American Association for Engineering Education Forum, February 25, 2002

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American Association for Engineering Education
Forum, February 25, 2002
Translating Science and Technology Into
Operational Capabilities
Anna Johnson-Winegar, Ph.D. Deputy Assistant to
the Secretary of Defense (Chemical and
Biological Defense)
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Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP)
Vision

• Ensure U.S. military personnel are the best
  equipped and best prepared force in the world
  for operating in future battlespaces that may
  feature chemically and biologically contaminated
  environments.

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Emerging Directions

• Homeland Security Roles and Missions
• Installation Force Protection
• Acceleration of CB Defense Technologies
• Transition to Civilian Applications
• Cooperation with HHS on Vaccine Development and
  Deployment

4
The Chemical and Biological Agent Threat

• First, chemical and biological agents, when
  properly prepared, are extremely toxic or potent
  and could be disseminated to incapacitate or kill
  thousands of individuals.
• Second, chemical and biological agents, in
  contrast to other destructive means, are suitable
  to attack large areas.
• Third, because chemical and biological agents may
  be disseminated over such a large area, they are
  indiscriminate. Effects can be particularly
  insidious in that they can be delayed, the onset
  occurring even after the person believes they are
  in a safe area. Chemical and biological agents
  are truly terror weapons.
• Fourth, chemical and biological agents are
  relatively inexpensive and available. In
  addition to the classic agents, many toxic
  industrial chemicals may be acquired either
  through legitimate means or by theft and used as
  terror weapon.

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The Civilian vs. Military Threat

• The very nature of a civilian population
  especially in a free and open democratic society
  makes chemical or biological agents both very
  effective and very deadly.
• Civilian populations, in contrast to the
  military
• are unorganized and have no chain of command,
• have no special equipment for detection,
  protection, or warning,
• have no specific training, and hence may be
  unaware of the threat or symptoms indicating an
  attack has occurred (especially for biological
  agents),
• are highly diverse, representing all ages, social
  and ethnic groups, sick and healthy,
• may be susceptible to agent delivery through a
  variety of means, including through building
  ventilation, food or water, or dispersal in
  enclosed areas.

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The Military Response

• At the outset of military operations, the
  military has three broad goals
• If possible, prevent an adversarys use of
  chemical or biological (CB) weapons in the United
  States or abroad,
• Provide rapid and uninterrupted force preparation
  and deployment in the face of CB threat or use,
• Provide comprehensive force protection while
  accomplishing the mission.
• Focus is a prepared and ready military Force.

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The Civilian Response

• In the civilian setting, use of chemical or
  biological agents would be interposed upon the
  mission of daily life. The civilian goals
  would be
• Rapidly respond to, and care for initial
  casualties,
• While protecting the First Responders,
• Quickly identify the nature and extent of the
  attack,
• Minimize spread of contamination and further
  casualties in order to,
• Return to business as usual.
• Focus is a prepared and ready Response Force.

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(No Transcript)
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Three Principles of Chemical Biological Defense

• No one technology or set of procedures is
  sufficient to counter the threat of chemical and
  biological weapons.
• The military response is based on a system of
  systems, which are organized according to three
  principles
• Contamination avoidance
• Protection
• Decontamination
• These three basic principles are supported by a
  variety of tools
• Modeling and Simulation
• Warning and Reporting
• Command and Control

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Science Technology PartnershipsChemical
Detection

• Warfighter Operational Needs

• Retrospective Detection

• Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD)

• Inhalation Toxicology

• Active Standoff

• Passive Standoff

• Toxicology of Chemical
• Warfare Agents

• Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent
  Detector (JSLCAD)

• Miosis Levels

DoD CBDP / DARPA
Advanced Technology Development
Academia
Technology Transition
Basic Research
Applied Research
Industry

• Ct

International Allies

• TICs

• How Clean Is Clean?

