Humanitarian Intervention in a Fragile State: A Case Study of Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka

1
Humanitarian Intervention in a Fragile State A
Case Study of Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka

• Dr. Shaheen Akhtar
• Research Fellow
• Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad.

2
Defining Humanitarian Intervention in a Fragile
State

• Fragile State
• A fragile State is a state significantly
  susceptible to crisis in one or more of its
  subsystems. It is vulnerable to internal and
  external shocks and domestic and international
  conflicts.
• Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC).
• Drivers of fragility weak political
  institutions, economic decline, poverty,
  geogrphy, history and violent conflict.
• Weak institutions are central driver of a state
  fragility.
• Violent conflict is the ultimate manifestation of
  state fragility
• A states geogrphy and history can also play a
  role in driving fragility.
• A low strategic value in eyes of int. actors
  contribute/ reinforces to a states fragility.

3
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention

• Humanitarian Intervention Definition
• HI is a principle in Int. customary law, referred
  to the armed interference in a sovereign state by
  another with the stated objective of ending or
  reducing suffering within the first state. That
  suffering may be the result of civil war,
  humanitarian crisis, or crimes by the first state
  including genocide.
• The legal context of HI
• The legal framework of HI incl.military
  intervention is based on various provisions of
  the UN Charter. The legal experts, however,
  interpret it either in justify or oppose
  humanitarian intervention.
• Opponents argue Article 2 (4), of the UN
  charter, prohibits the threat or use of force
  against another state. It states
• All Members shall refrain in their int.
  relations from the threat or use of force against
  the territorial integrity or pol. independence of
  any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
  with the Purposes of the UN.

4
Contd

• Article 2 (7) also states Nothing contained in
  the present Charter shall authorize the UN to
  intervene in matters which are essentially within
  the domestic jurisdiction of any state ..
• The proponents of HI justify it primarily in the
  name of a moral imperative "we should not let
  people die." This idea is grounded in the
  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 .
• Exceptions They also base their claims on the
  two exceptions to the Article 2 (4) prohibition.
  1) Article 51that allows a nation to use force
  in self-defense if an armed attack occurs
  against it or an allied country. 2) The charter
  also authorizes the Security Council to employ
  force to counter threats to or breaches of
  international peace.
• For the defenders, intervention is only
  legitimate when it is motivated by a massive
  violation of human rights and when it is put in
  motion by the UN Security Council. Chapters VI
  and VII also support this notion.

5
Contd

• The Political Context of HI
• In line with post-World War II Int.law, most
  govts. jurists have rejected unilateral
  humanitarian military intervention because of the
  potential that powerful states will abuse such a
  doctrine.
• The history of humanitarian military
  intervention is replete with examples of stronger
  states or coalitions invoking the doctrine of
  humanitarian intervention in order to conceal
  their own geopolitical interests.
• Somalia, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Kosovo,
  East Timor are examples of such interventions, to
  varying degrees justified in humanitarian terms.
• US-led coalition forces justified the invasion of
  Iraq on a variety of grounds, only one of whicha
  comparatively minor onewas humanitarian.

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Drivers of Fragility in Sri Lankan State

• Domestic, Regional international drivers of
  SLs fragility
• Domestic Drivers of Fragility
• Weak/small in terms of size and capability
  (mil. Eco, natural resources)
• Geography locational factor-. proximity with
  India, a strong regional power. low strategic
  value as compared to India
• Weak state institutions majoritarian structures
  of governance denying Tamils their due pol. eco.
  educational cultural rights that have remained
  at the heart of ethnic conflict in SL.
• Violent Tamil-Sinhala conflict since 1983, now
  spearheaded by the LTTE. LTTE is running a
  virtual defacto Tamil state in the Jaffna
  peninsula of SL in the North.
• Lack of economic growth/ discriminatory
  developmental policies are both a cause of the
  conflict sustaining it too.

7
Map of Tamil Eelam
8
Contd

• Regional Drivers of SLs Fragility
• India, the most powerful factor big in size
  powerful in terms of mil. Eco natural
  resources.
• Tamil Nadu linkages with the Sri Lankan Tamils
  playing imp. role in SLs ethnic conflict,
  especially in the 1980s.
• Hegemonic attitude of India towards the region in
  general and SL ethnic crisis in particular.
• Supportive to Sri Lankan Tamils militants-
  sheltering, arming training, financing them in
  the 1980s. .
• Supportive Int. attitude towards Indian
  humanitarian mil. intervention in 1987-90.
• Feeble regional response to Indian intervention
  in SL in 1987-90.

