Announcements

1
Announcements

• For Thursdays class review McTaggart, The
  Unreality of Time and read Russell The Problems
  of Philosophy, chapters I and II.
• Essays are due next Tuesday July 5.
• Tutorial exercises will be posted by tomorrow
  night please print them and bring them to
  class. We are going to focus on this tutorial
  Humes view of causality and freedom, Humes
  skepticism.

2
Section 9 Of the Reason of Animals

• Not much of interest to us here
• If animals have beliefs and reason, this could
  only be determined analogically
• What does Hume determine
• Animals learn but they do not reason
• Animals learn
• ..It seems evident, that animals, as well as men
  learn many things from experience, and infer,
  that the same events will always follow from the
  .

3
Fido learns

• same causes. (70)
• In all these cases, we may observe, that the
  animal infers some fact beyond what immediately
  strikes his senses and that this inference is
  altogether founded on past experience (70)
• But Fido doesnt reason
• It is impossible, that this inference of the
  animal can be founded on any process of argument
  or reasoning, by which he concludes, that like
  events must follow like objects and the course.

4
Fido doesnt reason

• of nature will always be regular in its
  operations (70)
• They seem to have beliefs
• It is custom alone, which engages animals, from
  every object, that strikes their senses, to infer
  its usual attendant, and carries their
  imagination, from the appearance of the one, to
  conceive the other , in that particular manner,
  which we denominate belief.(71)

5
Does Fido have beliefs?

• The behavioural evidence often seems to suggest
  that they do. However, philosophers have cast
  doubt on such evidence.
• If an animal is said to have beliefs, if we
  attribute such beliefs to them, then we should
  understand the nature of belief. We should know
  what it is that we are attributing to them.
• And in considering the nature of belief two
  considerations cast doubt , considerable doubt,
  on the strength of the behavioural evidence (1)
  holism (2) semantic opacity.

6
Section 10 Of Miracles

• Sections 10 and 11 contains Humes attack on
  religion.
• Or is it an attack? That is something we will
  have to debate.
• The Target Christianity
• However, though this is the specific target, what
  Hume argues applies to any faith that has a
  belief in sacred texts predicated upon divine
  revelation and/or contains stories of miracles.

7
Of Miracles

• Many Christians in Humes day considered miracles
  to be a proof for their religion. God is a
  supermagician, forced to stage public appearances
  with a spectacular show of miracles in order to
  gain self-confidence and recognition.
• Definition of a miracle
• A miracle may be accurately defined, a
  transgression of a law of nature by a particular
  volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of
  some invisible agent. (77)

8
Of Miracles

• Of course, for the religious the laws of nature
  are themselves a miracle (sign) that arouses
  humanitys wonder of the divine. However,
  putting that to the side.
• A maxim of rationality
• A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to
  the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded
  on an infallible experience, he expects the event
  with the last degree of assurance, and regards
  his past experience as a full proof of the future
  existence of the event. (73)

9
Of Miracles

• The reason why the laws of nature carries so much
  weight is that they are predicated upon the
  uniformity of experience.
• Now Hume needs to do a little more work here in
  distinguishing what is a miracle from
  inexplicable freaks of nature and other such
  irregular experiences. He needs to do a little
  more work in what exactly violates a law of
  nature and what are just irregular experiences.
  For he states

10
Of Miracles

• One, who in our climate, should expect better
  weather in any week of June than in one of
  December, would reason justly, and conformable to
  experience.All effects follow not with like
  certainty from their supposed causes. Some
  events are found to have been more variable, and
  sometimes to disappoint our expectations so
  that, in our reasonings concerning matter of
  fact, there are all imaginable degrees of
  assurance, from the highest certainty to the
  lowest species of moral evidence. (73)

11
Of Miracles

• From this quote there are invariable experiences
  codified in laws and are considered certainties.
• Others are irregular with ALL imaginable degrees
  of assurance, where their probability are lower.
• So when is something a suspension of the laws of
  nature due to the intervention of the divine and
  when is it just an irregularity?
• How low does probability have to go to be
  considered a miracle? Remember the miracle
  we did on the board last week.

12
Of Miracles

• Must a miracle happen only once? If miracles
  do happen somewhat frequently according to
  various religious traditions, would they have a
  regularity and uniformity to them so that all
  Hume is ultimately arguing is that he just
  doesnt believe them? This is not Humes claim.
• Since, as Hume maintains, there is no necessity
  in the outer world, so much so that there is no
  contradiction involved in existential statements,
  can he make sense of the idea of a physically.

