One Biosecurity: The Report of the Independent Review

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One Biosecurity The Report of the Independent
Review

• 3 March 2009
• Roger Beale AO
• Senior Associate , ACG Canberra

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The Independent Review

• Panel members
• Roger Beale (chair), Jeff Fairbrother, Andrew
  Inglis, David Trebeck
• Eight months work - 220 submissions - well over
  170 consultation meetings.
• 84 recommendations - Government has accepted in
  principle subject to budget.

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Biosecurity Management more difficult

• Increased risk and difficulty reflects
• Globalisation with huge increase in movement of
  people, goods, plants, animals and genetic
  material and many more trading partners
• Urbanisation, population movements into new
  habitats, intensive agriculture - all increase
  zoonotic disease risk, epidemic risk
• Climate change affecting spread of disease
  vectors and pest species
• Financial, physical and human skills constraints
  (particularly loss of plant and animal disease
  professionals)

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Effective biosecurity a good investment.

• A FMD outbreak would cost between 2bn and 13bn
  depending on how quickly we could get on top of
  it
• The EI incursion cost hundreds of millions - a
  varroa destructor incursion in honey bees could
  put pollination services worth 3.7bn at risk
• Current biosecurity status is good - but it wont
  remain that way without substantial changes to
  the system and more resources - panel estimated
  260m pa 225m one off
• Government and industry must recognise that
  holding back on expenditure runs the risk of
  incursions that will make recovery from the
  global financial crisis even more difficult

5
Zero risk - unattainable and undesirable

• Zero risk has never been government policy -
  physically and financially impossible
• Australian agriculture is dependent on movement
  across borders of improved genetic material -
  from seed types, to budwood stallions
• Australian agriculture is heavily export oriented
  - and we have important obligations under the SPS
  agreement (which protects our rights to access
  overseas markets) to apply consistent science
  based risk assessments to imports
• Australian consumers have legitimate interest in
  well priced, quality food from overseas
• Risks have to be kept very low - but zero is
  impossible
• Our biosecurity system has to recognise this -
  and be able quickly to spot and control the
  inevitable incursions

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Three core principles

• The reports recommendations are underpinned by
  three core principles
• an integrated biosecurity continuum covering
  identification and management of risks
  pre-border, at the border and post-border
• risk assessment reflecting rigorous, scientific
  analysis
• shared responsibility between the Commonwealth,
  states, territories, businesses and the community

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Five main themes

• Strengthened working partnership approach across
  the whole of the continuum
• Transparent, comprehensive governance
  arrangements
• Changed operational focus
• Increased resources
• Modern legislation to provide greater
  Commonwealth powers, clarity for administrators
  and users and improved enforcement and penalties

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Theme 1 Working partnership

• Need better partnerships between Commonwealth and
  the States and with business
• But Commonwealth has to take responsibility to
  lead - not just at the border - but in risk
  assessment, import decisions and post border

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Theme 1 Working partnership

• Shared responsibility, but greater role for the
  Commonwealth
• Pre-border
• more pre-border inspection and audit, and active
  risk management
• enhanced economic assessment in risk analysis of
  import access applications
• Commonwealth import decisions to over-ride states
• Post-border
• increased monitoring and surveillance

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Theme 1 Working partnership

• Commonwealth and state/territory collaboration on
  central biosecurity policy setting
• appropriate level of protection
• guidelines for conduct of risk analyses -
  including area freedoms
• appointments to national bodies
• Underpinned by national agreement on biosecurity
• But if states dont agree, Commonwealth to go it
  alone

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Theme 1 Working partnership

• Greater industry sign-on to cost-sharing deeds
• Improvements in co-regulation - more use of
  accreditation of industry systems with rigorous
  audit of performance
• Combined approach to education and awareness
• Increased investment in environmental biosecurity
• New biosecurity advisory council

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Theme 2 new governance structures

• Big themes
• More science and less politics
• Individual import risk analysis and decisions
  should be expert, independent, distanced from
  trade negotiations and local politics.
• Ministers should focus on policy - not case by
  case decisions
• All key biosecurity functions should be in one
  body, independent of the department.

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Theme 2 new governance structures

• Four components to new arrangements
• Government (minister)
• Commission of independent experts to make
  scientific decisions
• Statutory authority to carry out day to day
  operations
• Ensuring system integrityinspector-general

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Theme 2 new governance structures role of
Minister

• Minister has the key policy setting role
• power to issue statement setting ALOP - national
  interest
• power to issue guidelines relating to the conduct
  of biosecurity import risk analyses, import
  policy determinations and import permit decisions
• power to direct commission to commence a
  biosecurity import risk analysis
• will not have a role in decision-making or
  direction of individual biosecurity import risk
  analyses
• ultimately controls the budget subject to Cabinet
• leads the Commonwealth-State relationship
• has the key veto power in relation to
  appointments to the Commission and appoints the
  CEO of the Authority and Inspector General of
  Biosecurity
• can order review by Inspector General

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Theme 2 new governance structures National
Biosecurity Commission

• Independent, expert panel to determine priorities
  for risk assessments, undertake import risk
  analyses, make import policy determinations and
  provide advice to the new authority and the
  government
• Between 7 and 9 members appointed by minister,
  with agreement of at least five states, under
  Statute
• must have expertise in relevant natural sciences,
  risk assessment and management, ecology,
  agriculture and food production, or economics
• fixed tenure
• Supported by staff of the authority

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Theme 2 new governance structures National
Biosecurity Authority

