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Intruders Detection Systems

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Title: Intruders Detection Systems


1
Intruders Detection Systems
  • Presently there is much interest in systems,
    which can detect intrusions, IDS (Intrusion
    Detection System).
  • IDS are of very different character.
  • Some focus on one machine and try to stop the
    intruder from doing damage, such is LIDS for
    Linux.
  • Some can detect a worm attack from the way it
    spreads from machine to machine, like GrIDS.
  • Several are actually data mining, they determine
    from logfiles if there is an intrusion based on
    reasoning by an expert system, NSTAT is an
    example.
  • Many IDS implementations are listening passively
    to some LAN segment, look at the traffic and
    detect an intrusion. Snort IDS is a popular
    freeware program of this Network IDS-type.
  • Other IDS solutions protect one machine by access
    controls.

2
What is Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are designed
for detecting, blocking and reporting
unauthorized activity in computer
networks. The life expectancy of a default
installation of Linux Red Hat 6.2 server is
estimated to be less than 72 hours. The fastest
compromise happened in 15 minutes (including
scanning, probing and attacking) Netbios scans
affecting Windows computers were executed with
the average of 17 per day (source Honeynet
Project)
3
Unauthorized Use of Computer Systems Within Last
12 Months (source CSI/FBI Study)
  1. Motivation for Intrusion Detection

4
Most Common Attacks (source CSI/FBI)
  1. Motivation for Intrusion Detection
  • In year 2002 most common attacks were
  • Virus (78)
  • Insider Abuse of Net Access (78)
  • Laptop theft (55)
  • Denial of Service and System Penetration (40)
  • Unauthorized Access by Insiders (38)

(Red color shows the attack types, which IDS can
decrease)
5
There are Application-, Host- and Network IDS
Different Types of IDSs
  • Application IDS
  • Watch application logs
  • Watch user actions
  • Stop attacks targeted against an application
  • Advantages
  • Encrypted data can be read
  • Problems
  • Positioned too high in the attack chain (the
    attacks reach the application)

6
Application-, Host- and Network IDS
Different Types of IDSs
  • Host IDS
  • Watch kernel operations
  • Watch network interface
  • Stop illegal system operations
  • Drop attack packets at network driver
  • Advantages
  • Encrypted data can be read
  • Each host contributes to the detection process
  • Problems
  • Positioned too high in the attack chain (the
    attacks reach the network driver)

7
Application-, Host- and Network IDS
Different Types of IDSs
  • Network IDS
  • Watch network traffic
  • Watch active services and servers
  • Report and possibly stop network level attacks
  • Advantages
  • Attacks can be stopped early enough (before they
    reach the hosts or applications)
  • Attack information from different subnets can be
    correlated
  • Problems
  • Encrypted data cannot be read
  • Annoyances to normal traffic if for some reason
    normal traffic is dropped

8
Application-, Host- and Network IDS - Comparison
2. Different Types of IDSs
9
Diagram
Simple Process Model for ID
Parse data, filter data and execute Detection
Algorithms
For example applications log network driver, or
network cable
Drop packets, send alerts, update routing
tables, kill processes etc.
10
Misuse Detection
IDS principle of detection
There are two basic methods used by ID Systems
misuse detection and anomaly detection.
  • Search attack signatures, which are patterns,
    byte code or expressions belonging to a specific
    attack.
  • often called signature-based detection
  • A signature is created by analysing an attack
    method
  • The patterns are stored inside the IDS

Example Rule
Alert tcp !192.168.1.0/24 any -gt 192.168.1.0/24
111 (Content 00 01 86 A5msgExternal
Mountd access)
11
Example of a NIDS, snort
  • Enable NIDS mode of Snort
  • ./snort -dev -l ./log -h 192.168.1.0/24 -c snort
    .conf
  • The above command means that let Snort work as
    NIDS for the network 192.168.1.0/24 according to
    the rules inside snort.conf file.
  • Sample rule
  • alert udp any any -gt 192.168.1.0/24 5060
  • (content"01 6a 42 c8" msg SIP session
    signaling")
  • The rules are modular and it is easy to add new
    rules. Typically the rules make alarms of all old
    security breaches so that you cannot notice any
    new breaches.