13
Of Miracles

• .impossible event? What could such
  impossibility consist in since it couldnt be a
  contradiction?
• All of these questions are interesting of a
  theoretical level but perhaps we can put them
  aside as not touching Humes main argument (?).
• It is commonly believed though not universally
  especially in Humes day that if a miracle had
  a rational explanation it wouldnt be a miracle

14
Of Miracles

• Therefore, we can accept by definition that a
  miracle is a violation of the laws of nature
  putting aside the interesting question of
  precisely when is anything a violation of a law
  of nature when there are no natural causes?
  How is this determined? All irregular events
  appear so.
• The maxim of rationality forms the fundamental
  basis for why we believe in historical reports
• The reason, why we place any credit in
  witnesses, and historians, is not derived from a
  connexion, which we perceive a priori, between
  testimony and reality, but because we are
  accustomed to find

15
Of Miracles

• .a conformity between them. (75)
• Something must agree with our experience if we
  are to believe it.
• And now we have the key ingredients of Humes
  argument against miracles.
• 1.Weaker evidence can never undermine stronger
  evidence.
• 2. We proportion our beliefs according to the
  stronger evidence, that which is more probable.

16
The argument

• 3. A natural explanation of an event and the
  testimonies given of that event even if
  improbable and seemingly unlikely is ALWAYS more
  probable than the miraculous.
• Therefore,
• 4. Testimonies given of a miracle such as
  found in the Torah, Bible or Koran can never
  repeal this requirement of rationality.
• Therefore,
• 5. Miracles are not to be believed in.

17
The Argument

• There must, therefore, be a uniform experience
  against every miraculous event, otherwise the
  event would not merit that appellation. And as
  an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there
  is here a direct and full proof, from the nature
  of the fact, against the existence of any
  miracle nor can such a proof be destroyed, or
  the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite
  proof, which is superiorThat no testimony is
  sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the
  testimony be of.

18
The argument

• .such a kind, that its falsehood would be more
  miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to
  establish (77) This will never happen
• Applied to Christianity
• It can be, and is often, argued that the
  disciples/apostles were men of integrity, died
  for their faith, were cowards at first then
  struck with bravery, had nothing to gain
  especially since most lived in poverty and were
  persecuted, had .

19
Applied to Christianity

• .nothing to gain in that Jesus could still have
  been revered as a great rabbi (teacher) and the
  resurrection went counter to their Jewish
  expectations, were quite rational in that the
  Bible contains sophisticated reasonings as well
  as numerous admirable moral precepts about loving
  thy neighbour and not judging others. Therefore,
  why would they lie, die for a lie, and become
  hypocrites to their own moral teachings?

20
Applied to Christianity

• On a Humean account, all of this could be granted
  though as we shall see in Part Two Hume is not so
  generous to those testifying of miracles.
• However, though the probability of some kind of
  conspiracy account or theory here be low, maybe
  even extremely low, it is still higher than any
  supernatural or miraculous event. Thus, we cannot
  rationally believe the account.
• Question Is this nothing more than a prejudice
  against the supernatural?

21
A Prejudice

• For, if a miracle happened to you, you wouldnt
  be able to tell anyone about it since all of us
  are rationally required not to believe you no
  matter how honest or critically aware you are.
  Are we pre-judging, saying in effect that since
  miracles dont happen, we will not believe in
  them?
• Note the scope of Humes argument
• He is not proving that miracles are impossible
  how could an empiricist prove that, especially
  given the inability to state a physical
  impossibility.

22
Scope

• And given our apparent openness to experience.
• But rather,
• It is never rational to believe in the report of
  a miracle. All other alternative explanations
  will be more probable.
• Though this is the strict scope of his argument
  it should be noted that a committed Humean and
  /or naturalist would be strongly inclined to seek
  any alternative were a miracle to happen to
  them which is not hard to do since, as mentioned.

23
Scope

• previously, apparently inexplicable freaks of
  nature do happen.

24
Section Ten Part Two

• Adds nothing much to Humes central argument. I
  have already presented Humes argument that even
  if miracle reports are treated in their best
  possible light, they are still without rational
  foundation.
• This section is mostly a mixture of some useful
  advice to keep our critical antennae up high in
  hearing such stories and some not so useful
  elitist ad hominem

25
The validity of eye-witness accounts

• Four Arguments against
• (1) For first, there is not to be found, in all
  history, any miracle attested by a sufficient
  number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense,
  education and learning, as to secure us against
  all delusion in themselves of such undoubted
  integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion
  of any design to deceive others of such credit
  and reputation in the eyes of mankindyou get
  the point

26
Four Arguments

• Apologists for every religious tradition would
  disagree. Smacks too much of ad hominem here.
• (2) Peoples passions for juicy stories and
  neediness can make them gullible.
• The passion of surprise and wonder, arising from
  miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a
  sensible tendency towards the belief of the
  events from which it is derived (78)
• Useful advice here. Be careful. Especially when
  the collection plate is being past around.

