Donald Davidson Actions, Reasons, and Causes

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• Donald Davidson Actions, Reasons, and Causes
• An issue that has come up a number of times in
  our discussions of free will has been the
  relation between reasons and actions.
• 2 examples
• 1. A challenge to OConnors account of
  agent-causation, i.e. whether or not the notion
  of agent-causation can accommodate the fact that
  citing an agents reasons explains why an agent
  performed an action.
• - Clarke argued that the sense in which agents
  perform actions for reasons must be a causal
  sense, i.e. S performed an action A for reason R
  just in case R caused A. This led to a
  modification of OConnors agent- causation view.
• 2. Nagel argued that, from the external
  perspective, the notion of autonomy appears
  unintelligible, because it requires that reasons
  explain actions without causing them, and the
  only kind of explanation that makes sense from
  the external point of view is causal explanation.
  

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• The issue is what is the relation between an
  agents reasons and her action, when the reasons
  are cited in the explanation of the action?
• Or, as Davidson puts it What is the relation
  between a reason and an action when the reason
  explains the action by giving the agents reasons
  for doing what he did? We may call such
  explanations rationalizations, and say that the
  reason rationalizes the action.(3)
• Suppose Claire voted for Ralph Nader in the
  recent election, and we explain her action as
  follows
• Claire voted for Ralph Nader because (i) she
  wanted to reduce the power of corporations in
  American politics, and (ii) she believed that a
  vote for Nader would contribute to the reduction
  of corporate power.
• Here we have explained Claires action by citing
  her reasons, i.e. (i) and (ii) - a belief and a
  desire. Davidson calls this kind of explanation
  a rationalization, and the reasons cited in (i)
  and (ii) rationalize Claires action.

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• Davidson In this paper I want to defend the
  ancient - and common-sense - position that
  rationalization is a species of ordinary causal
  explanation.(27)
• Rationalizations causal explanations
• hence,
• Reasons causes of actions
• This is one of two main theses of this paper.
  The other is
• For us to understand how a reason of any kind
  rationalizes an action it is necessary and
  sufficient that we see, at least in essential
  outline, how to construct a primary reason.(4)
• primary reason pro-attitude belief
• pro-attitudes desires, wantings, urges,
  promptings, moral views, aesthetic principles,
  economic prejudices, social conventions, public
  and private goals
• (NOT beliefs a man may all his life have a
  yen, say, to drink a can of paint, without ever,
  even at the moment he yields, believing it would
  be worth doing.)

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• For us to understand how a reason of any kind
  rationalizes an action it is necessary and
  sufficient that we see, at least in essential
  outline, how to construct a primary reason.
• There are lots of rationalizes that do not cite
  primary reasons (pro-attitude belief).
• Why did Claire vote for Ralph Nader?
• Because Ralph Nader will reduce corporate power
  in American politics.
• Why did you take that physics course?
• Because it fulfills the science requirement.
• Why did you take the stairs instead of the
  elevator?
• Claustrophobia.

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• Davidsons idea is that in any case of a
  rationalization of an action, the explanation
  either explicitly provides a primary reason or
  provides enough information so that the hearer
  can, at least in essential outline, construct a
  primary reason.
• Why did Claire vote for Ralph Nader?
• Because Ralph Nader will reduce corporate power
  in American politics.
• - pro-attitude Claire wants to reduce
  corporate power
• - belief Claire believes by voting for Nader
  she can help reduce corporate power
• Why did you take that physics course?
• Because it fulfills the science requirement.
• - pro-attitude you want to fulfill the science
  requirement
• - belief you believe that by taking the
  physics course you can fulfill the
• science requirement
• Why did you take the stairs instead of the
  elevator?
• Claustrophobia.
• - pro-attitude you want to avoid feeling
  claustrophobic
• - belief you believe that by taking the stairs
  you can avoid feeling claustrophobic

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• Very often it is enough just to cite either a
  pro-attitude or a belief.
• Why are you easing the jib?
• Because I believe that easing the jib will stop
  the main from backing. (?)
• - pro-attitude you want to stop the main from
  backing
• - belief you believe that by easing the jib
  you can stop the mainsail from
• backing
• Why are you biting your thumb at me?
• Because I want to insult you.
• - pro-attitude you want to insult me
• - belief you believe that by biting your thumb
  at me you can insult me