12
Anomaly Detection
IDS principle of detection
Distinguish abnormal from normal
  • Threshold Detection
  • X events in Y seconds triggers the alarm
  • Statistical Measures
  • Current traffic profile matches the normal
    profile
  • Rule-Based Methods
  • Jack never logs in at 6 to 8 AM
  • If Jack just sent email from Espoo office, he
    should not send email from New York office at the
    same time

13
  • Example ( anomaly detection engine---SPADE)
  • 10411 spp_anomsensor Anomaly
    threshold exceeded 3.8919
  • 08/22-223700.419813
    24.234.114.963246 -gt VICTIM.HOST80 TCP TTL116
    TOS0x0 ID25395 IpLen20 DgmLen48 DF S
    Seq 0xEBCF8EB7  Ack 0x0  Win 0x4000  TcpLen
    28 TCP Options (4) gt MSS 1460 NOP NOP SackOK
    10411 spp_anomsensor Anomaly
    threshold exceeded 10.5464
  • 08/22-222246.577210
    24.41.81.2162065 -gt VICTIM.HOST27374 TCP
    TTL108 TOS0x0 ID10314 IpLen20 DgmLen48 DF
    S Seq 0x63B97FE2  Ack 0x0  Win 0x4000 
    TcpLen 28 TCP Options (4) gt MSS 1460 NOP NOP
    SackOK 10411 spp_anomsensor Anomaly
    threshold exceeded 7.8051
  • 08/23-230453.051245
    VICTIM.HOST31337 -gt 64.230.133.1963486 TCP
    TTL255 TOS0x0 ID0 IpLen20 DgmLen40 DF
    AR Seq 0x0 Ack 0x22676B9  Win 0x0 
    TcpLen 20 10411 spp_anomsensor
    Anomaly threshold exceeded 9.0907
  • 09/02-013031.545406 VICTIM.HOST515
    -gt 24.42.220.451189 TCP TTL64 TOS0x0 ID0
    IpLen20 DgmLen60 DF AS Seq 0x16FC5A7F 
    Ack 0x529F8CE7  Win 0x16A0  TcpLen 40 TCP
    Options (5) gt MSS 1460 SackOK TS 124399151
    14755839 NOP TCP Options gt WS 0

14
Anomaly/Misuse Detection Comparison
IDS principle of detection
15
Responses
IDS response principles
  • Alerts and notifications email, SMS, pager
    (important issue alert path must be bulletproof)
  • Increase Surveillance log more
  • Throttling slow down malicious traffic
  • Blocking Access drop data, update
    firewall/router
  • Make Counterattack Eye for an eye tactics
  • Honey Pots and Padded Cells route the hacker to
    a fake system and let him play freely

16
Detection problems
IDS problems in the detection stage
  • True positive, TP, is a malicious attack that is
    correctly detected as malicious.
  • True negative, TN, is a not an attack and is
    correctly classified as benign.
  • False positive, FP, is not an attack but has been
    classified as an attack.
  • False negative, FN, is an attack that has been
    incorrectly classified as a benign.
  • Detection rate is obtained by testing the IDS
    against set of intrusive scenarios

The false alarm rate is the limiting factor for
the performance in an IDS.
17
Advanced IDS Techniques
For Protection
  • Stream Reassembly follow connections and
    sessions
  • Traffic Normalization see that protocols are
    followed
  • Bayesian Networks Data mining and decision
    networks
  • Graphical IDSs (for example GrIDS) use graphs to
    model attacks
  • Feature equality heuristics port stepping,
    packet gap recognition
  • Genetic Programming, Human immune systems
  • Tens of research systems exist

For Attacks
  • Evasion methods (fragmentation, mutation etc.)
  • IDS trashing (DoS tools to like stick/snot to
    crash IDS capability

18
Detecting Intruders
  • Commercially the most used IDS systems are
    probably misuse based Network ID Systems, but
    Host-level IDS is also needed.
  • As an example of a Host-level IDS let us look at
    LIDS for Linux.
  • The philosophy of LIDS is to have a three layer
    protection
  • Firewall
  • PortSentry
  • LIDS
  • The firewall limits access to only allowed ports.
    In a Web-server only the TCP port 80 is
    absolutely necessary.
  • Disable ports which are not used, for instance by
    removing the daemons or by modifying
    /etc/inetd.conf. Leave only the basic activities
    needed.

19
Detecting Intruders
  • PortSentry is put to some port, which is often
    scanned but not used in the system.
  • One should find suitable ports where to put
    PortSentry by looking at ports which are scanned
    often, like 143 or 111.
  • Typically nowadays hackers do sweep scanning
    looking at only one port in several machines.
  • PortSentry monitors activity on specific TCP/UDP
    ports. The PortSentry can take actions, like
    denying further access to the port.
  • This is based on the assumption that the hacker
    will first probe with a scanner the machine for
    weaknesses.
  • You install PortSentry in TCP-mode by
  • portsentry -tcp
  • ports are in portsentry.conf -file.

20
Detecting Intruders
  • LIDS
  • LIDS is an intrusion detection system that
    resides in the Linux kernel.
  • It basically limits the rights of a root user to
    do modifications. It limits root access to direct
    port access, direct memory access, raw access,
    modification of log files, limits access to file
    system. It also prevents installation of sniffers
    or changing firewall rules.
  • An administrator can remove the protection by
    giving a password to LIDS, but if a hacker breaks
    into the root, he cannot without LIDS password do
    much damage.
  • Is this good? it certainly makes the life of a
    hacker more difficult, but what about a hacker
    getting into the kernel?
  • How nice it is being an administrator using LIDS?
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