• Surface Acoustic Wave

• Lowest Observable Adverse Effect (LOAEL)

• Surface Imprinted Silicates

• Lowest Observable Effect (LOEL)

• Domestic Preparedness
• Consequence Management

• Ceramic / Polymeric Materials

Common Technologies Different Goals
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Science Technology PartnershipsBiological
Detection

• Warfighter Operational Needs

• DNA Sequencing

• Pathogen Genomic
• Sequencing

• Small Unit
• Bio Detector

• Toxicology of Bio-
• active Compounds

• Biological Sample
• Preparation System

• Bio Time of
• Flight Mass Spec

• Fluorescent polymer/
• binding agent complexes

• Force Amplified
• Biosensor

• Critical Reagent
• Program

DoD CBDP / DARPA
Advanced Technology Development
Academia
Technology Transition
Basic Research
Applied Research
Industry
International Allies

• Hand-held Nucleic
• Acid Analyzer

• Advanced BiotoxinTickets

• DNA Sequencing

• Biochip

• Autonomous
• Pathogen Detector
• System

• Structural Biology

• Rapid Polymerase
• Chain Reaction

• Disease Monitoring

• Domestic Preparedness
• Consequence Management

• Biological Signatures

Common Technologies Different Goals
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Military vs. Civilian Approach
Military
Civilian
Similarities
Hazardous Material Response
Contamination Avoidance

• Defense environmental security and disaster
  preparedness programs
• Operations Other Than War and in Urban Terrain
• Defense preparations at forward installations,
  air and sea port areas, and logistics nodes
• Installation, force protection, and family force
  protection

• Military can move away from contaminated area
• Specific intelligence on limited agents
  delivery options
• Trained personnel--specialists and general
  service
• Specialized technology available
• Detect to protect
• Command and control systems well defined
  Communication protocols well established

• Cities cant move away
• 100s of possible agents (including toxic
  industrial chemicals, radiological materials, and
  biologicals)
• Unclear threat information
• Unprepared civilians
• Detect to treat/clean-up
• Forensics/epidemiology key

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Science Technology PartnershipsIndividual
Collective Protection

• Warfighter Operational Needs

• Pressure Swing Adsorption

• Joint Service Protective Mask

• Regenerative Filters

• Elastomeric Materials

• Temperature Swing Adsorption

• Selectively-permeable Membranes

DoD CBDP / DARPA
Advanced Technology Development
Academia
Technology Transition
Basic Research
Applied Research
Industry
International Allies

• Heat Stress

• Catalytic Oxidation

• Rapidly Deployable Collective Protection

• Human Factors

• Membrane Filtration

• Breathing Resistance

• Electrospun Materials

• Comfort vs. Performance

• Domestic Preparedness
• Consequence Management

• Aramid Fabrics

Common Technologies Different Goals
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Military vs. Civilian Approach
Military
Civilian
Similarities
Personal Protective Equipment

• Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
• Specialized Response Teams WMD-CSTs, CBIRF,
  C/B-RRT, USAR Recon and Decon Teams, Augmented
  MEUs
• Domestic Preparedness Program
• Operations Other Than War and in Urban Terrain

Individual Protection

• All personnel trained and provided with specific
  operational protection
• Protection standards focused on military
  operations
• Materiel stockpiles available

• General population lacks protection and training
• Protection requirements must
• meet specific standards NIOSH, OSHA, NFPA, etc.
  . .
• Only specialized responders
• have adequate protection and training
• Limited materiel stockpiles available for
  distribution

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Military vs. Civilian Approach
Military
Civilian
Similarities
HVAC Filtration

• Operations Other Than War and in Urban Terrain
• Defense preparations at forward installations,
  air and sea port areas, and logistics nodes
• Hasty shelters post-attack

Collective Protection

• Temporary/expedient measures added to existing
  facilities and portable shelters
• Modular equipment
• Trained personnel

• Limited to hospitals, research facilities, and
  high-value targets
• Must be built into public
• infrastructure to be effective
• Expense a significant factor for both new
  construction and retrofit

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Science Technology PartnershipsMedical
Countermeasures

• Warfighter Operational Needs

• Bioscavengers

• Anti-viral drugs

• Improved Nerve Agent Antidote

• Recombinant vaccines

• Monoclonal antibodies

• 2nd Generation Anticonvulsant

• Gene gun

• X-ray Crystallography

• Anti-inflammatory drugs

• Rapid PCR

• CB Diagnostics

DoD CBDP / DARPA
Advanced Technology Development
Academia
Technology Transition
Basic Research
Applied Research
Industry
International Allies

