Second Workshop on Advanced Technologies in RealTime Monitoring and Modeling for Drinking Water Safe

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Second Workshop on Advanced Technologies in
Real-Time Monitoring and Modeling for Drinking
Water Safety and Security

• Rutgers University-Newark
• CIMIC
• Dr. Nabil Adam
• Director and Professor
• Newark, NJ
• December 11-12, 2002

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Events of 9/11 Led to National Concern Over
Critical Infrastructure

• EPA created a Water Protection Task Force in
  October, 2001 to improve the security of the
  nation's drinking water and wastewater
  infrastructure
• WPTF identified water distribution system
  vulnerability as a security threat of major
  concern
• In June 2002, Pres. Bush established
  Bio-terrorism Act requiring vulnerability
  assessments and threat response plans from water
  utilities

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EPAs Office of Research and Development

• In spring of 2002 ORD Prepared Homeland Security
  Research Plan
• Also identified distribution systems as a point
  of major vulnerability
• Heavy emphasis on monitoring and sensor
  development
• Both ORD and WPTF identified the need for
  advanced technologies and modeling to address
  water distribution system vulnerabilities

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Nature of Threats Community Water Supplies (CWS)

• There are 60,000 CWS in the US serving over 226
  million people
• Over 63 of these systems supply water to less
  then 2.4 of the population
• About 5.4 supply water to 78.5 of the
  population
• In addition there are 140,000 non-community water
  systems that serve schools, recreational areas,
  trailer parks, etc.
• CWS are designed to deliver water under pressure
  -- generally supply most of the water for fire
  fighting purposes
• Loss of water or a substantial loss of pressure
  could disable fire fighting capability --
  interrupt service and disrupt public confidence
• This loss might result from sabotaging pumps
  that maintain flow and pressure, or disabling
  electric power sources could cause long term
  disruption

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Vulnerability of Water Systems

• Water systems are spatially diverse and
  therefore, have an inherent potential to be
  vulnerable to a variety of threats
• Physical, chemical, and biological
• There are several areas of vulnerability
  including
• the raw water source (surface or groundwater)
• raw water channels and pipelines
• raw water reservoirs
• treatment facilities
• connections to the distribution system
• pump stations and valves
• finished water tanks and reservoirs.
• Each of these system elements presents unique
  challenges to the water utility in safeguarding
  the water supply.

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Physical Disruption

• The ability of a water supply system to provide
  water to customers can be compromised by
  destroying/disrupting key physical elements of
  the system, e.g.,
• raw water facilities (dams, reservoirs, pipes,
  channels)
• treatment facilities
• distribution system elements (transmission lines
  pump stations)
• Physical disruption may result in
• significant economic cost, inconvenience and loss
  of confidence by customers, but have a limited
  direct threat to human health
• Exceptions, include, e.g., explosive release of
  chlorine gas at a treatment plant
• Water utilities should examine their physical
  assets, determine areas of vulnerability, and
  increase security accordingly
• Redundant system components would provide backup
  capability in case of accidental or purposeful
  damage to facilities

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Contamination (1)

• The most serious potential terrorist threat to
  water systems.
• Chemical or biological agents could spread
  throughout a distribution system and result in
  sickness or death
• For some agents, the presence of the contaminant
  might not be known until it is too late
• Even without serious health impacts, just the
  knowledge that a group had breached a water
  system could seriously undermine customers
  confidence in the system
• Accidental contamination of water systems has
  resulted in many fatalities, e.g.,
• Cholera contamination in Peru, Cryptosporidium
  contamination in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (U.S.), and
  Salmonella contamination in Gideon, Missouri
  (U.S.)

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Contamination (2)

• CDC has defined three categories of potentially
  threatening organisms
• Category A Agents/Water Threat, e.g., smallpox,
  anthrax
• Category B Agents/Water Threat, e.g., brucellosis
  
• Category C Agents/Water Threat, e.g., yellow
  fever, multidrug-resistant tuberculosis
• The U.S. Army has conducted extensive testing and
  research on potential biological agents.
• Though much is known about these agents, there is
  still research needed to fully characterize the
  impacts, stability and tolerance to chlorine of
  many of these agents

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The Rutgers Initiative - Objective

• Address the problem of drinking water resources
  and distribution network security in a
  fundamental manner and of a long-term nature
• Need to ensure the safety and security of
  drinking water at the source and in distribution
  networks within our region and within our nation
  for future generations
• This effort would be consistent with the national
  goal of critical infrastructure protection

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Road Map (1)

• Convene (Rutgers CIMIC and EPA Region II)
  workshops of relevant organizations
• 2) Establish a Regional Drinking Water Safety and
  Security Consortium
• 3) Leverage existing systems and advanced
  technologies as elements of an end-to-end pilot
  systems
• 4) Design and develop an operational prototype
  system

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Road Map (2)

• 5) Evaluate the technologies in an end-to-end
  prototype system (time span approximately
  3years)
• 6) Work with utilities to oversee and evaluate
  the implementation of an operational system
• 7) Develop the next generation prototype system
  by early acquisition and testing of new
  technologies and modeling systems

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Rutgers and EPA Held Workshop in June 2002

• Workshop held on June 27th-28th, 2002 Hilton
  Gateway Hotel, Newark, NJ
• Attendees about 115 representatives from 20
  industries, 16 water utilities, 13 government
  agencies, 14 academic institutions

