International Politics: International Systems

1
International Politics International Systems
Objectives of the class Two goals
P First it wants to give students an overview of
basic concepts that are used in the political
analysis of International relations and of their
recent theoretical developments. Among those
concepts are the basic notion of actor and system
in International relations, decision-making
bargaining, escalation and crisis, deterrence and
stability. The course also intends to cover
issues in International cooperation such as
alliances and coalitions, collective goods,
commons and international institutions.
2
International Systems
P Second, the course wants to provide
epistemological and methodological foundations
for the use of these concepts in a rigorous way.
In order to that the course will insist on the
closeness of economic and political approaches in
the use of rational choice analysis and game
theory particularly in their dynamic and
evolutionary aspects. The importance of
productive processes and of basic demographic and
resource bases for the understanding of
international politics will also be emphasized.
3
Fundamental questions

• The political analysis of international relations
  can be subsumed in two basic questions
• Why the present international power structure
• How will it evolve?
• The course will try to answer by emphasizing
• Fundamentals Demographics, Ecological
  Conditions, Technology, Health Factors The
  "Diamond" perspective
• Strategic aspects of political systems and
  behavior

4
World Configuration
5
Epistemological and Methodological Considerations

• Fundamental question What is politics?
• Different epistemological and methodological
  approaches will give different answers.
• I will use here a scientific (Popperian)
  epistemology characterized by what is called
  methodological individualism and the rational
  choice perspective
• This perspective gives a unique answer here
  namely Politics is the solution to collective
  action problems (Taylor)
• This approach has two advantages

6
International Systems
P It gives rigorous and unambiguous definitions
of concepts whereas a lot of concepts used by
social scientists are fuzzy P It clearly links
politics with economics and other scientific
disciplines such as biology, anthropology,
archeology, and evolutionary psychology.
Politics under different evolutionary settings
which links up with a tradition started in the
19th century
7
International Systems
What is the scientific method? It is according
to Popper A Hypothetico-Deductive Method which
includes at least 4 steps
P Definition of a paradigm (units of analysis) P
Definition of basic assumptions and hypotheses P
Logical conclusions from these assumptions P
Empirical testing of these conclusions through
rigorous methods independent from the assumptions
8
International Systems
Basic explanatory mechanisms in the social
sciences

• P Causal approaches
• P Normative approaches
• P Approaches based on the motivations of actors
  or agents they imply actors act strategically or
  instrumentally and not for other reasons!!
• Rational choice approaches
• lt Cognitive approaches

9
Rational choice approaches
Rationality means transitivity if AgtB and BgtC
then AgtC. Rationality is also represented by the
standard expected utility model Suppose a
transitive preference or utility order, this
order can be represented by a function
U(x,y,z,...). This function can then be
associated with a gamble. Here U(x) takes only
the values W (win), ST (Status quo) and L (lose).
We have the order here of WgtSTgtL. The gamble or
risk aspect is associated with a probability
scheme for different events.


gamble

sure
-
thing act

probability

lose

L

ST

p

win

W

ST

1
-
p


10
Cognitive approaches Example of a scheme

• EVENT

• PAST EVENTS

• SEARCH FOR SIMILAR EVENT IN PAST

• Modify event base to avoid future match

• Reinforce matched event

• Use matches to past to decide course of actions

• TAKE ACTION

• NO

• YES

• Did action yield desired outcome

11
Methodology Conceptual Constructions or Models
have to be verified (one has to attempt to
disprove them)
Problems
P Ecological fallacy drawing inferences from one
level to another P Non independence of
observations Contagion problem P Use of unclear
concepts no causal inference possible
12
Rational Choice Shows The Problematic Aspect of
Solving Collective Action Problems and Social
Choice and thus of the Linkage Domestic Foreign
Policy

• Two theoretical approaches especially in viewof
  information problems
• Condorcet-Arrow paradox and theorem
• The Theory of collective goods
• International dynamics are linked to such
  questions

13
Social Choice 1. Condorcet Arrow Approach
P 1. Social Choice and Arrows Theorem P 3
Voters x y z P 3 Issues A B C
14
The Condorcet Arrow Paradox
P Preferences P x A gt B gt C P y
C gt A gt B P z B gt C gt A Majority
Vote A gt B, B gt C, but C gtA
15
Arrow Paradox continued Single peakedness

• P
• r
• e
• f
• e
• r
• e
• n
• c
• e

• B

• A

• C

• A

• C

• B

• C

• B

• C

• A

• A B C

• A

• B

16
Collective Good Theory

• Collective goods as opposed to private goods are
  problematic with respect to exclusion and rivalry
• They are nevertheless essential for the working
  of society
• They originate with productive processes and
  population concentrations that are higher

17
Collective good theory continued
18
Collective good theory leads to a theory of
interest groups
P Free Rider Problem and Selective incentives P
Asymmetry of interest is important P Collective
goods are usually supplied by small groups P
Collective goods lead to the principal agent
problem
19
Politics and internal structures