27
Four Arguments

• (3) Such stories abound in the ignorant masses
• It forms a strong presumption against all
  supernatural and miraculous relations, that they
  are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and
  barbarous nations or if a civilized people has
  ever given admission to any of them, that people
  will be found to have received them from ignorant
  and barbarous ancestors(79-80)
• Civilized people such as the ones in Humes day
  who were practicing slavery, could only believe

28
Four Arguments

• in miracles as an inheritance from barbarous
  ancestors.
• Smacks too much of elitism the masses are asses
  and we the educated are so much better.
• (4) Every rival system has their miracle
  stories so who is to be believed and dont they
  all cancel each other out?
• What does this do to religion, here Christianity

29
The Effect

• Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not
  on reason(89)
• So that, upon the whole, we may conclude, that
  the Christian Religion not only was at first
  attended with miracles, but even this day cannot
  be believed by any reasonable person without one.
  Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of
  its veracity (90)
• But how to interpret these statements?

30
The Effect

• Some Scholars Hume wrote such statements as
  these to protect himself from the wrath of the
  authorities. And when you read them, especially
  the last one, they are not at all complementary
  of religion.
• Others we cant read into the text such
  motivations but must accept them at face value.
  Besides, what Hume says in his first argument
  which would apply to the Biblical writers shows
  that he doesnt really care about being in such.

31
The Effect

• trouble. Religion is without rational
  foundation. But so is (a) belief in an external
  world (b) induction that the future will
  conform to the past (c) the continued existence
  of objects. Religious beliefs are justified
  solely by faith.
• Ill leave it for you to decide what you take
  these statements to imply
• Hume himself? Definitely too much of a skeptic
  to advocate atheism. But beyond that it is the
  subject of debate which I not being a Hume

32
The Effect

• ..scholar will not comment on. Some argue
  agnosticism, others attenuated deism, fideism,
  - on such a murky subject unless I am confidently
  in the know, I will keep quiet. Read The
  Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and come
  to your own conclusion.

33
(No Transcript)
34
Section 12 Of Academical or Sceptical Philosophy

• Part One
• Central Thesis Reason does not possess the
  resources to act as a foundation or justification
  of any kind, for our beliefs. Beliefs that we
  hold to be self-evidently true cannot be
  substantiated through any rational argument. In
  fact, rational arguments actually disqualifies
  such beliefs. Ultimately, what acts as the
  foundations for beliefs are natural instincts.

35
The Varieties of Skepticism

• (1) Cartesian Skepticism the thesis of
  universal doubt.
• (2) A moderate version that is actually
  beneficial for us
• (3) Consequent to science and enquiry
• (a) With respect to the senses
• (b) With respect to the distinction between
  primary and secondary qualities.

36
Cartesian Skepticism

• Recall from Descartes the procedure of
  methodological doubt.
• What would happen if we were to adopt this form
  of doubt? That is, if we could?
• There would be no escape.
• But neither is there any such original
  principle, which has a prerogative above others,
  that are self-evident and convincing Or if
  there were, could we advance a step beyond it,
  but by the use of those very faculties, of which
  we are supposed

37
Cartesian Skepticism

• .to be already diffident. The CARTESIAN doubt,
  therefore, were it ever possible to be attained
  by any human creature (as it plainly is not)
  would be entirely incurable and no reasoning
  could ever bring us to a state of assurance and
  conviction upon any subject. (103)
• Even if we could obtain an original principle
  we could not advance a step beyond it.
• Have we seen this in Descartes?

38
Cartesian Skepticism

• The Cartesian Circle?
• (2) A moderate version of skepticism
• A careful method freed from prejudices and rash
  judgments. Impartial, restricted to that which
  is within the scope of reason to pronounce
  judgments upon but not allowing itself to extend
  further than this.
• To begin with clear and self-evident principles,
  to advance by timorous and sure steps, to review
  frequently our conclusions, and examine ..

