Title: The Aspen Institute Corporate Governance and Accountability Project:
1The Aspen Institute Corporate Governance and
Accountability Project
Rethinking MBA Curriculum in the Finance
Discipline Supported by the Alfred P. Sloan
Foundation Presented by John R. Becker-Blease,
Ph.D. Assistant Professor Finance Washington
State University, Vancouver Moderated by
Maureen Scully, Professor of Management,
University of Massachusetts, Boston and
Consultant to the Aspen Institute CGA Project,
2Incorporating Stakeholders into the Corporate
Finance Curriculum
3Goals of WSUVs Stakeholder-Engagement Model
- Stakeholder-focused leadership requires
- Understanding the vital interdependence between
businesses and critical stakeholders such as
employees, investors, customers, suppliers, and
public constituencies - Adopting an executive level perspective in making
decisions and taking actions that build strong
long-term relationships with stakeholders - And applying theory to solve practical problems.
4WSU MBA Curriculum
- Mktg 565 Managing for Long-Term Performance
- Acct 533 Administrative Control and Managerial
Accounting - MgtOp 590 Strategy Formulation and Organizational
Design - MgtOp 591 Statistical Analysis for Business
Decisions - MIS 580 Information Systems Management
- FIN 526 Problems in Financial Management
- MgtOp 593 Managerial Leadership and Productivity
- Mktg 506 Marketing Management and Administrative
Policy - MgtOp 589 Managing Value-Chain Partnerships
- MgtOp 585 Negotiations
- MgtOp 587 Business Ethics
- MgtOp 702 Final Oral Exam
5Financial Intermediation Research Society
- Teaching business ethics, always something of an
embarrassment, may simply come to be teaching
Finance well! - Teaching Finance correctly integrates ethics
into the business curriculum naturally, without
self-consciousness or embarrassment - Stuart Greenbaum Corporate Governance and the
Reinvention of Finance
6Objective Function
- We cannot maximize the long-term market value of
an organization if we ignore or mistreat any
important constituency - Michael Jensen Value Maximization, Stakeholder
Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function
7Course Modules
- Module 1 Review
- Module 2 Goal of the Corporation
- Module 3 Valuation
- Module 4 Capital Structure
- Module 5 Agency Theory Governance
- Module 6 Payout Policy
- Module 7 MA and Corporate Structure
8Teachable Questions
- Under what conditions is short-term stock
performance the equivalent to maximizing
shareholder value? - Who are shareholders and what are their
interests? - How can markets perform efficiently if
information is intentionally distorted? - What role should businesses play in determining
governments protection of the commons?
9Module Contents
- Learning Goals
- Required and Optional Readings
- Additional Materials
- Pedagogical Purpose Notes
- Additional Talking Points
- References
10Module 1 Review
- Learning Goals
- Review basic concepts of time value, project and
firm valuation, capital budgeting, risk-reward,
market efficiency. - Review market structures, short and long-term
equilibrium, competition, normal and excess
profit, barriers to entry, monopolies and
monopsonies. - Readings
- BMA CHs 1-12. (review of intro finance course)
- Goodwin, Neva. The limitations of markets
background essay. - Graham and Harvey (2001) The theory and practice
of corporate finance evidence from the field
(particularly pages 187-209).
11Module 2 Goal of the Corporation
- Learning Goals
- Describe shareholder/stakeholder models
- Describe perfect market assumptions
- Long-term vs. Short-term view of the firm.
- Legal framework for managerial decision making.
- Readings
- Winkler, Adam, Corporate laws or the law of
business? Stakeholders and corporate governance
at the end of history. - Stout, Lynn, 2002, Bad and not-so-bad arguments
for stakeholder primacy. - Clement (2005). The lessons from stakeholder
theory for U.S. business leaders - Barry, Norman, 2002. The stakeholder concept of
corporate control is illogical and impractical. - Jensen, Michael, Value Maximization, Stakeholder
Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function. - Bird, Ron, A.D. Hall, F. Momente, and F. Reggiani
What corporate social responsibility activities
are valued by the market?
