1 ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM) MALFUNCTIONING-HACKING IN EVM?
Presentation for Improved, Fool-proof Ballot/EVM System
Dr. Kirit Somaiya Ex Member of Parliament All India Convenor BJP Committee on EVM 22 July 2009 2 ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)
Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) has become a issue of
national debate. Experts have been continuously
expressing their concern about the malfunctioning of EVM
since Lok Sabha 2004 results. Satinath Choudhary
approached the Supreme Court in 2004.
Development has taken place in the developed countries
since last couple of years and the issue of malfunctioning
demands healthy debate and corrective measures.
Leaders belonging to all major political parties BJP,
Congress, CPM, TDP, ADMK, RJD, LJP, INLD, MDMK,
Trinamool Congress have expressed concern about the
malfunctioning of EVM.
3 ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)
Activists, NGOs, experts, authorities have expressed
concern about the present EVM system in India. Several
examples have also been put forward regarding unusual /
abnormality and also mal-functioning.
Developed countries like USA, Germany, Netherlands,
Finland, Ireland, Brazil have either disposed of EVM or
have come out with fool-proof system.
We feel there is a necessity of national debate on Fool-
proof Ballot/EVM System in India.
Here is the Presentation on the same.
Dr. Kirit Somaiya Ex MP
All India Convenor BJP Committee on EVM
4 ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)History of EVM in India
Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) used / introduced in the world since 1970s. During the 70s, Election Commission of India consider to use EVM in India. An Expert Committee was appointed in 1990 to review the designs, etc. An expert moved the Supreme Court in 2005 about the mal-functioning of EVM system in India. It was referred to the Election Commission of India.
The Election Commission appointed the Expert Committee on 29th December 2005, which submitted Report in 2006. The Committee suggested major measures for security, protection, upgradation. It also emphasized to use EVM only after providing security measures suggested by the Committee.
5 Introduction, Progress of EVM in India 6 India concern
Lok Sabha 2009 elections
Dr. Subramanian Swamy, former Law Minister, alleged in April 2009 that a group of people who had been convicted in the US for hacking bank accounts and credit cards had been recruited by a certain political party to possibly rig the elections
The Shiv Sena alleged that EVM malfunction caused its candidate Mohan Rawale to lose in South Mumbai. Said Rawale I wonder how I got only five votes from an area that is a Shiv Sena stronghold.
Journalist Cho Ramaswamy discussed how in MDMK leader Vaikos constituency, Virudhunagar, Tamil Nadu, while counting, the votes increased by 23,000 more than the polled votes.
7 POLITICAL PARTIES EVM
BJP L.K. Advaniji demanded transparent fool-proof ballot/EVM system
L.K. Advaniji demanded EVM with Paper Backup in future elections
CPM, TDP, ADMK, RJD, LJP, INLD, MDMK of Vaiko, Trinamool Congress have raised issues about malfunctioning of EVM
Mr. Gulam Nabi Azad, Union Minister has charged EVM malfunctioning in the recently held Orissa elections. He made the statement before the Press at Bhubaneshwar in JuneJuly 2009
Mr. Amrinder Singh, Punjab Congress President has made public demonstration with EVM and charged malfunctioning of EVM
8 FORMER BUREAUCRATS / EXPERTSRAISE CONCERN
Omesh Saigal ex-Chief Secretary, Delhi Govt. ex-Secretary, Govt. of India has submitted representation to the Election Commission
Issue raised is malfunctioning of EVM.
Other former bureaucrats Dr. Krishan Saigal ex-Chief Secretary, Assam, Ravi Kathpalia Ex Controller General of Accounts, GOI, Ms Asha Das Ex Secretary, GOI, K.P. Fabian former Ambassador, S.K. Agnihotri ex-Chief Secretary, Assam, A.R. Lall Advocate, Supreme Court have also raised this issue.