• Anti-vesicant countermeasures

• Neuroprotective compounds

• Aryl-esterases

• Acetylcholinesterase

• Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program

• Mouse ear vesicant model

• PADPR Inhibitors

• Domestic Preparedness
• Consequence Management

• Apoptotic change

• Neuronal Damage

Common Technologies Different Goals
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Military vs. Civilian Approach
Military
Civilian
Similarities
Medical Countermeasures
Medical Response

• Countermeasures rely on understanding of agent
  effects
• Medical products require US Food and Drug
  Administration (FDA) licensure
• Difficulties of using pre-exposure
  countermeasures absent an obvious, immediate
  threat

• Broad medical research efforts for diagnostics,
  prophylaxis, and therapies
• Medical prophylaxis and treatments available
  developed to counter specific threat agents
• Pre-exposure prophylaxis or immunization possible
• Studies in support of licensure limited to
  healthy adults (18-55) of both sexes

• Limited medical protection research efforts,
  products not commercially viable
• Diversity of threat precludes specific
  countermeasures
• Pre-exposure medical countermeasures not
  warranted from a classic benefit-to-risk
  perspective
• Potentially diverse population male, female,
  young, old, sick and healthy

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Science Technology PartnershipsDecontamination

• Warfighter Operational Needs

• Residual Contact Risk

• Low Level Toxicity

• Sensitive Equipment

• CB DECON

• Non Corrosive Materials

• Environmentally Friendly

• In situ copolymerization

DoD CBDP / DARPA
Advanced Technology Development
Academia
Technology Transition
Basic Research
Applied Research
Industry
International Allies

• Mass Casualty DECON

• Immobilized Cholinesterase

• How Clean is Clean?

• Polyurethane Coatings

• Fixed-Site DECON

• Wound decontamination

• Alkyd-resin Coatings

• Domestic Preparedness
• Consequence Management

• Porous Surfaces

Common Technologies Different Goals
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Military vs. Civilian Approach
Military
Civilian
Similarities
Mass Decontaminationand Remediation

• Operations Other Than War and in Urban Terrain
• Operations at large logistics installations, air
  and sea port areas, command and control
  facilities
• Military equipment and civilian responder
  technical decon

Decontamination

• Focused on immediate
• and expedient solutions for use on a
  battlefield to bring units back to operational
  status
• Decontamination standards focused on military
  operations
• Standard military decontaminants
• are destructive to the environment and materiel

• Focus on elimination of hazard
• Risk--averse standards, need to reduce
  contamination to the General Population Limit
  (GPL)
• Significant economic impact
• Urban environment complexities may require
  removal and disposal of soil and structural
  materials
• Requires specialized personnel for monitoring and
  planning

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Science Technology PartnershipsModeling and
Simulation

• Warfighter Operational Needs

• Dispersion Modeling

• Knowledge-Based Temporal Abstraction

• Source Terms

• Low Level Toxicity

• Validation, Verification, and Accreditation

• HPAC

• Upper-Air Dispersion

• VLSTRACK

DoD CBDP / DARPA
Advanced Technology Development
Academia
Technology Transition
Basic Research
Applied Research
Industry
International Allies

• Fluid Dynamics

• Monte Carlo Simulations

• Meso-Scale Meteorology

• D2PC

• Urban Flow Model

• Micro-Met Sensors

• Hazard Prediction Models

• Domestic Preparedness
• Consequence Management

• Virtual Prototyping

Common Technologies Different Goals
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Military vs. Civilian Approach
Military
Civilian
Similarities
Modeling and Simulation
Modeling and Simulation

• Hazard and downwind prediction modeling
• Accurate weather data
• Validated source-terms

• Limited automated field capabilities, mostly
  hand-calculated downwind hazard analysis for
  evacuation purposes
• Planning tools focused on fixed hazardous
  material storage sites
• Environment poorly represented without high
  computational complexity, slow results

• Multi-faceted applications for protection/maneuver
  , planning, and development

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Science Technology PartnershipsWarning,
Reporting, Command Control

