The Way Ahead in Counterproliferation

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The Way Ahead in Counterproliferation

• Brad Roberts
• Institute for Defense Analyses
• as presented to USAF Counterproliferation Center
  conference on
• Countering the Asymmetric Threat of NBC Warfare
  and Terrorism
• May 3, 2002

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USAF CP Master Plan Purpose

• Consolidates existing CP guidance
• OSD, Joint Staff, and Air Force
• Provides overarching guidance to coordinate the
  array of air space assets on CP activity
• Accomplish function of a Mission Area Plan
• Institutes investment strategy process
• Identify current capabilities, deficiencies, and
  solutions
• Directs MAJCOMs to develop implementation plans
  to organize, train, and equip forces
• Responsive to CINC/other MAJCOM CP taskings
• Able to meet growing threat to peacetime bases

slide courtesy Col. Dutch Miller USAF (ret)
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Threat Planning and Response Are We Ready?

• Todays threat environment puts AF installations
  at risk from attacks using asymmetric weapons
• If ready we would expect to see
• clear, executable guidance
• educated aware personnel
• the right people responding with the right
  equipment
• training exercises focused on these
  asymmetric threats
• with comprehensive, functioning assessment
  inspection programs

slide courtesy Col. Dutch Miller USAF (ret)
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USAF has a vision of necessary readiness a
plan for getting there made substantial headway
in implementation But How much progress?
How much further to go? What is the
difference between progress and success? If
success is at the top of 39 steps, how many has
USAF climbed?
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Steps and escalatorsa metaphor to illuminate
some counterproliferation challenges
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A More Rapid Climb up the Capabilities and
Learning Curves Would be Possible
With Leadership from OSD Clear guidance Careful
monitoring Sufficient funding A Joint
Acquisition Program Timely and cost-efficient Effe
ctive at meeting USAF-specific needs Joint
Planning With CINCs
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But the escalator appears to be
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Up the Down Escalator Regular personnel turnover
in USAF Joint Staff OSD Near-crippling effect on
ability to build institutional memory to
accumulate necessary core of expertise.
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Challenges of Staying the Course Competing
Demands Within USAF Combating Terrorism Shifting
OSD Leadership Priorities SECDEF Aspin to
Rumsfeld DEPSECDEF Deutch to Wolfowitz JCS
Powell to Myers
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To get from here to there looks simple
But the reality is messy.
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The Lure of False Remedies There is no quick
fix. Not MOPP gear. Not improved detectors. Not
vaccination. The solution set is
broad. Counterforce. Improved CF! Improved
technologies. Better readiness. Different
CONOPS. In-place medical and tactical
responses. Knowledgeable, aware operators. There
is no 100 solution. But a 70 solution is
good. There will always be risks. Manage them.
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As we climb 39 steps Our adversaries are building
more. 3rd and 4th generation CW apply
biotechnology to BW improved delivery bigger
stockpiles NBC integration with their planners.
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Success Requires

• Keeping an eye on the threat environment to
  understand how it is evolving, especially as
  adversaries pursue work-arounds.
• Avoiding the lure of false remedies. Dont wait
  for the 100 solution. Dont expect counterforce
  to do the whole job. Learn to manage risks.
• Staying the course despite many competing
  demands.
• Exploiting fully the benefits of cooperation with
  the Joint Staff, OSD, the CINCS, the other
  Services. This may require re-motivating them.
  And its a two-way street.

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But What Is Success? A Strategic Answer

• Success is the ability to protect, project, and
  prevail against an NBC-armed regional aggressor.
  
• Success is sustaining the war-fighting in the
  face of NBC threats and attacks. It does not
  mean no damage from NBC attacks, but damage
  limited to levels comparable to historical
  experience.
• Success means that the US will not be compelled
  to
• limit its war aims short of satisfactory pol-mil
  goals
• accept new limits on usability of US conventional
  power
• rely on nuclear threats to deter types of WMD
  attack for which such threats may lack
  credibility.

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But What Is Success? An Operational Answer

• The ability to attack and defeat adversary NBC
  weapons and infrastructure with minimal
  collateral damage.
• The ability to recover rapidly from WMD attack
  and to meet CINC optempo requirements.
• The ability to rapidly replace or otherwise
  compensate for force structure components lost to
  attack.
• The ability to assure war-fight critical
  infrastructure.

Success equates with counter-NBC war-fighting
capabilities in the form of prepared tactical
and operational responses.
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How Good Is Good Enough?

• It depends on the adversarycapability and will.
• Different operational challenges from adversary
• With few WMD (mostly CW) and generally risk
  averse.
• With a capacity for periodic CW re-attack that
  matches agents and delivery systems to target
  characteristics and a capacity for BW attacks
  seeking primarily political objectives.
• With many WMD (in a mix of NBC) and risk taking,
  including willingness to project CBW into US
  sanctuary for operational effects.
• With enough WMD to extinguish America and the
  will to do so.

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The Apocalyptic Scenario

• With enough WMD to extinguish America and will
  to do so.
• Good enough? Protection and defense seems
  unlikely ever to be adequate to eliminate all
  vulnerabilities.
• But for this problem, nuclear deterrence seems
  promising. The threat of an overwhelming and
  devastating response ought be credible (unless
  the adversary believes such an attack can
  successfully be conducted covertly).

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The Asymmetric Scenarios

• With few and risk averse, good enough can be
  measured in ability to recover air base ops after
  attack.
• With some ability to re-attack, capabilities must
  be both
• deeper (decon, medical, personnel)
• but broaderincreased reliance on sensors (mostly
  CW) in effort to gain battlespace awareness.
• With many and risk taking, good enough requires a
  detailed theater-strategic plan encompassing
  operational adjustments at the theater level and
  backed by possible nuclear role.

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Good enough? Depends on the challenge. Differen
t levels of performance against different types
of threats. How far up this set of stairway
landings has the USAF gotten?
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At the top of the steps isnt simply success but
successfully passing a test of some kind.
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Iraqi BW and a War of Regime Survival

• 1990 CIA reports that Iraqs BW program is the
  most advanced in the Arab world.
• 1995 Iraq admits to filling aerial bombs and
  ballistic missile warheads with three biological
  agents and to predeploying those weapons prior to
  the Gulf War. Evidence surfaces that release
  authority for the use of such weapons was
  predelegated in the event the coalition sought to
  remove Saddam from power.
• 2001 A decade after sanctions were first
  imposed, Iraq has foregone approximately 100
  billion in lost oil revenues in its stand-off
  with the United Nations Security Council over its
  refusal to relinquish its BW capabilities.
• 2002 U.S. leaders begin to consider publicly
  the use of military force against Iraq to seek
  the end of Saddams rule.

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Conclusions

• When the time comes, the USAF will go to war
  against a CBW-armed adversary whether or not it
  is good enough. It may run very large risks.
• Consider the consequences of failure. Mission
  failure. Many preventable deaths. The public and
  the President will be angry that more was not
  done when it could have been done.
• To successfully manage those risks requires
  having prepared tactical and operational
  responses. This requires a broad and deep
  solution set and knowledgeable, aware
  operators.
• The USAF has had a decade to prepare counter-NBC
  war-fighting capabilities. It has gotten farther
  than the other Services in studying the problem
  and creating tools to solve it. But it is not
  prepared. The way ahead should be an urgent rush
  to bring the necessary operational adjustments
  into being.