Radicalization of European Jihadi Networks

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Radicalization of European Jihadi Networks

• Marc Sageman
• sageman_at_post.harvard.edu

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Methodology of Research

• Emphasis is on application of scientific method
  to terrorism studies
• Evidence based terrorism research
• Open source data, open to peer review criticism
• Analysis of data, using rules of the scientific
  method
• What is happening on the ground, and not
  exclusively based on an interpretation of what
  leaders say or write

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Interim Results

• Specific threat to the U.S.
• Started with 9/11 Perpetrators as index sample
• Identified terrorists networks operationally
  linked to above
• 400 biographies of terrorists Open Source
  information
• Trial transcripts
• Press accounts (Open Source Center)
• Academic publications
• Internet (corroborated)

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Global Salafi Jihad

• Violent Islamist born-again social movement
• Idealistic young people seeking glory by trying
  to build a better world
• View themselves as heroes fighting for justice
  fairness
• Crisis of value Salafi virtue v. Western
  decadence greed
• Utopia modeled on community of the Prophet his
  companions (Salaf)
• Four phases
• Peaceful capture of the state
• Against the near enemy
• Global expansion of defensive jihad
• Global offense against the far enemy
• Expel the West from the Middle East
• Use of violence against non-Muslim governments or
  population to establish an Islamist state

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Evolution of al Qaeda

• Three processes of self-selection of the most
  militants
• 1988-9 the most militants, who had come to fight
  the anti-Soviet jihad could not go home, stayed
  behind and formed al Qaeda
• 1991-2 the most militants expelled from Pakistan
  went to Sudan
• Switch of strategy from near enemy to far
  enemy
• 1996 150 militants expelled from Sudan returned
  to Afghanistan
• 1996-2001 Golden age of al Qaeda
• Control of Golden Chain exclusive funding for
  terrorism
• Control of training camps provision of shelter
• Staff for planning coordination
• Afghanistan, as failed state, has little ability
  to control al Qaeda
• Al Qaeda controlled social movement focused it
  on far enemy

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Poverty? Family of origin (SES)
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Islam? Devotion as youth
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Madrassa? Educational background
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Naïve teenagers? Age at joining

• Average Age 25.69

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Ignorance? Levels of education
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Religious? Type of education
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Lack of opportunity? Occupation
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No sex? Marital status
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No responsibility? Family status
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Just bad? Criminal background
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Criminal Background

• Vast Majority no crime
• Some major crime
• Robbery (Roubaix gang, Kelkal gang, JI)
• Drugs (Madrid, Strasbourg)
• Petty crime Maghreb logistic cells
• Credit card fraud, false documents, insurance
  fraud
• Drug traffic (more common now)
• ASPD eliminated
• Those least likely to do harm individually are
  most able to do so collectively.

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Simply mad? Mental health

• Very little evidence of mental illness
• Very little evidence of personality disorder
• No narcissism (willingness to sacrifice for the
  comrade cause)
• No pathological hatred
• Very little trauma in family studied usually
  overprotected youths
• Overall, good kids, except second generation
  Maghreb Arabs, who lived life of petty crime

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Place where they joined jihad
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Diaspora

• Global Salafi Jihad is a Diaspora phenomenon
• Expatriate Second/Third Generation
• 84 of Global Salafi Mujahedin have joined the
  jihad, while living in a Diaspora (87 in Western
  Europe)
• Link between terrorism Diaspora predated
  globalization not specific to religion or
  Islam
• Anarchists, IRA, LTTE, ETA

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Joining the Jihad

• Friendship (pre-existing) 68
• Bunch of guys collectively deciding to join
• Joining childhood friends
• Kinship 20
• Fathers, brothers, first cousins
• Importance of in-laws marriage to cement
  friendship bonds

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Trajectory of Muslim expatriates

• Upwardly geographically mobile (best
  brightest)
• Religious, caring middle class families
• Global citizens 3 or 4 languages, skilled in IT
• Sent to university in the West
• Separated from traditional bonds culture
• Homesick, lonely, marginalized excluded from
  society
• Adopt Western lifestyle, without relief
• Seek friends
• Drift to mosques for companionship, not religion
• Move in together (halal food), formed cliques

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Trajectory of 2nd generation immigrants

• Two main paths
• Second generation in the West
• Young economic immigrants to the West
• Upwardly mobile, completely secular background
• Discriminated by excluded from society
• Drop out of school
• Turn to petty crime drugs
• Form gangs
• Resentful reactive activation of collective
  identity
• Collectively drift to religion to escape
  situation
• Radicalized collectively
• Personal experience resonate with Salafi ideology

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Mobilization

• Spontaneously self-organized bunches of guys of
  trusted friends, from the bottom up
• No top down Al Qaeda recruitment program
• Self-selection 15 of volunteers accepted
• No brainwashing acquire beliefs of their friends
• No recruiter total proselytizing environment,
  constant mutual recruitment
• Social bonds came before ideological commitment

