Machine consciousness: future, fact or fiction

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Machine consciousness future, fact or fiction ?

• Vanessa Herbert, Louise Redsull Anita Sanchez

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Defining consciousness

• Consciousness refers to those states of
  sentience and awareness that typically begin when
  we awake from a dreamless sleep and continue
  until we go to sleep again or fall into a coma or
  die or otherwise become unconscious. (Searle,
  1997)
• Many states of consciousness
• Consciousness is an inner, first person,
  qualitative phenomenon. It only exists when being
  experienced by a subject.
• Primary consciousness and higher order
  consciousness (Edelman, 1988)

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The study of consciousness

• Q. How do the events which register in our
  experience relate to those occurring in the
  brain?
• 2 methodological approaches 1st person
  (subjective) 3rd person (objective)
• Identity theory consciousness is identical to
  corresponding neural events.
• Functionalism Dennett (1991) states the essence
  of consciousness lies in the functions it serves.
  
• Analogy computer software human
  consciousness.
• BUT

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Phenomenal Consciousness

• Chalmers naturalistic property dualism
• Consciousness (the mind) and neural events (the
  body) are correlated but also distinct. E.g. A
  computer could report and act on its surroundings
  and therefore be functioning but it does not
  necessarily mean it is conscious.
• There is a missing ingredient of non-physical
  properties phenomenal consciousness a mystery?
• Chalmers (1996)- Qualia- the qualitative and
  subjective dimension of experience. E.g.
  sensations, feelings, perceptions, even thoughts
  and desires as well.
• Robots and computers do not have qualia but can
  have CRTM (Fodor, 1991). But syntax does not
  determine semantics (e.g. Searles Chinese room
  experiment)

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Phenomenal consciousness cont.

• Harnad (2003) Why are we not Zombies?
• Dennett (1991) We are Zombies
• Nagel (1979) asks us what it Is like to be a
  Dolphin? Humans could never know. Subjective
  experience cannot be reduced to neural events
  alone.
• Nagel (1986) explanatory gap due to gap in our
  understanding

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The science of consciousness

• The sources of conscious thought cannot be
  revealed by thinking alone.
• Hard problem of consciousness How do we turn
  the water of the physical brain into the wine of
  consciousness? (McGinn, 1991)
• No scientific explanation or description can
  substitute for the real thing.
• What are the fundamental properties that are
  shared by every conscious state? What kind of
  neural processes explain these properties?

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Neural correlates of consciousness

• NCC a specific system in the brain whose
  activity correlates directly with states of
  conscious experience. (Chalmers, 1998)
• Content of consciousness
• Binocular Rivalry in monkeys and humans coherence
  values (Finkel et al, 1989)
• Conscious experience requires Integration
• Conscious experience requires Complexity
• Dynamic Core hypothesis (Edelman Tononi, 2000)
• Qualia

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Can we create consciousness in an artificial
brain?

• The brain is unique in its organisation
• Artificial brain- is it possible?
• An artificial brain is possible in principle,
  although difficult to create (Dennett, 1994)
• Complexity is not sufficient
• We need to understand causation
• An artificial brain might cause consciousness
  though it is made of some substance totally
  different from neurons, so long as it has the
  causal power to get us over the threshold for
  consciousness (Searle, 1997)
• If the brain has physical features that cause
  consciousness (dynamic core for example), we need
  to understand how they cause consciousness

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Free Will/Volitional Consciousness

• McCarthy (2000)- humans computers have
• External free will results we/it can achieve.
• Internal free will knowledge of what we/it can
  achieve.
• Similarly Dennett (1984) is a soft determinist-
  humans have free will even if actions are
  determined by internal decision processes at a
  neural or cybernetic level
• But what about animals? Human beings are not
  alone in having desires and motives, or in making
  choicesNo animal other than man, however,
  appears to have the capacity for reflective
  self-evaluation (Frankfurt, 1971)
• Maybe free will is an illusion, and we are
  nothing more than sophisticated meat machines-
  also a mystery!

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Can a machine ever achieve consciousness? A
critique

• A problem of definition
• Defining Consciousness
• Defining Machine
• The actual question... Can a man-made artifact
  be conscious? (Harnad 2003).
• (Blackmore 2003, Franklin 2003)

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Can a Machine Ever achieve consciousness? A
critique cont.

• A problem of recognition
• No objective test or equivalent to the Turing
  test
• The other minds problem (Descartes)
• The misattribution problem (Torrance 2003)
• The impact of our willingness to Anthropomorphise
  (Blackmore 2003, Sharples et al 1989).
• Implications for machine consciousness (Harnad
  2003).

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Moral and Ethical Implications

• Torrance (2007) how should conscious machines be
  treated?
• Should they be granted a sense of social and
  ethical presence free from racism and speciesism?
• Implications for researchers.
• The implications of importing machines into us
  (Blackmore, 2003)
• But, do we really need or want conscious machines?

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Conclusions

• Machine consciousness valid topic for study
  (Holland, 2003)
• Each theory of consciousness has different
  implications for the likelyhood of machine
  consciousness
• Research is asking more questions than it answers
• If machines are prescribed with as if
  consciousness then the question of whether they
  are really conscious will become irrelevant.

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References

• Blackmore, S. (2003). Consciousness in meme
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• Blackmore, S. (2003). Consciousness an
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• Chalmers, D. (1996) The Conscious Mind. Oxford
  Oxford University Press.
• Chalmers, D. (1998) Neural Correlates of
  Consciousness Empirical and Conceptual
  Questions. MIT Press URLhttp//consc.net/papers/
  ncc2.html
• Dennett, D. (1984) Elbow room the varieties of
  free will worth wanting. MIT Press.
• Dennet, D.C. (1991) Consciousness explained.
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• Dennett, D.C. (1994) Consciousness in human minds
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• Edelman G.M. Tononi, G. (2000) Consciousness
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• Finkel, L.H. Edelman, G.M. (1989) Integration
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• Fodor, J. A., 1991, Replies. In B. Loewer
  andG.Rey (eds) Meaning in Mind Fodor and his
  Critics. Ox ford, UK Basil Blackwell, pp.
  255-318.

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• Frankfurt, H. G. (1971). Freedom Of The Will And
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• Torrance, S. (2003). How should we treat them?
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  on machine consciousness. Retrieved from the web
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