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• Very often we can explain an action by citing an
  emotion, mood, sentiment, passion, or hunger.
• - the claustrophobia example falls in this
  category
• Why did you poison him?
• Jealousy.
• - pro-attitude you wanted to redress an
  injustice / remove your cause of agony.
• - belief you believe that by poisoning him you
  can redress an injustice / remove your cause
  of agony
• Jealousy reveals the character of the
  pro-attitude.
• Compare
• Why did you poison him?
• Ambition
• Greed

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• Sometimes we explain an action simply by citing
  some fact related to the action that justifies
  the instrumental belief.
• Why did Claire vote for Ralph Nader?
• Because Ralph Nader will reduce corporate power
  in American politics.
• Why did you take that physics course?
• Because it fulfills the science requirement.
• Why are you pouring me a shot?
• It will soothe your nerves.
• - pro-attitude you want to soothe my nerves
• - belief you believe that a shot will soothe
  my nerves
• Davidson Because justifying and explaining an
  action so often go hand in hand, we frequently
  indicate the primary reason for an action by
  making a claim which, if true, would also verify,
  vindicate, or support the relevant belief or
  attitude of the agent.(8)

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• Sometimes we explain actions by citing our
  intentions.
• Why did James go to church?
• James went to church with the intention of
  pleasing his mother.
• - pro-attitude James wants to please his
  mother
• - belief James believes that by going to
  church he can please his mother
• Davidon in intentions The expression the
  intention with which James went to church has
  the outward form of a description, but in fact it
  is syncategorematic and cannot be taken to refer
  to an entity, state, disposition, or event. Its
  function in context is to generate new
  descriptions of actions in terms of their
  reasons...(8)
• syncategorematic an expression that does not
  have meaning in isolation and must occur in a
  larger linguistic context
• the intention that such-and-such - must occur
  in sentences of the form
• S did so-and-so with the intention that
  such-and-such.

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• Davidson citing an intention describing an
  action
• James went to church.
• James went to church with the intention to
  please his mother.
• By citing the intention, you are describing the
  action as one directed by the agent at the
  achievement of a certain goal (or the
  satisfaction of a certain pro-attitude.)
• You are not citing some state or entity or event
  that figures in the production of the action.
• If we want, we can talk about the agents
  intention in performing an action. But the
  intention is not something distinct from the
  action the agents primary reason.
• - intentions are not their own distinct kind of
  mental state
• (Davidson changes his mind about this in
  Intending)

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• So far all of this has been in support of the
  claim that rationalizations always directly
  provide primary reasons or provide information
  that is sufficient for reconstructing a primary
  reason.
• Davidson makes another important, general point
  about rationalizations.
• A rationalization of an action is always an
  explanation of the action under some description.
• I flipped the switch.
• I turned on the light.
• I illuminated the room.
• I alerted the burglar to my presence.

one action, 4 descriptions
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• Why did I flip the switch?
• Because I wanted to turn on the light.
• Why did I turn on the light?
• Because I wanted to illuminate the room.
• Why did I want to illuminate the room?
• Because I wanted to see where I was going.
• NOT Because I wanted to turn on the light
• Why did I alert the burglar to my presence?
• No rationalization for the action under this
  description
• A single action can be rational under one
  description and irrational under another
  description.
• Davidson an action an event.
• - all events can be described in many different
  ways
• - actions are rationalized under descriptions

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• C1. R is a primary reason why an agent performed
  the action A under the description d only if R
  consists of a pro attitude of the agent towards
  actions with a certain property, and a belief of
  the agent that A, under the description d, has
  that property. (5)
• Why did I flip the switch (i.e. do A under the
  description flipping the switch)?
• - I want to perform an action that has the
  property of being a turning-on-of-the-light
• (more simply I want to turn on the light)
• - I believe that A, under the description
  flipping the switch, has the property of being
  a turning-on-of-the-light
• (more simply I believe that by flipping the
  switch I can turn on the light)