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Progressive Motivation

• Innocuous participation with ever closer set of
  friends
• Increased commitment in born-again movement
• Importance of specific script
• 12 mosques generated 50 of sample
• Faith commitment grounded in intense group
  dynamics
• Gradual development of collective identity
  (vanguard)
• Attraction of heroic jihadi pathway
• Gradual slide into violence
• In-group love self-sacrifice for comrades and
  the cause
• Out-group hate experience of discrimination
  exclusion
• Endorse takfir doctrine ? sanctions crime v.
  society

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Group Dynamics

• Explanation in normal group dynamics, rather than
  individual mental pathology
• Group acts as interactive echo chamber, leading
  to escalation, overcoming inertia fatalism
• Once in the movement, difficult to abandon it
  without betraying close friends family
• This natural intense loyalty to the group,
  inspired by a violent Salafi script, transforms
  alienated young Muslims into fanatic terrorists

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Radicalization

• Idealistic young people chasing dreams of glory
  (cause comrades)
• Bottom up process of radical group formation
• Four major factors
• Sense of moral outrage, activating Muslim
  identity
• Interpreted through specific ideology
• Resonates with personal experience
• Mobilized through networks

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Moral Outrage

• Political in nature
• Major moral violation (killings, injury,
  arrests)
• Usually anger, not personal humiliation
• Images of global horrors (TV or Internet)
• Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine, Iraq
• Local personal experience
• Above horrors are part of larger issue that
  affects people personally
• EUR gt U.S.

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Ideological Relevance

• Perceptions (frames) are crucial intervening
  variables
• Crisis of values (Western decadence v. Salafi
  virtue)
• Most relevant in Muslim countries trying to
  emulate the West
• EURgt U.S.
• Greater cultural rejection of outsiders
• National essence v. Melting Pot
• Myths of national essence excludes outsiders
• Countries built on immigration more accepting of
  outsiders
• Lack of European Dream v. American Dream
• Discrimination v. land of opportunity
• European collectivism v. American Individualism
• Individuals less prone to collective hostility to
  host population
• Grass-root voluntarism v. lack of governmental
  action
• Exclusion discrimination in EUR interpreted as
  War on Islam

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Resonance with Personal Experience

• Local structural grievances EUR gtgt U.S. ? War on
  Islam
• Historical
• Socio-economic
• Different immigrant population (unskilled v.
  skilled)
• Labor markets
• Welfare policies
• Leisure time (boredom) v. necessity of working
• Social rigidity v. grass root voluntarism
• Political
• Failure of top down integration policy
• Lack of alternative expression of social protest
• Reaction to Xenophobic Right
• Religious
• US tolerance of religious fundamentalism (defuses
  escalation)
• Salafi supply of religious alternatives jihadi
  models of heroism

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Mobilization through Networks

• Face to Face groups
• Gangs of young Muslims
• Segmented patterns of immigration
• France Oran (Kelkal Gang)
• Montreal Algiers (Fateh Kamel Group)
• Madrid Tetuan (3/11 Group)
• Britain Mirpur district of Azad Kashmir (7/7,
  Plane Plot)
• Amsterdam Al-Hoceima (Hofstad Group)
• Radical Muslim Student Associations
• Germany, U.S., Britain (active student social
  life)
• Study groups around radical mosques
• Al Quds, Finsbury Park, M-30, Lukmanul Hakiem
• Virtual groups
• Interactive chat-rooms (Osage)

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Why no CONUS attacks since 9/11?

• Mobilization is bottom up EUR gt U.S.
• EUR 340 M people 12-20 M Muslims
• U.S. 300 M people 3-6 M Muslims
• Expected arrests (terrorism) EUR 3-4 x U.S.
• Actual arrests (terrorism) thousand v. dozens,
  gt 10 to 1 ratio
• Canada Australia are intermediary
• Culture to U.S., but social system EUR
• No sleeper cells in U.S.
• Threat comes from outside, so far, mostly from
  Europe
• Good deterrence at borders (very few attempts at
  penetration)
• Good law enforcement
• Elimination of any inside threat

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Continued Evolution

• Success of Post 9/11 Counter-Terrorism campaign
• Elimination of sanctuary, funding, communication
  key leaders
• Increased worldwide vigilance
• Neutralization of al Qaeda proper (except for
  British Fx links)
• Physical break up of formal global Salafi jihad
  networks
• Same dynamics (self organized groups) but no more
  linkage
• Homegrown phenomenon (decentralized, loosely
  linked networks)
• Lack of strategic leadership restraints (more
  aggressive reckless)
• Local autonomy, self-financing self-training
• Informal communications, difficult to monitor
• Fuzzy boundaries no formal initiation or fixed
  numbers

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Toward a Leaderless Jihad

• Gradual evolution from face to face to online
  interactions
• Especially in Europe, with 90 Internet
  penetration
• Militant young people in Middle East Asia are
  online
• Growing importance of the Internet
• Social transformation of jihad (younger members
  women)
• Interactivity of chat-rooms is critical factor
• People change their mind thru discussions with
  friends family, not by reading impersonal
  stories (interactivity)
• Jihadi chat-rooms are Enemy Center of Gravity
• Virtual invisible hand organizing terrorists
  operations C2
• Links networks into global social movement
• Provides ideological guidance uniting vision
• True leader of jihad collective discourse on
  jihadi chat-rooms
• Ideological battleground