12Module 3 Valuation
- Learning Goals
- Cover assumptions of adjusted weighted average
cost of capital - Introduce APV
- Internalization of externalities.
- Overview of financial options including binomial
and Black-Scholes valuation techniques. - Fundamentals of Real Option Valuation
- Required Readings
- BMA CH 19-22.
- Luehrman, Timothy A., Using APV A better tool
for valuing operations. - Luehrman, Timothy A., Investment Opportunities
as real options getting started with the
numbers. - Luehrman, Timothy A., Strategy as a portfolio of
real options
13Module 4 Capital Structure
- Learning Goals
- Understand how the choice of capital structure
can affect the value of assets. - Begin to identify the pervasive nature of
information asymmetries and their impact on
decision-making. - Trade-Off and Pecking Order theories of capital
structure - Identify how choice of capital structure can
affect various stakeholders and these
stakeholders response. - Readings
- BMA Chs 17-18.
- Graham and Harvey (2001) The theory and practice
of corporate finance evidence form the field
(pages 209-243). - Wruck (1990) Financial distress, reorganization,
and organizational efficiency. - Patrick, Steven C. Three pieces to the capital
structure puzzle The cases of Alco Standard,
Comdisco, and Revco. - Bronars, S. and D. Deere, 1991. The threat of
unionization, the use of debt, and the
preservation of shareholder wealth - Noronha and Singal (2004) Financial Health and
Airline Safety
14Module 5 Agency Governance
- Learning Goals
- Understanding the nature of a principal-agent
conflict and identify the various conflicts that
exist among the stakeholder of a firm. - Understand the role of contracting and monitoring
in addressing the agency issue and the challenges
that exist for efficient contracting. - Readings
- BMA Ch 12.
- Jensen (1986), Agency costs of free cash flow,
corporate finance, and takeovers. - Brewer, Chandra, and Hock (1999) Economic Value
Added (EVA) Its uses and limitations - Hall (2003), Six challenges in designing
equity-based pay. - Jensen (2003) Paying people to lie the truth
about the budgeting process. - Bryne, John The best and worst boards
Businessweek Dec, 1997. - McCafferty, Joseph 2008 Building an exceptional
board BusinessWeek 4-17-2008. - Stout, Lynn. 2007. The mythical benefits of
shareholder control
15Module 6 Payout Policy
- Learning Goals
- Payout Policy relevance and irrelevance
- Readings
- BMA CH 16.
- Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) Payout
policy in the 21st century.
16Module 7 MA and Corporate Control
- Learning Goals
- Description of the various forms of restructuring
and the importance of the market for corporate
control. - Coverage of traditional economic rationales for
MAs, both compelling and not so compelling. - Understand the motivations for corporate
diversification and the nature of the evidence
surrounding this issue. - Understand the term managerial entrenchment,
how this is accomplished, and good and bad
economic rationales for entrenchment. - Readings
- BMA Ch 32-34.
- Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) Corporate governance
and merger activity in the United States Making
sense of the 1980s and 1990s. - Jensen (1986), Agency costs of free cash flow,
corporate finance, and takeovers - Fee and Thomas (2004) Sources of gains in
horizontal mergers evidence from customer,
supplier, and rival firms. - Strine (2002), The social responsibility of
boards of directors and stockholders in change of
control transactions is there any there
there?. - Harford (2003) Takeover bids and target
directors incentives the impact of a bid on
directors wealth and board seats. - Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) Corporate
governance and equity prices
17 18Concluding Remarks
- jblease_at_vancouver.wsu.edu
- Financial Education Association
- Sept 18-20th, 2008 (Hilton Head, SC)
- Financial Management Association
- Oct 8th-11th, 2008 (Dallas, TX)