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• 2. The primary reason for an action is its cause.
• Why might someone think otherwise?
• By citing an agents reasons in a
  rationalization, we justify the agents action.
• - reasons justify actions
• Suppose I pour a cup of hot coffee on my head.
• - in the absence of a rationalization (reasons
  explanation) for this action, it is hard to see
  how I was justified in performing it
• - but suppose I tell you that I had a large
  spider in my hair, which I wanted to get rid of,
  and I believed that by pouring hot coffee on my
  head I could get rid of the spider
• - in the light of these reasons my action is
  justified
• Davidson In the light of a primary reason, an
  action is revealed as coherent with certain
  traits, long- or short-termed, characteristic or
  not, of the agent, and the agent is shown in his
  role of Rational Animal.(8)

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• Special feature of rationalizations they justify
  actions
• Davidson Nothing that nonteleological causal
  explanations do not display the element of
  justification provided by reasons, some
  philosophers have concluded that the concept of
  cause that applies elsewhere cannot apply to the
  relation between reasons and actions, and that
  the pattern of justification provides, in the
  case of reasons, the required explanation.(9)
• Teleology pertaining to goals, purposes, or
  ends
• Teleological explanation explanation of an event
  or action by citing its goals, purposes or ends
• Why did you pour coffee on your head?
• Because I wanted to get rid of the spider that
  was in my hair.

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• Nonteleological causal explanations
• Why was there a giant tsunami?
• - because of a large underwater earthquake
• Nonteleological causal explanations do not cite
  goals or ends or purposes. Because of this, they
  do not justify the events that they explain.
• - the earthquake does not justify the tsunami
• - my goal of getting rid of the spider justifies
  me pouring coffee on my head
• Davidsons opponents
• There are 2 kinds of explanation
• Teleological reasons explanations explain
  actions by citing justifying reasons
• Nonteleological causal explanations explain
  events by citing their causes

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• 2 kinds of explanation
• X explains Y

X justified Y
X caused Y
2 claims being made by Davidsons opponent 1.
If X justifies Y, then it cannot also be that X
caused Y - reasons are not causes 2. If X
justifies Y, then X explains Y - reasons are
explanatory reasons explain actions
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• Davidson rejects both (1) and (2). Lets start
  with (2).
• Why did I pour coffee on my head?
• Primary reason I wanted to get rid of the
  spider in my hair I believed that by pouring
  coffee on my head I could get rid of the spider
• 2 roles for this primary reason
• - justifies my action
• - explains my action
• The question is whether the fact that the primary
  reason justifies my action is sufficient to allow
  it to explain my action.

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• Davidson ...for a person can have a reason for
  an action, and perform the action, and yet this
  reason not be the reason why he did it.(9)
• Why did Claire vote for Ralph Nader?
• Primary reason 1 she wanted to reduce
  corporate power in American politics and she
  believed that by voting for Nader she could help
  do so
• Primary reason 2 she wants to annoy her
  parents, who are Democrats, and she believes that
  by voting for Nader she can do so
• Both Primary reason 1 and Primary reason 2
  justify Claires action - they both make Claires
  action seem reasonable by Claires lights.
• But suppose the reason why Claire voted for Nader
  was Primary reason 1 - and not Primary reason 2.
  Primary reason 2 is a reason Claire had for
  voting for Nader but it is not the reason why she
  did it.
• When we explain Claires action, we should cite
  Primary reason 1, not Primary reason 2.

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• The fact that a reason justifies an action is not
  sufficient for explaining that action.
• Davidson
• X justifies Y X explains Y
• The explanatory connection between reasons and
  actions cannot be located in the fact that
  reasons justify actions.
• Davidson Central to the relation between a
  reason and an action it explains is the idea that
  the agent performed the action because he had the
  reason. Of course, we can include this idea too
  in justification but then the notion of
  justification becomes as dark as the notion of
  reason until we can account for the force of that
  because.(9)

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• Davidson The fact that a reason justifies an
  action is not sufficient for it to explain the
  action.
• Given that reasons do explain actions, what else
  must be true of a reason in order for it to
  explain an action?
• The reason cited in an explanation must have
  caused the action.
• Recall (1), which Davidson rejects
• 1. If X justifies Y, then it cannot also be that
  X caused Y
• Davidson thinks that explanatory reasons must be
  causes if they are to explain actions.
• Primary reason 1 explains Claires vote for
  Nader
• - primary reason 1 justifies Claires vote for
  Nader
• - primary reason 1 caused Claires vote for Nader

both are required in order for the reason to
explain the action
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• 3 Objections responses
• Primary reasons consist of attitudes and
  beliefs, which are states or dispositions, not
  events therefore they cannot be causes.(12)
• Suppose I shoot off my big toe. Why did I do it?
  
