IPP- ETH Zurich October 12th, 2006 LAGUNA Meeting WG 7: Safety and Environment Report by L. Mosca

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IPP- ETH Zurich October 12th, 2006 LAGUNA
Meeting WG 7 Safety and EnvironmentReport
by L. Mosca
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• Members of the WG 7
• Luigi MOSCA (Fréjus) Coordinator
• Neil SPOONER (Boulby)
• Timo ENQVIST (Pyhäsalmi)
• W. PYTEL (Poland)
• .
• Others are welcome !

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• Few general remarks
• 1) The safety requirements should be present
  since the beginning of a laboratory and detector
  project (not added afterwards)
• 2) The safety solutions need to be studied in
  close connection with the overall safety strategy
  of the host infrastructure (tunnel or mine)
• 3) A close cooperation with the ILIAS WG-2 will
  be natural and fruitful

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• Proposed guide-lines(not exhaustive )
• stability of the large cavities considered in the
  feasibility study for each site (in particular
  versus possible earthquakes) and in the long term
• fire detection and extinction
• risk of liquids leaks (evaporation, surroundings
  contamination, etc.)
• risk of falls (great height)
• risk of electrocution
• air composition and purity (CO, CO2, NO,NO2,
  Radon, )
• integration of the experiments installation
  safety in the overall safety strategy of the host
  infrastructure (tunnel or mine)
• ..

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• So far two LAGUNA members contributed with a
  preliminary description (along the proposed
  guide-lines) of the safety problems and
  perspectives in their candidate site
• Pyhäsalmi and Fréjus
• (other contributions are expected )

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• Pyhäsalmi
• - Stability of large cavities
• According to a pre-feasibility study (April 2002),
   it is possible to
• excavate large-size caverns in Pyhäsalmi at the de
  pth of 1400 - 1500
• metres (4000 - 4200 mwe). This means LENA-type cav
  erns. This is especially
• true if the direction of the cavern is not importa
  nt.  The rock is very
• stable. Some micro-seismic activity appears (it is
   monitored by the mine)
• but they cannot be compared with earth quakes, whi
  ch are extremely rare
• and small in the scale (all around Finland). The l
  ong-term stability of
• large caverns should also be good.
• - Fire detection and extinction
• A fire is the most dangerous accident in the mine.
   It should take into
• consideration already in the design of an experime
  nt. Automatic detection
• systems should be used. Depending on the type of f
  ire, various (automatic)
• extinction systems can be used. Water usually is n
  ot good.
• - Risk of liquid leaks
• The ground water is above the 1400 metres level, a
  nd thus cannot be

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• Pyhäsalmi (continued)
• - Air composition and purity
• The mine operation takes place at the depth of 141
  0 metres (the main level).
• The fresh air is put directly there. This is norma
  l or standard way of
• having fresh air underground, and there are no tro
  uble with CO, CO2, etc.
• Also no trouble with radon, which is monitored reg
  ularly (by the Radiation
• Safety Authority in Finland). In the new deep labo
  ratory the fresh air
• procedure can be done in the same way.
• - Integration of the safety of the experiment with
   the mine
• This is essential. The experiment cannot be starte
  d until the mine has
• accepted all its safety (and other) issues. Appare
  ntly all the safety
• issues will be done (and should be done) together 
  with the mine safety
• personnel.

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• Fréjus
• - Stability of large cavities
• this item was already implicit in the
  Feasibility Study performed for the Fréjus site,
  but a more extensive investigation is needed in
  the frame of a Design Study
• - Fire detection and extinction
• I agree with you that fire is the more
  serious risk for an underground experiment we
  have some experience with the access to, and
  operations inside, the present Fréjus Laboratory
  (LSM)
• The type of fire automatic detection and fire
  (automatic ?) extinction must be very seriously
  investigated and defined by the Design Study
• - Risk of liquid leaks
• this risk is of course qualitatively very
  different for the 3 types of detectors (Water,
  Liquid Argon and Liquid Scintillator) and, for
  example, the case of Liquid Argon must be
  considered in very close connection with the
  ventilation system of both the Laboratory and the
  Tunnel and with a reliable monitoring of the air
  composition (see the next item)

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• Fréjus (continued)
• - Air composition and purity
• we have a quite long (about 25 years) and
  specific experience in this sector at the present
  (LSM) Laboratory, which should be taken into
  account in the Design Study
• - Integration of the safety of the experiment with
   the tunnel safety organization
• here also we have a 25 years experience
  with the LSM laboratory our safety equipments
  have been systematically discussed and defined in
  agreement with the Tunnel safety authorities and
  experts and safety tests and exercises are
  periodically performed with the Tunnel safety
  operators. So, the implication of the Tunnel
  safety experts in the Design Study will be an
  essential condition.

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• Road-map for the (next) future
• define a precise programme (more inputs are
  needed for that)
• fix milestones and deliverables
• find partners both in our Institutions and in
  external Institutions and Companies
• estimate the needed budget
• produce a draft-proposal