GV958 Contemporary Political Theory

1
GV958 Contemporary Political Theory Week 18
A Tale of Two Positivisms Explanation versus
Interpretation?
2
Falsificationist epistemology or at least a
sophisiticated variant of it is widely accepted
in the natural sciences and by philosopher of
science.
3
Falsificationist epistemology or at least a
sophisiticated variant of it is widely accepted
in the natural sciences and by philosopher of
science. However, positivism still exists in the
social sciences, at the level of street level
epistemology (to use Hardins phrase).
4
Falsificationist epistemology or at least a
sophisiticated variant of it is widely accepted
in the natural sciences and by philosopher of
science. However, positivism still exists in the
social sciences, at the level of street level
epistemology (to use Hardins phrase). Furthermo
re many of the critics of positivism advocate in
its place an interpretivism which is in many
ways an idealist positivism, in that it assumes
that ideas and meanings can be perceived directly
by intuition.
5
Falsificationist epistemology or at least a
sophisiticated variant of it is widely accepted
in the natural sciences and by philosopher of
science. However, positivism still exists in the
social sciences, at the level of street level
epistemology (to use Hardins phrase). Furthermo
re many of the critics of positivism advocate in
its place an interpretivism which is in many
ways an idealist positivism, in that it assumes
that ideas and meanings can be perceived directly
by intuition. The question is, does this matter?
Does positivist epistemological assumptions lead
to bad science?
6
Explanation and interpretation are often
presented as alternative approaches to social
science the distinction between providing
causes of actions and reasons for actions.
7
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology
8
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 1. Confusing the data with
the data generating process
9
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 1. Confusing the data with
the data generating process A fasificationist
approach often hypothesizes a reality (a data
generating process) behind the data. A positivist
approach, on the other hand, often assumes that
the data is reality. Consequences
10
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 1. Confusing the data with
the data generating process A fasificationist
approach often hypothesizes a reality (a data
generating process) behind the data. A positivist
approach, on the other hand, often assumes that
the data is reality. Consequences (a) Ignoring
ideal phenomena. Many social scientist (for
example, Winch The Idea of A Social Science)
argue that subjective meanings and ideas are a
constitutive part of social reality.
11
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 1. Confusing the data with
the data generating process A fasificationist
approach often hypothesizes a reality (a data
generating process) behind the data. A positivist
approach, on the other hand, often assumes that
the data is reality. Consequences (a) Ignoring
ideal phenomena. Many social scientist (for
example, Winch The Idea of A Social Science)
argue that subjective meanings and ideas are a
constitutive part of social reality. (b)
Ignoring nonobvious explanations. For example,
game theory emphasizes that a threat can affect
the outcome even if it is not carried out.
Furthermore the same outcome could be the result
of many different equilibria. Positivist without
hypothetical theory, this would be ignored.
12
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 1. Confusing the data with
the data generating process A fasificationist
approach often hypothesizes a reality (a data
generating process) behind the data. A positivist
approach, on the other hand, often assumes that
the data is reality. Consequences (a) Ignoring
ideal phenomena. Many social scientist (for
example, Winch The Idea of A Social Science)
argue that subjective meanings and ideas are a
constitutive part of social reality. (b)
Ignoring nonobvious explanations. For example,
game theory emphasizes that a threat can affect
the outcome even if it is not carried out.
Furthermore the same outcome could be the result
of many different equilibria. Positivist without
hypothetical theory, this would be ignored. (c)
Confusing measurements with reality
13
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 1. Confusing the data with
the data generating process A fasificationist
approach often hypothesizes a reality (a data
generating process) behind the data. A positivist
approach, on the other hand, often assumes that
the data is reality. Consequences (a) Ignoring
ideal phenomena. Many social scientist (for
example, Winch The Idea of A Social Science)
argue that subjective meanings and ideas are a
constitutive part of social reality. (b)
Ignoring nonobvious explanations. For example,
game theory emphasizes that a threat can affect
the outcome even if it is not carried out.
Furthermore the same outcome could be the result
of many different equilibria. Positivist without
hypothetical theory, this would be ignored. (c)
Confusing measurements with reality Example of
materialism-postmaterialism index
14
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 1. Confusing the data with
the data generating process A fasificationist
approach often hypothesizes a reality (a data
generating process) behind the data. A positivist
approach, on the other hand, often assumes that
the data is reality. Consequences (a) Ignoring
ideal phenomena. Many social scientist (for
example, Winch The Idea of A Social Science)
argue that subjective meanings and ideas are a
constitutive part of social reality. (b)
Ignoring nonobvious explanations. For example,
game theory emphasizes that a threat can affect
the outcome even if it is not carried out.
