Confidence Building Measures and Confidence and Security Building Measures

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Confidence Building Measures and Confidence and
Security Building Measures

• Major General Muniruzzaman (Retd)
• President
• Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security
  Studies (BIPSS)

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www.bipss.org.bd
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Confidence Building Measures(CBM) And Confidence
Security Building Measures (CSBM)
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INTRODUCTION
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(No Transcript)
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STATE'S SECURITY
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The concept of Confidence and Building Measures,
in short CBM has become very significant in the
post Cold War era
End of the Cold War. Moscow, June 1, 1988
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AIM
THE AIM OF THE PRESENTATION IS TO GIVE YOU A
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF CBM/CSBM WITH A
PARTICULAR FOCUS ON SOUTH ASIA
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• Meaning of CBM/CSBM
• Objectives of CBM/CSBM
• Prerequisites
• Evaluation of CBM/CSBM
• Tools of CBM/CSBM
• Types of CBM/CSBM
• Brief Review of S Asian Security Environment
• Existing CBM/CSBM Situation in S Asia
• A Road Map for New Initiative

SEQUENCE
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MEANING OF CBM/CSBM
CBM Arrangements designed to enhance....
assurance of mind and belief in the
trust-worthiness of states...confidence is the
product of much broader patterns of relations
than those which relate to military.
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CONCEPT BY SOME CBM SCOLARS
Formal or informal measures, intended to clarify
a potential adversarys military intention, to
reduce uncertainties about hostile intent, and/
or to constrain opportunities for
surprise attack
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CBM/CSBMs are measures designed to eliminate
subjective factors and evaluations which are
often due to prejudice and faulty understanding
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CSBM
Formal and informal measures, whether unilateral,
bilateral or multilateral, that address, prevent
or resolve uncertainties among states, including
both military and political elements
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CSBM
Agreements Between
Two or more governments
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CBM
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, General
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, President Ford, and
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko during Helsinki
Summit, Aug 2, 1975
Madrid CSCE Follow-up Meeting
President Ford signing the Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE), Helsinki, Finland. August 1, 1975
CSBM
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GRADUAL REDUCTION IN TENSION (GRIT)
Charles Osgood
A Prominent US Journalist
GRIT refers to those strategies whereby
mutual tension and fear can be interrupted and
the de-escalation process begun through
conciliatory moves
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Peace
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Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Jimmy
Carter, and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat signed
historic Camp David Peace Accord at Camp David
in September 1978.
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Trust Building Measures
The concept of trust-building measures (TBMs)
rather than confidence-building measures is used
to convey the idea of a less formal approach,
built upon a base of personal political contacts
and relationships. Trust-building measures, or
trust and reassurance measures, can be broadly
divided between those measures that involve some
form of information exchange and those that
require specific measures of constraint.
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OBJECTIVES OF CSBM/CBM
CSBM aim to lessen tensions by increasing
transparency of capabilities and intentions,
lessening anxieties or suspicions and improving
predictability for the parties involved,
clarifying intentions about military force and
political activities.
CBM/CSBM aim to alter inaccurate usually
negative perceptions of motives toward each
other, and thus avoid misjudgments concerning
military actions and policies that might
otherwise provoke violent conflict.
CBM/CSBMs are most effective at the early stage
of a conflict, or to prevent recurrence in the
aftermath of a conflict. CBM/CSBMs are least
likely between countries or parties who are
actively engaged in violent conflict.
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OBJECTIVES OF CSBM/CBM
CBM/CSBM may be especially useful in mitigating
or preventing violent ethnic conflicts within
states such as, over minority rights, conflict
between states arising from refugee problems,
border disputes, disputes over boundaries of
economic zones, problems with transit by citizens
of one country through another, conflicts over
minority rights or suspected or actual
clandestine support of political opposition.
CBM/CSBM can also be used within a single
country, for example, when a series of CBM/CSBM
cumulatively encourages rivals to sustain and
abide by peace agreements. CBM/CSBM can be links
between state and non-state actors, e.g., ethnic
minorities, to help overcome their mistrust of
state power.
CBM/CSBM primarily address operational prevention
they are unlikely to alter the existing balance
of power between countries or to resolve issues
or conflicts between them, although they can help
to enhance a cooperative atmosphere in which such
disputes might be resolved. .
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PREREQUISITES OF CSBM
The most important condition for building
confidence is recognition of the importance of a
relationship, commitment to its sustenance and a
mutual willingness to invest in it. For
intra-state CBM/CSBM both state and non-state
actors need enlightened, effective leadership,
party leadership must be able to maintain control
of their followers .