• - I wanted to avoid the draft.
• - I believed that by shooting off my big toe I
  could avoid the draft.
• This desire and belief are states or dispositions
  - persistent mental conditions. They are not
  events. But only events can cause events. My
  desire and belief cannot be the causes of my
  shooting off my big toe.
• Davidsons reply
• - very often we cite causal conditions (not
  events) that are triggered or activated in the
  causal production of an event
• Why the did the bridge collapse?
• Because of a structural defect. (structural
  defect causal condition)

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• Still, though, when we cite a causal condition in
  order to explain an event, there must be some
  causing event that we are somehow implicitly
  alluding to.
• Why did the bridge collapse?
• Because of a structural defect (e.g. too much
  tension in a cable)
• Cause a cable snapped
• Effect the bridge collapsed
• We might say that the causal condition (too much
  tension in the cable) is triggered or activated
  on a certain occasion (e.g. in a wind-storm) -
  thus resulting in a certain event (the cable
  snapped), which caused the bridge to collapse.

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• Why did I shoot off my big toe?
• Because I wanted to avoid the draft and believed
  that by shooting off my toe I could do so.
• Cause the onslaught of the desire to avoid
  the draft
• Effect my shooting off of my toe
• A certain causal condition (my desire to avoid
  the draft) is triggered or activated in certain
  circumstances (I receive my draft notification in
  the mail), which produces an onslaught of the
  desire to avoid the draft, which causes me to cut
  off my big toe.
• Davidson States and dispositions are not
  events, but the onslaught of a state or
  disposition is.(12)
• General point very often in causal explanations
  we cite causal conditions that were triggered or
  activated and which brought about the causing
  event.

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• According to Melden, a cause must be logically
  distinct from the alleged effect but a reason
  for an action is not logically distinct from the
  action therefore, reasons are not causes of
  actions.(13)
• There are a number of ways of taking this
  objection.
• B1. Citing a reason for an action is a way of
  redescribing the action. Hence, the reasons
  cannot be distinct from the action.
• Compare
• I shot off my big toe.
• I shot off my big toe because I wanted to avoid
  the draft.
• The claim is that these are just two descriptions
  of a single action. The second description
  provides more information, but this doesnt mean
  that it cites some other event which caused the
  action.

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• Davidson To describe an event in terms of its
  causes is not to confuse the event with its
  cause, nor does explanation by redescription
  exclude causal explanation.(14)
• The bridge collapsed.
• The bridge collapsed because of a structural
  defect.
• This second claim is also a redescription of the
  event, but obviously it is also a causal
  explanation of that event.
• B2.
• S desires to ? means S will perform any action
  she believes will accomplish ?
• - if so, the claim that someone desires ? and
  believes that if ? then ?, will logically entail
  the claim that she ?s.
• - but the connection between statements and
  statements of effects is not logical.
• - hence, desires and beliefs cannot be causes.

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• I wanted to avoid the draft If I believed
  that doing ? would allow me to avoid
  the draft, then I did ?.
• I wanted to avoid the draft.
• I believed that by cutting off my toe I could
  avoid the draft.
• ? I cut off my toe.
• If I believed that doing ? would allow me to
  avoid the draft, then I did ?.
• I believed that by cutting off my toe I could
  avoid the draft.
• ? I cut off my toe.
• Logically valid.

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• Compare
• Why did the bridge collapse?
• Because the cable snapped.
• The cable snapped.
• ? The bridge collapsed.
• NOT logically valid.
• (Note we could turn it into a logically valid
  inference by adding another premise which has the
  form of a law
• Whenever a cable on a bridge snaps, the bridge
  collapses.
• But this law is not cited in the original
  explanation. So as it stands, the original
  explanation is not logically valid. On the other
  hand, rationalizations are (supposedly) logically
  valid as they stand.)