Furthermore the same outcome could be the result
of many different equilibria. Positivist without
hypothetical theory, this would be ignored. (c)
Confusing measurements with reality Example of
materialism-postmaterialism index Example of
Zaller as evidence that behaviourists think hard
about these problems.
15
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 2. Confirmationism
16
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 2. Confirmationism Tendency
of some work in political science to try to
prove a theory right, by statisitical or other
means.
17
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 2. Confirmationism Tendency
of some work in political science to try to
prove a theory right, by statisitical or other
means. Logically flawed. The fact that your
model has high R2 and your coefficients are
significant only shows that your model is
consistent with the data. There may be many other
models that also fit the data.
18
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 2. Confirmationism Tendency
of some work in political science to try to
prove a theory right, by statisitical or other
means. Logically flawed. The fact that your
model has high R2 and your coefficients are
significant only shows that your model is
consistent with the data. There may be many other
models that also fit the data. This can lead to
duelling regressions many different articles
with incompible models each claiming to have
validated their theory.
19
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 2. Confirmationism Tendency
of some work in political science to try to
prove a theory right, by statisitical or other
means. Logically flawed. The fact that your
model has high R2 and your coefficients are
significant only shows that your model is
consistent with the data. There may be many other
models that also fit the data. This can lead to
duelling regressions many different articles
with incompible models each claiming to have
validated their theory. Instead, to make your
theory credible, you have to test the aternative
explanations and eliminate them, while subjecting
your theory to the hardest tests possible.
20
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 3. Induction by statisitics
21
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 3. Induction by
statisitics There is a tendency by some social
scientists to treat techniques like regression or
factor analysis as truth revealing mechanisms.
You throw loads of variables into a regression,
and the results tell you which ones are
significant (or alternatively you include
everything and the kitchen sink to control for
these variables and avoid omitted variable bias).
22
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 3. Induction by
statisitics There is a tendency by some social
scientists to treat techniques like regression or
factor analysis as truth revealing mechanisms.
You throw loads of variables into a regression,
and the results tell you which ones are
significant (or alternatively you include
everything and the kitchen sink to control for
these variables and avoid omitted variable
bias). This is logically flawed. Regression can
only test how the data fits the model. If the
model is incorrect (e.g. you assume the
relaionship is linear, when it is not) all your
coefficients are biased (ie wrong).
23
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 3. Induction by
statisitics There is a tendency by some social
scientists to treat techniques like regression or
factor analysis as truth revealing mechanisms.
You throw loads of variables into a regression,
and the results tell you which ones are
significant (or alternatively you include
everything and the kitchen sink to control for
these variables and avoid omitted variable
bias). This is logically flawed. Regression can
only test how the data fits the model. If the
model is incorrect (e.g. you assume the
relaionship is linear, when it is not) all your
coefficients are biased (ie wrong). See
Christopher Achen Let's Put Garbage-Can
Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits Where They
Belong, Conflict Management and Peace Science 22
327-339, for a demonstration of how seemingly
minor amounts of nonlinearity can lead to
severely incorrect results.
24
Consequences of materialist positivist street
level epistemology 3. Induction by
statisitics There is a tendency by some social
scientists to treat techniques like regression or
factor analysis as truth revealing mechanisms.
You throw loads of variables into a regression,
and the results tell you which ones are
significant (or alternatively you include
everything and the kitchen sink to control for
these variables and avoid omitted variable
bias). This is logically flawed. Regression can
only test how the data fits the model. If the
model is incorrect (e.g. you assume the
relaionship is linear, when it is not) all your
coefficients are biased (ie wrong). See
Christopher Achen Let's Put Garbage-Can
Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits Where They
Belong, Conflict Management and Peace Science 22
327-339, for a demonstration of how seemingly
minor amounts of nonlinearity can lead to
severely incorrect results. Note that this is
not an argument against regression or
statisitics, but against their abuse. Regression
is very useful for testing theories, but cannot
tell you what the model should look like
25
Consequences of Idealist Positivism
26
Consequences of Idealist Positivism Many of the
critics of positivist social science (notably
Peter Winch) argue instead for an interpretivist
social science, in which social scientists
concern themselves with the subjective meanings
of agents actions and in particular the ideas
implicit in institutions and organizations.
27
Consequences of Idealist Positivism Many of the
critics of positivist social science (notably
Peter Winch) argue instead for an interpretivist
social science, in which social scientists
concern themselves with the subjective meanings
of agents actions and in particular the ideas
implicit in institutions and organizations. The
problem is, if there are more than one possible
interpretation, which is right?
