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Boom and Bust in US and UK House Prices The Contribution of Changing Credit Conditions and Bubbles

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Title: Boom and Bust in US and UK House Prices The Contribution of Changing Credit Conditions and Bubbles


1
Boom and Bust in US and UK House PricesThe
Contribution of Changing Credit Conditions and
Bubbles
  • Anthony Murphy
  • Oxford University
  • Institut DÉconomie Publique
  • Housing Market Bubbles and Cycles Conference
  • Marseille, Oct 22-23 2009
  • Based on joint research with John Duca (Dallas
    Fed) and
  • John Muellbauer (Oxford University)

2
Outline
  • Bubbles and changing credit conditions
  • Explaining US house prices
  • Inverted demand house price equations
  • House price to rent equations
  • Future US house prices a simulation
  • Credit conditions and UK house prices
  • Concluding remarks

3
Bubbles
  • It is difficult to detect bubbles in asset prices
    using formal econometric tests.
  • The tests have low power and are based on a range
    of auxiliary assumptions.
  • For example, Gurkaynak (J. Econ Perspectives
    2008) suggests that bubble tests of equity prices
    do not do a good job of differentiating between
    mis-specified fundamentals and bubbles. It is a
    matter of taste and personal preference that
    makes the econometrician choose between bubble
    and fundamentals-based explanations of stock
    price behaviour.
  •  

4
Bubbles (Contd)
  • I believe the same caveats apply to detecting
    house price bubbles persistent deviations of
    house prices from fundamentals - where we have
    even less data and less agreement on
    fundamentals.
  • In the US and the UK, many house price bubble
    episodes appear to be generated by changes in
    credit conditions, which were either long term
    changes or widely perceived to be long term
    changes at the time (e.g. the subprime
    revolution).

5
In a Nutshell
  • Standard econometric house price models for the
    US (and, to a lesser extent, the UK) do not work
    well in sample .so not very useful for policy
    analysis or simulation.
  • Why?
  • Econometric answer mainly structural break, due
    to classic omitted variable bias.
  • Economic answer models do not take account of
    changing credit conditions / standards.

6
In a Nutshell (Contd)
  • Easier credit drives up the house price to income
    and house price to rent ratios, ceteris paribus.
  • Proxy mortgage credit conditions for the US using
    the cyclically adjusted trend in the loan to
    value ratio (LTV) for first time buyers. Source
    American Housing Survey.
  • The adjusted LTV data are consistent with
    standard accounts of lax credit conditions and
    the growth in sub-prime lending etc.

7
Aside The US Housing Bust(A Scary Bedtime Story
for Central Bankers)
  • Financial innovations in securitization and
    changes in procedures by rating agencies, inter
    alia, resulted in the sub-prime revolution.
  • Loans were extended to borrowers with poor credit
    histories, previously denied loans.
  • Many of the loans were for adjustable rate
    mortgages which particularly benefited from the
    lowest interest rates for decades in 20012003.
  • The house-price rises, set in train by these
    credit-supply and interest-rate changes, fooled
    many people into thinking that such rises would
    be sustained.
  • Fundamentals changed in 2003 as interest rates
    returned to more normal levels, and high rates
    of building expanded the housing stock, while
    house prices became increasingly overvalued.
  • As the extent of bad loans gradually became
    clear, the fundamentals changed again, as the
    supply of credit for all types of mortgages
    contracted.

8
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9
In a Nutshell (Contd)
  • Two basic (theoretical) approaches to modelling
    house prices the inverted housing demand and
    house price to rent approaches.
  • Our LTV based measure of credit conditions work
    well in both econometric models
  • LTV highly significant
  • Obtain plausible and (more) stable long run
    equilibrium parameters and adjustment speeds
  • Models track well in pseudo out of sample
    forecasts.
  • Can use models to examine various interesting
    scenarios.

10
What Do We Want To Explain? US House Prices
Gains 1999-2006
2006q4
45
34
26
11
What Do We Want To Explain (Contd)? Recent US
House Prices Falls
2008q4
23
11
6
Source Freddie Mac, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Federal Reserve Board.
12
(No Transcript)
13
Econ 101 What Determines House Prices?Two
Models.
  • The most basic theory of what determines house
    prices is just a story of supply and demand,
    where the supply - the stock of houses - is given
    in the short run.
  • Then house prices depend on the stock of housing
    and the factors driving demand.
  • This is our inverted housing demand model.
  • In the US, where rental markets are
    well-developed and rents are generally market
    determined, the most popular model of house
    prices is the house price to rent model.

14
Model 1The Inverted Housing Demand Model
  • The inverted demand equation is obtained by
    considering the demand for housing services
  • where hp real house price, y real income,
    and z other demand shifters.
  • Own-price and income elasticities are ? and ß.
  • Inverting yields

15
Demand Shifters (zs) in the Inverted Demand
House Price Model
  • Housing is a durable good (with an investment
    component) ? expected or permanent income and
    user cost should be important drivers.
  • User cost after-tax interest rate property
    tax rate depreciation rate - expected rate of
    house price appreciation (less transactions
    costs).
  • Expected capital gains seldom observed so must
    be proxied by past capital gains or a reduced
    form model etc.  