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The 1st Workshop, June 27-28

• Objective
• Provide a forum for scientists, water utility
  professionals, and leaders in the area of real
  time sensor and modeling technologies to share
  their expertise and ideas on how these evolving
  technologies may be used to monitor drinking
  water resources and distribution networks in
  order to protect public health
• A follow-up workshop to take place in December
  11-12 , 2002

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Preliminary Workshop Findings (1)

• Surface Source Water
• Very large dilution factors are typical
• Some biotoxins may be potent enough to cause
  negative health effects even at very low
  concentration
• Natural treatment processes can remove or
  neutralize most contaminants
• Contamination near the intake will minimize
  dilution and natural treatment
• Off-stream storage is vulnerable to attack

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Preliminary Workshop Findings (2)

• Distribution System Vulnerabilities
• More vulnerable than source waters
• Large, complex, and accessible Commercial
  residential service connections fire hydrants
  finished water storage

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Preliminary Workshop Findings (3)

• Difficult to contaminate an entire city via the
  distribution system, but fairly easy to impact
  small sections or individual buildings
• Impossible to eliminate all access, but the key
  is to
• Harden system components,
• Monitor, evaluate, respond and contain the
  threats in real-time fashion

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The Regional Drinking Water Safety Security
Consortium (RDWSSC)Goal

• Provide a forum for state and local government
  agencies representatives, highly talented
  scientists, water utility professionals, and
  leaders in the area of real time sensor and
  modeling technologies
• Provide a test bed for the rapid prototyping of
  advanced and still evolving technologies to
  monitor drinking water resources and distribution
  networks in order to better protect the public

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RDWSSC - Membership

• A MoU among the following members
• U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
• State of New Jersey Department of Environmental
  Protection
• U. S. Geological Survey
• American Water Works Service Company, Inc.
• North Jersey District Water Supply Commission
• Passaic Valley Water Commission
• Rutgers CIMIC
• The goal of the MOU is to implement the drinking
  water security recommendations of the 1st
  workshop

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The Rutgers Laboratory for Water Security (LWS)

• An independent research lab within the guidelines
  established by Rutgers University
• Provides research forum and serve as research
  support to the Consortium
• Attracts support from federal, state, non-profit
  funding agencies such as AWWARF, NSF, DARPA, EPA,
  etc.

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RDWSSC - Immediate Objective

• Development and implementation of an Early
  Warning System (EWS) that
• Is real-time
• Integrates sensors, monitoring and modeling into
  an end-to-end system
• Is deployed in real-world environment
• Utilizes in the source waters (reservoirs and
  streams) and the distribution network by
  municipal water systems
• Document the Consortiums experience into a
• Guide for Developing and implementing an EWS
• to share with others across the country

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Approach

• Three Phases
• Phase I
• Develop Prototype System and serve as test bed
  for integration of monitoring and modeling
  systems
• Phase II
• Investigate technologies close to commercial
  application
• Phase III
• Evaluate emerging technologies

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The Consortium Unique Contributions

• A collaboration among federal and state agencies
  together with water utilities and academic
  institutions
• The Consortium will provide several unique test
  sites for evaluating existing and emerging
  sensors and monitors and modeling technology
• Sites in selected portions of the distribution
  systems in the PVWC and AWWSC water utilities and
  in the reservoirs and source waters managed by
  the NJDWSC
• This activities supports and complements the EPA
  in house testing program for water quality
  sensors and monitors.

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Planned Research Studies by The Consortium (1)

• Conduct research studies utilizing the field
  testing sites to
• compare the specifications of the monitors as
  provided by the vendors against actual field
  scale performance
• Studies on data handling and validation including
• User requirements,
• Data quality objectives
• Real-time reporting and decision support
• Compliance reporting

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Planned Research Studies by The Consortium (2)

• Determination of where in the distribution
  system, online monitoring would be most
  effective 
• Development of real time decision support systems
  for the monitoring network
•  Research on
• Predictive modeling
• Data mining
• SCADA systems
• Optimal location of monitoring stations
• Integration of water quality modeling with
  monitoring information to create an EWS

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2nd Workshop, Dec. 11/12

• Objective
• Provide a forum for scientists, water utility
  professionals, and leaders in the area of real
  time sensor and modeling technologies to share
  their expertise and ideas on how to
• Further refine the needs for research and the
  specific research issues as related to Early
  Warning Systems for security in drinking water

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RDWSSC Long Term Objective

• Serve as a model for other regions in the Country
• Help incrementally establish similar regional
  consortium around the country
• Establish a national federation made up of
  regional consortiums, that addresses the safety
  and security of our drinking water in the entire
  nation

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Summary and Next Steps

• WPTF was established as a result of 9/11
• Distribution Systems have been identified as the
  most vulnerable part of a water utility
• Rutgers University held workshop from June 27-28
• Results from workshop emphasized the potential
  for advanced sensing and monitoring and modeling
  for protection of distribution systems

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Summary and Conclusions

• Established consortium
• Rutgers will establish a water security research
  institute
• Three Phased Program
• Establish test bed in a water utility based on
  public sector model
• Examine sensors and monitors close to
  commercialization
• Conduct studies on new and emerging technology