9 Observations, objections regarding the present EVM system in India
2005 An IT Expert filed a Petition on EVM
Supreme Court sent the Petition to the Election Commission
2006 Expert Committee appointed by the Election Commission submitted report with several recommendations to plug loopholes on manipulation, mal-functioning
BEL and ECIL were asked to make corrections
EC has not implemented the recommendations, security measures
10 Observations, objections regarding the present EVM system in India (Contd)
Several instances found in Lok Sabha 2009 about mal-functioning of EVM
Various petitions in High Courts and Supreme Court about mal-functioning of EVM
Various technocrats, IT experts have expressed doubt about the fool-proof EVM system in India
Concern expressed by the experts and authority about the mal-functioning of EVM used in India
11 EVM MALFUNCTIONING OBSERVED IN LOK SABHA 2009 ELECTION
Any button pressed, light/vote registered to one particular candidate
EVM could not be opened on the counting
Seal found open
EVM malfunctioning on polling day
12 EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL FUNCTIONING/BEHAVIO UR OF EVM
Malfunctioning of EVM seen during the Lok Sabha 2009 elections
EVM could not start
EVM got jammed and did not open on counting day
EVM stopped functioning during the poll/in between the polling process
When button of one candidate pressed, light on another candidate got flashed
Polling staff was not at all updated or aware about the security measures
EVMs lying/ was used in previous elections in a particular district were used in the same district in the Lok Sabha 2009
13 EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL FUNCTIONING/BEHAVIO UR OF EVM
In a EVM, an independent candidate with no base/logic, got/shown 500 votes and major political parties candidate got 0 or 1 vote
EVM result in many booths shows 100 votes against one candidate (more than 200 votes polled in that area)
Differences between the polling figures declared by the Election Commission in the booths and the outcome / result shown in EVM in those booths
State Election officials/Election Commission for reasons known to them, have not collected all such information / data, process, study, research them
No special follow up undertaken of EVM till todate.
14 EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL/UNUSUAL FUNCTIONING / BEHAVIOUR OF EVM
EVM in Booth No.176 Nutan School Votes given/button pressed for Candidate No.1 but vote/light flashed against another candidate
EVM replaced around 2.30 pm in between the polling process on 16th April 2009
No further study, action till today
15 EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL FUNCTIONING/BEHAVIO UR OF EVM
61 NOIDA ASSEMBLY
An Independent candidate got 415 votes in Booth No.61. He got 0 to 1 in other booths
How it is possible for an Independent who has no connection, concern with that area?
Sector 25 Jalvayu Vihar, Noida In this area, main contest observed between BJP, Congress
In Booth 61, BJP and Congress got one vote each and BSP 7 votes
Is it not EVM mal-functioning?
16 ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL BEHAVIOUROF EVM 61 NOIDA ASSEMBLY 17 EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUALFUNCTIONING/BEHAVIO UR OF EVM
Abnormality observed in Muradnagar segment of Ghaziabad
Contest was mainly between BJP, Congress, BSP
Rajnath Singh won by 80,000 votes
Mr. Satish, an independent candidate, who has no base, no background, in all got 2719 votes
Mr. Satish secured 998 votes in 24 rounds. He got 507 votes in Round No.19 in Muradnagar Vidhan Sabha
Mr. Satish has no locus standee in Booth No.247
All 507 votes were given/allotted/counted by EVM in Polling Booth No.247 alone
In Booth No.247, BJP Candidate Rajnath Singh and Congress Candidate got 0 votes each and BSP candidate Amar Pal Sharma got 1 vote.
18 EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL FUNCTIONING/BEHAVIO UR OF EVM
EVM Booth No.160 Any button pressed, light/vote flashed against BJD
Congress, BJP people in Nimasahi Booth of Cuttack drew the attention of the Polling Officer
Presiding Officer/polling officials have no explanation for the same
Election Commission had to accept the manipulation / malfunctioning of EVM
Repolling was held in Nimasahi Booth No.160.
19 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT
Voting pattern in Parliament and Assembly elections in Rellivalasa village is worth noting. Voting pattern shows vast difference
Voting not recorded by the Electronic Voting Machine accurately to which candidate voters voted.