9
Contd

• International Drivers of SLs Fragility
• As a small state, Sri Lanka was never taken
  seriously in the superpower rivalry in the Indian
  Ocean/South Asian region. Even during the time of
  tight bipolarity SLs position vis-à-vis India
  was marginal. From 1983 to 1990, loose bipolarity
  also did not enhance SLs position in the
  strategic calculations of the superpowers
• In fact, US/SU Cold War rivalry enhanced Indias
  strategic value in the 1980s and that continued
  even in the unipolar world.
• Thereby, superpowers attitude was more
  favourable to India than SL in the 1980s.
  Endorsed Indias geo-political interests in SL
• Supported Indian mediation (1983-86) military
  intervention in SL (1987-90).

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Nature/Implications of Indian Humanitarian
Military intervention in Sri Lanka 1983-1990

• Looking from both Indian and Sri Lankan
  perspectives and at three main stages of the
  ethnic crisis a) July 1983 anti-Tamil riots, b)
  Forced airdrop, c) ISLA, July 1987 and induction
  of IPKF in Sri Lanka
• Indian Stance Humanitarian Considerations V
  Strategic Interests
• The entire Indian argument justifying Indian
  mediation in SLs ethnic crisis and subsequent
  military intervention was weaved around
  humanitarian considerations. In reality, however,
  India tried to protect its geo-political
  interests in SL. i.e. awarding of Trincomalee
  Oil Farm to a Western Consortium and expansion
  of VOA facilities in SL.
• July 1983 anti Tamil riots India highlighted
  atrocities against Tamils plight of Tamil
  refugees but kept arming sheltering, training
  training Tamil militants so as to maximize its
  leverage in mediation with SLG in the ethnic
  crisis as well as secure its geo-strategic
  interests in the island.

11
Contd

• Indira Doctrine ethnic violence in SL in 1983
  led to the formulation of Indira doctrine- an
  Indian s version of the Monroe Doctrine, wherein
  India viewed entire region as a single strategic
  unit and herself as the sole custodian of
  security and stability in the region.
• On 5 August 1983, intervening in a debate in Lok
  Sabha on the developments in Sri Lanka, Indira
  Gandhi stated
• In this matter, India cannot be regarded just
  like any country. Sri Lanka and India are the
  two countries who are directly concerned. Any
  extraneous involvement will complicate matters
  for both our countries.
• Forced Air drop/Operation Poomalai June 1987
• 3 June Failing to secure Consent from SLG, on
  3 June 1987, India sent a flotilla of 19 fishing
  boats carrying relief supplies under the Red
  Cross flag led by Vikram, a 1000-tonne Indian
  offshore patrol vessel out of

12
Contd

• Rameshwaran. A helicopter of the Indian navy and
  coastguard planes also accompanied the flotilla.
  The SL navy refused entry of the uninvited
  Indian vessels to SL and they returned to
  Rameshwaram.
• 4 June 1987 On 4 June India summoned the SLG
  High Commissioner in New Delhi B. Tilakaratne to
  the South Block and Indian Min. of State for
  External Affairs, K. Natwar Singh told him that
  in 35 minutes, India would airdrop relief
  supplies over Jaffna.
• 4 June 1987, India launched its Operation
  Poomalai (garland). It sent five Indian Antonov-
  32 transport planes escorted by four Mirage 2000
  jet fighters to air drop relief supplies over
  Jaffna. They dropped 25 metric tones of food and
  medicines over Jaffna. They were instructed to
  return fire in the event that they were attacked,
  and the Indian air force was placed on full alert
  to meet any eventuality.

13
Contd

• Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) July 1987
  Intervention upon Invitation
• India justified its military intervention/inductio
  n of IPKF in SL under the ISLA which was signed
  on 29 July 1987. India maintained that ISLA was a
  product of a consensus between SLG and GOI
  wherein SL invited IPKF to SL. and. In fact,
  Accord was primarily geared to secure Indias
  geo-strategic interests vis-à-vis SL.
• Induction of IPKF The stated objective of the
  IPKF was to disarm the insurgents within 72
  hours, guarantee and enforce the cessation of
  hostilities and provide security to the Tamils.
  However, PM Rajiv Gandhi envisaged a wider
  political role by stating that they would help
  implement the agreement to end the ethnic
  struggle in SL.

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Sri Lankan Stance on Indian Humanitarian
Intervention

• As a fragile state, dominant perception in SL
  regarding Indias involvement in its ethnic
  crisis and subsequent intervention was that India
  readily exploited ethnic conflict in the island
  to coerce it into abandoning pro-Western foreign
  policy, eco. liberalization as well as extracting
  more concessions for the Tamils in SL.
• July 1983 riots SL as a fragile state could not
  properly handle the enormity of anti-Tamil riots
  in July 1983. The riots unleashed a wave of
  refugees into neighbouring Indian State of Tamil
  Nadu which have 50 million Tamil population,
  having deep cultural, linguistics links with the
  SL Tamils.