28
Consequences of Idealist Positivism Many of the
critics of positivist social science (notably
Peter Winch) argue instead for an interpretivist
social science, in which social scientists
concern themselves with the subjective meanings
of agents actions and in particular the ideas
implicit in institutions and organizations. The
problem is, if there are more than one possible
interpretation, which is right? Max Weber
(ironically much cited by interpretivists) argues
that interpretations have to be tested causally
using, amongst other things, statisitical
means. Against this Winch argues (p. 113) that
what is needed to judge an interpretation is not
statistical evidence, but a better
interpretation.
29
Consequences of Idealist Positivism Many of the
critics of positivist social science (notably
Peter Winch) argue instead for an interpretivist
social science, in which social scientists
concern themselves with the subjective meanings
of agents actions and in particular the ideas
implicit in institutions and organizations. The
problem is, if there are more than one possible
interpretation, which is right? Max Weber
(ironically much cited by interpretivists) argues
that interpretations have to be tested causally
using, amongst other things, statisitical
means. Against this Winch argues (p. 113) that
what is needed to judge an interpretation is not
statistical evidence, but a better
interpretation. The problem is, how do we judge
whether an interpretation is better.
30
Consequences of Idealist Positivism Many of the
critics of positivist social science (notably
Peter Winch) argue instead for an interpretivist
social science, in which social scientists
concern themselves with the subjective meanings
of agents actions and in particular the ideas
implicit in institutions and organizations. The
problem is, if there are more than one possible
interpretation, which is right? Max Weber
(ironically much cited by interpretivists) argues
that interpretations have to be tested causally
using, amongst other things, statisitical
means. Against this Winch argues (p. 113) that
what is needed to judge an interpretation is not
statistical evidence, but a better
interpretation. The problem is, how do we judge
whether an interpretation is better. If we
assert that we can just know by intuition, then
we indeed have an idealist positivism, with
intuitive certainty in place of sense certainty
in materialist positivism.
31
Consequences of Idealist Positivism Many of the
critics of positivist social science (notably
Peter Winch) argue instead for an interpretivist
social science, in which social scientists
concern themselves with the subjective meanings
of agents actions and in particular the ideas
implicit in institutions and organizations. The
problem is, if there are more than one possible
interpretation, which is right? Max Weber
(ironically much cited by interpretivists) argues
that interpretations have to be tested causally
using, amongst other things, statisitical
means. Against this Winch argues (p. 113) that
what is needed to judge an interpretation is not
statistical evidence, but a better
interpretation. The problem is, how do we judge
whether an interpretation is better. If we
assert that we can just know by intuition, then
we indeed have an idealist positivism, with
intuitive certainty in place of sense certainty
in materialist positivism. This of course begs
the question of how to adjudicate when people
disgree on interpretations
32
Consequences of Idealist Positivism
33
Consequences of Idealist Positivism Both forms
of positivism legitimates a division of labour in
social science between people who study facts
and people who study ideas, which is extremely
problematic as a viable social science is
impossible without both.
34
Consequences of Idealist Positivism Both forms
of positivism legitimates a division of labour in
social science between people who study facts
and people who study ideas, which is extremely
problematic as a viable social science is
impossible without both. Equally problematic is
the argument that it is possible to distinguish
between explanation and interpretations the
distinction between providing causes of actions
and reasons for actions.
35
Consequences of Idealist Positivism Both forms
of positivism legitimates a division of labour in
social science between people who study facts
and people who study ideas, which is extremely
problematic as a viable social science is
impossible without both. Equally problematic is
the argument that it is possible to distinguish
between explanation and interpretations the
distinction between providing causes of actions
and reasons for actions. We even see this in
Hollis (although to be fair Hollis eventual
position is far more nuanced).
36
Consequences of Idealist Positivism Both forms
of positivism legitimates a division of labour in
social science between people who study facts
and people who study ideas, which is extremely
problematic as a viable social science is
impossible without both. Equally problematic is
the argument that it is possible to distinguish
between explanation and interpretations the
distinction between providing causes of actions
and reasons for actions. We even see this in
Hollis (although to be fair Hollis eventual
position is far more nuanced). Weber is often
cited as the source or justification for this
dichotomy.
