Cryptanalysis of the End-to-End Security Protocol for Mobile Communications with End-User Identification/Authentication

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Cryptanalysis of the End-to-End Security
Protocolfor Mobile Communications with
End-UserIdentification/Authentication

• AuthorYongBin Zhou, ZhenFeng Zhang, and DengGuo
  Feng
• Presenter???

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Outline

• INTRODUCTION
• REVIEW OF CHANG et al.S PROTOCOL
• CRYPTANALYSIS OF CHANG et al.S PROTOCOL
• MODIFYING THE BP PROTOCOL
• CONCLUSION

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INTRODUCTION

• MUTUALLY authenticated key agreement protocol
• Chang et al. proposed an end-to-end security
  protocol for mobile communications with end-user
  authentication.

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REVIEW OF CHANG et al.S PROTOCOL
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REVIEW OF CHANG et al.S PROTOCOL

• Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card
• The subscriber account information and the
  personal certificate of the mobile user are
  stored in the SIM
• The SIM card is stolen, the conspirator may
  impersonate the register to communicate with
  anyone.
• Password is involved to construct the end-to-end
  security authentication protocol

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REVIEW OF CHANG et al.S PROTOCOL

• Previous study
• Messages between the MS and the BS are in
  encrypted form
• Messages between the two BSs are usually in clear
  form.
• Security breach
• Messages should be encrypted by a secret session
  key known only by the two MSs.

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REVIEW OF CHANG et al.S PROTOCOL

• Parks protocol

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REVIEW OF CHANG et al.S PROTOCOL

• Parks protocol
• g be a generator of the multiplicative group
  , where p is a prime
• Private key of MS is ? ,andthe
  public key is mod p
• the private and public keys of BS are ?
  and mod p

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REVIEW OF CHANG et al.S PROTOCOL

• Impersonation attack against Parks Protocol.

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REVIEW OF CHANG et al.S PROTOCOL

• Impersonation attack against Parks Protocol
• R ( )-( ) ( -
  )
• E can easily recover the current session key by
  computing

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REVIEW OF CHANG et al.S PROTOCOL

• CHANG et al.S PROTOCOL
• certificate-based authentication and session key
  agreement protocol
• session agreement protocol is based on the
  Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol

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REVIEW OF CHANG et al.S PROTOCOL

• The basic authentication protocol

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REVIEW OF CHANG et al.S PROTOCOL
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REVIEW OF CHANG et al.S PROTOCOL

• The end-to-end security protocol.

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REVIEW OF CHANG et al.S PROTOCOL

• EBP to support end-user authentication.

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CRYPTANALYSIS OF CHANG et al.S PROTOCOL

• Impersonation attack against BP Protocol.

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MODIFYING THE BP PROTOCOL

• MODIFYING THE BP PROTOCOL

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Conclusion

• In this letter shown that the end-to-end security
  protocol for mobile communications with end-user
  authentication due to Chang et al. is insecure
  against impersonation attack.
• Proposing a modified protocol can preserves the
  claimed security.