20 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT VOTING PATTERN PARLIAMENT RELLIVALASA VILLAGE For the same booth, voting for Assembly is total contradiction (see next Table) 21 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT VOTING PATTERN ASSEMBLY RELLIVALASA VILLAGE 22 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT
In Khammam Constituency, Polling Station 198, Electronic Voting Machine could not read data and the voters were discounted by the EC officer. As per booth data collected from the Dist. Collector office, this particular booth data is missing
Manipulated Electronic Voting Machines can misbehaveand corrupt the entire memory as well as hang the Control Unit and rendering E2PROM unreadable
23 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT
In Pedakurapadu (Guntur Dist) Constituency Booth No.2, 122 votes were polled in the First Electronic Voting Machine. As the EVM malfunctioned and was replaced by a second EVM
Electronic Voting Machines are not stable
24 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT List of Booths where the machines could not read data 25 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT Table showing polling booths where there was particular pattern of voting The data suggests EVMs used in these booths have been manipulated.). Congress candidate got almost 100 votes in various booths 26 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT Table showing difference between actual votes polled and votes counted by EVM 11 BHANDARA GONDIA LOK SABHA 27 PETITIONS IN INDIA
Retired computer science professor Satinath Choudhary, producing doctored EVMs is childs play, as early as 2004
Banwarilal B. Purohit vs. Election Commission of India filed in 2004
Shailendra Pradhan filed a PIL in 2009 in the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur
The PMK, which suffered a shock defeat in Virudhunagar constituency in 2009 Parliamentary election, has filed an appeal to the Election Commission
The MDMK has filed a PIL in Madras High Court against EVMs.
28 PETITIONS IN INDIA
Various PILs have been filed at High Courts and Supreme Court
Supreme Court Jana Chaitanya Vedika (NGO) has moved the Apex Court regarding authenticity and credibility of EVM system.
In the Petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution the Petitioners are seeking directions from the Honble Court to ensure that the votes cast by the voters, which are part of their constitutional right of free expression under Article 19(1)(a), are registered properly and without any tampering/manipulation of the Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) which are used in the election
Supreme Court - NetIndia, renowned Company in EVM technology, has submitted an affidavit in the Supreme Court regarding lack of security measures, transparency and hacking of EVM in India
29 PETITIONS IN INDIA
Supreme Court Mr. Mohan Rawale 5-time Shiv Sena MP has filed a Petition in the Supreme Court on EVM malfunctioning
Mumbai High Court Dr. Jagtap and Dr. Jadhav have moved the Mumbai High Court regarding malfunctioning of EVM
Orissa High Court Activists have moved the Orissa High Court regarding malfunctioning of EVM
Hyderabad Issues raised at Andhra Pradesh High Court
Tamil Nadu EVM malfunctioning issues raised at the High Court
30 IT SECURITYEXPERT VIJAY MUKHIS SUGGESTIONS
After spending years in the security industry, we believe that in principle all technology can be tampered with.
There is no such thing as 100.
As a EVM is a technology machine it can be tampered with in principle.
The world has realized that there is only one way to prevent misuse of technology and that is by having a open process where the whole world can participate in trying to break security.
What we recommend to the Government and the Election Commission is to make public the entire EVM eco-system, which includes the hardware schematics and the software that control the EVM.
31 IT SECURITY EXPERT VIJAY MUKHIS SUGGESTIONS (contd.)
Today, we cannot say that the EVM is safe or unsafe from being tampered with because like the rest of the country, as we have no information whatever on the EVM. The entire EVM ecosystem is a state secretary inaccessible to just a few.
The GSM world introduced a SIM card that had a password stored within it. Years ago, it would take hours to clone a SIM card, today it takes about 15 minutes max. There is no way to undo the damage as there are over a billion users of GSM today.
We want EC/Government to follow international best practices in securing the technology used to public governance and welfare.
