specific parameters for specific languages
• Modular view of language

6
In contrast with G.G.

• Language is view form the point of view of
  meaning.
• Meaning is not isolated from other aspects of
  cognition.
• Language is not attributed to innate potentiality
  but derives from interaction and context of use.

7

• Therefore the language faculty cannot be
  separated from other kinds of cognitive
  resources.
• Language is the result of a wide range of
  cognitive resources.

8
Meaning is a central aspect

• It is not separate from syntax
• Lakoff most important aspects of syntax depend
  on thought, since the main function of language
  is that of expressing thoughts
• Langacker syntax is a formal system whose
  purpose is to give shape to meanings

9

• Grammar acquires meaning
• Grammatical units make up a continuum with lexis,
  setting un various levels of abstraction

10
How has this new research opened up new research
possibilities for understanding figurative
language?
11
Does figurate competence stand outside ordinary
language and cognition or does it belong to them
as an essential condition of thinking and
language use?
12
Interesting research routes

• Figurative language is not only a formal
  (syntactic) means but the manifestation of more
  deeply rooted, more general cognitive competence
• Figurative activity is the ability to construct
  world images employed in reality

13
Figures are cognitive processes

• Anthropological processes because they concern a
  specifically human characteristic
• Expressive processes because they refer to the
  means by which human beings organize their
  communicative faculties
• These cognitive processes are not restricted to
  verbal expression (imaginative faculty, myth,
  unconscious, domains linked with expressive
  behavior)

14
How did Nietzsches View of Language anticipate
some of these new directions in research and
thinking about language?
15
Roots in the past

• Nietzsche, Darstellung der antike Rhetorik
  (communication is intrinsically metaphorical
  because a metaphorical process underpins the
  formation on concepts)
• Giambattista Vico, De Constantia Philologiae
  (figures give rise to knowledge we can see the
  cognitive approach as leading a return to Vico)

16
How did Vicos View of Language anticipate some
of these new research insights into cognition and
language?
17
Juri Lotman

• Metaphor and metonymy belong to the field of
  analogical thought. This is why they are
  organically linked with creative consciousness as
  such. In this sense it is a mistake to contrast
  rhetorical thought, inasmuch as it is
  specifically artistic, with scientific thought.
  Rhetoric is intrinsic to scientific consciousness
  in the same way as it is to artistic
  consciousness1.
• 1 Juri M. Lotman, Retorica, in Enciclopedia,
  vol. XI, Torino, Einaudi, p. 1056.

18
Juri Lotman

• the trope is not an ornament which only belongs
  to the sphere of expression. It is not decoration
  of invariant content, but rather the mechanism
  for constructing content which cannot be
  controlled within a single language. The trope is
  a figure that comes into being at the joining
  point of two languages, and, in this sense, is
  isostructural to the creative consciousness
  mechanism as such1.
• 1 Ib., p. 1055.

19
How does the new cognitivist approaches help us
better understand the limits and the
possibilities of translation?
20
What limits did a descriptivist approach to
translation studies place on the theory and
practice of translation?
21
In what sense can we say that a descriptivist
approach to translation studies is
epistemologically naïve?
22

• From my point of view the new cognitivist
  approaches, as the perspectives of textual
  rhetoric, can offer new possibilities to the
  broad area of studies on translation, above all
  in the direction to go beyond some of the limits
  of the discipline

23
J. Holmes, The Name and Nature of Translation
studies

• Two main branches of discipline
• DESCRIPTIVE part (concerning concrete
  translational phenomena) and THEORETICAL part
  (establishing general principles to explain and
  predict translational phenomena)
• APPLIED BRANCH (translator training, translation
  criticism and translation aids)

24
T.S. Epistemologically naïve stance

• The theoretical aspect was greatly dependent on
  the descriptive one
• In contrast with most 20th century epistemology
  description of facts are influenced by code and
  described in the light of a specific
  socio-semiotic system

25
Do you agree or disagree that new research into
figurative speech is as to translation as were in
the 20th century newer developments in semantics?
26
How do concepts like rhetorical field or, in a
cognitive framework, domain, frame, profile,
mental spaces, and similarity help us understand
the limits and possibilities of translation?
27

• the importance of the role of figurative speech
  in the new rhetoric is as important to
  translation as was the explosion of semantics in
  the cognitive studies and the idea that metaphors
  structure our world perception.
• Such an appreciation of figurative speech can
  permit us to go beyond these limits and encourage
  a possible rethinking of translation studies
  founded on a wider consideration of the kind of
  facts which are connected with translation.