39
Moderate Skepticism

• .accurately all their consequences though by
  these means we shall make both a slow and a short
  progress in our systems are the only methods, by
  which we can ever hope to reach truth, and
  attain a proper stability and certainty in our
  determinations. (103)
• Ultimately, it is this form of skepticism that
  Hume is going to advocate.
• (3) Consequent to Science and Enquiry

40
Consequent to Science and Enquiry

• (a) with respect to the senses
• What beliefs doe we naturally hold to be
  self-evidently true?
• (1) What we are directly aware of in sense
  perceptions are the objects of such perceptions.
  I am seeing this table here and now.
• (2) The external world. The objects of our
  beliefs are the familiar objects just as we
  perceive them to be in the external world. Such
  objects are the source of our sense perceptions.

41
Beliefs we hold true

• (3) Of such objects our presence bestows not
  being on it Our absence does not annihilate it.
  It perserves its existence uniform and entire,
  independent of the situation of intelligent
  beings, who perceive or contemplate it. (104)
  What we have here is actually two distinct though
  related beliefs (a) the continuous existence of
  objects they remain in existence even when we
  are no longer perceiving them (b) our familiar
  problem of induction the future will conform to
  the past.

42
Their rational support?

• Of (1) reason shows us to be false. What we
  are directly aware of, what we have contact with,
  are our perceptions ideas, representations,
  sense-datum, perceptions in Hume from which we
  need to infer a source an inference that is not
  possible for us to rationally make.
• Of (2) and (3), they are without rational
  foundation. We cannot demonstrate them to be
  true or false.
• In many respects such a conclusion for (2) and
  3(a) follows from (1).

43
Of (1) what does reason show us?

• The table, which we see seems to diminish, as we
  remove farther from it But the real table,
  which exists independent of us, suffers no
  alteration It was therefore, nothing but its
  image, which was present to the mind. These are
  the obvious dictates of reason and no man, who
  reflects, ever doubted, that the existences,
  which we consider, when we say, this house and
  that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the
  mind, and fleeing copies or representations of
  other existences, which remain uniform and
  independent. (104-5)

44
Of (1)?

• Note Keep this argument in mind. We are going
  to see one very similar if not identical to
  it when we come to Bertrand Russell. There I
  will present a critique.
• We have varying different perceptions of the
  table i.e., it can appear in a different shape,
  smaller and different colour depending upon my
  position of perception while we believe the
  table itself to remain the same. What this is
  suppose to convince us of is that what we are in
  contact

45
Of (1) ?

• with are our perceptions themselves.
• Having establish this, (2) can be placed in
  skeptical doubt.
• By what argument can it be proved, that the
  perceptions of the mind must be caused by
  external objects, entirely different from them,
  though resembling them (if that be possible) and
  could not arise either from the energy of the
  mind itself, or from the suggestion of some
  invisible and unknown spirit(105)

46
Of (2)?

• We have our familiar correspondence or vantage
  point problem. Recall how do we demonstrate
  that our perceptions (ideas, sense-datum)
  corresponds to the way objects are if all that we
  possess are our perceptions? From what vantage
  point do we verify the correspondence?
• From experience? What is the problem with this
  suggestion?
• And Hume Agrees.

47
Of (2)?

• But here experience is, and must be entirely
  silent. The mind has never any thing present to
  it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach
  any experience of their connexion with objects.
  (105)
• From what vantage point? We are stuck on one
  side of the claimed relation between thoughts and
  objects and therefore cannot validate both sides
  of the relata. We cannot demonstrate what the
  source on the other side of the relation is.
  Therefore, according to reason, the external
  world is lost.

48
Appeal to God?

• No. Two reasons given.
• (1) A perfect God would create our sense
  experiences to be perfect because it is not
  possible that he can ever deceive (105).
  However, we are not infallible.
• (2) If we can doubt the external world, we have
  removed the basis from which we can prove the
  existence of God.
• Two Questions
• (1) How does Descartes respond to (1) ?

49
Two Questions

• (2) Why does Hume hold (2)? Think of his
  critique of the ontological argument.
• Once we grant the argument concerning how what we
  are fundamentally in contact with are our
  perceptions can you see how 3 (a) escapes
  rational justification and proof?
• And 3 (b) is just our familiar problem of
  induction.
• Therefore, what is the foundation for all such
  beliefs? An instinct of nature. Thats it.

