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The Effect of SCHIP Expansions on Health Insurance Decisions by Employers

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Shore-Sheppard (1997) Yazici and Kaestner (1998) Thorpe and Florence (1998/1999) ... Shore-Sheppard, Buchmueller and Jensen (2000) Methods ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: The Effect of SCHIP Expansions on Health Insurance Decisions by Employers


1
The Effect of SCHIP Expansions on Health
Insurance Decisions by Employers
  • Thomas Buchmueller (UC Irvine and NBER)
  • Phil Cooper (AHRQ)
  • Kosali Simon (Cornell University and NBER)
  • and Jessica Vistnes (AHRQ)

2
SCHIP Expansions
  • In 2002, SCHIP covered 5 million children
  • (Almost) all children in families under 200 of
    the Federal Poverty Level are now eligible
  • Compared to earlier federal minimums of 185 for
    infants, 133 for children 1-6, 100 for children
    born after 1983
  • 32 states changed eligibility for older children
    (17-18) from lt100 to at least 200 FPL
  • Expansions occurred late 1998/early 1999
  • Variation in the timing and extent of SCHIP
    adoption across states

3
Did SCHIP affect employers health insurance
decisions?
  • Did employers cut back on offers of health
    insurance in low and middle wage firms as a
    result of SCHIP?
  • Did employers encourage workers to drop family
    benefits?
  • By increasing employee contributions to family
    health insurance plans?
  • Did workers drop family benefits?

4
Anecdotal Evidence
  • RWJ outreach programs
  • Evidence from state benefit managers
  • Roll-backs

5
Hypotheses
  • Reasons to expect an effect
  • Family health insurance premiums were 7500 in
    2001, with employees contributing 1740 of the
    cost
  • In 1996 , many children who would later become
    eligible for SCHIP were covered by private
    insurance and had working parents
  • Administrative data show several million children
    served by SCHIP

6
Hypotheses
  • Reasons to expect no effect
  • SCHIP has measures designed to prevent crowd out
  • Competitive labor markets of the late 1990s, even
    for low-wage employers
  • Take-up of SCHIP has been low, stigma costs may
    exist
  • Employers might not know employees total family
    income and employee eligibility for SCHIP

7
Importance of using employer data to answer these
questions
  • Employer decisions plausibly driven by the median
    worker, and individual level data do not identify
    employer workforce characteristics
  • Problems in identifying affected group in
    individual data
  • Employer decisions such as premium contributions
    are not captured well in individual level surveys

8
Findings from previous studies
  • Household-based studies
  • Cutler and Gruber (1996)
  • Dubay and Kenney (1997)
  • Shore-Sheppard (1997)
  • Yazici and Kaestner (1998)
  • Thorpe and Florence (1998/1999)
  • Blumberg, Dubay and Norton (1999)
  • Cunningham, Hadley, Reschovsky (2002)
  • LoSasso and Buchmueller (forthcomming)
  • Employer-based studies
  • Shore-Sheppard, Buchmueller and Jensen (2000)

9
Methods
  • Dependent variables employer and employee level
    health insurance decisions and outcomes
  • offer insurance
  • offer family coverage
  • cost of family
  • Also, cost relative to single coverage
  • Enrollment rate
  • Family enrollment rate
  • Affected firms those with substantial share of
    workers newly eligible for SCHIP (other firms
    serve as controls)

10
Econometric Specification
  • Identifying sources of variation
  • Exploiting time and state variation in
    eligibility expansions
  • Model Y B1 Eligibility B2 Percent LOW
    B3 (Percent Low Eligibility) B5 Other
    Characteristics
  • Where Y different health insurance outcomes

11
Data
  • MEPS-Insurance Component (MEPS-IC)
  • List Sample of Private Establishments
  • 1997-2001
  • Roughly 25,000 private sector establishments and
    their plans in each year
  • Employers asked
  • Whether they offer insurance
  • Fraction of eligible active workers that enroll
  • At all
  • In single/non-single coverage
  • Premiums and contributions for single and family
    coverage
  • Workforce characteristics, including information
    on the percent of workers in three different wage
    ranges

12
Data (continued)
  • Wages 1997-1999 lt6.50, 6.50-15.00, gt15
  • Wages 2000-2001 lt9.50, 9.50-21.00, gt21
  • Industry
  • Age of firm
  • Establishment size
  • Percent of workforce that are women, union
    members, over age 50, part time
  • For profit status
  • Organization type (i.e. corporation)
  • State dummies
  • Year dummies

13
Data (continued)
  • We merge in data on
  • SCHIP/Medicaid Eligibility
  • Computed from running detailed simulation
    programs (created by Gruber and Simon) on March
    CPS respondents as in Cutler and Gruber (1996)
  • We take all March CPS children in 1996, and
    calculate the weighted fraction of them that
    would be eligible for Medicaid or SCHIP in a
    particular state in a particular year. That
    fraction is used as our measure of
    Medicaid/SCHIP generosity. The measure varies by
    state and year.

14
Data (continued)
  • Workers most likely to affected by SCHIP
    expansions.
  • Using PUMS we construct a proxy measure of the
    percent of families with children under 200 FPL
    by industry and state (LOW).

15
Mean of Eligibility Measure from CPS
16
Data (continued)
  • Other data merged onto the MEPS-IC
  • Area Resource File
  • Unemployment rate
  • Per capita income
  • Number of active doctors in area
  • Number of HMOs in county
  • County Business Pattern Data
  • Percent of establishments with lt 10 employees, gt
    1000 employees, in manufacturing
  • Herfindahl index

17
Results
  • Offers and Family Offers
  • No significant results on eligibility in either
    equation
  • Employers are not reacting to SCHIP through
    offers of coverage or family coverage

18
Results
  • Take-up
  • For hypothetical establishments with 50 percent
    of the workforce under 200 percent of the poverty
    line, a 0.188 increase in ELIG results in a
  • 4 percentage point decrease in overall take-up
    rates.
  • 5 percentage point decrease in family take-up.

19
Results
  • Marginal Cost of Family Coverage (family
    single).
  • For hypothetical establishments with 50 percent
    of the workforce under 200 percent of the poverty
    line, a 0.188 increase in ELIG results in a
  • 378 increase in the marginal cost of family
    coverage
  • All workers under 200 FPL - 800 increase in
    marginal cost of family coverage

20
Implications
  • If employers are reacting to SCHIP expansions,
    what will happen with rollbacks?
  • What is the effect of a sluggish economy?

21
Future plans
  • Include other measures of SCHIP outreach,
    waiting periods, paperwork simplification
  • Use more worker eligibility indices (lt100 FPL,
    200 300 FPL, etc.)
  • Additional years
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