• A new statutory authority to assume day-to-day
  operations
• combining AQIS, BA and elements of PIAPH
• To be established under the Financial Management
  and Accountability Act, with staff employed under
  the Public Service Act
• Strengthened investigation and compliance unit
  and internal audit capacity - policies to
  emphasize consistent quality management across
  its programs to include periodic audit of
  official certification procedures by foreign
  governments and accredited third party systems
• Department to retain trade (non-technical) and
  market access negotiation functions

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Theme 2 new governance structures System
integrity

• Inspector-General of Biosecurity
• external audit/ review of authoritys activities
  and systems
• investigate and report on matters referred by
  minister - reports to be generally available to
  the public
• supported by departmentnot the authority
• Merits review for import permit decisions in
  specific circumstances

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Theme 3 changed operational focus

• Other border, regulatory and law enforcement
  agencies have careful risk profiling and place
  resources where they get the best payoff - AQIS
  driven by mandated targets since 2001
• Risk return to replace mandated intervention
  targets - based on risk assessment framework
  (will take time to develop)
• Strategic surveillance, intelligence/ data
  gathering/ analysis
• Information sharingdomestic and international
• Continuum approach to augment border resources
• Greater investment in pre- and post-border
  monitoring and surveillance

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Theme 4 greater resources

• Review recommends additional 260 million per
  annum
• With a substantial proportion to be met from user
  fees and charges
• Inject a further 225m to upgrade information
  technology and business systems - AQIS has lagged
  far behind other border agencies (particularly
  Customs) and the AFP
• Cost recovery to continue, but simplify charging
  structure and administration
• charges for like activities to be aggregated
  across programs and so number of charges reduced
• export inspection and certification to return to
  100 cost recovery (current subsidy to lapse 30
  June 2009)
• Five yearly independent review

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Theme 5 modern legislation

• Quarantine Act is substantially based on 1908 Act
  pasted over with multiple amendments - limited in
  the constitutional powers it invokes, complex and
  hard to enforce.
• New act to replace Quarantine Act 1908 and
  associated legislation/regulations
• Key changes include
• Power for Minister to set the ALOP and determine
  risk assessment guidelines
• Capacity to enforce national import permit
  decisions so that states/ territories cannot
  impose additional biosecurity measures
• Capacity to set aside state biosecurity measures
  on interstate trade of domestic goods where they
  are not supported by science and unnecessarily
  restrict interstate trade
• A more streamlined set of enforcement powers for
  the NBC
• Provision to regulate ballast water and
  biofouling on (international) vessels
• Establishment and powers for the NBC, NBA and the
  IGB.

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Controversies

• Report generally well received but four areas of
  controversy
• Some have said not support any move away from
  zero risk
• Some voices raised against the confirmation of
  the lapsing of export certification subsidies
• Similarly some have criticised the suggestion
  that the PMC could be raised to cover any
  increase in passenger related costs
• Vigorous opposition from some quarters to the
  Reviews proposal that, subject to rigorous
  assessment and conditions, the import of positive
  control samples of key viruses including foot and
  mouth to AHAL should not be banned.

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Zero risk

• It is wrong to say Review recommended a move away
  from zero risk
• The Australian system has never been based on
  zero risk - so you cannot move away from it
• The system has palpably failed to deliver zero
  risk - and zero risk is not an attainable goal
• The Reviews recommendations are all about
  reducing risks both from imports and to exports -
  but this requires explicit acknowledgement that
  incursions will occur and biosecurity has to put
  in place defence in depth - overseas, at the
  border and post-border
• The Review recommended no change in the current
  ALOP (very low but not zero risk)
• But called for it to be spelled out in a
  legislative instrument
• And for guidelines on how to implement it to be
  set and made public

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Export certification subsidies

• The Reviews approach was based on its general
  endorsement of the principle that those who
  create the need for regulation should bear its
  costs on both efficiency and equity grounds
• And that this had been endorsed on a broadly
  bipartisan basis for the past two decades
• With export regulation it could be argued that
  the beneficiaries are two fold
• The international consumer who receives the
  product guaranteed as to biosafety
• The Australian exporter
• In neither case does there seem to be a strong
  case for Australian taxpayers at large to assume
  the cost

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Passenger Movement Charge

• The Review recognised that the PMC is neither a
  fee for service in the constitutional sense, nor
  a hypothecated tax.
• But its introduction, and its increase have in
  the past been justified on the basis of changes
  in passenger movement, including quarantine,
  costs.
• If there is a general tax element in the PMC in
  excess of the revenue required to defray
  Commonwealth costs associated with the safe and
  lawful entry and departure of passengers then
  that would be unchanged by an incremental change
  strictly based on additional passenger movement
  related biosecurity costs.
• The Reviews recommendation was not an invitation
  to increase the PMC willy-nilly or to cover non
  passenger costs.

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Import of live virus samples

• Recommendation not intended to greenlight
  imports without review, but to remove any blanket
  ban on review applications.
• Panel recognised the risks associated with any
  import of live virus material (particularly but
  not only FMD).
• But benefits in having positive control samples
  to prepare for the event of an incursion.
• Any import decision would be dependent on
• An application from a bona fide researcher or
  government agency on a case by case basis.
• A strict and thorough assessment in detail of the
  risks and needs in the particular circumstances
  and consultation, all subject to the guidelines
  set out by the Minister.

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Import of live virus samples

• Not proposed in any of the written submissions
• but discussed in meetings with a number of
  research agencies, bodies and facilities
• The witch hunt to see who might have suggested
  that there could be benefits in examining imports
  on a case by case basis - and the nervousness of
  scientists and professionals to speak on the
  record - underlines a lot of what has been wrong
  with the biosecurity debate.
• We need openness and evidence based debate - but
  this will only happen if we tolerate differences
  and respect each others contribution.