Briefing on Afghanistan

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Briefing on Afghanistan

• Barnett R. Rubin
• AFNORTH
• 3 December 2003

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I. Mission of ISAFSecurity for State Building

• Help Afghans provide security as they build
  institutions to do so themselves.
• Effective provision of security requires
• Military (ministry of defense)
• Police (ministry of interior)
• Legitimate government accountable to people
• Economy supplying legal livelihoods and adequate
  tax base

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ISAF Mandate in the Bonn Agreement (Annex 1)

• Security the responsibility of Afghans.
• Request international aid in establishment and
  training of new Afghan security and armed
  forces.
• Till then, UN-mandated force for Kabul and
  environs, expanded elsewhere as appropriate.
• Parties to Bonn agree to withdraw all military
  units from Kabul and other urban centers or other
  areas in which the UN mandated force is
  deployed. Not implemented.

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Security from what for what?

• Security from
• Factional pressure to assure that capital is
  national center.
• External attack (Taliban, al-Qaida,
  Hizb-Hikmatyar)
• Security for
• Peace implementation, e.g. for DDR
• Training of new security institutions

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II. Land, people, nation

• Territory arid, mountainous, sparsely populated
• People dispersed, rural, urbanizing, with
  multiple sources of identity
• Economy poor, agricultural-pastoral, trade,
  criminalized
• Nation Long history, strong identity, weak
  institutions

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Territory Satellite View of Afghanistan
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Drought and Vegetation
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People Sources of Identity

• Family Patrilineal, Patriarchal
• Qawm solidarity group
• Clan/Tribe
• Ethnic Group
• Location (region, province, valley, city)
• Religion Islam, Sunni/Shia, Sufism
• Party/Faction

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Family and honor

• Patrilineal, patriarchal family is basic social
  unit.
• Creates close solidarity groups by lineage.
• Marriage is political and economic alliance of
  two lineages.
• Men must defend honor of family and home.
  Implications for searches.

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Qawm solidarity group

• Many potential units, mobilized by leadership and
  patronage.
• Kinship as idiom of solidarity inherited,
  created, fictive.
• Leaders khan, malik.
• Ethnicity situational and fluid, multilayered.
• Institutions shura, jirga

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Approximate location of ethnic groups (National
Geographic). 10 named groups.
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CNN Ethnic map (4 named groups) Beware of
ethnic percentagesNo census no definition of
ethnic membership no definition of
population.Hot political issue whose
Afghanistan is it?
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CIA ethnic map (11 named groups)
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BBC Ethnic map (9 named groups)
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Islam

• Central identity
• Sects Sunni/Hanafi, Shia, Ismaili
• Worship, law, Sufism
• Islamic politics local alliances, national
  parties, ulama, shura.
• Islam and state Key issue not whether state is
  Islamic, but who determines what is Islamic.

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Major parties/factions

• No legal parties as yet.
• Current factions remnants of jihad, regime
  militias (Jamiat, Junbesh, Shura-yi Nazar).
• New parties forming (Nehzat, royalists, others)
• Regionally based factions.
• Anti-regime groups Taliban, Hizb-i Islami of
  Hikmatyar, al-Qaida (Arab and other non-Afghan)

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III. State and power

• Descended from Pashtun tribal empire established
  in 1747.
• Pre-1978 Rule by Pashtun dynasty through
  ethnically mixed centralized, weak state.
• Last 25 years
• Collapse of state
• Empowerment of non-Pashtun militias
• Formation of transnational networks
• Pashtun reassertion by Taliban

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Centralized administration, weak state

• Power centralized in executive
• No provincial or local governments
• Weak state pre-1978 domestic revenue 6, state
  expenditure 10 of GDP
• Balance covered by foreign aid
• Informal self-government at local level. Local
  shuras built by UN, NGOs.

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Legal administrative map

• Territory divided into 32 provinces, 300
  districts.
• Governors, district heads appointed by center.
• All revenue, foreign aid belongs to center.