37
Consequences of Idealist Positivism Both forms
of positivism legitimates a division of labour in
social science between people who study facts
and people who study ideas, which is extremely
problematic as a viable social science is
impossible without both. Equally problematic is
the argument that it is possible to distinguish
between explanation and interpretations the
distinction between providing causes of actions
and reasons for actions. We even see this in
Hollis (although to be fair Hollis eventual
position is far more nuanced). Weber is often
cited as the source or justification for this
dichotomy. However, Weber clearly did not see
explanation and interpretation as alternative
approaches, but rather viewed both as necessary
elements of understanding meaningful social
action.
38
Consequences of Idealist Positivism Both forms
of positivism legitimates a division of labour in
social science between people who study facts
and people who study ideas, which is extremely
problematic as a viable social science is
impossible without both. Equally problematic is
the argument that it is possible to distinguish
between explanation and interpretations the
distinction between providing causes of actions
and reasons for actions. We even see this in
Hollis (although to be fair Hollis eventual
position is far more nuanced). Weber is often
cited as the source or justification for this
dichotomy. However, Weber clearly did not see
explanation and interpretation as alternative
approaches, but rather viewed both as necessary
elements of understanding meaningful social
action. Building on this, I will argue that in
the social sciences interpretation and
explanation cannot be separated when you
propose one, you logically imply the other.
39
Consequences of Idealist Positivism Both forms
of positivism legitimates a division of labour in
social science between people who study facts
and people who study ideas, which is extremely
problematic as a viable social science is
impossible without both. Equally problematic is
the argument that it is possible to distinguish
between explanation and interpretations the
distinction between providing causes of actions
and reasons for actions. We even see this in
Hollis (although to be fair Hollis eventual
position is far more nuanced). Weber is often
cited as the source or justification for this
dichotomy. However, Weber clearly did not see
explanation and interpretation as alternative
approaches, but rather viewed both as necessary
elements of understanding meaningful social
action. Building on this, I will argue that in
the social sciences interpretation and
explanation cannot be separated when you
propose one, you logically imply the other.
Thus interpretation can in principle be tested
behaviourally, while behavioural regularities
require interpretation.
40
Weber on Explanation and Interpretation
41
Weber on Explanation and Interpretation Weber
defines sociology thus (Economy and Society, p.
4) Sociology (in the sense in which this highly
ambiguous word is used here) is a science
concerning itself with the interpretive
understanding of social action and thereby with a
causal explanation of its course and
consequences. (Italics mine)
42
Weber on Explanation and Interpretation Weber
defines sociology thus (Economy and Society, p.
4) Sociology (in the sense in which this highly
ambiguous word is used here) is a science
concerning itself with the interpretive
understanding of social action and thereby with a
causal explanation of its course and
consequences. (Italics mine) For Weber,
sociology (which for Weber included all the
social sciences, including economics) was
different from the natural sciences, in that it
was necessary to understand the motivations and
meanings of actions, not just to explain them in
a mechanical way.
43
Weber on Explanation and Interpretation Weber
defines sociology thus (Economy and Society, p.
4) Sociology (in the sense in which this highly
ambiguous word is used here) is a science
concerning itself with the interpretive
understanding of social action and thereby with a
causal explanation of its course and
consequences. (Italics mine) For Weber,
sociology (which for Weber included all the
social sciences, including economics) was
different from the natural sciences, in that it
was necessary to understand the motivations and
meanings of actions, not just to explain them in
a mechanical way. However, to understand an
action it is still necessary to explain why it
happened, not just impute subjective meaning to
it. This involves understanding the causes of the
action.
44
Subjectively adequate versus causally adequate
interpretation of action
45
Subjectively adequate versus causally adequate
interpretation of action Weber contrasts
subjective adequacy with causal adequacy
(p.11)
46
Subjectively adequate versus causally adequate
interpretation of action Weber contrasts
subjective adequacy with causal adequacy
(p.11) An interpretation is subjectively
adequate (or adequate on the level of meaning) if
it provides an understandable reason for the
action.
47
Subjectively adequate versus causally adequate
interpretation of action Weber contrasts
subjective adequacy with causal adequacy
(p.11) An interpretation is subjectively
adequate (or adequate on the level of meaning) if
it provides an understandable reason for the
action. An interpretation is causally adequate
if according to established generalizations from
experience, the is a probability that it will
always occur in the same way.
48
Subjectively adequate versus causally adequate
interpretation of action Weber contrasts
subjective adequacy with causal adequacy
(p.11) An interpretation is subjectively
adequate (or adequate on the level of meaning) if
it provides an understandable reason for the
action. An interpretation is causally adequate
if according to established generalizations from
experience, the is a probability that it will
always occur in the same way. Thus causal
explanation depends on being able to determine
that there is a probability, which in the rare
ideal case can be numerically stated, but is
always in some sense calculable, that a given
observable event (overt or subjective) will be
followed or accompanied by another event.