• While not necessary conditions, CBM/CSBM have
  been shown to have greater chances of success if
  countries or parties can readily identify common
  interests and have the following factors in
  common
• Historical experience
• Cultural and religious heritage
• Similar form of social and political
  organization
• Strong states or other strong
  administrative structure
• Stable governments
• Civil control of the military
• Effective multilateral institutions in
  other issue areas
• Approximately equal military forces.

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EVALUATION OF THE CSBM REGIME
Strengths.

• Weaknesses
• a. CBM/CSBMs are ill-advised if parties
  flagrantly flout widely-accepted international or
  regional standards.
• b. CBM/CSBMs depend on the voluntary compliance
  of signatories.
• c. CBM/CSBM cannot be seen as a framework for
  enhancing stability throughout a region instead,
  they are marginally helpful in highly specific
  situations and circumstances.
• d. Military CBM/CSBMs are most likely to succeed
  and be sustained when augmented with political
  and other CBM/CSBM.
• e. CBM/CSBM are more difficult to achieve if
  major powers outside the region are in
  competition with each other for influence in the
  region and try to exert pressures on regional
  governments, thus increasing divisions among them.

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Lessons Learned
In contrast, support from countries outside the
region to set up CBM/CSBM can help increase the
political will of regional countries to attain a
successful agreement. CSBM agreements require
careful selection of realistic areas of agreement
and detailed specification of their enforcement
to provide incentives for compliance.
CBM/CSBM need to be even-handed, so that one side
does not gain undue advantage over another. The
introduction of CBM/CSBM should be linked with
other conflict management processes such as
negotiations and peacekeeping.
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CBM/CSBM TOOLS
Communication. Hotlines. Regional
Communication. Regular Scheduled Consultations.
Constraint. Thin-out Zones.
Pre-notification Requirements .
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CBM/CSBM TOOLS
Transparency. Pre-notification Requirements.
Data Exchanges . Voluntary Observations .
Verification Measures . Aerial Inspections .
Ground-based Electronic Censoring Systems .
On-site Inspections .
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TYPES OF CBM/CSBM

• Military and Diplomatic CBM/CSBM
• Systematic exchange of military missions.
• Demobilization, disarmament, and force
  restructuring.
• Formation of regional or sub-regional risk
  reduction centers.
• Arrangements for the free flow of information,
  including monitoring regional arms agreements.
• Information exchange, communications, and
  notification requirements such as
  pre- notification of upcoming military activities
  like war games and training exercises or troop
  movements carried out close to borders.
• Declarations and codes of conduct such as common
  targets for the levels of armaments, or within a
  state, codes of conduct for domestic behavior of
  security forces.
• Consultative mechanisms, security commissions,
  and other joint activities, such as direct
  telephone lines between military commanders,
  mutual privileges for joint observation of
  military maneuvers or inspection of military
  installations, and meetings to review
  cross-border problems such as smuggling,
  poaching, customs and cattle rustling.
• Exchange of relevant information accompanied by
  intrusive verification procedures, including
  observation and on-site inspection.

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Political CBM/CSBM
Within a country, political measures such as
power-sharing, proportional recruitment and
allocation, electoral reform, and
decentralization of power to various localities
and regions can also act as political
confidence-building measures. Political
institutions that encourage bargaining and
political accommodation produce an ongoing set of
political exchange relationships and
reciprocities that result in political learning
among rival parties.
In the context of intra state conflicts cultural
CBMs aim to demonstrate the followings
?Demonstrating respect for cultural leaders and
local practices by the state. ?Showing respect
for traditional authorities and allowing them at
least a symbolic role in local affairs. ?Either
avoiding declaring an official language, or
declaring several. ?Exercising sensitivity on
such issues as removing monuments meaningful to
certain ethnic/regional groups.
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Economic CBM/CSBM
Economic cooperation can bind nations together
and remove barriers of mistrust. In this world of
global competitiveness, economic factors play a
major role in determining relations amongst
states. It also forges closeness in their mutual
areas of cooperation. Economic interdependencies
also fosters close and fruitful relationships.
Nations who are in such relationship do not risk
their economic wellbeing and survival by entering
into any confrontation.
Nuclear CBM/CSBM
The threat of nuclear power poses the highest
level of threat between and among states.
Therefore the need and implication for nuclear
CBM/CSBM is extremely high and complex. It calls
for a high degree for a technical and political
understanding of the parties specially in regards
to testing, accidental launch and strike
capabilities.
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Other CBM/CSBM