28

• Concept like RHETORICAL FIELD, DOMAIN, FRAME,
  PROFILE, MENTAL SPACE, SIMILARITY can be very
  productive

29
Contrastive Linguistics could be rethought in
cognitive terms
30
How do the examples below illustrate the
important role of frames in the process of
translating concepts from one culture to another?
31
Partial equivalence

• In Italian casa (house) presumes a frame that
  specifies some important structural
  characteristics
• English house is outlined by physical objects,
  while home conveys to the affective sphere
• BUT both house and home are translated in
  Italian into casa!!!!

32
Another example mangiare

• The Italian term for eat, mangiare, stands
  for the process of consuming food
• In German we have essen and fressen both
  describe the process of consuming food, but one
  is used for human beings and the other for animals

33
Croft and Cruse (2004) to genuflect

• to genuflect is a movement of the body, more or
  less the same concept of kneel down, but to
  genuflect belongs to a more specific frame,
  which is Catholic liturgical use
• Often the frames are very culturally specific
  translating imply a loss (there is non-
  equivalence of frames)

34
Profile and frame in the analysis of
untranslatable words
35
Do you agree or disagree that some concepts are
not translatable?
36
How do the hypotheses of Frames and Profiles
assist in overcoming the problem of
non-translatability?
37
Can you provide from your own research or case
studies similar examples?
38
Kuki Shuzo the Japanese concept of iki

• In the XVII century it meant something worth of
  particular attention.
• In successive age it changed its meaning into
  someone who is expert of making love.
• In the XIX century it stands for a behavior of
  the geishas, the ability to move in situations
  under pressure. Therefore the ability of being
  deceiving, spontaneous and elegant.
• The maximum level of the Japanese culture. It can
  mean elegance, but also to despise someone, and
  at last, it can stand for the best behavior and
  essence of someone.

39
esprit

• Germans generally translate it with Geist (but
  it doesnt have the same meaning)
• Not even geistreich is exhaustive
• Esprit doesnt have a perfect translation into
  English spirit and intelligence diminsh its
  meaning, while wit is excessive

40
Croft and Cruse the German term Bildung

• The reason why iki, esprit and Bildung are
  not translatable is due to the fact that specific
  cultural characteristics of the frame against
  which the concept is profiled.
• Translating iki with elegance, esprit with
  Geist, or Bildung with culture creates an
  approximate equivalence between the profiles, but
  absolutely non on the frame level.

41
END OF PRESENTATION ONE
42
PRESENTATION TWO
43
What is the consequence of a mistranslation of
one of the most foundational texts and concepts
in western philosophy?
44
How does a new approach to figurative language
help us rectify this mistranslation?
45
Parmenides, Perì phüseos.

• B1 The first fragment is the proem. It describes
  a trip Parmenides takes on a chariot to the house
  of Dike, who offers to teach him how to
  distinguish between discourse founded on truth
  (aletheia) and discourse founded on human
  experience.

46

• B2-B3 This fragment is the logical consequence.
  It points at the method to attain what has been
  laid out earlier. There are two ways for the
  investigation (odoi dizesios). The first one is a
  persuasive method and leads to truth (it will be
  revealed in B8) the second cannot be pursued,
  because that which does not exist cannot be
  known. Being and thinking are one and the same
  thing (thinking-seeing) one can only think, know
  and talk about what is.

47

• B4-B5 (B5-B4) These fragments develop the line
  of argument whereby doxa and aletheia are not
  opposite. They are one and the same reality which
  becomes the object of sensible perception and
  discourse.

48

• B6 This fragment completes B2-B3. One can think
  and express what is, but one cannot talk about
  nothingness. Therefore, the method that does not
  reflect reality must be dropped however, one
  should not be misled by reality's contradictions
  and confusion.