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Rough de facto power map(omits Eastern
Afghanistan)

• Warlords head ethno-regional militarized
  patronage networks
• Official positions military/civilian
• Control of resources
• Foreign aid
• Legal duties and taxes kept illegally
• Parallel economy

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IV. International intervention and the Bonn
Agreement

• Afghanistan on 10 Sept. 01 Taliban vs. NA
• International response to 9/11/01
  counter-terrorism, regime change
• Bonn Agreement timetable, benchmarks
• Defining success in Afghanistan building a
  sustainable state
• Back to ISAF mandate

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Afghanistan on 10 Sept. 2001

• Taliban Islamic Emirate controls most of country
• Who are Taliban?
• Response to warlordism after 1992
• Start as Qandahari group (Deobandi mullahs)
• Link to Pakistan more than an ally
• Pashtun reassertion
• Growing links to al-Qaida

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Resistance to Taliban (UF/NA)

• Mostly non-Pashtun
• Supplied by Iran, Russia, through C. Asia
• US non-lethal aid, intelligence cooperation,
  after embassy bombings of August 1998
• No effective unified command
• Holds UN seat, tenuous international legitimacy
• Dialogue with Zahir Shah in Rome

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Other groups/processes

• Zahir Shah/Rome group
• Cyprus, Peshawar groups
• NGOs, civil society

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US response to 9/11

• Overthrow Taliban regime if do not give up
  al-Qaida leaders
• Arm and fund UF/NA commanders plus others
  (Pashtuns, e.g. Hamid Karzai) to fight with US
  aid through Special Forces and CIA
• Result on ground revival of warlordism

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Bonn Agreement (Dec. 5, 2001)

• Not a peace agreement
• UN mediated agreement on forming government after
  overthrow of Taliban
• Occurred after NA/Shura-yi Nazar occupation of
  Kabul, revival of warlords.
• Established legal framework for power,
  incorporating facts on ground.

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Legal/political framework of Bonn

• Restore 1964 constitution without king,
  parliament
• Interim administration under Karzai (6 months)
• Emergency Loya Jirga chooses transitional
  administration
• Constitution, elections by June 2004

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Political deal of Bonn

• Shura-yi Nazar controls power ministries, cedes
  head of state to Qandahari Pashtun from Rome
  group
• Regions controlled by commanders allied with US
  to fight Taliban, al-Qaida, mostly NA
• Zahir Shah returns, opens LJ

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Rough de facto power map(omits Eastern
Afghanistan)

• Warlords head ethno-regional militarized
  patronage networks
• Official positions military/civilian
• Control of resources
• Foreign aid
• Legal duties and taxes kept illegally
• Parallel economy

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Situation by theater

• Kabul and national government
• Northeast (Shura-yi Nazar, Jamiat)
• East (Jalalabad Hazrat Ali, Hajji Din Muhammad,
  the Kunar/Nuristan problem)
• Southeast Tribal fragmentation, Taliban
• South Changes in Qandahar? Taliban
• West Herat Ismail Khan vs. center
• North Mazar Dostum vs. Atta
• Center Bamiyan Khalili, excluded no more

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Basic contradiction (1) of post-Bonn
counter-terror vs. peace building

• Counter-terror military campaign allied with
  warlord militias in Pashtun areas
• State building make Afghanistan permanently
  immune to terror by building legitimate state,
  removing or transforming warlords, bring Pashtun
  leaders into power coalition
• Need for Pashtun inclusion vs. empowering
  non-Pashtun anti-Taliban allies
• Control of Kabul by Fahim/Shura-yi Nazar vs.
  political need to demilitarize.

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Basic contradiction (2) of post-Bonn politics
without state building

• ELJ Insecurity and failure to make government
  more representative
• Effect on constitutional drafting fear of
  intimidation
• The revival of the Taliban
• The impossibility of elections

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Elements of state building

• New security forces subject to rule of law
• Reform of MoD, MoI
• Afghan National Army (ANA)
• Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR)
  of existing forces
• Means disempowering UF/NA
• Establishing national control of provincial
  administration, revenues

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Obstacles to state building

• Weak resource base of government
• Ineffective administration
• With US military aid, warlords captured parallel
  economy
• Drugs leading producer of opium half GDP
• Gems (emeralds, lapis lazuli)
• Customs, smuggling, transit trade
• Timber, arms, more