32 IT SECURITY EXPERT VIJAY MUKHIS SUGGESTIONS (contd.)
We recommend that in the din of politics a reason edvoice will not be heard at all and hence to put an end to this controversy it would be better to have a paper trail of the vote caused. As people do not understand technology, tempers get frayed and by introducing paper, something that people understand, would put an end to a controversy.
33 EVM around the world
There is a veritable tsunami of negative reports about Electronic Voting Machines from all over the world. There is no country in which EVMs have been welcomed so enthusiastically as they have been in India, and perhaps this is with good reason.
Hardly any major developed country uses EVMs to any extent indeed, despite the fuss over hanging chads and other arcana in their 2000 elections, even Americans who are partial to technological solutions have resisted the siren-song of voting machines after due consideration.
34 EVM around the world (Contd)
United States (California)
In April 2004, California banned 14,000 EVMs because the manufacturer (Diebold Election Systems) had installed uncertified software that had never been tested and then lied to state officials about the machines. The machines were decertified and criminal prosecution initiated against the manufacturer.
EVM gadbad in US 2004 Presidential elections. In Gahanna, Ohio, only 638 votes were cast, but EVM result declared Bush received 4,258 votes to Kerrys 260.
A study by UC Berkeleys Quantitative Methods Research Team reported that irregularities associated with EVMs may have awarded 130,000-260,000 votes to Bush in Florida in 2004.
35 EVM around the world (Contd)
Various bills proposed in House/Senate
HR 550 Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2005
HR 774 and S 330 Voting Integrity and Verification Act of 2005
HR 939 and S 450 Count Every Vote Act of 2005
HR 533 and S 17 Voting Opportunity and Technology Enhancement Rights Act of 2005
HR 278 Know Your Vote Counts Act of 2005
HR 5036 Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act of 2008
36 EVM around the world (Contd)
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany declared EVMs unconstitutional.
The Netherlands ( 2006)
The Interior Ministry withdrew the licences of 1,187 voting machines because it was proven that one could eavesdrop on voting from up to 40 metres away. The suit was brought by a Dutch citizens group named We Do Not Trust Voting Machines. This group demonstrated that in five minutes, they could hack into the machines with neither voters nor election officials being aware of it.
37 EVM around the world (Contd)
The Supreme Court declared invalid the result of a pilot electronic vote in three municipalities.
United Kingdom (2007)
The Open Rights Group declared it could not express confidence in the results for the areas that it observed. Their report cites problems with the procurement, planning, management and implementation of the systems concerned.
38 EVM around the world (Contd)
Ireland embarked on an ambitious e-voting scheme, but abandoned it due to public pressure.
There were serious discrepancies in the Diebold systems predominantly used in Brazils 2006 elections.
39 EVM STORY
We understand very clearly the complete process of development, manufacturing and rollout of EVMs across India. ECIL BEL have done the research and development in-house and shipped the software to their vendors Renesas in Japan, Microchip in US respectively for the software to be fused into the Chips. The mode of shipment goes through many layers before it reaches the vendor and similarly back to the manufacturers. The security adopted in the transfer of the software is not known, as well there is ambiguity on the Prof. Indiresan Expert Committee review report 2006 on whether an OTP or a Masked ROM chips are used. As a layman wecan consider OTP to be a Blank CD in which you can write what you want at your location and Masked ROM is like buying a Movie CD which is pre-written.
40 EVM STORY
A chance but still there exists the opportunity to swap the chips while shipment and the manufac-turers have no method of verification. The only way to verify the EVMs is putting them to a Mock Poll, and we have already demonstrated how properly functioning EVM while in Mock Poll can be manipulated to favour a candidate in the actual poll.
Further as there is no precise verification tool to check whether the EVM is manipulated opens up several different opportunities of tampering the EVM.
41 CLARIFICATION EXPECTED FROM THE ELECTION COMMISSION
Is it true
EVM in the same area is repeatedly used in the same area/periphery
No records of when, how what about the failure of EVM machines maintained, checked, studied
Repairs, maintenance, storage, transportation to be foolproof
The polling staff is purely temporary, on deputation for the election day and counting day, has no knowledge and concern or trained about the EVM technology, security measures, etc.
