Subway Station Design: Lessons Learned from Case Studies of Contemporary Terrorism Incidents

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Subway Station Design Lessons Learned from Case
Studies of Contemporary Terrorism Incidents

• Christopher R. Cherry
• University of California, Berkeley
• Project Sponsored by
• Mineta Transportation Institute, San Jose State
  University
• University of California, Los Angeles
  International Institute

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Outline

• Background of Transit Counter-Terrorism
  Strategies
• Case Studies of Significant Rail Terrorism
  Incidents
• The IRA (Irish Republican Army) bombings against
  the London rail system
• The Fulton Street Station fire bombing in New
  York
• The Sarin gas release on the Tokyo subway
• The GIA (Armed Islamic Group) bombings against
  the Paris rail system
• The Al Qaeda Attack on the Madrid Subway System
• Conclusion and Recommendations

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Rail Transit Terrorism

• For those determined to kill in quantity and
  willing to kill indiscriminately, public
  transportation offers an ideal target. (Jenkins
  and Gersten 2001)
• Public Transit is inherently open and accessible.
  
• Rail Transit operates on fixed routes and
  schedules
• Volume of passengers make traditional screening
  impossible
• Security goals often conflict with transit goals
  of accessibility, convenience and affordability

Jenkins, B., and Gersten, L. (2001). "Protecting
Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism
and Serious Crime Continuing Research on Best
Security Practices." MTI-01-07
FHWA/CA/OR2001-29, Mineta Transportation
Institute, San Jose, CA.
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Framework to Address Terrorism

• Deterrence, Mitigation, Response, Recovery
• Four stages to plan for terrorism
• Planning, Designing and Building
• Planning for incident response
• Immediate Response to Incident
• Long-term recovery
• Investigate terrorism incidents that span
  different regions have different characteristics
  to learn lessons on how to plan and design
  against terrorism

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The IRA (Irish Republican Army) bombings against
the London rail system

• The IRA conducted two terrorism campaigns on the
  British Rail system in London (1973-1976 and
  1991-1992)
• IRA bombed or attempted to bomb system 22 times
  in those spans
• The most significant attack was on 2/18/1991 at
  Victoria and Paddington Stations (43 injuries, 1
  fatality)
• Paddington station bomb was warning at 420 am
• Victoria station bomb exploded in trash at 745
  am

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The IRA (Irish Republican Army) bombings against
the London rail system

• Most of the injuries were a result of secondary
  fragmentation

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Design and Policy Response

• London-Effectively eliminated station bombings
  by
• reducing the hiding places for bombs
• increasing CCTV coverage
• improved lighting
• removal of secondary fragmentation sources
• public outreach and cooperation
• systematic threat assessment system

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Fulton Street Firebombing-New York

• Edward Leary detonated two incendiary devices on
  December 15th and 21th 1994
• Both devices were on timers and intended to
  ignite while in tunnels
• December 15th 315 pm-Two injured when device
  exploded under a seat at the 145th street station
• December 21st 130 pm-48 injured when device
  malfunctioned and prematurely exploded under
  Learys seat at Fulton Street Station

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Fulton Street Firebombing-New York

• Most of injuries were due to smoke inhalation and
  burns
• The effects were mitigated greatly by alert
  off-duty officer who found a fire extinguisher
• Several train lines taken out of service for
  three hours, stranding commuters
• Response very rapid resulting in lower severity
  of injuries

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Design and Policy Response

• New York -The Fulton Street Station attack did
  not elicit a major response to design trains and
  stations against terrorism. In light of more
  recent attacks
• Transit officials are beginning to draft
  emergency response documents
• Much of the security concern is crime driven
• Passenger vigilance could have mitigated the
  effects of Learys first bomb
• Because of the availability of a fire
  extinguisher, an alert passenger, and effective
  emergency response, the effects of the second
  bomb was mitigated significantly

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Sarin Gas Attack-Tokyo

• Aum Shinrikyo attacked five trains of the Tokyo
  Subway at 800 am on March 20, 1995
• Utilized an impure mixture of Sarin Gas in sealed
  plastic bags
• Punctured the bags with sharpened umbrella tips
  and quickly exited the trains
• All affected trains were converging on
  Kasumigaseki Station where the
  Police headquarters was located