15
Contd

• The strong Indian reaction to 1983 riots and
  subsequent support to Tamil insurgents greatly
  scared the SL leadership of Indian intensions and
  they feared an Indian invasion of SL.
• June 1987 Forced air drop
• SLG pointed out that neither has the GOSL
  solicited any humanitarian aid nor does the
  situation prevailing in the North require any
  assistance from any outside sources the GOSL is
  in a position to meet all the requirements.
• The SLG strongly condemned the Indian forced
  airdrop calling it a naked violation of our
  independence and an unwarranted assault on our
  sovereignty and territorial integrity a
  rehearsal for an invasion, and lodged a formal
  protest note with the UN Security Council.

16
Contd

• A SL analyst Rohan Gonartna observed Sri Lanka
  did not have the capability to fight back-
  otherwise, the mood was war. However as a
  fragile state SLcould not prevent India from
  airdrop. In fact SL halted its mil ops in the
  North as India desired.
• July 1987 ISLA Sri Lanka regarded the Accord and
  subsequent Indian military intervention in Sri
  Lanka by way of induction of Indian Peace Keeping
  Force (IPKF) as a product of coercive
  diplomacy. The Annexures letters of exchange to
  the Accord ensured that SL changes its policy on
  Tricomalee Oil Tank Farms and VOA.

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International Response to Indian Humanitarian
Military Intervention in SL

• As a fragile state SL could not secure the
  support of any superpower, including its ally,
  the US. In August 1983, President Jayewardene had
  stated that if in the future, the SL govt. felt
  that there was a threat from India, it would turn
  to the US, UK and like-minded powers for military
  assistance in defending its territory against the
  Indians. None of them came to SLs rescue, when
  India actually intervened.
• US Response
• Although US strongly supported the unity and
  territorial integrity of SL and sought a peaceful
  negotiated settlement of the ethnic crisis, it
  extended limited support to Colombo to combat
  terrorism, urged Colombo to address human rights
  concerns and strongly supported Indian mediation
  in finding a political solution of the ethnic
  crisis. The US never gave commitment to SL of
  support in case of invasion of Sri Lanka.

18
Contd

• The US supported Indias forced airdrop over
  Jaffna peninsula. The State Department only
  expressed regrets that the discussions between
  Indian and Sri Lanka on the modalities of
  delivering relief supplies to Jaffna failed and
  consequently the GOI felt it necessary to deliver
  supplies by air.
• The US endorsed ISLA and extended full support to
  Indian intervention and stationing of Indian
  troops (IPKF) in Sri Lanka.
• The Soviet Response
• The Soviet attitude towards Sri Lankas ethnic
  crisis during the Cold War era was primarily
  determined by her close relationship with India
  with which it had a community of fundamental
  interests.
• Moscow found an imperialist connection in Sri
  Lankas ethnic crisis that was meant to hurt
  Indian interests. It did not criticize Indian
  support for arming and training of the Tamil
  militants.

19
Contd

• Moscow strongly supported Indian mediation in Sri
  Lankas ethnic crisis.
• At the time of the Indian airdrop on Jaffna, the
  Indian External Affairs Minister N. D. Tiwari was
  in Moscow and appreciated the Indian
  position on the issue.
• Moscow supported the ISLA and Indias
  peacekeeping role in Sri Lanka for political and
  strategic reasons. The provisions contained in
  the Letters of Exchange indirectly served not
  only India but also Soviet interests in the
  region.
• Regional Response
• Pakistan, Bangladesh and China criticized the
  airdropping as violation of int. law and as
  interference in the internal affairs of a small
  country. They also mildly criticised ISLA, but it
  did not prevent India from intervening in SL.

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Conclusion

• The case study of the humanitarian intervention
  in the fragile state of Sri Lanka shows that
  Indian intervention in SL was unilateral and
  against Article 2 (4) 2 (7) of the UN charter.
  It was not covered by the UN Security Council or
  Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter. So legally
  speaking it was untenable.
• As far as moral imperative of the HI was
  concerned, the intervention in fact, led to more
  violence in SL. .In the North East, IPKF was
  fighting the same Tamils that it had come to
  protect while creation of TNA pitted Tamils
  against Tamils. In the South the ISLA led to
  second JVP uprising that resulted in the killings
  of thousands of Sinhalese youth.
• Most importantly, the Indian HI aggravated the
  fragility of the Sri Lankan state, it widened the
  wedge between the Tanils and the Sinhalese. It
  also led to the emergence of the LTTE as the most
  powerful armed group in SL which continues to
  resist a solution of the conflict within the
  framework of a united SL.
• It also hardened Sinhalese stance on Tamils
  demands who felt that Indian intervention
  manifested that SLs territorial integrity and
  sovereignty was at stake.