• What can be said historically?
• Given types of political systems appear Chiefs?
  organizers of redistribution-providers of higher
  goods, lords, kings, emperors, self-government
• These have international connotations The Konrad
  Skaperdas model
• Evolutionary aspects from Chiefs to
  self-government
• Fundamental question what conditions these
  evolutions

20
The Konrad-Skaperdas Model

• The Konrad-Skaperdas Theory
• Basic Assumptions Diminishing Returns in
  Production, Trade-offs between private and
  collective defense and between defense and
  productive activities.
• 4 Nash equilibria from Konrad Skaperdas Anarchy,
  Self governance, Leviathan, Competing Lords

21
Theories
P Classical Hume, Kant, Cobden P More recent
Neo-realism, Neo-liberal institutionalism,
Information based conceptions such as epistemic
communities.
22
The International Actor and its Bargaining Power

• Even though we know that the international actor
  is not unitary, it is convenient to represent it
  like that sometimes
• Sometimes the unitary actor is even justified
• There is however no relation between unitary
  actor and rationality More complex
  representations are possible
• It is in particular desirable to represent the
  actor like this in terms of bargaining and
  bargaining power

23
The Basic Bargaining Model
Type II
q
q
1-q
Type I
Accepts
ST
Gives up
Insists
24
Characteristics of the Basic Bargaining Model

• The basic bargaining model emphasizes the
  importance of
• Sequence and thus time preferences and
  discounting
• Uncertainty and thus attitudes toward uncertainty
  and risk

25
Basics of Bargaining Prisoners Dilemma and
Chicken

• Chicken

• Prisoners Dilemma

• C

• Row

• Row

• C

• C

• C

• (3,3)

• Column

• Column

• C

• C

• C

• C

• C

• C

• (2,2) Nash Equilibrium

• (4,2)Nash Equilibrium
• (Subgame Perfect)

• (4,1)

• Row

• (3,3)
• Nash Equilibrium

• (1,1)

• (2,2)

• (1,4)

26
Bargaining Power A General Conception

• P International Actors, like Domestic Ones
  interact by using their Bargaining Power
  Probability to defect in a bargaining situation
• P This Power is determined by
• Domestic Constraints leading to the Metaphor and
  then Models of Two-Level Games
• By the Symmetry or Asymmetry of Preferences or
  (expected) Utilities (As already noticed for
  Collective Goods). This characteristic was
  emphasized by John Nash in his theory of
  bargaining.

27
Bargaining Power (continued)
P This Power is also Determined by International
Actors' Propensity toward Risk, by the Patience
or Impatience of Actors with Respect to a
Bargaining Outcome and thus by their Discount
Rate (Rubinstein Theory of Bargaining) P
Incomplete information about the nature of an
other actor or about propensity toward risk will
also play a role, particularly in evaluating
threats
28
Conflict Escalation
P The analysis of negotiation among actors
indicates an irrationality of conflict
escalation P This irrationality can be explained
through the notion of incomplete information or
poor risk preference P The dollar auction game
is a good metaphor for conflict escalation and
the costs associated to it.
29
Deterrence and Stability
P Deterrence can be explained via the analysis of
compellent or deterrent threats. P If credible
threats are absent deterrence or compellence may
not work P If deterrent power is well spread
stability is maintained.
30
The Evolution of Warfare and Combat and Arms Races
P The evolution of military technology influences
international relations because it modifies the
costs of using armed forces. P There are often
complementarities between military force and
production and exchange systems. Phoenician and
Athenian fleets protected trade and commerce,
Roman armies were guarding the empire but also
conducting raids for slaves, Viking ships could
both be used for piracy and trade.
31
The Evolution of Combat
P Combat is characterized by two parameters,
concentration and dispersion P These two notions
were studied by the British engineer Lanchester
during World War I in terms of dynamic equations,
one for frontal attacks, one for blanketing an
area (such as naval battles or artillery fire) P
For concentration dx1/dt-ax2 a quadratic law
obtains to explain success x12/x22 gt a / b P For
dispersion , a linear law obtains dx1/dt-Ax1x2
x1/x2 gt A / B
32
Historical Evolution of Combat
P Good strategists like Hannibal have always been
able to use a combination of concentration and
dispersion. P Historically combat tends to
disperse more and more (cf. The analysis made by
T. Dupuy) P These evolutions influence military
preparedness and produce arms races.
33
The Roman Empire at 100 BC
Changes effected by Second Punic WarConquest of
Syracuse, complete control of Sicily - 211 BC
Conquest of Carthaginian Spain - 206 BC Creation
of Hispania Citerior (Nearer Spain) - 197
BCCreation of Hispania Ulterior (Further Spain)
- 197 BC Conquest of Macedonia - 148 BC Conquest
of Greece, incorporated into Macedonia - 146
BCConquest of Carthage, creation of province of
Africa - 146 BCInheritance of the kingdom of
Pergamum (Province of Asia) - 133 BC (129
BC)Conquest of Illyricum (possibly incorporated
into Macedonia at first) - 129 BCConquest of
Balearic Islands, incorporated into Hispania
Citerior - 123 BCConquest of Gallia Transalpina
(Narbonensis) - 121 BCConquest of Cilicia - 102
BC
34
HannibalBattle of Cannae 216 BC
35
(No Transcript)
36
Roman generals Lucius Aemilius Paullus Gaius
Terentius Varro Forces 48 000 infantry 6 000
cavalry
37
Carthaginian general Hannibal Forces 35 000
infantry 10 000 cavalry
38
More Seriously BC Hannibal
39
Hannibal, Battle of Cannae, 216 BC
Aufidus River
40
The Schlieffen Plan
41
Historical Evolution of Combat continued
P Increased dispersion enlarges battle field
surface P Logistics and preparation grow in
importance P Destruction of enemy potential is
required P Gains of war are reduced. P Inversion
of the proportion military/civilian casualties
42
Importance of Arms Races