• A number of other forms of CBMs can also be
  effective in different circumstances. Sports CBMs
  have been quite powerful in relations between
  Pakistan and India.
• The famous Ping Pong diplomacy brought about a
  fundamental opening in the Sino-US relationship
  and ended years of deep animosity. Similar is the
  potent power of religious CBMs, shared religious
  faith and values can build trust between states.
• The existence of secret sites in other states
  also brings about greater respect and
  understanding about that state. CBMs can also be
  built by tourism and greater people to people
  contact, exchange of students, artists etc.
• Fear is mostly a psychological and artificial
  state and can best be removed by more human
  contact in any field or form.

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A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT
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EXISTING CBM/CSBM SITUATION IN SOUTH ASIA
Military Hotlines Steps Taken Data Exchanges

Declarations on Non-Use of Force, Bilateral
Resolution of Differences Steps Taken
Implementation
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EXISTING CBM/CSBM SITUATION IN SOUTH ASIA
Military Exercises Steps Taken Implementation

Non-intrusion of Air Space Steps Taken
Implementation
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EXISTING CBM/CSBM SITUATION IN SOUTH ASIA
Non-Attack of Nuclear Facilities Steps Taken
Implementation
Bilateral Accord on Chemical Weapons Steps
Taken Implementation
Non-Harassment of Diplomatic Personnel Steps
Taken Implementation
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CBM/CSBM WITH SMALL STATES

Summary
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A ROAD MAP FOR NEW INITIATIVE
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• First, it would be unwise to conclude that
  military CBMs should be preferred to non-military
  CBMs or vice versa, both serve the laudable
  purpose of improving relations between
  antagonistic states. Military CBMs are designed
  to avoid or prevent conflict. Non-military CBMs
  can soften the edges of suspicion, and generate
  an atmosphere conducive to peace and stability by
  enlarging the areas of cooperation pertaining to
  the newer sources of insecurity like migration,
  transnational crime etc. A realistic prognosis of
  their threats to national security would inform
  which CBMs should preferentially be sought in
  South Asia.

• Second, a pledge by the regional states that they
  shall prevent the organization, assistance or
  encouragement of any acts detrimental to the
  maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations
  is of supreme importance. It is no secret that
  subversion and covert intervention in the
  internal affairs of their neighbors is national
  policy in South Asia. Numerous instances can be
  provided, hence, it is recommended that SAARC
  leaders issue a joint statement that they will
  discourage such activity in future.

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• Third, past experience reveals that CBMs are best
  sought in an incremental fashion since, An
  evolutionary step-by-step approach seems to work
  best, at least until core security issues are
  tackled. A building block approach commends
  itself, hence the military CBMs established
  between India and Pakistan could be enlarged
  before more radical measures are sought. Thus-.
• (1) The agreement not to attack each others
  nuclear facilities and installations could be
  extended to identified population and economic
  targets.
• (2) The agreement on providing advance notice of
  military exercises could be broadened to
  associating military observers with major field
  exercises, and establishing crisis management
  centers.
• (3) The agreement on preventing air space
  violations could be enlarged into an open
  skies arrangement to allow joint aerial
  reconnaissance of the line of control which has
  been activated after the Kargil-Drass conflict.