• Warfighter Operational Needs

• Active Surveillance

• Response Strategies

• Data Mining

• Passive Surveillance

• JWARN

• Web-Based Tools

DoD CBDP / DARPA
Advanced Technology Development
Academia
Technology Transition
Basic Research
Applied Research
Industry
International Allies

• NBC Scenarios

• Disease Surveillance

• Incipient Epidemics

• Sensor Fusion

• Medical Support Scenarios

• Data Collection

• Domestic Preparedness
• Consequence Management

Common Technologies Different Goals
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Military vs. Civilian Approach
Military
Civilian
Similarities
Command and Control
Command and Control

• Rapid communication of nature and location of
  the CB threat is essential

• Multiple command and control channels and layers
  of authority add complexity and potential for
  confusion
• Limited automated field capabilities
• Exposed personnel may be resistant to orders or
  instructions

• Unity of command identified command structure
• Common communications platforms
• Exposed personnel and / or casualties responsive
  to orders

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Key DoD Chemical and Biological Defense
Laboratories

• Army
• Soldier, Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM)
• Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC)
• Natick Soldier Systems Command
• Medical Research and Material Command
• US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
  Diseases (USAMRIID)
• US Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical
  Defense (USAMRICD)
• Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR)
• US Army Research Institute of Environmental
  Medicine (USARIEM)
• Dugway Proving Ground
• Navy
• Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division
• Naval Research Laboratory
• Naval Medical Research Center
• Air Force
• Brooks AFB (Human Systems Center)
• Air Force Research Laboratory

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DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Laboratories
Unique Capabilities
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DoD Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force

• Purpose
• Provide DoD a coordinated technology plan for
  combating terrorism
• Scope
• Technologies to address potential terrorist
  threats from
• Chemical,biological, nuclear, radiological and
  high explosives
• Technologies to improve situational awareness and
  options for DoD action
• Looking at near, mid, and long-term options
• Organization 4 Working Groups
• Deterrence and Indications and Warning
  (Protection)
• Survivability and Denial (Prevention)
• Consequence Management and Recovery (Response)
• Attribution and Retaliation (Response)
• Initial Approach
• Early emphasis on very near-term technologies
  available
• Longer-term tech evaluations will include
  coordination with outside experts (industry,
  advisory boards,)

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Submitting Unsolicited ProposalsBroad Agency
Announcements (BAAs)

• U.S. Army Soldier Biological and Chemical Command
  http//www.sbccom.apgea.army.mil/RDA/baa01.htm
  
• U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command
  http//mrmc-www.army.mil/
• Air Force Research Laboratories
  http//extra.afrl.af.mil/bus-opps.htm
• Naval Surface Warfare Center http//www.nswc.na
  vy.mil/dahl.htm
• Marine Corps Systems Command http//www.marcors
  yscom.usmc.mil/BusOpps.htm
• Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
  http//www.darpa.mil (Especially SPO and DSO)
• Technical Support Working Group
  http//www.tswg.gov

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Limitations on Military Material Support for
Civilians

• Concepts of Operations (or lack thereof) may not
  support civilian use of medical or other CB
  defense technologies, even if available.
• In the United States, the Department of Defense
  does not have the lead responding to or managing
  a chemical or biological event involving the
  civilian population.
• The process to develop civilian requirements has
  not been formalized.
• No research and development specific to needs at
  the state and local levels.
• Many civilian requirements will be different
• A unique civilian requirement is the need to
  collect and identify chemical or biological
  agents for forensic purposes
• Civilian equipment must comply with occupational
  safety and health regulations. This often
  requires protective equipment that includes
  self-contained breathing, not just filtered air.
• Civilian standards for decontamination will be
  more stringent.

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Limitations on Military Material Support for
Civilians

• Material designed to meet warfighter requirements
  may not be suitable for civilian use.
• Medical products must be fully licensed by the
  Food and Drug Administration and / or used with
  individual informed consent.
• Military medical CB defense products assume a
  healthy adult population.
• Some CB defense vaccines, pretreatments, and
  treatments may confound other medical treatments.
• Classic benefit-to-risk decisions are not
  likely to support pre-exposure immunization of
  large populations against biological agents.
• Voluntary compliance cannot be guaranteed for a
  large population.