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(b) Primary and Secondary Qualities

• Recall from Descartes. What is the distinction?
• Basic thesis Primary qualities are just as much
  in the mind as secondary qualities. Therefore,
  if secondary qualities are not really real or
  objective then neither are primary qualities.
• Supporting argument
• Do we ever detect, and even stronger, can we ever
  effect, a separation of primary and secondary
  qualities? Hume couldve said here from what
  impression do we have such a separation

51
Supporting Argument

• What is extension without a shape, a colour, a
  hardness etc.
• An extension, that is neither tangible nor
  visible, cannot possibly be conceived And a
  tangible or visible extension, which is neither
  hard nor soft, black nor white, is equally beyond
  the reach of human conception. (106)
• The argument Berkeleys against such general
  or abstract ideas.

52
Supporting Argument

• But if we can effect no such distinction between
  primary and secondary and thereby consider them
  both to be in the mind
• Bereave matter of all its intelligible
  qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a
  manner annihilate it, and leave only a certain
  unknown, inexplicable something, as the cause of
  our perceptions a notion so imperfect, that no
  sceptic will think it worth while to contend
  against it. (107)

53
Section 12 Part Two

• Reason itself, instead of being clear and
  distinct presents us with its own paradoxes
• Hume mentions the infinite divisibility of matter
  as an example. Finite matter yet infinitely
  divisible. Every division yields some
  matter/quantity, so how could it be infinitely
  divisible?
• There are others (i.e., Russells paradox)
• Note in part one Hume casts skeptical doubt
  concerning matters of fact and existence. Here

54
Part Two

• he wishes to show that mathematics is not immune
  to such doubts either. This corresponds nicely
  to his division of reason at the beginning of
  section four between relations of ideas and
  matters of fact. The upshot all of reason is
  vulnerable to skeptical attack and weakening.
  Reason has a limited domain.
• Note the difference with Descartes. With
  Descartes, we can fully trust our clear and
  distinct ideas.

55
The power of Skepticism

• So what should our reaction be to such a power of
  skepticism? Do we face utter paralysis? A
  Hamlet state where we are unable to act since
  reason cannot be our guide?
• No to the latter two questions. Nature saves the
  day Nature is always too strong for principle
  (100).
• The excessive skeptic Pyrrhonian will
  ultimately destroy herself.

56
Excessive Skepticism

• On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will
  acknowledge any thing, that all human life must
  perish, were his principles universally and
  steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action
  would immediately cease and men remain in a
  total lethargy, till the necessities of nature,
  unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable
  existence. (110)
• Interesting the life guided purely by reason.
• However, nature will intrude and set the matter
  straight.

57
Excessive Skepticism

• the first and most trivial event in life will
  put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and
  leave him the same, in every point of action and
  speculation, with the philosophers of every other
  sect, or with those who never concerned
  themselves in any philosophical researches
  (110-11)
• So much so that the excessive skeptic will be
  forced to laugh at herself and the whimsical
  condition of mankind, who must act and reason and
  believe. (111)

58
Excessive Skepticism

• Does this satisfy us? Will it encourage its own
  form of dogmatism? Laziness? Shouldnt we keep
  working on the hard problems of reason? Would
  such an attitude discourage this?
• Summary. The arguments against excessive
  skepticism
• (1) Produces no good or useful outcomes. Nothing
  good arises from it.
• (2) Paralyzes action leading to a miserable
  life.
• (3) Ultimately produces no conviction nature
  is too strong.

59
Excessive Skepticism

• (4) Unanswerable leaving us nowhere to
  concentrate our research efforts.
• However, in this section, the skeptic who keeps
  with his proper sphere, and display those
  philosophical objections (110) will have ample
  matter of triumph (110)
• As in the previous section Hume speaks favourably
  of a moderate skepticism that appreciates and
  doesnt attempt to transgress its limits. Read
  the summary on page 110. Who does it remind you
  of?

60
Part Three Humes Conclusions

• The moderate brand of skepticism Hume favours is
  here called mitigated or academical
  skepticism.
• Its benefits (a) Cautious study.
• (b) Modesty, humility
• (c) Contrary to dogmatism
• (d) Knows and accepts its limitations and scope.

61
Limitations

• A correct Judgment observes a contrary method,
  and avoiding all distant and high enquiries,
  confines itself to common life, and to such
  subjects as fall under daily practice and
  experience leaving the more sublime topics to
  the embellishment of poets and orators, or to the
  arts of priests and politicians.But they will
  never be tempted to go beyond common life, so
  long as they consider the imperfection of those
  faculties which they employ (112)

62
Limitations

• Question such sublime topics left to the
  poets, priests and politicians are some of the
  most important issues facing the human being. No
  one has gone to war over a scientific theory or
  mathematical formula however, unfortunately, we
  have over such topics. Such topics of life and
  death, war and peace, of art and religion
  inspire the human being enabling her to reach the
  greatest heights of imagination, wonder and
  compassion. And also the greatest lows of the
  human being.