49

• B7-B8 This is the beginning of the part thatas
  it is statedconcerns Being (to eon, Being or
  that which is). Being is not generated and is
  indestructible, its totality is immutable, it has
  no goal to tend to. It has neither past nor
  future, but it is always present. It has no birth
  nor growth, because outside of it there is only
  me eon, nothingness. It exists in an absolute
  sense, it is not born, it does not die. It is
  equivalent to itself, because it expresses being
  at its fullest. Because the processes of birth
  and death are alien to it, it is immutable,
  stationary, not incomplete and nothing is wanting
  in it. If thinking is worth only to the extent it
  reflects that which is and if it must be
  expressed within the constraints of reality, the
  names men give to eon are necessarily untrue.
  Such terms as being born, dying and the like are
  true only relative to the mutability of phenomena
  and of man's everyday experiences. Relative to
  that which is, they are untrue. "That which is"
  is an order without divisions, it is homogeneous.
  These considerations bring the discourse about
  truth to a close.

50

• Line 50 marks the beginning of the second part,
  which will interest us. After closing the part
  about the semata of eon, sensible reality is
  ushered into the discourse. Here, discourse
  cannot be as precise as before what follows will
  be a way for arranging sensible reality. In order
  to make sense of the world and its changeability,
  men decided to name two elements pur and nux. If
  unity is the inevitable principle to explain
  eon's semata, duality is required to explain the
  semata of eonta.

51

• B9 This fragment completes the last lines in 8.
  To justify their experiences, men must identify
  two elements, in this case light and night, out
  of whose mix all the things issue. This duality
  does not imply contradiction as a principle to
  make sense of sensible reality, duality is as
  legitimate as unity was for the abstract world.

52

• B10-B19 These fragments include an account of
  Parmenides' theory on the origin and nature of
  the universe, the stars, earth, the moon, man's
  pathology and physiology, and the origin of
  thought. Very little of it has survived but we
  are in luck, because this part is irrelevant to
  our point.

53
Fragment B8, lines 50-52

• 50 ?? t? s?? pa?? p?st?? ????? ?d? ???µa
• ?µf?? ????e???? d??a? d? ?p? t??de ß??te?a?
• µ???a?e ??sµ?? ?µ?? ?p??? ?pat???? ??????.
• ???f?? ??? ?at??e?t? d?? ???µa? ???µ??e???
• t?? µ?a? ?? ??e?? ?st?? - ?? ? pep?a??µ???? e?s??
  -?
• 55 t??t?a d? ?????a?t? d?µa? ?a? s?µat? ??e?t?
• ????? ?p? ???????, t? µ?? f????? a??????? p??,
• ?p??? ??, µ??? ??af???, ???t? p??t?se t??t??,
• t? d? ?t??? µ? t??t??? ?t?? ???e??? ?at? a?t?
• t??t?a ???t? ?da?, p?????? d?µa? ?µ?????? te.

54
En. (Parmenides. A Text with Translation, edited
by Leonardo Tarán, Princeton, Princeton
University Press 1965)

• 8.50 Here I end my trustworthy account and
  thought concerning truth. From now on learn the
  beliefs of mortals, listening to the deceptive
  order of my words.

55
En. (Parmenides of Elea. A Text and Translation
with an Introduction by David Gallop, Toronto,
University of Toronto Press 1984)

• 8.50 Here I stop my trustworthy speech to you
  and thought
• About truth from here onwards learn mortal
  beliefs,
• Listening to the deceitful ordering of
  my words.

56
It. (Giovanni Casertano, Parmenide. Il metodo la
scienza lesperienza, Guida, Napoli 1978)

• 8. 50 Con ciò interrompo il discorso certo e il
  pensiero
• intorno alla verità dora in poi apprendi le
  esperienze degli uomini,
• ascoltando lordine, che può trarre in inganno
  delle mie parole.

57
It. (Pio Albertelli, in Hermann Diels, I
Presocratici, edited by Gabriele Giannantoni,
Bari, Laterza 1981)

• 8.50 Con ciò interrompo il mio discorso degno di
  fede e i miei pensieri
• intorno alla verità da questo punto le
  opinioni dei mortali impara
• a comprendere, ascoltando lingannevole
  andamento delle mie parole.

58
It. (I Presocratici, introduction, translation
and annotations by Angelo Pasquinelli, Torino,
Einaudi 1958)

• 8.50 E qui termino il discorso della certezza e
  il pensiero
• intorno alla verità e da questo momento
  apprendi le opinioni dei mortali,
• ascoltando lordine ingannevole che
  nasce dalle mie parole.