49
Subjectively adequate versus causally adequate
interpretation of action Weber contrasts
subjective adequacy with causal adequacy
(p.11) An interpretation is subjectively
adequate (or adequate on the level of meaning) if
it provides an understandable reason for the
action. An interpretation is causally adequate
if according to established generalizations from
experience, the is a probability that it will
always occur in the same way. Thus causal
explanation depends on being able to determine
that there is a probability, which in the rare
ideal case can be numerically stated, but is
always in some sense calculable, that a given
observable event (overt or subjective) will be
followed or accompanied by another event. Weber
argues further (p.12) If adequacy with respect
to meaning is lacking, then no matter how high
the degree of uniformity and how precisely its
probability can be numerically determined, it is
still an incomprehensible statistical
probability, whether we deal with overt or
subjective processes. On the other hand, even the
most perfect adequacy on the level of meaning,
has causal significance from a sociological point
of view only insofar as there is some kind of
proof for the existence of a probability that
action in fact normally takes the course which
has been held to be meaningful.
50
Subjectively adequate versus causally adequate
interpretation of action Weber contrasts
subjective adequacy with causal adequacy
(p.11) An interpretation is subjectively
adequate (or adequate on the level of meaning) if
it provides an understandable reason for the
action. An interpretation is causally adequate
if according to established generalizations from
experience, the is a probability that it will
always occur in the same way. Thus causal
explanation depends on being able to determine
that there is a probability, which in the rare
ideal case can be numerically stated, but is
always in some sense calculable, that a given
observable event (overt or subjective) will be
followed or accompanied by another event. Weber
argues further (p.12) If adequacy with respect
to meaning is lacking, then no matter how high
the degree of uniformity and how precisely its
probability can be numerically determined, it is
still an incomprehensible statistical
probability, whether we deal with overt or
subjective processes. On the other hand, even the
most perfect adequacy on the level of meaning,
has causal significance from a sociological point
of view only insofar as there is some kind of
proof for the existence of a probability that
action in fact normally takes the course which
has been held to be meaningful. Thus both types
of adequacy are necessary to understand
meaningful social action.
51
The following is particularly significant
(p.10) Every interpretation attempts to attain
clarity and certainty, but no matter how clear an
interpretation as such appears to be from the
point of view of meaning, it cannot on this
account claim to be the causally valid
interpretation. On this level it must remain only
a peculiarly plausible hypothesis.
52
The following is particularly significant
(p.10) Every interpretation attempts to attain
clarity and certainty, but no matter how clear an
interpretation as such appears to be from the
point of view of meaning, it cannot on this
account claim to be the causally valid
interpretation. On this level it must remain only
a peculiarly plausible hypothesis. He goes on
to argue that verification of subjective
interpretations by the concrete course of events
is indispensible. This can be by experiment
(where possible), by statisitics (in the case of
mass phenomena) or imaginary experiments
(counterfactual analysis, with high degree of
uncertainty.)
53
The following is particularly significant
(p.10) Every interpretation attempts to attain
clarity and certainty, but no matter how clear an
interpretation as such appears to be from the
point of view of meaning, it cannot on this
account claim to be the causally valid
interpretation. On this level it must remain only
a peculiarly plausible hypothesis. He goes on
to argue that verification of subjective
interpretations by the concrete course of events
is indispensible. This can be by experiment
(where possible), by statisitics (in the case of
mass phenomena) or imaginary experiments
(counterfactual analysis, with high degree of
uncertainty.) This is a hypothetico-deductive
approach empathy and intuition suggest
hypothesized interepretations, which are then
tested against facts.
54
The following is particularly significant
(p.10) Every interpretation attempts to attain
clarity and certainty, but no matter how clear an
interpretation as such appears to be from the
point of view of meaning, it cannot on this
account claim to be the causally valid
interpretation. On this level it must remain only
a peculiarly plausible hypothesis. He goes on
to argue that verification of subjective
interpretations by the concrete course of events
is indispensible. This can be by experiment
(where possible), by statisitics (in the case of
mass phenomena) or imaginary experiments
(counterfactual analysis, with high degree of
uncertainty.) This is a hypothetico-deductive
approach empathy and intuition suggest
hypothesized interepretations, which are then
tested against facts. Compare to Popper and
King, Keohane and Verba.
55
I will argue that there is a logical link between
explanation and interpretation. First, however
it is necessary to consider Webers
methodological rationalism.