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Poor road network
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Reconstruction delayed, nearly invisible

• A. Government of Afghanistan estimate of needs
  over five years (15 billion). Source
  "Afghanistan High Level Strategic Forum,
  Brussels, 17 March 2004, Chairman's Summary,"
  http//www.af/resources/mof/adf-ahsf-artf/ahsf/AHS
  F20Chairmans20summary.pdf.
• B. Baseline World Bank/Asian Development Bank/UN
  Development Program preliminary estimate of needs
  over five years from (10.2 billion). Source
  World Bank, http//lnweb18.worldbank.org/
  SAR/sa.nsf/Attachments/ ex/File/n-ex.pdf.
• C. Total pledged at the International Conference
  for Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in
  Tokyo, January 2002, for first five years of
  reconstruction (5.2 billion), plus additional
  pledges by the US and others (preliminary total -
  7 billion). A more accurate tally of new
  pledges should be available in late February,
  after the second pledging conference. Sources US
  Government, Transitional Government of
  Afghanistan, Afghan Assistance Coordination
  Authority (AACA).
• D. Total committed as of 15 November 2003 (5.4
  billion). Source AACA
• E. Total disbursed as of 15 November 2003 (2.9
  billion). Source AACA.
• F. Total disbursed for reconstruction projects as
  of 15 November 2003 (2.04 billion), excluding
  humanitarian assistance, defined as refugee/IDP
  aid, food, and relief commodity distribution, and
  coordination costs of international agencies.
  Source AACA.
• G. Total disbursed for reconstruction projects
  that have begun as of 15 November 2003 (1.8
  billion). Source AACA.
• H. Total expenditure on reconstruction projects
  that have been completed as of 15 November 2003
  (.11 billion). Source AACA.

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Current political issues

• Who has power?
• Weakening Panjsheris MoD reform, ANA, MoI
  reform, DDR
• State building and Pashtun technocrats UF vs.
  Ministries of Finance and Interior
• Constitution and future government
• Form of government and ethnic balance
• Rights and judiciary
• Islam and the state
• Degree of centralization

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Regional environment pre-9/11

• States
• Pakistan sponsor of Taliban
• Iran, Russia, Tajikistan sponsors of NA
  Uzbekistan and Dostum
• Non-state actors, networks
• Pakistani parties
• Al-Qaida
• Traders, smugglers, refugees

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Regional environment post-9/11

• US-coalition presence a deterrent to open
  regional interference
• Skepticism over US commitment keeping options
  open
• Pakistans choice partner or target
• Ally against al-Qaida
• Sanctuary and support for Taliban
• Iran multiple tracks
• Russia support for NA

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US policy reluctant nation builder

• Two policies in conflict DoD, State
• The Congressional critique
• Belated policy shift accelerate success
• Shift from war to stabilization coordinate
  military with political
• Double reconstruction funding
• Change rules of engagement on green on green
• Support ISAF expansion
• Focus on the south

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ISAF indispensable leverage for state building

• In Kabul
• Oversee withdrawal, DDR of Fahims forces
• Support MoI to establish security in city
• Establish external security, prevent infiltration
• In Provinces
• Leverage for administration change
• Security for DDR
• Security for reconstruction of administration

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PRTs, ISAF expansion, reconstruction

• Provincial Reconstruction Teams
• Origin in coalition experience
• Relation of security to reconstruction
• Inadequacy of PRTs
• ISAF expansion
• PRT/PST as unit of expansion
• Need for uniform mandate

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ISAF PRTs, PSTs and reconstruction

• Principal mandate stabilization under national
  control
• Provide environment for SSR and administrative
  reform
• Security for reconstruction actors
• Focus on civil affairs activities others can or
  will not do, such as building government offices,
  courts

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Strengthen national, not necessarily central,
government

• Liaison through MoI general
• Meet regularly with local shuras, elders,
  together with administration
• Focus on stabilization, patrolling, strengthening
  government response to security threats

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NATO Condemned to success

• The only exit strategy success
• Local support for the goals of the operation is
  strong
• Providing, deepening, and expanding security
  necessary to deepening and expanding peace
  process, state building, to provide sustainable
  resistance to re-establishment of terror bases