59
Fr. (Le poéme de Parménide, edited by Jean
Beaufret, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France
1984)

• 8.50 Ici je mets fin à mon discours digne de foi
  et à ma considération qui cerne la vérité
  apprends donc, à partir dici, quont en vue les
  mortels, en écoutant lordre trompeur de mes
  dires.

60
Sp. (Parmenides - Zenon - Meliso - Escuela de
Elea, Fragmentos, translation, preface and
annotations by José Antonio Miguez, Buenos Aires,
Aguilar 1965)

• 8.50 Sobre lo cual dejo de pronunciar mi discurso
  digno de fe y ceso en mi pensamiento
• referente a la verdad . En adelante,
  serán las opiniones de los mortales
• las que tú podrás aprender al dar oídos a
  la ordenación engañosa de mis versos.

61
Why has the traditional treatment of kósmon
apatelón decided in favour of deceptive order,
which is a thoroughly dark and pessimistic
approach to this side of reality?
62
What cultural and cognitive frames and profiles
led to this dark translation of the text?
63
kósmon apatelón

• 'deceptive order
• ordine ingannevole
• ordre trompeur
• ordenación engañosa

64
Simplicius

• Simplicius advised not to interpret logos
  doxastós and apatelós as logos pseudés (false)
  but rather as a discourse that went beyond
  intelligible truth to cover the world of the
  senses

65
Pistón lógon and amphís alethéies

• This is the certain discourse about truth
• This phrase can be referred back to lines 28-32
  in B1
• The goddess says that one should attain a
  knowledge that includes both (emén) THE TRUTH
  (aletheia) and (edé) what is called doxa.
• In two places (B 1.28 and B 1.31) the goddess
  repeats that knowledge should include ta
  dokóunta.
• It follows that doxa and dokóunta have no
  negative values attached to them, the genuinely
  wise man investigates in all directions (B1.32).

66
Dóxas brotéias

• The discourse of the world of human opinions
  follows the pistós logos about to eon.
• Doxai must be comprehended (mánthane) one cannot
  build a pistós logos on their basis, all we can
  do is try and interpret them through a kósmos
  apatelós.

67
Kósmon apatelós

• Kósmos apatelós is not a lógos pseudés, deceitful
  discourse or reasoning.

68
Kósmon apatelós apáte (1)

• In ancient Greece (e.g. in Thucydides III, 43, 2)
  apáte is a creative act of the intellect which
  transforms something (whereas pseudés possesses
  an ethical undertone of lying and must be
  condemned).
• In Homer the act of apáte is often attributed to
  a god and directed to other gods or mortals
  (apáte intellectual creativity and the gods
  superiority over men).
• Apáte as an act is carried out through péithein,
  persuasion - a nexus that we already find in
  Homer - and constitutes a world alternative to
  our own.

69
Kósmon apatelós apáte (2)

• in Hesiod's ltTeogoniagt (line 224), apáte
  becomes a goddess, daughter of the night and
  dweller of a world that is irrational or, at
  least, that logico-formal investigation cannot
  fathom.
• in the ltTeogoniagt, Hesiod accurately
  distinguishes apáte from falsehood, in a place
  where the Muses put the former close to truth in
  poetry.

70
Kósmon apatelós apáte (3)

• in the Homeric hymns, apáte is also associated
  with musing and joie de vivre.
• Beginning with the school of Pythagoras, the
  notion of apáte is linked with that of kairós,
  the ltright momentgt.
• kairós is one of the universal laws which finds
  its origin in Pythagorean philosophy and in the
  doctrine of the opposites which - held together
  by harmony - generate the universe.
• kairós allows one to highlight a logos or its
  opposite, and the upshot is apáte .

71
Kósmon apatelós apáte (4)

• This apáte can also be identified with dike (the
  law of the world) because the world is irrational
  and this irrationality can be represented only
  through it.
• Men experience páthema through apáte and this
  constitutes a kósmos. This is an idea which
  Aeschylus well illustrated in his ltCoeforegt and
  which pervades all classical Greece.
• The author of Dissoi Logoi takes up the notion to
  introduce it into the world of art .
• Gorgias too will interpret apáte as a basic
  element of poetic experience.