No standard guideline, programme, procedure implemented by EC
EVM code is installed by a private company/MNC of a foreign country and not at a Government PSU, i.e. BEL/ECIL
44 Observations about EVM Manufacturing faults
Manufacturing faults in the hardware may result in malfunctions. More sinister issues arise from malicious and intentional tampering. The programs used are proprietary and not open for inspection, unlike, say, open source programs which any individual can test out.
45 Fraudulant way of tampering
Tampering with the software to add malicious code to alter vote totals or favour any candidate
Tampering with the hardware of the machine to alter vote totals or favour any candidate
Intentional mis-configuration of the ballot design to misidentify a candidates party
Abusing the administrative access to the machine by election officials might also allow individuals to vote multiple times.
46 TROJAN HORSE
In-built Trojan Horse in software
Programming code available to few selected
No provision for checking, inspection of software, hardware by anybody including the Election Commission
Leakage, corruption can make hacking feasible
New EVMs purchases in January 2009 182,000 from BEL and 78,000 from ECIL
Coding, decoding of these new machines
Imported chips are used
No transparency about the chips, hardware, software
47 TROJAN HORSE (Contd)
No political party or candidate taken into confidence about the software, hardware, etc.
Even the Election Commission do not have any system to check the transparency and security
Chips can be corrupted
EVM used can be corrupted
Hacking, etc., can take place during transportation, handling, Polling Station, storing places, repair, maintenance
So many individuals, private persons involved in EVM handling
48 Technical details about the EVMsused in India
2 PSUs BEL and ECIL are the suppliers of EVM in India
Chip used in EVM imported from Japanese company
Software designed in India and sent to Japanese company
Transportation of EVMs, chips are handled by private contractors/sub-contractors
Repairs and maintenance done by BEL/ECIL engineers
BEL, ECIL is also outsourcing the work to private people/contractors
No system of control, security measures about transportation, delivery, handling by private people / contractors, persons involved in repair and maintenance and also supervision on the day/eve of polling
49 EXPERT COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE ELECTION COMMISSION
REPORT OBSERVATIONS RECOMMENDATION
50 EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
2009 EC appointed an Expert Committee with reference to suggest amendment and additional features
EC noted EVM of 1990 has become outdated to be replaced
Committee headed by Prof. P.V. Indiresan with Prof. A.K. Agarwala and Prof. D.T. Shahani as Members.
51 EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
It was agreed by the manufacturers that these could be implemented and that it primarily involved some alterations in the software, while hardware design would remain the same. Once the software was modified by the manufacturers to meet the above recommendations, only a detailed check of functional working of the modified EVM would be needed, which EC as the user could do on its own or get done before inducting the upgraded EVMs
The Committee notes with satisfaction that the entire cable is in the public view with all the time, any such tampering becomes self-evident. Further, in case any such device
52 EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
has been attached to the cable, it will leave telltale punch marks which can be recognized easily. Therefore, this probability also is ruled out by the Committee
Altering the results of the polls before, during and after the poll duration provided, due security pre-cautions already in force and additional modifica-tions suggested by the committee are enforced and the sealing at various stages is adhered to. In case for any reason the Unit has been tampered, it immediately gives an indication that the system has malfunctioned and this remain as a permanent record on the Machine and this record can be checked at any time later.
53 EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that before every election the manufacturers may be asked to check (this can be done very fast through a very simple exerciser) and ensure that all the units are functioning as designed. Incidentally, this method will be checked, by what is called the self test signature of Machine and thereby the Manufacturers will be able to certify that the Machine is identical to what they have supplied and it has not been modified or replaced by any other.
54 EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
Election Commission to maintain a register of the voters in the sequence of their voting, not only the process of recount is possible but also verification of the recount against any possible tampering is also possible. Each role and key press is time/data stamped
Further as each key press in EVM units whether valid or invalid is date-time stamped and recorded no activation of a possible Trojan Horse by any specific key press sequence on EVM during poll can possibly go unnoticed.
