RRW and Complex 2030 Transformation The Path to the 2030 Stockpile and Infrastructure

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RRW and Complex 2030 Transformation The Path to
the 2030 Stockpile and Infrastructure

• Briefing to
• Security for a New Century Study Group
• 110th Congress
• John R. Harvey
• National Nuclear Security Administration
• 20 April 2007

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Basic message

• To meets its security needs and those of its
  allies, the U.S. will need a safe, secure, and
  reliable nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable
  future.
• We will achieve this with the smallest stockpile
  consistent with our nations security.
• We assess increased risk, absent nuclear testing,
  in assuring long-term safety and reliability of
  todays aging stockpilethe legacy warheads left
  over from the Cold War.
• Todays nuclear weapons complex is not
  sufficiently responsive to technical problems
  in the stockpile, or to potential emerging
  threats.
• Our task is to ensure that the U.S. nuclear
  weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure,
  meets long-term national security needs.
• Our approach is to develop and field replacement
  warheads for the legacy stockpile as means to
  transform both stockpile and supporting
  infrastructure.
• These warheads will have enhanced safety and
  security.
• We intend to accomplish all this without
  requiring nuclear tests.

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RRW features enable transformation

• Legacy Design
• Optimized for high yield-to-weight
• Relatively low margin-to-failure
• Energetic high explosives
• Limited security features
• Exotic/hazardous materials
• Hard-to-manufacture components

RRW Design

• Optimized for high performance margins
• Insensitive high explosive
• Enhanced security
• Ease of manufacture
• relaxed tolerances
• eliminate exotic materials
• reduce process steps
• Reduced surveillance needs
• Improved dismantlement and material disposition

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Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties
Performance Margin M gt U1U2
U1
U2
Primary Operating Range
Total Yield
Uncertainties U1 ? primary yield U2 ?
cliff position
Primary Yield
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Vision of stockpile transformation
WARHEADS
Legacy Capability
RRW
Adaptive Capability
Refurbished Legacy
Stockpile evolved to all-RRW (?)
Refurbished Legacy
Today
2012
2012-2030
Far Future
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Todays Nuclear Weapons Complex
The Defense National Laboratories and Test Site
The Production Complex
Nevada Test Site Test readiness
and subcritical nuclear material tests
Kansas City Plant Nonnuclear manufacturing/procur
ement
Sandia Systems engineering and nonuclear
component design
Pantex Plant Weapons assembly/disassembly
Los Alamos Nuclear design lab (B61, W76, W78,
W88)
Y-12 National Security Complex Uranium
operations
Savannah River Site Tritium operations
Lawrence Livermore Nuclear design lab (W62, W80,
W84, W87)
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Nuclear Weapons Complex Past and Present
Hanford
INEL
Mound
LLNL
LLNL
NTS
NTS
Fernald
RFP
KCP
KCP
LANL
Y-12
Y
-
12 and
LANL
SNL
K
-
25
SRS
PX
SNL
PX
SRS
Pinellas
Nuclear Weapons Complex (2006)
Nuclear Weapons Complex (1980)

• Plan for the 2030 Complex
• Retain current sites with reduced footprint
• Consolidate SNM to fewer sites
• Integrate sites, eliminate duplication, share
  facilities
• Modernized, fully-capable, production facilities
• Construct consolidated Pu center at existing site

Legend
Category I/II SNM
No Category I/II SNM
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What are elements of a Complex 2030 Responsive
Infrastructure (RI)?

• Excellent, trained, well-managed workforce
• Enhanced science and technology base including
  modern, maintained research facilities
• Efficient, modern, right-sized manufacturing
  facilities/equipment
• Streamlined business practices and technical
  processes that permit rapid and flexible response
  to emerging needs
• reverse risk averse culture that has limited
  productivity
• And, very importantly, frequent, end-to-end
  exercise of key capabilities
• to remain highly responsive
• to train the next-generation workforce

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RI must redress past underfunding of warhead
production complex
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How responsive do we need to be?
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Stockpile/Infrastructure transformation seeks to
achieve

• Sustained long-term confidence in stockpile
  safety/reliability
• Smaller stockpile
• Reduced likelihood of future underground nuclear
  tests
• Increased diversity in critical areas of
  stockpile (e.g., W76)
• Enhanced stockpile safety and security
• Modernized, fully capable, warhead manufacturing
  facilities
• Exercise of key nuclear design capabilities that
  have lain dormant for two decades
• essential for mentoring next generation of
  weapons scientists/engineers
• Reduced DOE and DoD ownership costs for nuclear
  forces
• reduced costs to certify, remanufacture,
  refurbish, dismantle
• must bound ever-increasing resources devoted,
  post-9/11, to physical security of warheads and
  associated nuclear materials

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RRW Counterarguments

• Current U.S. nuclear arsenal is OK now and for
  foreseeable future stockpile reliability not
  degrading. If it aint broke, dont fix it.
• RRW risky because diverts funds/capabilities from
  maintaining legacy stockpile (which is becoming
  more reliable, cheaper to maintain).
• RRW will increase the political pressure to test.
  Resumption of testing will lead to an arms race
  where US has most to lose.  
• RRW is a backdoor to new nuclear weapons
  capabilities.
• As a result of (3) and (4) above, RRW will
  undermine the global nonproliferation regime,
  making the world less safe.
• Might need RRW in the future, but no urgency to
  do it now. Can wait until we observe some
  degradation in legacy stockpile.
• RRW not necessary for infrastructure
  transformation. Reduce/restore infrastructure
  now, but continue to support LEPs. Use restored
  infrastructure in future if RRW becomes
  necessary.
• Enhanced surety will not reduce security
  costspresence of SNM will still dictate the
  security posture.

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RRW Myths

• RRW means that the Stockpile Stewardship Program
  has failed.
• RRW will eliminate the need for the SSP.
• RRW means we can halt now the LEPs for the legacy
  stockpile.
• RRW means that the current stockpile is not safe
  or reliable.
• RRW will be more reliable than todays legacy
  warheads (including LEPs).
• RRW is new warhead and therefore not permitted
  under FY03 NDAA.
• RRW will provide (or lead to) new military
  capabilities.
• RRW will obviate the need for expanded pit
  production capacity.
• RRW is an enabler for RNEP.