72
Kósmon apatelós apáte (5)

• In Parmenides, apatelós has the same character we
  found in Gorgias.
• kósmon apatelón is the correlative to pistós
  lógos for the sensible world.
• It is the order that follows the complexity of
  reality and tries to interpret it and relive it
  by narratives means.
• It is emphatically not a deceitful order, but one
  that allows us a nonabstract knowledge of
  complexity, irrationality, and passions which
  can all be managed by fiction.

73
What have we gained with a translation of kósmon
apatelón as a perfectly legitimate path to
knowledge?
74
What have we lost, translationally, conceptually,
culturally, and ideological with a translation of
kósmon apatelón as a deceptive order of things?
75

• We can therefore affirm that, in Parmenides, the
  fictional order - e.g., of myth and tragedy -is a
  perfectly legitimate way to knowledge the only
  one that allows us to come close enough to the
  world of eonta.

76

• It remains to be explained why all the
  translations we have seen above refer to an
  inexistent deceit.

77
Parmenides identifies two ways to attain
knowledge of reality

• the one for to eon, in the sense of stationary
  and immutable perfection, uses the language of
  logic
• the other, for experience, requires a kósmon
  apatelón, a narrative language.

78
Reality is not given

• It follows that reality is not given, but depends
  on the languages we employ.
• Ultimately, reality is nothing else than the
  object of interpretation, as Freud and Niestzsche
  would maintain in our day.

79
After Parmenides the two ways become radical
alternatives

• Gorgias would take the way of lógos apatelós,
  discarding Parmenides' noema. In fact, for him
  truth does not exist, and even if it existed, it
  could not be communicated because there is no
  correspondence between truth and words.
• Plato would instead choose the other way he
  stripped lógos apatelós of any value and
  identified it with lógos pseudés.

80
To what extent must we lay at Platos feet the
responsibility for encouraging the traditional
understanding and translation of Parmenides view
of being?
81
What did Plato (and with him the western world
that absorbed his philosophy) from this
devaluation of Parmenides?
82
Plato

• Sophist (here the Platos confutation of
  Parmenides is relative)
• Phaedo (Parmenides' two ways get totally
  reinterpreted in the Phaedo and, consequently,
  the sensible world and the kósmos apatelós are
  deprived of value).

83
Johns Gospel

• En arché en o Lógos
• Jerome rendered the incipit In principium erat
  verbum

84
Have you ever considered the semantic, cultural,
and ideological consequences of mistranslation?
85
What is gained by translating logos with verbum?
What is lost?
86
What is gained by tranflating logos with sermo?
What is lost?
87
To what extent does research into figurative
language help us understand the gains and losses?
88
In principium erat verbumItalian

• 1. In principio era il verbo versione CEI
• 2. Al principio cera colui che è la Parola
  versione interconfessionale in lingua corrente
• 3. In principio era la Parola Società Biblica
  Britannica e Forestiera, Roma 1999.

89
In principium erat verbumEnglish

• 1. In the beginning was the word
• Tyndale NT 1526, Geneva Version 1557-1560, Rheims
  NT 1582, King James Version 1611, Revised
  Standard Version 1946, New American Standard
  Version 1960, New King James Bible 1979-1982, New
  Revised Standard Version 1989 New International
  Version 1973 New American Bible 1970, Jerusalem
  Bible 1966, New Jerusalem Bible 1985
• 2. When all things began, the Word already was
  New English Bible 1970

90
In principium erat verbumEnglish (2)

• 3. Before the world was created, the Word
  already existed Good News Translation
  1966-1976
• 4. Before anything else existed, there was
  Christ, with God Living Bible 11966-1976
• 5. In the beginning was the one who is called
  the Word Contemporary English Version
  1991-1995
• 6. The Word was first Eugene H. Peterson, The
  Message 1993

91
In principium erat verbumSpanish

• 1. En el principio ya era la Palabra Reina
  1569, Valera 1602
• 2. En el principio era el Verbo Scio de San
  Miguel 1793, Moderna 1893, Biblia de las Americas
  1973, Reina-Valera 1960 revision, RV 1995
  revision
• 3. En el principio era ya el Verbo Torres Amat
  1823-1825
• 4. Al principio era el Verbo Nacar Colunga
  1966, Garofalo 1969
• 5. Cuando todo comenzo, ya existia la Palabra
  Version Popular 1966, 1970
• 6. En el principio ya existia la Palabra
  Version Popular 1979, 1983, 1994
• 7. En el principio existia El Verbo
  Latinoamericana 1971