16
Bubble Builder and Burster Dynamics
  • Housing market not efficient, so systematic
    mis-pricing (over or under shooting) can persist
    for quite a while.
  • There is also a large extrapolative element in
    expectations.
  • A series of positive shocks to fundamentals can
    lead to rising prices and the expectation of
    further appreciation, leading to greater and
    greater overvaluation. In due course, the
    increasing negative pull from fundamentals and
    increased supply reduce the rate of appreciation.
  • Lagged house price capital gains or losses are an
    important determinant of current house prices,
    termed the bubble-builder by Abraham and
    Hendershott (1996).
  • The deviation of prices from long-run
    fundamentals is then the bubble-burster. 

17
Yet More Explanatory Variables!
  • Demography e.g. the proportion of households in
    the under-35 age group where many first-time
    buyers are to be found.
  • Many mortgage borrowers face limits on their
    borrowing and may be risk averse ? nominal
    interest rates and proxies for downside risk or
    mortgage default may be important. (Cameron et
    al., 2006).
  • Finally, changes in credit conditions matter for
    house prices (and savings), particularly in the
    US and UK.

18
Model 2 The Ratio of House Price to Rents
  • Ceteris paribus, arbitrage between owner-occupied
    and rental housing markets implies the house
    rent-to-price ratio equals the real user cost of
    housing.
  • Hence, the log house price-to-rent ratio equals
    the log of the inverse of real user cost
  • Very simple and attractive model.
  • But misleading if credit conditions vary etc.

19
More Realistic Model of House Price / Rent Ratio
  • Kim (2007) show that in a model with binding (max
    LTV) credit constraints for marginal home buyer,
    plus rental agency costs
  • ydev deviation of income from trend
  • The negative user cost elasticity can be smaller
    than one.

20
The Inverted Demand Model - Data
  • Home Prices Freddie Mac repeat sales of homes
    purchased with conforming mortgages. Deflated
    using PCE index.
  • Income Real per capita labor plus transfer
    income.
  • Real Mortgage Rate After tax and depreciation
    adjusted nominal mortgage rate, minus 16 quarter
    annualized appreciation (adjusted for home
    selling costs).
  • Real Housing Stock Feds Flow of Funds estimate
    of the replacement cost of housing structures,
    deflated by housing construction price index.
  • Monetary Target Regime Dummy for monetary
    targets that boosted interest rate volatility
    (1979 Q4 to 1982 Q3)
  • Deposit Regulations Two quarter change in effect
    of Regulation Q (REGQ) dis-intermediation policy.
  • Tax VariableTax advantage to housing capital
    gains since 1998 Q1

21
Inverted Demand Model Results
  • Our mortgage credit conditions measure is highly
    significant (both economically and
    statistically).
  • Can treat it as exogenous.
  • Models with credit conditions are more stable.
  • In pseudo out-of-sample forecasts, models without
    the credit conditions measure do not track the
    sub-prime boom and bust.
  • Models with the credit conditions measure do.
  • Credit conditions effect identified in the data
    by (small) earlier relaxations in mortgage credit
    standards.

22
VEC (Vector Error Correction) Inverted Demand
Results
Vectors allow trends in variables but not in the
cointegrating relationship. Controls include 0-1
dummies for monetary targeting regime and 1998
capital gains tax relief, depreciation rate on
rental properties, and consumer income/interest
rate expectations. Statistics from Tables 1 and
2 from the paper.
23
Real House Prices Tracked Better by Long Run
Equilibrium of LTV vs. Non-LTV Models
24
Long Run Equilibrium House Prices Similar for LTV
Models Estimated With Without 2002-2007
25
House Price to Rent Model Results
  • Our findings are qualitatively similar when we
    model the house price to rent ratio.
  • Models with our LTV based measure of credit
    conditions perform better.
  • One specification of the estimated long run rent
    and house price to rent equations for the US is
  •  
  • The estimated speeds of adjustment to the long
    run equilibrium are very slow, since rents are
    very sticky.

26
March 2009 Hostage to Fortune - The Simulated
Path of Future US House Prices
  • If our model is correct, the US house price bust
    may last quite a long time!
  • Our March 2009 simulated path of future real US
    house prices, shown in next figure, assumed that
  • The US economy recovers very slowly no real
    income growth and unemployment only returning to
    its long run average in 2014
  • Mortgage credit condition revert to their end
    1999 value
  • Actual house prices have not fallen as fast in
    the past two quarters.

27
Real House Price Simulation Based on House
Price-to-Rent Model (LTVs Revert to 1999 Q4
Level in 2008 Q4)
28
A Run Thru Some UK Results
  • Cameron, Muellbauer Murphy (2006) Mmodel house
    prices for 8 regions of Great Britain between
    1972 and 2003 with a system of inverted demand,
    equilibrium correction equations.
  • The housing stock is an explanatory variable
    along with regional income, real and nominal
    interest rates, demographics and other demand
    shifters, especially credit conditions.
  • Identify significant direct and indirect (via
    real and nominal interest rates) effects of more
    liberal credit conditions.