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Fourth, greater attention needs being given to
non-military CBMs that can, in a low-key manner,
improve relations between India and its smaller
neighbors, but also between India and Pakistan.
Article lll of the Simla Agreement provides a
framework for such measures. It
proposes (1) Steps shall be taken to resume
communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land
including border posts, and air links including
over- flights. (2) Appropriate steps shall be
taken to promote travel facilities for the
nationals of the other country. (3) Trade and
cooperation in economic and other agreed fields
will be resumed as far as possible.
(4) Exchange in the fields of science and
culture will be promoted.
Fifth, the need for India and Pakistan to
negotiate nuclear weapons related CBMs is both
immediate and vital. They had pledged under the
Lahore Declaration to provide each other with
advance notification in respect of ballistic
missile flight tests, notify any accidental,
unauthorized or unexplained incident, maintain a
unilateral moratorium on conducting further
nuclear test explosions, conclude an agreement
on prevention of incidents at sea, review the
implementation of existing Confidence Building
Measures, review existing communication
links.....with a view to upgrading and improving
these link, and engage in bilateral
consultations on security, disarmament and
non-proliferation issues.
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Sixth, the Graduated Reduction in Tensions (GRT)
strategy offers the best hope of successful
incremental implementation of non-military CBMs
between India and Pakistan, since taking
unilateral conciliatory steps could be
politically difficult. The GRIT strategy would
encompass initiating a positive action in order
to elicit an appropriate reciprocating move from
the adversary.
Seventhly, a larger engagement between the South
Asian countries through regional and sub-regional
cooperation should be sought through commerce and
joint economic development agreements. This
process is important, which suggests vigorous
exploration of the areas of cooperation
identified by SAARC, promoting SAFTA, and
exploring infra structural schemes like the
establishment of oil pipelines, power projects
communications, and exploitation of water
resources.
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Unilateral Measures. Neither side nor states
need to wait for encouragement or clearance from
the international community to make a positive
gesture. Unilateral measures can be effective
catalysts for a confidence building process. The
following may be considered
(1) Starting small, and building up (2) The value
of shuttle diplomacy (3) Desisting from adverse
propaganda, and promoting genuine debates, (4)
Adopting a capacity-building approach, and
building political will by encouraging
stakeholders in confidence-building
processes (5) Building up expertise on CBMs among
decision-makers (6) Consider a policy of
no-first-use on both sides (7) Encourage
doctrinal transparency on the thinking and modes
of operation of national security
forces (8) Adopt a policy of increased
transparency on conventional capabilities and
orders of battle (9) Consider the impact of
powerful symbolic gestures (e.g. Sadats visit to
Israel).
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Multilateral Measures
(1) Role of outside powers in the confidence
building process. (2) SAARC to have significant
potential for building confidence across the
region although its possible role in creating a
nuclear-weapons-free zone had been overtaken by
events. (3) Some inspiration could be drawn from
ASEANs constructively low-key approach to
contentious issues, although it is recognized
that tensions within ASEAN were never as great as
in South Asia. (4) Nuclear CBMs, including
de-alerting, are to be discussed. International
observers may play a neutral role high tension
areas.
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Institutional Framework
South Asian countries need to build a process to
facilitate the growth of trust. Taking
inspiration from South Africas channel
process, each Prime Minister could nominate a
senior and respected person with special
responsibility for CBM. More generally, efforts
should be made to clarify which institutions are
to handle the settlement of disputes, Enhanced
institutionalisation of the TCBM/CSBM process
would help to ensure that confidence-building
facilities do function in times of crisis (unlike
the hotline during the Brasstacks crisis). A
permanent institutionalised mechanism to oversee
CBMs and their implementation should be mandated
to report to the public, thus helping to broaden
and deepen the impact of confidence building.
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Context and Timing

• Some States are ready to enter a
  confidence-building process whereas others are
  not. For those that are not yet ready, the
  lessons from the ASEAN process may be useful. It
  was also argued that it is important for South
  Asia to develop a regional approach to empowering
  civil society and to hold governments accountable
  so that the process of talking about CBMs becomes
  a CBM/CSBM in itself.

• Confidence building measures cost money. Donors
  could be encouraged to pay to enhance security in
  the region. However, South Asian countries will
  also have to meet the donors halfway and be aware
  of good governance issues (human rights,
  appropriate military spending, opportunities to
  strengthen institutions of civil society). To
  address the fact that there prevails much
  confusion between policies and postures, every
  effort should be made to increase communications
  and clarity on matters related to CBMs.

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CONCLUSION
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OPEN FORUM
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THANK YOU
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