Any system can be tested randomly by mock poll to prove this performance. Further as each key press in EVM units whether valid or invalid is date-time stamped and recorded no activation of a possible Trojan Horse during poll can possibly go unnoticed.
56 EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
Carrying out on a sample basis, recounting of votes in certain booths post poll at an appropriate administrative level, to act as a deterrent against potential mischief-makers so as to generate a climate of confidence about the infallible nature of electoral process
57 EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
The Committee after a review of the material presented to it has felt it necessary to highlight certain very key conclusions and recommendations as below
(i) The basic Electronic Voting Machine developed by M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL) and M/s. Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) is a secure system. The security emanates from two very important basic factors
(a) The fixed program nature of the software which is fused into the processor and which is effectively unalterable
58 EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
(b) The faithful recording of all events in the processor (electronically) and the possibility of recalling the same with the added (manual) administrative procedures on BU, CU at various stages in public view prescribed by the Election Commission which make available the sequence of voters voting rendering it possible tampering.
(ii) With the provision of non-volatile memory, any physical interruption leads to the retention of all voting information till that point.
59 EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
(iii) With the system as designed by the above agencies having built-in security, the Election Commission and the Government only need to ensure the security of the equipment, to safeguard the sanctity of the electoral process. The procedural safeguards as stated in Section 6.0 should be implemented
(iv) The Committee wishes to place on record the high level of accomplishments of the Engineers and Scientists of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd and M/s. Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. In developing an Electronic Voting Machine using the latest technology.
60 EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
(v) The Committee unanimously recommends the use of the upgraded EVMs in elections after due modifications stated in this report
(vi) Committee also recommends strongly that bio-metric method of voter identification is pursued by EC and tested for feasibility in large population and integrating this sub-system with EVM in future.
61 INDEPENDENTTECHNICAL TEAM
62 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT
Independent Technical Committee has studied in depth and presented its report/observations
Experts were requested by activists, NGOS to study healthy EVM system in India
The engineers were involved in developing a simulated product in similar lines with the features of the Electronic Voting machine with a Control Unit, and a Ballot Unit and have performed extensive research to understand how vulnerable the Electronic Voting Machines are.
63 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT
The following questions are the outcome of the Evaluation done.
Questions On Process
Questions On Expert Committee Report
64 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT
Issues on Expert Committee Report
All through the executive committee report the major issue raised by most of the people i.e. tampering of the Electronic Voting Machine has not been technically addressed. Further we have noted that the answers provided to the abovementioned problem are not technical clear
Source code was not fused in India at the manufacturers premises under stringent security but it was sent over to the vendor outside the country and delivered through various delivery channels to the manufacturer and so can be prone to any kind of tampering at various stages of the shipment
65 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT
Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)
As the entire lot shall have the same Unique ID and this also has to be sent along with the source code to the vendor for fusing into the Chip, there is always a possibility of Trojan being added into the chip with the ID already existing. The E2PROM being replaced while polling operations being conducted due to E2PROM malfunctioning, this should have made EVM inoperative.
No evidence of how many number of EVMs upgraded with modifications suggested by the Experts Committee and how many odl EVMs were reused for this elections
66 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT
Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)
Software modification not possible due to hardware design as the chips used are Masked Chips and technically unalterable and require a complete new Circuit Board with a new chip mounted on it with proposed modifications to the software
Even if few EVMs were upgraded with Dynamic Key Coding, programme is incapable of recording every key pressed and key sequence when pressed activates the Trojan. Also to test each of the Electronic Voting Machines with such a number of key sequences would be highly impossible.
67 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT
Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)
None of the Control Unit Circuit Boards were sealed and there is no mention of a modification to the existing Ballot Units.