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Sarin Gas Attack-Tokyo

• Sarin began affecting people almost instantly
• Most of the injuries occurred on the trains and
  platforms where the Sarin was left
• 43 platform, 32 train, 15 station, 10 other
  places
• Because of non-severe symptoms there was no
  urgency to evacuate
• During evacuation, the trains were parked, with
  doors and windows open to the crowded platform
• Because of poor interagency communication there
  were high levels of secondary contamination

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Design and Policy Response

• Tokyo-Officials and researchers have been
  attempting to develop isolation strategies for
  chemical or biological attacks.
• Platform edge doors that separate the railway
  from the platform would have mitigated the effect
  of the gas.
• Remote incident detection CCTV system are
  potentially more effective than chemical
  detection devices.
• Smoke ventilation must be carefully used because
  it could potentially aggravate the situation.
• Rolling stock was redesigned to provide more
  ventilation.
• Cross-agency communication protocol was
  developed and employees trained.

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Algerian (GIA) Bombing Campaign Paris

• From July 1995 to December 1996 the Armed Islamic
  Group (GIA) bombed Paris subway system six times
• Most severe was the July 27, 1995 bomb detonated
  on a train as it entered St Michel Station during
  the evening rush (80 injuries, 8 fatalities)
• A 28-pound gas cylinder packed with
  shrapnel was set on a timer and
  left under a
  seat
• Similar bombs were detonated on other
  trains and station areas in the year
  that followed

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Algerian (GIA) Bombing Campaign Paris

• The response was very rapid and efficient
• The train was heavily damaged and could not fit
  through the tunnel
• The station sustained minor damage to
  communication lines
• Emergency workers set up a first aid station to
  treat and stabilize the injured at the station
• The system was shut down for the night and
  service restored in by morning

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Design and Policy Response

• Paris-Similar approach as London. Even before
  attacks, officials had well planned response
  protocol
• removed combustible materials, and introduced a
  smoke evacuation system.
• After attack, relied upon high profile policing
  and terrorist profiling (vigipirate).
• Officials sealed trash cans or replaced them by
  plastic bags.
• New stations are designed with transparent
  materials, employ natural lighting and improve
  line-of-sight from security stations.

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Al Qaeda Bombing RENFE Subway-Madrid

• Terrorists detonated ten bombs on four trains
  on March 11, 2004
• 1800 injuries and nearly 200 fatalities
• Three bombs were found and safely detonated in
  the Atocha Station
• Stations attacked were suburban and did not fit
  the profile for the most vulnerable station
• There was no anti-terrorist system in place on
  the subway prior to attack
• High profile security instituted
  after the attack

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Design and Policy Response

• Madrid- Thus far
• Officials have heavily increased policing
• They have improved CCTV coverage
• They are in the process of acquiring X-ray
  machines, mobile scanners, and portabombas in
  which to place suspicious objects.
• They have decided against sealing trash cans
  because of the inconvenience to passengers.
• Additionally, because of high levels of fear the
  are not posting signs promoting passenger
  vigilance.

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Recommendations and Conclusions

• Improving systems to counter an extremely rare
  terrorist attack is costly and improvements
  should also serve the dual purpose of crime or
  safety improvement
• Remove or closely monitor hiding places for
  devices (trash cans, lockers, bathrooms, etc)
• Improve CCTV coverage of station areas
• Reduce sources of secondary fragmentation (ground
  level glass, vending machines, chairs,
  decorations, etc)
• Improve transparency, visibility and lighting to
  all areas of station
• Control air circulation and establish ventilation
  procedures in the event of a chemical or
  biological attack
• Use non-combustible and non-toxic materials in
  stations and rolling stock
• Improve interagency communication systems and
  protocol
• Encourage passenger vigilance

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Acknowledgements

• I would like to acknowledge the research team
  that worked on this project and provided valuable
  input Martin Wachs, Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris,
  Brian Taylor, Robin Liggett, Peter Haas, Ellen
  Cavanagh, and Camille Fink
• The results of this work are preliminary
• Questions/Comments?