56
I will argue that there is a logical link between
explanation and interpretation. First, however
it is necessary to consider Webers
methodological rationalism. (Note that Weber
also insists on methodological individualism,
because only individuals can have subjective
orientations and meanings, although he does
accept that it is often useful to treat
collectives as if they are actors. This, however,
is less crucial to the argument here.)
57
Webers methodological rationalism
58
Webers methodological rationalism Weber argues
that it is convenient to treat all irrational
action as a deviation from the pure type of
rational action. (p.6)
59
Webers methodological rationalism Weber argues
that it is convenient to treat all irrational
action as a deviation from the pure type of
rational action. (p.6) Weber argues that this is
strictly methodological and does not involve a
rationalistic bias in sociology. The merit of the
ideal type of rational action is that it has the
merit of clear understandability and lack of
ambiguity. When studying irrational action, one
can ask what rational action would have
predicted, then look at the factors causing
deviation from this.
60
Webers methodological rationalism Weber argues
that it is convenient to treat all irrational
action as a deviation from the pure type of
rational action. (p.6) Weber argues that this is
strictly methodological and does not involve a
rationalistic bias in sociology. The merit of the
ideal type of rational action is that it has the
merit of clear understandability and lack of
ambiguity. When studying irrational action, one
can ask what rational action would have
predicted, then look at the factors causing
deviation from this. It is hard to see how we
can avoid this approach.
61
Webers methodological rationalism Weber argues
that it is convenient to treat all irrational
action as a deviation from the pure type of
rational action. (p.6) Weber argues that this is
strictly methodological and does not involve a
rationalistic bias in sociology. The merit of the
ideal type of rational action is that it has the
merit of clear understandability and lack of
ambiguity. When studying irrational action, one
can ask what rational action would have
predicted, then look at the factors causing
deviation from this. It is hard to see how we
can avoid this approach. When we cannot
understand the meaning of an action or speech
directly (such as the assertion that 224, we
really on explanatory understanding. When we
interpret why someone does something, we
inevitably posit that they are doing it for some
reason. This implies a thin assumption of
rationality.
62
Webers methodological rationalism Weber argues
that it is convenient to treat all irrational
action as a deviation from the pure type of
rational action. (p.6) Weber argues that this is
strictly methodological and does not involve a
rationalistic bias in sociology. The merit of the
ideal type of rational action is that it has the
merit of clear understandability and lack of
ambiguity. When studying irrational action, one
can ask what rational action would have
predicted, then look at the factors causing
deviation from this. It is hard to see how we
can avoid this approach. When we cannot
understand the meaning of an action or speech
directly (such as the assertion that 224, we
really on explanatory understanding. When we
interpret why someone does something, we
inevitably posit that they are doing it for some
reason. This implies a thin assumption of
rationality. Take for example, our
interpretation of a man aiming a gun.
63
Webers methodological rationalism Weber argues
that it is convenient to treat all irrational
action as a deviation from the pure type of
rational action. (p.6) Weber argues that this is
strictly methodological and does not involve a
rationalistic bias in sociology. The merit of the
ideal type of rational action is that it has the
merit of clear understandability and lack of
ambiguity. When studying irrational action, one
can ask what rational action would have
predicted, then look at the factors causing
deviation from this. It is hard to see how we
can avoid this approach. When we cannot
understand the meaning of an action or speech
directly (such as the assertion that 224, we
really on explanatory understanding. When we
interpret why someone does something, we
inevitably posit that they are doing it for some
reason. This implies a thin assumption of
rationality. Take for example, our
interpretation of a man aiming a gun. We assume
he is doing it for some reason, that he has some
goal (following orders, hunting food, seeking
revenge, etc.)
64
Webers typology of social action
65
Webers typology of social action 1. Goal
rationality (Zweckrationalität). (Usually
translated instrumental rationality) that is,
determined by expectations as to the behaviour of
objects in the environemnt and of other human
beings these expectations are used as
conditions or means for the attianment of the
actors own rationally pursued and calculated
ends. (p.24)
66
Webers typology of social action 1. Goal
rationality (Zweckrationalität). (Usually
translated instrumental rationality) that is,
determined by expectations as to the behaviour of
objects in the environemnt and of other human
beings these expectations are used as
conditions or means for the attianment of the
actors own rationally pursued and calculated
ends. (p.24) 2. Value rationality
(Wertrationalität) Action determined by value for
its own sake, independently of prospects of
success.
