Theory and Practice of Network Centric Operations for Major Warfighting

1
Theory and Practice of Network Centric
Operationsfor Major Warfighting

Presentation to Transformation Short Course 25
Apr 06
Mr. John J. Garstka Asst. Director, Concepts of
Operations Office of Force Transformation Office
of the Secretary of Defense (703)
696-5713 john.garstka_at_osd.mil www.oft.osd.mil
2
Bottom Line Up Front

• Network Centric Warfare (NCW)
• An emerging Military Response to the Information
  Age
• Maturing capabilities demonstrated during OEF/OIF
• Evolving evidence base provides insight into
  capabilities of networked forces
• NCW Implementation
• Not just about technology
• Involves all lines of development

3
Overview

• Network Centric Operations as an Element of
  Strategy
• Tenets of Network Centric Operations
• Domains of Warfare
• NCO Value Chain
• Applying the NCO Value Chain to Major Combat
  Operations

4
Network Centric OperationsIn Strategy and Joint
Concepts
Fiscal Guidance (in lieu of JPG)
Presidents Budget
National Defense Strategy
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
National Military Strategy

Joint Operating Concepts
Joint Functional Concepts
Capabilities Based Assessment
Strategic Planning Guidance
QDR
Service / Joint Transformation Roadmaps
Strategic Transformation Appraisal
Joint Integrating Concepts
5
Network Centric OperationsAn Element of
National Defense Strategy
March 2005
6
Network Centric Operations
An Element of National Defense Strategy
Page 14
7
Networked ForceDescribed in Capstone Concept
for Joint Operations
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
August 2005
8
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
Characteristics of the Future Joint Force (1 of
2)

• Knowledge Empowered
• Emphasizes better decisions made faster through
  all levels of command
• Networked
• All joint force elements will be connected and
  synchronized in time and purpose to facilitate
  integrated and interdependent operations across
  the global battlespace
• Interoperable
• The future joint force will able to share and
  exchange knowledge and services between units and
  commands at all levels
• Expeditionary
• An expeditionary joint force is organized,
  postured capable of rapid and simultaneous
  deployment, employment, and sustainment.
• Adaptable/Tailorable
• An adaptable/tailorable force is versatile in
  handling disparate missions with equal success
  scalable in applying appropriate mass and weight
  of effort agile in shifting between types of
  missions without loss of momentum responsive to
  changing conditions and environments and whose
  leaders are intellectually empowered by a
  background of experience and education.

Source United States Armed Forces Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations Aug 05
9
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
Characteristics of the Future Joint Force (2 of
2)

• Enduring/Persistent
• A combination of mental will and physical staying
  power that enables a joint force to sustain
  staying power while breaking the adversaries.
• Precise
• The ability to act directly upon key elements and
  processes to enable commanders to shape situation
  or battlespace in order to generate the desired
  effects while minimizing unintended effects and
  contributing to the most effective use of
  resources.
• Fast
• Key to effectively controlling tempo is the
  ability to be faster than the adversary or
  situational events. The speed at which forces
  maneuver and engage, or decisions are made or
  relief is provided, will largely determine
  operational successes or failure.
• Agile
• An agile joint force has the ability to move
  quickly and seamlessly to diffuse (or help to
  diffuse) a crisis situation or effectively
  operate inside the decision loop of even the most
  capable adversary.
• Lethal
• This is the ability to destroy an adversary
  and/or his systems in all conditions and
  environment when required.
• h

Accessible at www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/con
cepts/approved_ccjov2.pdf
10
Characteristics of the Future Joint Force
Knowledge Empowered

• The future joint force will emphasize better
  decisions made faster throughout all levels of
  command. The fundamentals of this knowledge
  empowerment are experienced and empowered
  decision makers benefiting from an enhanced
  understanding of the environment, potential
  adversaries and cultures, as well as enhanced
  collaborative decision-making processes.
  Although we will never eliminate the fog of war,
  an increased level of understanding should
  empower leaders throughout the joint force. This
  will enable them to anticipate and act as
  opportunities are presented, apply innovative
  solutions, mitigate risk, and increase the pace,
  coherence, and effectiveness of operations even
  in complex environments. A knowledge empowered
  force, capable of effective information sharing
  across all agencies and partners, will be able to
  make better decisions quicker, increasing joint
  force effectiveness.