63
Question

• Shouldnt we expect, shouldnt we demand, that a
  correct judgment have something to say here?
  Or so we say that if it cannot be studied
  mathematically or scientifically, it just doesnt
  exist? Is nothing to say actually the best
  response? Does Hume ultimately lead to a social
  conservatism?
• Question considering Humes division in section
  one between the easy and obvious philosophy where
  a philosopher who purposes only to represent the
  common sense of mankind in.

64
Question

• ..more beautiful and more engaging colours, if
  by accident he falls into error, goes no farther
  but renewing his appeal to common sense, and the
  natural sentiments of the mind, returns into the
  right path, and secures himself from any
  dangerous illusions (2), and abtruse thought
  which is dangerous. With Humes emphasis on the
  common life and nature in the above quotes, is
  he ultimately supporting and vindicating the
  easy and obvious philosophy?

65
The proper objects of Study

• What should we be investigating? What should we
  be spending our intellectual labour and effort
  on?
• Relations of Ideas demonstrative (mathematics)
• Matters of Fact the sciences
• And thats it. They are the only sources of
  knowledge.

66
Humes Criteria

• Sometimes referred to as Humes Fork
• When we run over libraries, persuaded of these
  principles, what havoc must we make? If we take
  in our hand any volume of divinity or school
  metaphysics, for instance let us ask, Does it
  contain any abstract reasoning concerning
  quantity or number? No. Does it contain any
  experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact
  and existence? No. Commit it then to the
  flames For it can contain nothing but sophistry
  and illusion.

67
Humes Criteria

• A philosopher has presented us with a criteria.
  We know what to do. It is?

68
Humes Criteria

• So lets ask it of Humes book.
• Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning
  quantity or number? No. It is not a work of
  mathematics.
• Does it contain any experimental reasoning
  concerning matter of fact and existence? No. It
  is not a work of scientific investigation and
  experiment.
• So what are we suppose to do with the Enquiry?
• Commit it to the flames For it can contain..

69
Humes Criteria

• .nothing but sophistry and illusion.
• How odd?
• Has Hume opened the door to a proper field of
  study and knowledge only to attempt to close it?
  Adopting a vantage point, a meta-level, that
  attempts to absolutize itself by disqualifying
  its own possibility?

70
McTaggart, The Unreality of Time
71
Skeletal Outline of McTaggarts The Unreality of
Time

• Five Basic Movements
• (1) Our understanding of temporality divides
  into two kinds the A series and the B
  series
• (2) Despite initial appearances, it is the A
  series that is essential for time the B
  series is derived from, predicated upon, the A
  series for its legitimacy

72
McTaggart Outline Continued

• (3) Therefore, time can only be real as the A
  series
• (4) The A series is incoherent and
  self-contradictory
• (5) Therefore, time cannot be real.

73
What to watch for

• Therefore, in your reading follow carefully steps
  (1) (5)
• i.e., clearly identify what the A series is and
  how it differs from the B series
• i.e., why is the B series parasitic upon the A
  series? What are the arguments? How does
  considerations surrounding change play a role?
• i.e., how does the argument designed to show that
  the A series is self-contradictory work?

74
McTaggarts The Unreality of Time

• The A series past/present/future
• Includes the far past, near past, present, near
  future etc.
• The B series the earlier than/ later than
  relation
• Following Mellor we can define this series as the
  series of dates 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
  2006 etc.

75
McTaggarts The Unreality of Time

• The B series relations are transitive and
  asymmetrical
• transitive if A is earlier than B and B is
  earlier than C then A is earlier than C
• asymmetrical it is not the case that if A is
  earlier than B then B is earlier than A that
  would be a symmetrical relation

76
McTaggarts The Unreality of Time

• Since the A series involves tenses past tense,
  present tense, future tense we can call this
  the tensed view of time
• Since the B series doesnt involve such tenses
  only the earlier than/ later than relation
  and/or dates - we can refer to this as the
  tenseless view of time

77
McTaggarts The Unreality of Time

• The tenseless view of time appears more
  fundamental and objective
• Why? Because the tensed view of time seems to
  require a subject and therefore appears to be
  merely subjective past to whom?
  Past/present/future appears relative to us
  whereas dates are permanent and thereby appears
  more objective and real

78
McTaggarts The Unreality of Time

• Characteristic of the B series tenseless view
  of time its relations are permanent
• If A is earlier than B then this is forever so
• May 9, 2005 was earlier than June 9, 2005 period
• By contrast the A series is not characterized
  by its permanency an event occurring now will
  become past, near past, far past. A future event
  will become closer and closer

