History of biological warfare and terrorism

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Chemical or biological terrorism Is the threat
real?
Michael D. Mehta, Ph.D. Associate Professor
Department of Sociology Website
www.policynut.com
2
History of biological/chemicalwarfare and
terrorism

• During the French and Indian Wars (1754-1767)
  Jeffrey Amherst commander of the British forces
  used smallpox-contaminated blankets to decimate
  tribes along the Ohio River Valley.
• In 1915, German troops at Ypres deployed chlorine
  gas against the French. By 1918, more than
  100,000 people died from exposure to chemical
  weapons.
• Between 1932-1945, Japan tested anthrax,
  meningitis cholera and the plague in occupied
  Manchuria killing at least 10,000 prisoners.
  During this period, at least 11 Chinese cities
  were attacked with biological weapons.
• Tampering of Tylenol in 1982 (laced with cyanide)
  - seven dead. A wave of copycat tamperings
  occurred
  afterwards Lipton Cup-A-Soup in 1986, Exedrin
  in 1986,
  Tylenol again in 1986, Sudafed in 1991.

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• Rajneeshee cult (1984) infected salad bars in
  Oregon with salmonella infecting more than 700
  people? scheme to incapacitate voters to win
  local election
• Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo released
  sarin gas in the Tokyo subway (1995) killing 20
  people, and injuring thousands? seeking to
  establish a theocratic state in Japan
• Larry Wayne Harris (1998) threatened to use
  plague and anthrax against U.S. government
  officials? part of a Christian Identity group
  interested in having several states in the
  North-West designated as a white holy land.

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What do these groups have in common?

• They use violence, or the threat of violence,
  instrumentally to advance a political,
  ideological or religious goal.
• The main motivations are
• To promote nationalist of separatist objectives
  (e.g., Chechen rebels, Kurdistan Workers Party,
  Tamil Tigers)
• To retaliate or take revenge for a real or
  perceived injury
• To protest government policies
• To defend rights of animals or the unborn
• Two most common types of targets
• General civilian population
• Symbolic buildings or organizations

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Three types of responses to risk

• acceptance of the risk
• personal management of the risk
• dread risk response (risk aversion -- anxiety
  responses)
• Clearly there are areas where the risk is so high
  as to be manifestly unacceptable and others where
  it is so low as to be negligible.
• Of course, most of the debate is in the gray area
  in-between.
• Social amplification of risk ? the fear that
  people have towards a hazard exceeds health and
  safety effects.

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Trust Benefits Memorable Morality Natural or
Technological
Dread Impacts Voluntariness Control Familiari
ty Catastrophic potential Uncertainty Attributabil
ity Reversibility Distribution
Gender Age Understanding Personality Media
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Voluntary exposure is a key indicator of social
acceptance
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Risk comparisons

• Annual risk of dying in a bathtub 1 in a million
• Risk of HIV from a unit of blood 1 in 913,000
• Annual risk of being electrocuted 1 in 350,000
• Annual risk of choking to death on food 1 in
  160,000
• Annual risk of dying while riding your bicycle 1
  in 130,000
• Annual risk of dying in a car accident 1 in
  10,000
• Annual risk of dying from smoking 1 in 10
• Risk of dying eventually 1 in 1

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500 life-saving interventions cost per life year
saved (US)

• arsenic emission control in glass plants?51M
• trichloroethylene control in water?34M
• ban chlorobenzilate from citrus farming?1.2M
• warning letters of problem drivers?720,000
• neonate care for low birth infants?270,000
• mandatory smoke detectors in homes?210,000
• child resistant cigarette lighters?42,000
• flashing lights at railway crossings?42,000
• home dialysis for renal disease?20,000
• nicotine gum for smoking cessation?8,000

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• air bags plus seatbelts in automobiles?6,700
• chlorination of drinking water?3,100
• mandatory motorcycle helmet law?2,000
• breast cancer screening in women lt50?810
• influenza vaccine for all?140
• mandatory seat belt use?69
• measles, mumps and rubella vaccine?0
• smoking cessation advice for pregnant women?0

Reference Tengs et al. (1995) Risk Analysis,
15(3)
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The nature of risk

• All risks are interpreted through filters of
  values because risk is perceived.
• It is a normative position to assume that some
  risks are real while others only exist in the
  mind of the perceiver.
• Hazards are generally thought of as actual,
  physical events or phenomena.
• Risk is viewed by many as the scientific
  characterization of a hazard.
• By contrast, safety is a social and political
  construct.

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Characteristics of risk assessments

• Scope of assessments are usually narrow.
• Certain scientific issues are excluded because
  they are complex or contentious.
• Regulatory authority often defines the scope of
  an assessment.
• Alternative technologies are often not considered
  as part of the process (ban or not ban, locate
  here or somewhere else).
• Time constraints.
• The human element.

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Reasons why actual risk cannot be distinguished
from perceived risk

• Risk probabilities often do not reflect risk
  frequencies there are reliable frequencies only
  for events that have a long recorded history.
• Actual risk estimates are usually imprecise off
  by many orders of magnitude (safety factors).
• Many important features of hazards are not
  amenable to quantification risk being imposed
  without consent, threat to civil liberties, due
  process

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• 4. Self-fulfilling prophecy perception often
  influences reality.
• 5. Expert estimates of probability are not
  necessarily better than those of laypeople.
  Experts do not have some magic window on reality.
• 6. There is considerable disagreement among
  experts about the model to use, time frame, level
  of significance
• 7. There is no distinction between perceived and
  actual risks because there are no risks except
  perceived risks.

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Proportionality

• Measures must not be disproportionate
• to the desired level of protection and
• must not aim at zero risk.
• Least restrictive alternatives
• equivalent level of protection

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Comparable situations or technologies should
not be treated differently.
Non-discrimination
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Measures should be consistent with
measures already adopted in similar circumstances.
Consistency
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A comparison must be made between the most likely
positive or negative consequences of the
envisaged action and those of inaction in terms
of overall cost, both in the long- and short term.
Benefits and costs of action or lack of action
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What should be done?

• Reconcile and coordinate tasks, responsibilities,
  powers and jurisdiction of players.
• Improve training of medical personnel to
  recognize these diseases.
• Fund surveillance and monitoring programs and
  increase the coordination of information about
  population health.
• Find ways to communicate the risks honestly to
  the public without contributing to panic.
• Recognize that scientific developments are
  double-edged (they bring risks and benefits).