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Critical Needs Remain in Supporting Civilian
Organizations

• Develop a rationale and comprehensive civilian
  risk analysis (see Biological and Chemical
  Terrorism Strategic Plan for Preparedness and
  Response. CDC Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
  Report (MMWR), April 21, 2000 / Vol. 49 / No.
  RR-4).
• Develop credible chemical and biological exposure
  scenarios.
• Recognize the distinctly different properties of
  chemical versus biological agents.
• Develop appropriate doctrine, training and
  procedures on the initial identification,
  assessment, triage, and immediate response to a
  chemical or biological event.

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Cross-cutting CB Technology Needs

• Chemical agent detectors that provide real-time
  quantitative vapor concentrations in the Lowest
  Observable Effects Level (LOEL) to Immediately
  Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) range.
• A close-standoff / non-contact technology for
  identifying liquid chemical agent surface
  contamination (e.g., M8 / M9 paper replacement).
• Actual (vs. extrapolated) in vivo low-level
  chemical agent toxicity studies.
• Real-time or near-real-time biological
  detection that is not dependent upon
  wetchemistry consumables (e.g., solid-state
  detection).
• Validated biological markers of chemical or
  biological agent exposures
• (e.g., animal surrogate markers and clinical
  human specimens).
• Validated chemical and biological agent
  dispersion and effects models for post-attack
  hazard prediction.

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What Next?

• Weve come a long way from the simple recognition
  that "Its not a matter of if, but when.
• The challenge for all of us now is to more
  thoroughly anticipate and address the rest of the
  questions the whos, wheres, whats and whys
  behind any adversarys (to include terrorists)
  decisions to use chemical or biological agents.

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Additional Slides
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Emerging Chemical and Biological Defense
Technologies

• Chemical Detection
• Biological Detection
• Individual Protection
• Medical Countermeasures
• Decontamination
• Modeling Simulation
• Warning, Reporting, Command Control

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Emerging Chemical and Biological Defense
Technologies Chemical Detection

• Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent
  Detector (JSLSCAD)
• Detects nerve, blister blood agent vapor clouds
• Mounts on land, sea air platforms
• Provides 360 x 60 on-the-move coverage
• Provides 5 km detection range
• Automatic Warning/Reporting through JWARN
• No operator required

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Emerging Chemical and Biological Defense
Technologies Biological Detection

• Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS)
• Fully Automated
• Improved Aerosol Sample Collection
• 12 Hour Continuous Operation
• 15 Minute Identification upon Detection
• 10 Agents
• Sample Isolation
• lt 30 Minute Set-Up

Common Suite for all Services
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Emerging Chemical and Biological Defense
Technologies Individual Protection

• Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit
  Technology (JSLIST)
• Provides improved chemical protection, including
  overgarments, boots, gloves
• 45 day protection and launderable
• Planned improvements include new materials
  (selectively permeable membranes) to reduce
  weight and thermal stress and improved closures
  to prevent leaks
• Multipurpose Overboot
• Wet weather and CB protection
• JSLIST Glove Upgrades
• Replace butyl rubber gloves
• Improved dexterity
• CB aviation glove
• Liner or all-in-one glove

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Emerging Chemical and Biological Defense
Technologies Medical Countermeasures

• Chemical Agent Prophylaxes
• A genetically engineered human cholinesterase for
  use as a pretreatment for nerve agent exposure.
• Protein-based bioscavengers were identified that
  protect against five LD50s of nerve agent in
  animal models without additional therapy or
  operationally significant physiological or
  psychological side effects.