67
Webers typology of social action 1. Goal
rationality (Zweckrationalität). (Usually
translated instrumental rationality) that is,
determined by expectations as to the behaviour of
objects in the environemnt and of other human
beings these expectations are used as
conditions or means for the attianment of the
actors own rationally pursued and calculated
ends. (p.24) 2. Value rationality
(Wertrationalität) Action determined by value for
its own sake, independently of prospects of
success. 3. Affectual
68
Webers typology of social action 1. Goal
rationality (Zweckrationalität). (Usually
translated instrumental rationality) that is,
determined by expectations as to the behaviour of
objects in the environemnt and of other human
beings these expectations are used as
conditions or means for the attianment of the
actors own rationally pursued and calculated
ends. (p.24) 2. Value rationality
(Wertrationalität) Action determined by value for
its own sake, independently of prospects of
success. 3. Affectual 4, Traditional,
determined by ingrained habituation.
69
Webers typology of social action 1. Goal
rationality (Zweckrationalität). (Usually
translated instrumental rationality) that is,
determined by expectations as to the behaviour of
objects in the environemnt and of other human
beings these expectations are used as
conditions or means for the attianment of the
actors own rationally pursued and calculated
ends. (p.24) 2. Value rationality
(Wertrationalität) Action determined by value for
its own sake, independently of prospects of
success. 3. Affectual 4, Traditional,
determined by ingrained habituation. Note 2-4
have to cause action directly. They cannot be
reasons for actions, otherwise we are back to
goal-rationality.
70
Webers typology of social action 1. Goal
rationality (Zweckrationalität). (Usually
translated instrumental rationality) that is,
determined by expectations as to the behaviour of
objects in the environemnt and of other human
beings these expectations are used as
conditions or means for the attianment of the
actors own rationally pursued and calculated
ends. (p.24) 2. Value rationality
(Wertrationalität) Action determined by value for
its own sake, independently of prospects of
success. 3. Affectual 4, Traditional,
determined by ingrained habituation. Note 2-4
have to cause action directly. They cannot be
reasons for actions, otherwise we are back to
goal-rationality. Thus as soon as we interpret
actions as opposed to explain them directly, we
are faced by goal-rationality
71
Webers typology of social action 1. Goal
rationality (Zweckrationalität). (Usually
translated instrumental rationality) that is,
determined by expectations as to the behaviour of
objects in the environemnt and of other human
beings these expectations are used as
conditions or means for the attianment of the
actors own rationally pursued and calculated
ends. (p.24) 2. Value rationality
(Wertrationalität) Action determined by value for
its own sake, independently of prospects of
success. 3. Affectual 4, Traditional,
determined by ingrained habituation. Note 2-4
have to cause action directly. They cannot be
reasons for actions, otherwise we are back to
goal-rationality. Thus as soon as we interpret
actions as opposed to explain them directly, we
are faced by goal-rationality Habermas concept
of communication action as an alternative to
goal-rationality. Johnsons critique of this
(Political Theory 19.2 181-201)
72
Boudreau, McCubbins and Rodriguez argument about
the intentional stance with regard to statutory
interpretation is similar.
73
Boudreau, McCubbins and Rodriguez argument about
the intentional stance with regard to statutory
interpretation is similar. When we interpret
other actions, we inevitably postulate
rationality. That is we assume that people do
things for reasons. Indeed we do this even in the
case of inanimate objects.
74
Boudreau, McCubbins and Rodriguez argument about
the intentional stance with regard to statutory
interpretation is similar. When we interpret
other actions, we inevitably postulate
rationality. That is we assume that people do
things for reasons. Indeed we do this even in the
case of inanimate objects. (The authors point
is that we can do this in the case of
legislatures, even though a legislature lacks
subjectivity.)
75
Equivalence of interpretation and explanation
76
Equivalence of interpretation and
explanation Suppose we are trying to understand
the decision to vote communist (to use Hollis
example.) Suppose we give a subjective
explanation, such as People support communists
because they help the working class. If this
interpretation is valid, then we already have an
explanation of voting communist indeed we have
a rational explanation of voting communist.
People vote communist in order to further the
interests of the working class.
77
Equivalence of interpretation and
explanation Suppose we are trying to understand
the decision to vote communist (to use Hollis
example.) Suppose we give a subjective
explanation, such as People support communists
because they help the working class. If this
interpretation is valid, then we already have an
explanation of voting communist indeed we have
a rational explanation of voting communist.
People vote communist in order to further the
interests of the working class. Furthermore, if
the interpretation is valid, we should find that
people who hold certain attitudes (that the
working class would benefit from the communist
programme, and that the interests of the working
class ought to be prioritized) will vote
communist.