92
In principium erat verbumSpanish (2)

• 8. En el principio la Palabra existia
  Jerusalem Bible 1967
• 9. En el principio existia la Palabra Nueva
  Version Internacional 1980
• 10. En el principio ya existia la Palabra
  Version Popular 3rd ed. 1995
• 11. En el principio ya existia el Verbo Nueva
  Veraion Internactional 1999
• 12. Al principio ya existía la calabra
  Mateos-Schökel
• 13. Antes de que todo comenzara ya existia aquel
  que es la Palabra TLA ( Traduccion en lenguaje
  actual) 2003.

93
In principium erat verbumFrench

• 1. Au commencement etait la parole Lefevre
  dEtaples 1530, Olivetan 1535, Chateillon 1555,
  Diodati 1644, Martin 1712, Segond 1880-1978,
  Nouvelle Bible Segond 2002, Synodale 1910 
• 2. Au commencement etait le verbe Louvain
  1550 
• 3. La parole etait des le commencement
  Beausobre Lenfant 1718 
• 4. La parole etait au commencement Ostervald
  1824 
• 5. Au commencement de tous les temps etait deja
  le Verbe de Sacy (Port Royal) 1667 
• 6. Au commencement le Verbe etait Jerusalem
  1953, 1956 

94
In principium erat verbumFrench (2)

• 7. Au commencement etait le Verbe Jerusalem
  1973, 1998, Osty 1955-1973, Maredsous 1948,
  Crampon 1952, TOB ( Traduction OEcumenique de la
  Bible) 1972-1988 
• 8. Au principe etait la parole Pleiade 1971
• 9. Avant que Dieu cree le monde, la Parole
  existait deja FC ( Francais Courant) 1971 
• 10. Au commencement, lorsque Dieu crea le monde,
  la Parole existait deja FC 1982 
• 11. Au commencement la parole existait deja FF
  ( Francais Fondamental) 1989-2000 .

95
In principium erat verbumGerman

• 1. Im Anfang(e) war das Wort 1466 Bible (based
  on 14th c. ms.), Luther 1522, Zuerich 1531, van
  Ess 1807 (we have only 1816 ed.) Allioli 1830 (we
  have only 1866 ed.), Herder (Jerusalem) 1966,
  Einheitsuebersetzung 1972, 1980 
• 2. Bevor die Welt geschaffen wurde, war das Wort
  schon da Gute Nachricht 1967
• 3. Am Anfang, bevor die Welt geschaffen wurde,
  war schon der, der Das Wort heisst GN 1971
• 4. Am Anfang, bevor die Welt geschaffen wurde,
  war Er, der Das Wort ist GN 1982
• 5. Am Anfang war das ewige Wort Gottes
  Christus Living Bibles International 1983, 1991.

96
But translating lógos into verbum raises a few
questions.
97
Some notes on Greek linguistics

• The Greek term lógos is strongly polysemous. It
  does mean 'word', but in Homer, for instance, it
  appears only twice with this meaning and only in
  its plural form. In fact, it can also mean the
  following

98

1. expression, way of saying
2. saying, telling, but also rumour, renown, news
3. discourse, conversation, dialogue, discussion
4. tale, narration, scientific and literary genres
5. reason and reasoning
6. explanation, justification, account, counting
7. opinion, assessment
8. relationship, correspondence, ratio, rationale,
   analogy
9. divine idea or thought (e.g, in Plotinus).

99
Latin translation of lógos include

• Ratio
• Sermo
• Oratio
• Verbum is closer to Greek lexis, onoma or sema.

100
The history of translation and interpretation of
Lógos has had enormous consequences in the
formulation of Christian orthodoxy. What are some
of these?
101
Philo of Alexandria

• Lógos was a link between God and the world.
• This idea runs beneath the interpretations of
  John's Lógos among the early Fathers of the
  church, although these latter insisted on two
  basic points i) Logos-Son is a perfect peer to
  God the Father ii) humankind participates in
  Logos.

102
How does the Polysemy of lógos in Johns Gospel
force us to make translation choices with strong
implications for Johns conceptual, semantic and
cultural world?
103
How did the history of translation and
interpretation of lógos create a divide between
traditions stamped as orthodox and those labelled
heretical?
104
Origin

• Lógos , not God, is the being of beings, the
  substance of substances, the idea of ideas. God
  instead is beyond all this.
• In this sense, Lógos is co-eternal to the Father
  but not in the same sense.