Source United States Armed Forces Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations May 05
11
Characteristics of the Future Joint Force
Networked

• All joint force elements will be connected and
  synchronized in time and purpose to facilitate
  integrated and interdependent operations across
  the global battlespace. A networked joint force
  can extend the benefits of decentralization-initia
  tive, adaptability, and increased tempo without
  sacrificing the coordination or unity of effort
  emblematic of centralization. The joint force
  will capitalize on being networked by making
  user-defined information and expertise available
  anywhere within the network, and will exploit
  network connectivity among dispersed joint force
  elements to improve information sharing,
  collaboration, coordinated maneuver, and
  integrated situational awareness. Networks
  should extend to interagency and multinational
  partners, where possible, to support unified
  action.

Source United States Armed Forces Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations May 05
12
How a Networked Force Operates Network Centric
Warfare
Creates an Information Advantage and translates
it into a decisive Warfighting Advantage
Information Advantage - enabled by the robust
networking of well informed geographically
dispersed forces Characterized by -
Information sharing - Shared situational
awareness - Knowledge of commanders
intent Warfighting Advantage - exploits
behavioral change and new doctrine to enable
- Self-synchronization - Speed of
command - Increased combat power
Exploits Order of Magnitude Improvement in
Information Sharing
13
Order of Magnitude Change
Historical Insights

• Characteristics of New Sources of Competitive
  Advantage
• Order of magnitude change in a key dimension of
  warfare
• Emergence of New Elite Displacement of
  Existing Elite
• Land Warfare Sustained Rate of Fire
• Rifle (1.8 x 101 rounds per minute)
• Machine Gun (6 x 102 rounds per minute)
• Land Warfare Sustained Speed Maneuver
• Cavalry Infantry
• Mechanized Armor Infantry Air Power Radio
• Warfare at Sea Range of Engagement
• Battleship 1.8 x 101 miles
• Carrier Aviation 1.8 x 102 miles
• Air Warfare Range of Engagement
• Artillery .7 x 101 miles (Standard Artillery)
  to
• 7 x 101 miles (70 Miles -
  Long Range German Artillery in WWI )
• Long Range Bomber 8.5 x 102 miles (Combat
  Radius for B-17) to
• 18 x
  102 miles ( Combat Radius for B-29)

14
Domains of Warfare

• Shared Situational
• Understanding
• Awareness
• Assessment

Social Domain
Leadership Unit Cohesion Morale

• Situational
• Understanding
• Awareness
• Assessment

Cognitive Domain
Mind of the Warfighter
Information Domain
Where Information is Created , Shared ..
Strike Maneuver Protect
Physical Domain
15
Information-Age Warfare
Sources of Advantage
Social Domain Cultural Awareness
Cognitive Domain Cognitive Advantage
Conveyed Commanders Intent
Plan, Organize, Deploy, Employ and Sustain Cycle
Compressed Operations
Shared Awareness
Network Centric Operations
Information Domain
Physical Domain Force Advantage Position
Advantage
Information Advantage
Precision Force
Speed and Access
16
Tenets of Network Centric Operations
The New
Value Chain High Level
Tenets of NCW A Hypothesis Regarding Sources of
Power
17

The Network Centric Operations Value Chain
Expanded
Cognitive Social Domains
Information Sharing
Networked Force
Common Picture
Self Synchronization
Physical Domain
Information Domain
18
A Tactical Picture
19
Bottom Line

• Networked Forces
• Outfight
• Non-Networked Forces

it allowed us to make decisions and execute
those decisions faster than any opponent.

Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan

Coalition Forces Land Component

Commander, OIF
23 April 03
20
Warfighting Advantage Evidence for Increased
Mission Effectiveness

• Maneuver Networked Ground Forces
• Networked coalition forces demonstrate
  unprecedented operational agility and speed of
  maneuver in defeating opposition forces
  (Operation Iraqi Freedom)
• Networked Stryker Brigade decisively engages
  OPFOR at JRTC -- 10 fold reduction in
  loss/exchange ratio form 10/1 to 1/1 (2003-2004)
• Protect (Counter Air) Networked Air Forces
• USAF found F-15Cs, working with data links
  (shared awareness), increased kill ratio by over
  100 -- 2.61 for both Day Night Ops (JTIDS
  Operational Special Project - Mid 1990s)
• Fires Networked Air and Ground Forces
• Networked Air and Ground Forces decisively defeat
  OPFOR at night (USA Division Capstone Exercise -
  Phase I, Apr 2001)
• Networked Air and Ground Forces decisively
  prosecute counter TBM mission (Operation Iraqi
  Freedom Western Iraq)

21
Network Centric Operations Case Studies

• Focus on behavior of networked military
  organizations
• Examine exercises, combat operations, and peace
  keeping operations
• Explore how US forces, US led coalition forces,
  NATO forces, and US allies operate with varying
  degrees of networking capabilities
• Employ a conceptual framework and a rigorous data
  collection and analysis methodology
• Provide insights into how organizations transform
  to enable network-centric operations
• Quantify the operational impact of networking
• Quantify Mission Effectiveness of Networked
  Forces
• Increases for high intensity conflict range from
  1.5 x to 10 x
• Demonstrate the value of connecting less than
  perfect networks
• Benefit of 10x to 100x improvement in information
  position
• Identify what really matters to the warfighter
• Improvement of situational awareness for
  commanders and their forces

22
Network Centric Operations Case StudiesInsight
into how Organizations Transform
People Innovation
People
People
Organizational Innovation
Organization
Organization
Process Innovation
Process
Process
Technology Innovation
Technology
Technology
Evolving Capability
Initial Capability
23
Getting the Decision Rules and Metrics
RightNetwork Centric Operations Case Studies
Military Support to Crisis
Stability Operations
Major Combat Operations
TF-50 (OEF) NSWG I (OEF/OIF)
SARS Singapore
Stryker BCT (OIF)

Military Support to Crisis Netherlands
Stryker BCT (JRTC) V Corps/3 ID (OIF)
NCO in SASO UK Low Intensity Conflict
Air-to-Air (JTIDS)
Hastily Formed Networks Hurricane
Katrina Response
Air-to-Ground (DCX-I /OEF/OIF)
NATO Task Force Fox
Air-to-Ground w/ SOF (OIF)
Joint Urban Operations
US/UK Coalition (OIF) NATO ACE Mobile Force Land
Completed Report Available Online Complete
Report Under Peer Review Ongoing Preliminary
Report Complete Ongoing Planned
NATO Response Force Assessment
Coalition Maritime Ops (OIF)
24
Network Centric OperationsCase Study Partners

• UK MoD
• US/UK Coalition Ops during OIF Major Combat Ops
  (MCO)
• Low Intensity Operations
• Singapore MoD
• Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
• Netherlands Armed Forces
• Military Support to Crisis
• Allied Command Transformation
• NATO Response Force Assessment
• OSD (Homeland Defense)
• SARS
• HQ USAF/A8XC
• Western Iraq during OIF MCO
• Network Enabled Air-to-Ground Ops
• Army War College
• V Corps/3rd ID during OIF MCO

25
Operation Iraqi FreedomObjectives and Actions

• Objectives
• Finish the Regime
• Eliminate WMD
• Capture/drive out terrorists
• Gain terror WMD Intel
• Secure the oil fields
• Deliver humanitarian relief
• Create conditions for representative government
  
• Insure territorial integrity

Attack Position

• Actions
• Fix with Special Operations
• Deny with Air Special Ops
• Seize oil fields early
• Kinetic and non kinetic attacks