79
The Fundamental Series

• So is the B series more fundamental and real?
• No - it is actually the A series that is
  fundamental for time
• The argument
• Change is essential for time
• i.e., if nothing ever changes, if nothing ever
  became different, then we would not be able to
  state or understand A became B before C became
  D and after E became F

80
The Fundamental Series

• Without such changes there would be no situations
  in which before and after could be used or
  even understood
• Since change is essential for time our question
  then becomes Is there change in the B series?
• No. This relates to the permanency
  characteristic we mentioned above
• M is earlier than N which is earlier than O MltNltO

81
The Fundamental Series

• Such relations are permanent M,N,O are points
  in time in the B series and such relations are
  static and permanent
• But M changed into N at a certain moment
• Yes, but introducing at a certain moment is
  introducing a now, a present in other words,
  introducing a tense
• Such tenses are not part of the tenseless view of
  time

82
An analogy

• How should we think of this argument?
• Think of the B series as a map without a you are
  here symbol
• (1) without the symbol is the map useful to us?
  No. But that may be just subjective. It is
  after all an objective and complete
  representation of spatial relations

83
An analogy

• BUT when we move from Mississauga Road to Bay
  Street (maybe that is a trip some of you are
  planning to make) is there any travel in the
  map qua map? No, the map is as it is. WE are
  moving our finger along the map and that is the
  travel that is being done but there is no such
  travel in the map itself as an accurate
  representation of spatial relations

84
An analogy

• Map B series
• Travel change
• In keeping with our analogy, in the second part
  of McTaggarts article where he argues that time
  is unreal, one of the basic points of his
  argument or so I shall argue - will be that
  whereas in a map you can give a complete and
  accurate representation of spatial relations
  hence, real and objective there is no such map
  of time

85
An analogy

• Time, in contrast to spatial relations, will
  require a you are here symbol in order to be
  made sense of
• All to come
• Therefore, change requires the A series
• How to think of change with respect to time and
  the A series?
• Event you writing the test on June 9 (McT.s
  example the death of Queen Anne)

86
Time and Change

• Event you writing the test on June 9
• All the characteristics of this test writing are
  stamped in time felt confident/needed more
  time/studied too much/little.
• Event now and forever was on June 9
• Let x represent the test being written

87
Time and Change
88
Time and Change

• Where do we see the change in this table?
• In column B the B series - there is no change
  May 20 is ALWAYS later than May 9 and earlier
  than June 9 by the same constant unchanging
  intervals these dates as points on a line do not
  alter
• In the A column the A series we note change
  in the changing tenses was distant future, near
  future, present, past, etc. -quote from p.13

89
Time and Change

• Or to continue with our map analogy you are the
  you are here symbol, the temporal frame of
  reference, in the test being written while the
  dates remain fixed and unchanged
• As you travel, come closer to the event change
  occurs
• However, the key point is that it is only in the
  A series with such a reference point whereby
  past/present/future can be articulated, within
  the river of time itself can change occur

90
Time and Change

• Change is the changing tense of things and events
  moving from the past to the present to the future
• Points on a line as we find in the B series do
  not change such points are just located at
  different parts of the B series i.e., a poker
  analogy
• Such ever changing tenses define the earlier
  than/later than relation itself
• Therefore, the B series is derived from the A
  series

91
Some Conclusions

• Therefore, no A series --- no change
• Therefore, B series is not sufficient to
  constitute time given that change is essential to
  time
• Therefore, B series as a temporal series is
  dependent upon the A series
• Therefore, if the A series is incoherent then
  time is incoherent and unreal

92
Three Objections

• (1) Russell
• Past/present/future belongs only to the subject
• Makes sense in the analogy above I have stated
  that you are the you are here symbol
• Past/present/ future are token reflexive
• Defn terms such as I, here, now whose
  essential occurrence in a sentence renders that
  sentence capable of bearing different truth
  values according to the circumstances of utterance

93
Three Objections continued

• Examples Today is sunny, I am at UTM, I am
  at UTS etc.
• Russell such token reflexives does not belong
  to time
• No subjects/ human beings events could still be
  earlier than/ later than each other
• Implicit also if we wish to give an objective
  complete description of reality we cannot
  tolerate constant fluctuating truth values
  i.e., the map