• What is the logic of action reaction arms races?
• Gap closing D Arms A Necessary Arms A Actual
  Level. Necessary Arms A A function of
• Arms B.
• Ex. The British German naval race in the early
  1900'erts Dreadnought Class boats and Naval
  standards related to the Lanchester formulations

43
Arms Races (continued)

• The Arms race will eventually stabilize at high
  levels Cold War Arms Race driven y technological
  evolutions
• This problem is still with us In developing
  nations (India, Pakistan), To some extent in
  "Star Wars" or Missile defense shield.

44
Alliances and coalitions
P A rational analysis of coalition formation is
difficult e.g. Game of the division of a
between 3 actors at a majority vote P The
analysis of coalitions and alliances only makes
sense once one considers multidimensional
aspects of their formation similar to the notion
of comparative advantage in economics e.g
Caplow's model P 3 actors A, B, C, AgtBgtC but
Alt BC P In this case the AB coalition is unlikely
45
Table of gains in the Caplow Triad Game
Players
A
C
B
A
-
2
2
B
2
1
-
C
1
1
-
46
The analysis of Caplows Triad Game reveals
important aspects
P There are fundamental differences between
balancing and bandwagonning behavior in alliance
formation. P Internal and external gains from
coalitions have to be distinguished P Such gains
can be either substitutes or complements P These
two aspects lead to very different forms of
cooperation at the international level.
47
General Stability Problems at the International
Level

• The review of traditional theories has emphasized
  the importance of structural characteristics
  Alliances, Power Hierarchies invisible hand
  perspective, Role of information
• Caplow's analysis shows the limitations of the
  structural approaches fundamental ambiguity
• The Kantian perspective has also drawn attention
  to internal factors, institutional elements and
  general cooperative links between states

48
Stability, continued

• Internal factors are clearly very important
• Many international conflicts have internal
  origins
• This is true now and used to be the case in the
  20th as well as in the 19th century
• Often major conflicts follow major regime changes

49
Why?

• Historically the territorial national state is a
  recent phenomenon (19th) which might be
  disappearing in its classical form
• There is no "diplomatic" bargaining game before
  the 19th
• 19th century conflicts are mostly conflicts to
  establish national states
• The 20th century showed the problems linked to
  national states

50
New elements

• The implosion of the USSR shows the fragility of
  certain state systems
• Developing countries present quite a few cases of
  state disintegration and war-lordism
• The paradox is that international institutions
  and cooperative structures can sustain
  particularities and conflicts (Works of Alesina
  and Deutsch on optimal size of systems)

51
2 Fundamental aspects of international cooperation
P Cooperation to achieve a Pareto Improvement ,
Prisoners Dilemma, Harmony P Cooperation to
avoid Pareto inferior situations, Chicken First
move advantage, thus principal agent problem
52
Cooperation Graphical representation
53
Cooperation for Pareto Improvement
P Commercial and economic cooperation Can take
an imperial form or more recently the form of an
international order P E.G. The WTO and its
Dispute Settlement Mechanism which institutes
decentralized control
54
Cooperation cannot however be explained by state
interests alone

• Why aren't all states protectionists?
• Very few arguments for protectionism except
  optimal tariff
• The answer lies probably in the existence of
  increasing returns to scale for firms and thus
  the constitution of exporting and importing (as
  opposed to import protecting) interests

55
Common Pool Resources
P Complex question common pool resources are
collective goods that result in crowding calls
for property rights in combination with other
measures P Raises the issue of property rights
and the relations between systems with different
types of property rights Exchanges might be
unequal in this case, e.g. natural resources P
Can sometimes be solved by instituting new
property rights schemes. This is however
difficult in some cases
56
For cooperation in common pool resources domestic
pressures are also necessary

• Environmental and human rights lobbies
• Reputational effects for firms and politicians
• The importance of knowledge From Easter Island
  to Diseases
• The impact of epistemic communities