Source USJFCOM OIF Lessons Learned
26
Operation Iraqi FreedomScheme of Maneuver
27
OIF Western IraqIntegrated Air - Ground Ops

• CFACC Supported Commander
• Missions TBM, ISR, CSAR Counter-Land
• Special Ops / Air Force Focus
• Non-contiguous Non-Linear Battlespace
• Economy of Land Force (500 US 10,000 Iraq)
• Non-Traditional Linkages of Infrastructure
  Networks Supported
• COIs Which Supported
• Non-Traditional Missions TTPs
• XATK NTISR

XATK On Call Attack NTISR Non-Traditional
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance COI
Community of Interestx
28
Western Iraq Missions

• Primary Counter-TBM in Western Iraq
• Identified by National Command Authority as top
  strategic priority
• Keep Israel out of the war
• Keep the Coalition intact
• Prevent Mid-East meltdown
• 410 AEW fighters other air SOF ISR CAOC
  TST / C2
• XATK (F-16C, A-10, GR-7) with inherent Non
  Traditional ISR and TST TTP
• Secondary CSAR ISR for Western Iraq
• CSAR HH-60s HC-130s PJs (Plus A-10 and F-16
  SANDY tasking)
• Traditional ISR PR-9s
• Tertiary / Ad Hoc
• CAS FAC-A
• Interdiction / Strategic Attack / DEAD / OCA
  Air-to-Ground OCA Air-to-Air
• JMO-Air

29
Western IraqCoalition Forces

• Coalition Ground Forces (JSTOF-West)
• 35 Coalition SOF Teams
• National Guard Conventional Light Infantry
• Company C/2-70 AR(-) of 3rd BCT/3Rd ID
• Coalition Air Forces
• 410th Aerospace Expeditionary Wing
• Unit Equipment
• 120th EFS CO ANG 18
  F16C
• 160th EFS AL ANG 18
  F16C
• 466th EFS Hill AFR 6 F16C
• 131st EFS Mass. ANG 24 A/O A-10
• ACC Rescue 6 HH-60 and
• ACC Rescue 4 HC-130
• 38th E Rescue SQ. 40 Technicians
• RAF 3rd SQD.
  8 GR-7 Harriers (AV8-B)
• RAF 39th RECON
  3 PR-9 Canberra's
• Theater ISR Assets

Aircraft equipped with Situational Awareness
Data Link (SADL)
Aircraft equipped with Litening II Targeting Pods
30
Western IraqMission Effectiveness

• The Western AO was seized successfully
• Preserved CFLCC forces
• CFACC/CFSOCC forces seized area size of
  S.Carolina
• Unprecedented synchronization of tactical air,
  ISR, SOF training and employment
• Asymmetry Airpower was the great enabler
• Ground Troop Ratio 500 Coalition SOF to
  10,000 Iraqis
• Airpower supported over 100 Troops in Contact
  engagements
• Key Measures of Effectiveness
• Zero 410 AEW fratricide - minimal collateral
  damage
• Zero 410 AEW aircraft lost

31
Western IraqCommand and Control Relationships
CFACC
General A.F.
Western Iraq
W-JFACC
SOF
410th AEW
US
UK
UK
AUS
US
32
Networking Networks With Deployable Gateways
AWACS
JOINT STARS
RIVET JOINT
F16C
F-15E
SADL NETWORK
LINK 16 NETWORK
RAF C-130
SIPRnet
CAOC
33
Networking Networks w/Deployable Gateways
GB SATCOM
ISR
Request for support

BUG-E as ROC
TOC
Request for Platform to engage target
BUG-E combines targeting info with SOF position
already on hand (no-latency)
SOF
Blue Force Position
Target Track
SOF Broker
410th AEW AOC
W-JFACC
GB Grenadier BRAT GCCS Global
Command and Control System ROC Remote
Operations Center TBMCS Theater Battle
Management Core System ADSI Air Defense System
Integrator TOC Tactical Operation Center
34
Networking NetworksLink-16/ SADL / EPLRS
F-16C Horizontal Situation Cockpit Display
UAV
GFAC
Friendly EPLRS Positions
GFAC 9 line Target
UAV SPI
A-10 FAC
LINK-16 Air Track
Link-16 Land Track
SADL Flight Member
35
Air-Ground Integration