29
ABC of Regional House Price Models
  • At regional level, demand in a region depends on
    own-price and prices in other regions.
  • If prices are simultaneously determined, we have
    to invert system of demand equations.
  • This is why (log) house price in a region depends
    on log income/house etc. in own region and in
    other regions.
  • US studies of house prices at Metropolitan Area
    level all use Lucas islands paradigm neglect
    substitution between nearby locations.

30
Long Run Effects Income Per House
  • The long-run solution is for the real log level
    of house prices in region r.
  • The key element in the long-run solution is the
    log of real personal disposable non-property
    income per house.
  • For region r, this is defined as
  • log(real non-property income) - log(housing
    stock)-1 - 0.7log(rate of owner-occupation)-1 in
    region r.
  • Modest spill-over from non-owner occupied supply
    onto the owner-occupied housing market.

31
  • All regions are influenced not just by the own
    region value of income per house but also by the
    GB value, with weights of ? and ? respectively
  • The long-run effect of log real income per house
    on the log real house price is 1.6, in line with
    previous studies.
  • The speed of adjustment to long run equilibrium
    is allowed to vary with Stamp Duty rates.

32
Figure 7 Equilibrium Correction Terms
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
Greater London
West Midlands
North
-0.4
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
  • Figure 7 shows one version of an equilibrium
    correction term including income per house,
    Greater London catch up, credit and interest rate
    effects.
  • The figure suggests that, given interest rates,
    incomes, population and housing stock, Greater
    London was only moderately overvalued in 2003,
    while the West Midlands and the North were
    substantially undervalued

33
Long Run Effects of Credit Conditions
  • Used an index of credit conditions (CCI) which
    measures credit supply to UK households.
  • We find a significant CCI levels effect, as well
    as interaction effects of CCI with both the
    nominal mortgage rate and the real mortgage rate.
  • Ceteris paribus, easier credit conditions raises
    house prices by relaxing downpayment constraints.
  • In addition, nominal rates matter less and real
    rates more (so intertemporal effects are more
    important) when credit availability improves.
  • Consistent with findings for mortgage demand by
    Fernandez-Corugedo Muellbauer (2005) and
    consumer spending by Aron, Muellbauer Murphy
    (2006).

34
Figure 3 Long Run Effects of Credit Conditions
and Interest Rates
0.3
0.2
Credit Conditions CCI
(Excd Interactions)
0.1
0.0
Interest Rates
(Incld CCI Interaction)
-0.1
-0.2
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
  • Figure 3 shows the estimated long-run effect of
    the credit conditions index (cci) and real and
    nominal mortgage rates interacted with cci.
  • Relative to the 1970s, the estimated effects of
    cci, in terms of its direct, positive effect on
    real house prices, is roughly canceled out by the
    effect of the rise in real interest rates.

35
Some Short Run Effects
  • Short run effects include
  • house price and income dynamics
  • as well as
  • changes in nominal interest rates,
  • new housing supply,
  • population structure
  • inter alia.

36
Model Adequacy and Recent Bubble
  • Overall the model fits well, although there is
    some evidence of mild autocorrelation in one
    equation.
  • The stability of the model was checked by
    estimating it on different sub-samples.
  • In particular, there is no evidence that we over
    fitted the house price boom at the end of the
    sample (1997-2003).
  • Conclusion No evidence of bubble?

37
Difficulties in Detecting Bubbles
  • Does a bubble imply substantial positive
    residuals (i.e. under-predictions) when
    forecasting house prices for recent years, given
    parameter estimates for earlier years?
  • No, regularities in the dynamic behaviour of
    house prices may be well captured by a model with
    extrapolative expectations, so that bubbles can
    arise without such residuals being found.
  • A more decisive test? Using plausible scenarios
    for the drivers of house prices (e.g. long run
    values) for the next 5 to 10 years, is a major
    decline likely?
  • Difficulty - There is a range of uncertainty
    about long-run values!

38
Detecting Bubbles and Prospects for UK House
Prices
  • At the time, many regarded the expansion in
    credit supply in the US from 2000 to 2005 as a
    permanent shift! We now know that it was
    unsustainable.
  • Thus, what may have looked like a permanent shift
    in US and UK equilibrium house prices now looks
    like a bubble.
  • In the UK, credit conditions have worsened
    substantially since the start of 2008.
  • Over time, credit conditions will improve
    somewhat and new housing supply is severely
    constrained so house prices will recover in the
    long run, albeit to a lower level than before the
    current bust,

39
To Do
  • Mainly data issues!
  • Update credit conditions index CCI
  • New survey of mortgage lenders with extended
    coverage sort out discontinuities
  • Data not published any longer need access to
    data.
  • Revisions in historical national and regional
    employment data.
  • New regional personal income data.
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