78
Equivalence of interpretation and
explanation Suppose we are trying to understand
the decision to vote communist (to use Hollis
example.) Suppose we give a subjective
explanation, such as People support communists
because they help the working class. If this
interpretation is valid, then we already have an
explanation of voting communist indeed we have
a rational explanation of voting communist.
People vote communist in order to further the
interests of the working class. Furthermore, if
the interpretation is valid, we should find that
people who hold certain attitudes (that the
working class would benefit from the communist
programme, and that the interests of the working
class ought to be prioritized) will vote
communist. If this is not the case, there is
something wrong with our interpretation.
79
Equivalence of interpretation and
explanation Suppose we are trying to understand
the decision to vote communist (to use Hollis
example.) Suppose we give a subjective
explanation, such as People support communists
because they help the working class. If this
interpretation is valid, then we already have an
explanation of voting communist indeed we have
a rational explanation of voting communist.
People vote communist in order to further the
interests of the working class. Furthermore, if
the interpretation is valid, we should find that
people who hold certain attitudes (that the
working class would benefit from the communist
programme, and that the interests of the working
class ought to be prioritized) will vote
communist. If this is not the case, there is
something wrong with our interpretation. Consider
the interpretation that Americans vote
Republican because they are Christians, with the
contrary evidence that Christians are no more
likely to vote Republican than anyone else.
(Perhaps it is conservatism, not Christianity
that is really decisive.)
80
On the other hand, consider the explanation
People vote communist because they are working
class.
81
On the other hand, consider the explanation
People vote communist because they are working
class. It was undoubtedly true that industrial
workers in many countries were far more likely to
vote communist than anyone else.
82
On the other hand, consider the explanation
People vote communist because they are working
class. It was undoubtedly true that industrial
workers in many countries were far more likely to
vote communist than anyone else. Nevertheless,
this does not serve as an adequate explanation of
why people people vote communist it simply begs
the question Why do workers vote communist?
83
On the other hand, consider the explanation
People vote communist because they are working
class. It was undoubtedly true that industrial
workers in many countries were far more likely to
vote communist than anyone else. Nevertheless,
this does not serve as an adequate explanation of
why people people vote communist it simply begs
the question Why do workers vote communist? It
is not until we have provided an interpretation
of why people act the way they do )that is
subjective motivations and meanings) that we have
truly explained their actions.
84
Example Explaining voting for the Radical Right
in the Alps With the rise of the New Radical
Right in Western Europe in the 1980s and 1990s,
came a great deal of work trying to interpret
this. Unfortunately, not only was there not a
great deal of evidence, but many authors refused
to take the evidence seriously (for example, the
statements of far right parties were not to be
taken at face value.) Thus authors could
essentially assert anything they want.
85
Example Explaining voting for the Radical Right
in the Alps With the rise of the New Radical
Right in Western Europe in the 1980s and 1990s,
came a great deal of work trying to interpret
this. Unfortunately, not only was there not a
great deal of evidence, but many authors refused
to take the evidence seriously (for example, the
statements of far right parties were not to be
taken at face value.) Thus authors could
essentially assert anything they want. How to
accurately interpret the new radical right
phenomena? Certainly it is necessary to be aware
of how the parties understand themselves. This
means reading party manifestos, press statements
etc.
86
Example Explaining voting for the Radical Right
in the Alps With the rise of the New Radical
Right in Western Europe in the 1980s and 1990s,
came a great deal of work trying to interpret
this. Unfortunately, not only was there not a
great deal of evidence, but many authors refused
to take the evidence seriously (for example, the
statements of far right parties were not to be
taken at face value.) Thus authors could
essentially assert anything they want. How to
accurately interpret the new radical right
phenomena? Certainly it is necessary to be aware
of how the parties understand themselves. This
means reading party manifestos, press statements
etc. However, it is also necessary to study
whether our interpretations stand up to evidence.
If we wish to understand why people vote for
these parties, it is necessary to consider who
votes for these parties and what attitudes they
hold.
87
Kitschelt and McGann (1995) and McGann and
Kitschelt (2004) are able to reejct many common
interpretations 1. Revived fascism
88
Kitschelt and McGann (1995) and McGann and
Kitschelt (2004) are able to reejct many common
interpretations 1. Revived fascism 2. Simple
anti-immigration
89
Kitschelt and McGann (1995) and McGann and
Kitschelt (2004) are able to reejct many common
interpretations 1. Revived fascism 2. Simple
anti-immigration 3. Anti-democratic
authoritarianism Instead a complex coalition of
traditional far-right voters (small business)
working class authoritarians, and rather
libertarian middle-class voters suspicious of
clientelism, consensual democracy and the EU.