• The effectiveness of Joint Fires Command and
  Control in the western desert can best be
  summarized by the results In the first 27 days
  of combat Ops the Joint Fires element at the
  JSOTF did 393 successful Joint Fires
  deconflictions while prosecuting the highest
  percentage of Dynamic Target strikes in IRAQ
  (40) . and had absolutely zero incidents of
  fratricide and injury due to friendly fire.
• SOF Commander

We were a totally integrated force, totally.
We had complete visibility on what SOFs ground
scheme and maneuver was gonna be. And as a
result we had faster decisions, better decisions
in terms of positive outcome. We had over a 100
troops in contact engagements in the west without
a single loss with anybody that we trained with.
MAJ. John D. Caine, USAF-ANG
36
Western Iraq Case StudySummary

• Western Iraq was the most networked theater of
  operations, operationally and tactically, in the
  history of warfare.
• 2nd largest conventional coalition SOF
  operation in the history of warfare (after OEF)
• Largest scale use of data-linked tactical
  aircraft in history of warfare
• Largest scale deployment of aircraft performing
  non-traditional ISR mission
• Only area of operation in Iraq where Blue Force
  Tracking information on SOF conventional ground
  forces was provided via data link to fixed wing
  combat aircraft.
• Demonstrated capability for networking to
  decrease the response time for time sensitive
  targeting
• Zero Fratricide
• Only area of operations in Iraq where
  air-to-ground fratricide was eliminated

37
NCO Case Studies Preliminary FindingsCommand
and Control of a Networked Force
Whats Different?

• Common Operational Picture
• Reduced Fog of War
• Shared Situational Awareness (SA)
• Significantly increased SA for
• Commander
• Subordinate Commanders
• Individual Warfighters
• Decreased cognitive loading in developing SA
• Command Intent
• Increased shared situational understanding
• Enhanced by capabilities for real-time
  collaboration
• Enhanced Decision Making
• Speed Better Decisions
• Increased Tactical Agility
• Reduced Risk

38
Network Centric OperationsKey Relationships
Precise Application Of Force
Quality of Organic Information
Individual Situational Awareness
Precision Effects
Tempo
Decision Making
Common Tactical Picture
Common Tactical Picture
Speed of Maneuver
Shared Situational Awareness
Robustly Networked Force
Self Synchronization
Information Sharing
Social Cognitive Domains
Quality of Shared Information
Information Domain
Physical Domain
Collaboration
39
Network Centric Operations Case StudiesSummary
of Key Findings Relating to Technology

• High quality blue force information is a
  significant contributor to increased mission
  effectiveness
• Blue force information combined with voice
  communications significantly enhances blue force
  situational awareness
• Blue force information enhances identification,
  designation, and engagement of adversary forces
• Blue force information contributes to blue force
  combat identification and reduced fratricide
• Increased situational awareness had a significant
  positive impact on risk taking for ground
  maneuver forces
• High quality blue force situational awareness
  imperfect red force situational awareness
  survivability and lethality of ground forces
• SATCOM/Non-line of sight communications is a key
  enabler of distributed operations
• Enables Battle Command on the Move and enhances
  speed of maneuver for ground forces
• Enhances integration of conventional air and SOF
  ground forces
• Key enabler for SOF forces
• Accelerates time sensitive targeting for airborne
  aircraft
• Legacy system/network/coalition interoperability
  can be significantly enhanced through use of
  gateways

40
Conclusion

• Network Centric Warfare (NCW)
• An emerging Military Response to the Information
  Age
• Maturing capabilities demonstrated during OEF/OIF
• Evolving evidence base provides insight into
  capabilities of networked forces
• NCW Implementation
• Not just about technology
• Involves all lines of development

41

• Questions?