History of USSoviet Nuclear Arms Race

1
(No Transcript)
2
History of US-Soviet Nuclear Arms Race

• 1945-1950 US nuclear monopoly
• 1950-1960 Bomber race
• development of H-bomb "massive retaliation"
  strategy of US
• 1960-1970 Missile race
• end of atmospheric testing beginning arms
  control talks after 1962
• development of SLBMs
• 1970-1975 SALT I and ABM treaty formalizes
  mutual deterrence system
• development of MIRVs

3
History of US-Soviet Nuclear Arms Race

• 1975-1985 Arms control effort suspended
• Soviets achieve approximate parity with USA
• US develop cruise missiles and propose SDI
• 1985-1990 Gorbachev arms control period
• INF treaty
• 1991 Collapse of USSR unilateral disarmament
  measures
• Disarmament of Belarus, Ukraine, Khazakstan
• U.S. concern shifts to proliferation

4
Deterrence Theory Vocabulary

• nuclear fission ("A-bomb") - power measured in
  kilotons
• nuclear fusion ("H-bomb") - power measured in
  megatons
• mutual assured destruction (MAD) "balance of
  terror"
• second strike capability the ability to absorb a
  first strike by an opponent with sufficient
  survival retaliatory capability to inflict
  "unacceptable damage" on that opponent
• first strike capability the ability to attack an
  opponent with sufficient force that the opponent
  cannot inflict unacceptable damage in a
  retaliatory attack
• counterforce targeting attack military assets
• counter value targeting attack cities and
  industrial capacity
• nuclear triad
• ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile
• SLBM Submarine launched ballistic missile
• bombers (mostly B-52s some B-1 and B-2)

5
(No Transcript)
6
Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence

• 1. You never know when deterrence is working,
  only when it has failed.
• 2. If you believe in deterrence, you target your
  opponent's civilians, not the military
• 3. If your opponent believes in deterrence, then
  your attempts to protect your civilians will
  increase the likelihood of war, and therefore
  decrease their protection.

7
Dueling Propaganda

• Whence the Threat to Peace
• 78-page booklet from the Military Publishing
  House, USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow 1982
• Produced in response to Reagan military build-up,
  clearly modeled on Soviet Military Power
• Soviet Military Power
• Annual publication of the US Department of Defense

8
(No Transcript)
9
(No Transcript)
10
(No Transcript)
11
(No Transcript)
12
(No Transcript)
13
(No Transcript)
14
(No Transcript)
15
(No Transcript)
16
(No Transcript)
17
Arms Control Agreements Pre-WWII

• ???????????????????????????????????????????Great
  Lakes
• ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
  ???
• ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
  ???
• ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
  ????????????????????????
• ??????????????????????????

18
Arms Control Agreements Post-WWII

• ?????????????????????????? ???????????????? ????
  ?????????????? ?????????????? ??????????????????
  ??????????????????????
• ??????????????????????????????????????
• ?????????????????????????? ??????????????? ?????
  ?????????????????? ????????????????????? ???????
  ?????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
  ?????????? ?????????????????

19
(No Transcript)
20
NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES

• 10,000
• USA
• Russia
• 1000
• China
• 100
• Great Britain
• France
• 10
• India -- tested "peaceful nuclear device" in
  1974 tested "weapon" in May, 1998
• Israel -- assumed to have 50-100 weapons
• Pakistan -- probably has material for 10 weapons
  

21
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimates for
nuclear weapons, 2005

• USA
• 5300 operational warheads, 5000 reserve
• 500 ICBMs
• 14 submarines with SLBMs
• Russia
• 7200 operational warheads
• 585 ICBMs
• 12 submarines with SLBMs
• China
• Around 400 operational warheads
• 120 ICBMs
• 1 submarines with SLBMs, not clear it really
  works
• Great Britain, France (each)
• 4 subs with a total 64 SLBMS total
• Around 100 other warheads launchable from aircraft

22
Countries considered potential nuclear weapons
states by US

• Iran
• North Koreaas of 18 Oct 06 has conducted one
  very low yield nuclear test not clear whether
  this could be used as a weapon