105
The conceptual shifts may be explained perhaps
with an attempt at using the notion of Lógos to
salvage the philosophical speculations of ancient
Greece.

• Justins Book of Wisdom
• Eusebio of Cesarea
• Cyrill of Alexandria
• Theodoret of Cyrrhus

106
Gregorio of Nazanzio

• Lógos is the link between man and the divine
  Lógos, the continuty between divine and the human

107
Cyprianus

• Used sermo to arrive at the following for John's
  incipit "in principio erat sermo (Testimoniarum
  libri adversus Iuddaeos)
• verbum, by contrast, is used only in quotations.

108
Novatianus

• He uses both sermo and verbum although he seems
  to prefer sermo.
• De Trinitate "Verbum made itself into flesh and
  lived among us in this way, it really had our
  body, because sermo really takes up our flesh".

109
Tertullianus, Apologeticum

• Even among your wise men, logos--which means
  sermo and ratio--was the creator of the universe
  (21, 10).
• For us too, sermo and ratio, as well as virtus
  through which God created everything, are but one
  substance which we consider the spirit. Sermo is
  in Him in so far as it pronounces itself, ratio
  assists when He decrees, and virtus presides when
  He accomplishes His work (21, 11).

110
Goete, Faust

• Wort (word)
• Kraft (power)
• Sinn (meaning)
• Tat (deed)

111
O. Messiaen, Traité de musique, de couleurs et
dornithologie

• In the beginning was the Rhythm

112
Tertullianus, Adversus Praxean (a)

• God is rational and ratio is in Him first,
  therefore everything proceeds from Him. This
  ratio is His mind. The Greeks called it logos, a
  term we use also to say sermo. This is why we
  usually translate in a simple way "sermo was
  originally with God".

113
Tertullianus, Adversus Praxean (b)

• However, it would be better to consider ratio
  older, because God is not a speaker since the
  beginning but He is rational even before the
  beginning, and also because sermo, which consists
  in ratio, shows that it is preceded by the latter
  as far as substance is concerned. But it makes no
  difference. In fact, even when God had not spoken
  His sermo yet, He already had ratio and He had
  sermo in Himself. He was silently thinking and
  arranging within Himself that which he would
  later say by means of sermo (5, 2-7).

114
Tertullianus

• Sermo is speech faculty (, not to speech).
• Dialogical idea of lógos
• Sermo is a process rather than a static entity
  it is that which can generate, a creative force
  which in the beginning acted according to ratio.

115
Lattanzio, Divinae institutiones

• the Son is the sermo of God, whereas angels are
  His spiritus. And if spiritus manifests itself
  without sound, sermo proceeds from the mouth,
  therefore with voice and sound.
• lógos means both sermo and ratio, because it is
  the voice and the wisdom of God at a time. Not
  even Pagan philosophers ignore this divine sermo
  (4, 9).
• Lógos represents Gods creative power.

116
In what way did Augustine close down the debate
about the translation of lógos ?
117
What cultural, ideological and semantic frames
and profiles might have guided Augustine
translational choice?
118
Augustineverbum replaces sermo

• Augustine chooses verbum as opposed to ratio
  lógos is not more polysemous, but it only means
  individual word.
• Augustine eliminates the terms dialogical
  implications.

119
Why?

• from a dynamic theology of dialogue to a static
  theology of the word.
• Moreover, this ltnewgt translation implies a
  conceptualization of God's verbal activity that
  holds a highly complex relationship with that of
  man. In Augustine, God's verbum is the founding
  metaphor of Christ.
• Divine lógos is not a sound emitted by phonatory
  organs, but a will. It is an inner, mental lógos
  (comparable to de divine one).

120

• Like our word (verbum) somehow becomes voice when
  it issues from our body to manifest itself to the
  senses, so God's Word (verbum) became flesh to
  manifest itself to men's senses. ltAnd like our
  word is carried by voice but it does not turn
  into voice, so God's Word was truly carried by
  flesh, but in no way did it actually turn into
  flesh (De Trinitate, XV, 11, 20).gt

121
Per speculum in aenigmate

• Human word refers to the divine Word per speculum
  in aenigmate because it reflects the mind's
  spiritual interiority in this sense it can be
  its METAPHOR.
• However, the soul cannot manifest itself through
  words alone because it includes an ineffable part
  which--á la Wittgenstein--escapes conscience
  itself. Such ineffability and incommunicability
  merely manifest the non-coincidence of word to
  reality and gives rise to our ability to lie.

