A Forward-Secure E-Mail Protocol without Certificated Public Keys - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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A Forward-Secure E-Mail Protocol without Certificated Public Keys

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Password-based e-mail protocol. Considerations of an e-mail system for mobile applications ... g1, g2: two generators of G : A's one-time private/public key pair : ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: A Forward-Secure E-Mail Protocol without Certificated Public Keys


1
A Forward-Secure E-Mail Protocol without
Certificated Public Keys
  • Source Information Sciences, article in press
  • Author Jeong-Ok Kwon, Ik-Rae Jeong and
    Dong-Hoon Lee
  • Speaker Ting-Fang Cheng
  • Date 2009/10/08

2
Introduction (1/2)
The common e-mail architecture
Mail Servers
Store-and-forward system
Sender (A)
Receiver (B)
M
M
3
Introduction (2/2)
Considerations of an e-mail system for mobile
applications
  • Confidentiality and authenticity
  • PGP, 1995
  • Forward secrecy
  • Diffie-Hellman key exchange, 1976
  • Sun et al.s e-mail protocol, 2005
  • Kim et al.s e-mail protocol, 2006
  • Efficiency
  • Password-based e-mail protocol

4
Notations
  • SA the mail server which A registered
  • SB the mail server which B registered
  • pwA As password shared with SA
  • pwB Bs password shared with SB
  • G the finite cyclic group of order q
  • p a large prime
  • g1, g2 two generators of G
  • As one-time private/public key
    pair
  • Bs one-time private/public key
    pair
  • Ek(.)/Dk(.) the symmetric encryption/decryption
    algorithm with key k
  • PEk(.)/PDk(.) the public-key encryption/decryptio
    n algorithm with key k
  • Mac(.), F(.), H(.) three pseudorandom functions

5
Proposed protocol (1/6)
The scenario
  • Assume that A wants to send a message M to B
  • A and B have registered at distinct mail servers
    SA and SB respectively
  • SA stores (A, )
  • SB stores (B, )

6
Proposed protocol (2/6)
Login phase of A
SA
A
Selects xA ? Zq Computes
A, XA
Selects yA ? Zq Computes
SA,
Computes
Computes
7
Proposed protocol (3/6)
Login phase of A
SA
A
Verifies Computes
Verifies Computes
Key agreement
8
Proposed protocol (4/6)
Sending phase of A
SA
SB
A
Establish a short-term key kSS through a secure
AKE protocol
Computes
YB
Decrypts YB Computes
YA
9
Proposed protocol (5/6)
Sending phase of A
SA
SB
A
YA
Decrypts YA to get Computes
Z1
Decrypts Z1 to get Z Computes
Z2
Decrypts Z2 Stores (A, B, Z) in database
10
Proposed protocol (6/6)
Receiving phase of B
B
SB
B login to SB and produces a key KB shared with SB
Searches database Computes
Computes Chooses new public/private key pair
to replace the old one in its
mobile device
Decrypts the message to get Replaces
with
11
Conclusions
  • Forward secrecy
  • Password-based protocol
  • Practicality and efficiency
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