23
Countries that have formally ended nuclear
weapons programs or weapons

• South Africa -- dismantled program before
  shifting political system to majority rule
• Brazil
• Argentina
• Ukraine (gave up control of nuclear weapons kept
  control of natural gas pipeline)
• Belarus
• Kazakhstan
• Iraq ended through the use of UN sanctions
• Possibly Libya

24
Nuclear Proliferation Factors Favoring

• Technology is well-understood and readily
  available
• Civilian nuclear power programs
• Weapons may be available for sale from the former
  Soviet Union
• Major powers have not disarmed
• Regional nuclear arms races in Middle East, East
  Asia
• Possibly still some prestige value in some
  states, e.g. Libya, North Korea

25
Nuclear Proliferation Factors Opposing

• Nuclear weapons have not been used in war since
  1945, so the military utility is unclear
• Strategic utility of a small number of nuclear
  weapons is unclear given the preponderance of
  power and delivery systems held by the USA
• Fear of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of
  domestic opposition when a government changes
  (South Africa)
• Nonproliferation regime has largely been followed
  by states

26
Ballistic Missile Proliferation

• USA has made everyone's air force obsolete, so
  they buy missiles instead.
• There is dual-use in satellite technology, and
  they are also considered legitimate weapons
• These do not have the bad reputation of nuclear
  weaponsin fact the damage they do is very
  limited
• the largest ballistic missile warhead is only
  enough to destroy one large building most are
  smaller. They are equivalent to a single bomb
• Iraqi SCUD attacks on Israel in 1992 directly
  killed only one person, though several others
  died from heart attacks, etc
• However, a lucky Iraqi hit on a US barracks in
  1992 killed a couple dozen people, and massive
  ballistic missile attacks by Hezbollah against
  Israel in 2006 caused substantial casualties (44
  dead, about 1,500 wounded)
• However, if a country wants zero-risk (as the USA
  tends to), they remove that possibility
• ABM systems have had an abysmal track record.

27
CHEMICAL WEAPONS

• Technology has been in place for a long timemost
  of the scary scenarios one hears could have been
  done any time in the past sixty years.
• They have been used only rarely by the regular
  military, and even less by terrorists (N1).
• They are very dangerous to develop and use. Real
  terrorists are not as smart as movie terrorists.
• Military utility is very limited they have not
  been a pivotal weapons even when widely used
  (WWI, Iran-Iraq War).

28
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

• Use is almost entirely hypothetical. Except for
  very primitive applicationse.g. distributing
  give smallpox-infected blankets to native
  Americansthey have never been used in warfare.
  It is also very unclear whether they would be
  effective except as a terror weapon.
• They make chemical weapons look safe in
  comparison.
• US has had two test runs on its biological
  warfare preparation
• Accidental Ebola virus outbreak in Virginia in
  mid-1990s. This turned out okay, but indicated
  how limited the response capability is.
• Anthrax letters in September-October 2001.
  Perpetrator is still unknown but disruptive
  effects were huge and several deaths occurred.

29
CYBERTERRORISM

• Apparently there are a lot of systems that are a
  lot more vulnerable than one might think,
  particularly in terms of critical infrastructure
  such as power and communications
• Unclear just how much is going on since no one
  seems inclined to advertise it. But some
  shutdowns of the long-distance phone system have
  been due to hackers, as has NASDAQ. (though a
  lot more disruptions have been due to a guy named
  Joe who has a can of beer and a backhoe)
• Cyber-wars have gone on, particularly between
  Palestinians and Israeli hackers. But this is
  pretty small stuff.

30
CYBERTERRORISM

• Systems are primarily vulnerable through idiotic
  human practices
• E.g. the most common passwords are password,
  blank and various obscenities.
• Microsoft software (e.g. Outlook/Exchange)
  appears particularly vulnerable but is
  nonetheless widely used
• Microsoft asserts that any widely used system
  will be successfully targeted
• Others outside of Microsoft have suggested that
  the security features of Windows appear to have
  been designed by chimpanzees
• Networked systems are generally assumed to be
  robust, not brittle.
• Some critical infrastructure has been connected
  to the internet without consideration of security
  implications
• An air gaphaving a human implement commands
  transmitted by computersolves this problem
• Critical infrastructure is generally robust due
  to the problems of dealing with Backhoe Joe, ice
  storms, and white-collar criminals.