122

• This is the clearest difference between human
  word and divine Word. In God, Word and reality
  coincide because God generated reality to show
  Himself identical to the generator (De fide et
  symbolo III, 4). The Word is also called the
  self-present Truth precisely because of its
  complete identity with God. We can find here a
  very strong commitment to totality.

123
What conditions existed in the 16th century that
probably made it impossible to return to an
understanding of Logos as sermo?
124
Erasmus (Johns prologue)

• 1515 In principio erat verbum
• 1519 In principio erat sermo.
• 1520 Apologia de In principio erat sermo.

125
Novum Testamentum 335 A-B

• Logos Graecis varia significat, verbum,
  orationem, sermonem, rationem, modum,
  supputationem nonnunquam et pro libro usurpatur,
  a verbo lego, quod est dico, sive colligo. Horum
  pleraque divus Hieronymus aliqua ratione putat
  competere Filium Dei. Miror autem cur verbum
  Latinis placuerit magis quam sermo. Nos tametsi
  videbamus sermonis vocabolo rectius esprimi
  Graecam vocem, qua usus est Evangelista, logos,
  tamen in Editione prima superstizioso quodam metu
  non mutaveramus verbum, quod posuerat Interpres
  ne quam ansam daremus iis, qui quidvis ad quamvis
  occasionem calumniantur.

126
(Novum Testamentum 335 A-B).

• Tantum testati sumus alicubi sermonis nomine non
  infrequenter signari Filium Dei in Sacris
  Volumnibus. Mox ubi comperimus hoc tam passina
  fieri et hoc ipso in loco quondam Ecclesiam
  legisse, In principio erat sermo, atque ita
  citari in libris Cypriani et Augustini, non
  existimabam quemquam fore, qui offenderetur
  praesertim cum haec demus non in Templis, sed in
  Musaeis legenda.

127
A possible objection to Erasmus

• verbum is a conceptus tacitus more applicable to
  Christ than sermo which indicates a conceptus
  expressus voce.

128
Erasmus reply

• Erasmus makes reference to the metaphorical
  ability of the human mind.
• The lógos metaphor is telling us that the Son of
  God is neither an unuttered nor a spoken concept
  it is something more and utterly different and
  irreducible which--at any rate--the translation
  cannot simplify.

129

• Different names are adapted to the divine persons
  on the basis of the habits of human language,
  thanks to which our slowness can more easily
  approximate a cognition of the divine. Some
  things are thus attributed to particular
  realities as if they were proper to them, even
  though they are not proper to actual reality
  however some things are predicated of certain
  realities in a more practical way according to
  the ability of the human mind. Whenever we do so,
  we cannot but stretch the sense of human words.
  At any rate, the Son of God is not a thought,
  neither internal nor expressed by voice (119B-C).

130

• Preserving sermo would mean preserving the
  original polysemy because it offers a wider
  interpretative spectrum. Verbum would weaken the
  metaphor's power to produce diverse
  interpretations and would narrow it down towards
  one direction only.

131
What resources do your working languages contain
to translate lógos along the lines of the Latin
concept of sermo?
132
Would such a dynamic and figurate treatment of
lógos be helpful in creating engagement and
readability in the cultures and language you are
working?
133
How can we interpret the history of these
translations?

• To the modern eye, the question of lógos can be
  analysed from three viewpoints at least
  linguistic, theological, and conceptual.

134
Linguistic plane

• Verbum sweeps away the polysemy of lógos forcing
  the metaphor into a straitjacket.

135
Theological plane

• sermo implies a theology of dialogue
• verbum implies a theology of monologue.

136
Conceptual plane

• Two worlds are built on opposite interpretations
  of classical culture.
• Opting for sermo is in line with an effort to
  maintain the totality of the classical world into
  Christianity.
• Sermo stands for the lógos of antiquity insofar
  as it grasps the idea of multifarious oneness it
  also stands for the dialogues of the Olympians.