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• This objection depends on a strong claim about
  the meanings of statements about desires
• S desires to ? means S will perform any
  action she believes will accomplish ?
• Davidsons response is to deny this semantic
  claim.
• But desires cannot be defined in terms of the
  actions they may rationalize, even though the
  relation between desire and action is not simply
  empirical there are other, equally essential
  criteria for desires - their expression in
  feelings and in actions that they do not
  rationalize, for example.(15)
• Consider
• Salt is water soluble means When placed in
  water, salt will dissolve
• This is a correct semantic account of water
  soluble. All there is to being water soluble is
  that something will dissolve when placed in
  water. But the analogous thing is not true for
  desires. There is more to having a desire than
  simply performing an action when one has a
  certain belief.

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• According to Hume, we may define a cause to be
  an object, followed by another, and where all the
  obejcts similar to the first are followed by
  objects similar to the second.(15)
• Singular causal claims (e.g. A caused B) are
  supported by law-like generalizations (e.g.
  A-type events are always followed by B-type
  events.)
• - There are no law-like generalizations between
  reasons and actions. Hence, reasons are not
  causes.
• Davidson concedes something to the objection
  ...generalizations connecting reasons and
  actions are not - and cannot be sharpened into -
  the kind of law on the basis of which accurate
  predictions can reliably be made.(15)
• The issue here is about whether there are any
  strict psychological laws linking desires and
  beliefs and actions. Davidson thinks not.

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• My desire to avoid the draft and my belief that
  shooting off my toe will allow me to avoid the
  draft caused me to shoot off my toe.
• What is the covering law?
• For all S, if S desires to avoid the draft and
  believes that by shooting off his toe he can
  avoid the draft, then S will shoot off his toe.
• This is not even true, much less a law. Davidson
  rejects the idea that it can be sharpened into
  a law.
• - so, since there is no covering law, the
  original claim must be false
• Davidsons response
• Consider
• The cables snapping caused the bridge to
  collapse
• Covering law?
• Whenever a cable on a bridge snaps then the
  bridge collapses.
• This is also false.

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• Davidson ...Humes claim, as quoted above, is
  ambiguous. It may mean that A caused B entails
  some particular law involving the predicates used
  in the descriptions A and B, or it may mean
  that A caused B entails that there exists a
  causal law instantiated by some true descriptions
  of A and B.(16)
• My desire to avoid the draft caused me to shoot
  off my toe.

A
caused
B
Davidsons idea is that there are ways of
describing these two events for which there is a
strict law.
My neural event such-and-such caused my bodily
movement so-and-so.
C
D
caused
Law whenever C-events occur, D-events follow.
A C
B D
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• Davidson Suppose a hurricane, which is reported
  on page 5 of Tuesdays Times, causes a
  catastrophe, which is reported on page 13 of
  Wednesdays Tribune. Then the event reported on
  page 5 of Tuesdays Times caused the event
  reported on page 13 of Wednesdays Tribune.(17)
• The event reported on p.5 of Tuesdays Times
  caused the event reported on p.13 of Wednesdays
  Tribune.
• Obviously, no covering law for these events under
  these descriptions. But there are different
  descriptions for these very same events under
  which there is a covering law.
• Davidson The laws whose existence is required
  if reasons are causes of actions do not, we may
  be sure, deal in the concepts in which
  rationalizations must deal. If the causes of a
  class of events (actions) fall in a certain class
  (reasons) and there is a law to back each
  singular causal statement, it does not follow
  that there is any law connecting events
  classified as reasons with events classified as
  actions - the classifications may even be
  neurological, chemical, or physical.(17)

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• Davidson considers and responds to 2 more
  objections, D E. E relates to the free will
  problem - Davidson reveals his compatibilism.
• Davidson Why on earth should a cause turn an
  action into a mere happening and a person into a
  helpless victim? Is it because we tend to
  assume, at least in the arena of action, that a
  cause demands a causer, agency an agent? So we
  press the question if my action is caused, what
  caused it? If I did, then there is the absurdity
  of an infinite regress if I did not, I am a
  victim. But of course the alternatives are not
  exhaustive. Some causes have no agents. Among
  these agentless causes are the states and changes
  of state in persons which, because they are
  reasons as well as causes, constitute certain
  events free and intentional actions.(19)
• Homework what is Davidsons dilemma? How does
  Davidson solve it?

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• Spring Break 05!