94
Three Objections continued

• Russells idea to think of change as difference
  in truth values
• The test is being written as asserted on May 9
  False
• The test is being written as asserted on June 9
  True
• Note change in truth values therefore, change
• A relation between a proposition, date (B series)
  and truth value

95
Three Objections Continued

• Note in such a relation no seeming mention of
  the A series, tenses just the proposition, date
  (B series) and truth value
• McTaggarts response his poker example or in
  our example such truth values whether T or
  F are eternally true or false they are thus
  fixed and unchanging
• The test is being written as asserted on May 9
  False and always, eternally false

96
Three Objections Continued

• The test is being written as asserted on June 9
  True and always, eternally, true
• Therefore, whence the change? These facts in (1)
  and (2) never, and will never, change
• But the change is in the in-between (1) and (2)
  when I assert it on May 9 as opposed to when I
  assert it on June 9
• Quite right but now notice the return of the
  subject, the I, the you are here point!

97
Three Objections Continued

• The change is captured in the as asserted and
  now we are back in the A series
• The as asserted the proposition as sometimes
  T sometimes F is where change happens
• Yet in such a listing of dates with these fixed
  truth values we are not going to get a sometimes
  T, sometimes F phenomena
• Russell doesnt want any such ambiguity always
  true/ always false therefore, as always no
  change

98
Three Objections Continued

• Second Objection Non-existent time series the
  adventures of Don Quixote
• Don Quixote as fictional cannot be said by us
  to be past/present/future
• But as we read the book we grasp without this the
  earlier than/later than relation as temporal
• Therefore, B-series is all we need

99
Three Objections Continued

• McTaggarts Response (1) why are we talking
  about anon-existent time series to prove the
  existence of time? No sense
• weak hypothetical thought experiments
  including fiction elicits truth? It is precisely
  the role of the imaginary to bring real things
  to light. If in our reading of fiction we can
  grasp temporal relations without the A series,
  then the A series is not fundamental, essential
  or necessary for time regardless of the fact that
  it is fiction.

100
Three Objections Continued

• Second Response better our grasp of these
  adventures can only be in the A-series as if
  they really happened (15) here I may be
  strengthening McTaggart a little beyond what he
  literally says but only a little
• All that is real i.e., Cervantes mind when he
  invented the story is in the A - series

101
Three Objections Continued

• Several Real and independent time series
• The argument p.15
• Present is a marker only on each line, within
  each line
• Yet our ability to distinguish such presents is
  not as successive yet, we can still distinguish
  them
• But the present can only be real if it is
  successive

102
Three Objections Continued

• The different time series are real
• Therefore, these different time series must exist
  independently of past/present/future
• McTaggarts response in our overview of such
  time lines, there is no present since the present
  can only be successive
• But what is time without the present therefore,
  there is no time from such an overview

103
Three Objections Continued

• Our mistake was to derive certain characteristics
  of the overview itself and impute them on each of
  the members - which is the real time series
• The way McTaggart responds does strike one as
  simply begging the question what is being
  challenged is precisely whether we can grasp the
  present non-successively as this objection
  states
• However, one fruitful manner of understanding
  this response maybe strengthening it.

104
Three Objections Continued

• In some informal logic textbooks there is a
  fallacy called division where one aspect of
  this fallacy is to argue fallaciously from the
  attributes of a collection of elements to the
  attributes of the elements themselves

105
Three Objections Continued

• For example, university students collectively
  study medicine, law, engineering, philosophy,
  dentistry etc. therefore, each student
  individually studies medicine, law, engineering,
  philosophy etc.
• It doesnt follow.
• With this objection we see a similar structure
  (albeit not quite identical) collectively the
  present of these time series which we
  understand and are real can be understood
  non-successively and yet the present can only be
  the present successively

106
Three Objections Continued

• Therefore, we can understand individually each of
  these time series without the distinction between
  past, present, and future
• Here we see double division (I) the alleged
  incompatibility between the collective present
  non-successive- and the individual present
  successive an incompatibility only b/c we have
  fallaciously juxtaposed the characteristics of
  the collection and the individual elements

107
Three Objections Continued

• And (II) the inference that since collectively we
  can understand the present as not the present we
  can understand individually each time series
  without the present
• Is it any surprise that McTaggart returns the
  discussion to what must be true of the individual
  case

108
Concluding Remarks of First Part

• After answering such objections
• We conclude, then, that the distinctions of the
  past, present, and future are essential to time,
  and that, if the distinctions are never true of
  reality, then no reality is in time (16)
• Now McTaggart has to show that the A series
  involves a contradiction and therefore, time is
  unreal
• Stay Tuned - Cheers

109
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