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Emerging Chemical and Biological Defense
Technologies Decontamination
Joint Service Sensitive Equipment Decontamination

• Block I Requirement Decon sensitive equipment
  without adverse effects to the decontaminated
  items
• Sensitive equipment includes electronics,
  avionics, environmental control systems, and
  life-support systems
• Objective Transportable system able to process
  electronic and night vision equipment rapidly for
  immediate re-use

• Block II Requirement Decon aircraft / vehicle
  interiors and cargo without affecting aircraft
  / vehicle / cargo operation or service life
• C/B agents may penetrate porous materials,
  presenting residual agent off-gassing problems
  requiring periodic decon
• Objective System which can be equipped on or
  with all existing airframes / vehicles for
  on-demand Decon operations

• Block III Requirement Decon aircraft / vehicle
  interiors and associated cargo On-the-Move
• On-demand decon operations without adverse
  effects on crew, mission, or platform performance
• Objective Block II upgrade which is capable of
  safe operation in-flight

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Emerging Chemical and Biological Defense
Technologies Modeling Simulation
CBW Computational Fluid Effects Model General
Description

• Capabilities
• Full 3D Navier-Stokes equations (coupled
• flow field and transport)
• Multi-phase flow with full diffusion
• equations
• Droplet evaporation, surface deposition
• and weathering effects

• Uses
• CB threat studies and analyses (shipboard,
• urban environments)
• Detector placement
• Contamination of external structure
• surfaces
• Validation tool for less complex
• methodologies

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Emerging Chemical and Biological Defense
Technologies Warning, Reporting, Command
Control
Information Systems Technology Battle Management
Thrust

• Objectives
• Sensor integration
• Information management
• Data fusion
• Communications interfaces
• Visualization approaches

• Panel of experts meeting is planned to
  refine/develop program objectives

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Medical Biological Defense Current Capabilities
Vaccines

• Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed
• Approved by the FDA in 1970 (Only licensed BD
  vaccine)
• Cell-free filtrate, produced by a strain of
  anthrax that does not cause disease.
• Safely and routinely administered to at-risk wool
  mill workers, veterinarians, laboratory workers,
  and livestock handlers in the United States
• Manufactured by BioPort Corporation
• Currently requires 6 shots annual booster to
  maintain full immunity
• Study underway to investigate fewerdoses in
  series (reduce to 3-4 shots)

Why vaccinate? After three-years of study it was
found that vaccination was the safest way to
protect a highly mobile military against a threat
from anthrax spores that are 99 lethal for
unprotected persons
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Medical Biological Defense Current Capabilities
Therapeutics

• Therapeutics
• Various antibiotics for treatment of exposure to
  bacterial agents
• Ciprofloxacin
• Doxycycline
• Tetracycline

Cell wall destroyed by antibiotic
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Medical Biological Defense Current Capabilities
Identification

• Key Capabilities
• Simple, antibody based assay used to identify BW
  agents
• Presumptive detection, not an FDA-licensed
  diagnostic system
• Inexpensive (4.00 ea.), highly specific,
  sensitive and very reliable
• Identifies one agent per assay (currently 8
  different BW threat and 4 simulant agents)
• Used in Southwest Asia, Operation Desert Thunder
  (3,000 assays, lt.05 Percent False Positive)
• Read visually or incorporated into automated
  detection devices (e.g., Portal Shield, Joint
  Biological Point Detection System).
• Not for analysis of soil samples, or dirty,
  heavily dust laden surfaces
• Dispose of all used HHAs as medical waste.
• Continued Development Critical Reagents Program
  (CRP)
• Critical reagents and HHAs will be developed
  against the BW threat agents listed in the
  International Task Force 6 (ITF-6) list. This
  list defines the threat for all biological
  detection systems in the US, UK and Canada.

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Medical Chemical Biological Defense Current
Capabilities Training Education

• Medical Management of CB Casualties
• Basic training, knowledge, and treatment
  strategies
• Resident courses (Thousands trained)
• Satellite courses (10s of Thousands trained)
• Medical response to chemical warfare terrorism
• http//ccc.apgea.army.mil/
• Medical response to biological warfare
  terrorism
• http//www.biomedtraining.org
• Partnered with Centers for Disease Control
  Prevention

IMPACT Equips medical personnel to manage
chemical and biological agent casualties
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Medical Chemical Defense Current Capabilities

• Pre-treatment
• Pyridostigmine Bromide (NAPP)
• Inhibits aging of GD
• Treatment
• Atropine (Mk I)
• Blocks nerve agent
• Pralidoxime Chloride (2-PAM Cl) (Mk I)
• Regenerates Cholinesterase
• Diazepam (CANA)
• Anti-convulsant
• Diagnosis
• Field Cholinesterase Kit