Technically not clear how any embedded device without any processor or micro controller or any chip transfer data with encryption
The Committee to the best of its ability has looked into all possibilities of tampering with the EVM and has come to the conclusion that there is no way of altering the results of the polls before, during and after the poll duration provide due to security precautions already in force and additional modifications suggested by the Committee are enforced
68 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT
Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)
No evidence to support the fact that the suggestions made by the expert committee were followed subsequently
Suggestions are not completely followed by the manufacturers leaving enough room for security breach, which was the main cause of concern
Knowing the time of the first voter from the EVM and mapping to the register can actually bring out the detail of vote cast by every citizen thus putting democracy into a major threat
69 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT
Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)
There was no diagnostic check available for checking the sanctity of the embedded program in the EVM. Neither the technicians, who prepare the EVMs for elections, understand the recommendations made by the technical committee
No evidence to support the fact that the suggestions made the expert committee were implemented subsequently
70 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT
Software developed for the EVM locally by the manufacture was either uploaded through inernet or sent through courier to the concerned distributor of the chip vendor in form of CD. No secured methodology adopted for the transfer of developed source code/programme software to be fused in to the chip
Chips delivered from warehouse picked by a courier, etc. provides grave opportunity of replacing and manipulating thus procured chips at various levels of shipment.
71 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT
Possible Manipulations (contd)
No verification program developed to cross check every chip for genuine code before mounting on to the circuit board of EVM. No manufacturer in a position to define whether chips are original due to lack of thorough verification tool
Ballot unit can be swapped at any point of time as there is no encrption between Ballot Unit and Control Unit. A new Ballot Unit can be attached to the Control Unit throwing immense opportunity for running Trojans
72 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT
Possible Manipulations (contd)
Pre-poll After the withdrawal of candidates for a constituency, the allotment of keys on the Ballot Unit is done through the Control Unit by pressing the CANDIDATE SELECTION button. Trojan can be activated to favour a particular key by means of adding percentage over other key or by deducting a set of votes polled for all other keys and adding to the favoured key. It cannot be detected.
While Poll Trojan can be activated by anybody going in as a voter entering the sequential key code on the Ballot Unit. This can go absolutely undetected as the buttons pressed in that sequence cannot be captured because of the functional behaviour of the Trojan.
73 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT
Standard Verification tool can be developed
A Printer added to the EVM can give print out of every vote to the voter which he/she can verify whether the vote was cast properly
EVM should be part of E-governance of Government of India
74 Ways to reduce EVM Frauds
No IT technology/software/hardware in the world is
foolproof. According to security experts, in a short
time, hackers find out the ways of hacking
EVM frauds can be reduced
Parallel testing to have independent set of results
EVM with paper back up
Testing tool made available to all candidates/political parties
Open, transparent software, hardware system
Implementation of e-governance policy of India
Pre-poll, during poll and post-poll fullfledged test, audit test of EVM
75 Ways to reduce EVM Frauds (Contd)
All EVMs which found malfunctioning in Lok Sabha 2009 should be checke, verified and studied by independent machinery/experts
BEL, ECIL and any Government person, staff of election duty including the Election Commission should not be allowed to touch all these machines
Reason for malfunctioning should be studied by independent experts and should be published
Logic and accuracy testing before elections
Independent software verification and certification. Can use code signatures to ensure software is identical. Open source may also be a good idea.
In light of all the above discussions, it is clear that there is reasonable doubt about the reliability of EVMs.
Given the poor experience with Electronic Voting Machines worldwide, it is difficult to believe that India EVMs are somehow far superior to those used elsewhere, and somehow immune to fraud.
This has to be demonstrated. A priori, the evidence suggests that Indias EVMs are susceptible to fraud in a number of dimensions.
77 Conclusion (contd)
It appears that both technical and procedural measures must be put in place to allay the concerns about the reliability, or lack thereof, of electronic voting machines.
It is entirely possible that the election machinery has taken every possible step in good faith, but that clever criminals have subverted the system for their own ends. Improved transparency, and public scrutiny of the system, including an analysis of ways in which it can be made more secure, are urgent and imperative before any future elections.