LESSON 20 CRISIS DECISION MAKING USS Vincennes Case Study

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LESSON 20CRISIS DECISION MAKINGUSS Vincennes
Case Study
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USS Vincennes Case StudyHistorical Background

• THE LINGERING THREAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST
• SHAH OVERTHROWN - 62 AMERICANS TAKEN HOSTAGE
  (1979)
  
• IRAN/IRAQ WAR COMMENCES (SEP 1980)
• BEIRUT EMBASSY BOMBING (1983)
• TANKER WAR ESCALATES (1984)
• USS STARK INCIDENT (MAY 87)
• IRAQI F-1 LAUNCHES (2) EXOCET MISSILES (Pilot
  Error)
  
• 37 DEATHS, 21 INJURED, CO RELIEVED FOR CAUSE
• U.S. REFLAGS KUWAITI TANKERS (1987)
• OPERATION EARNEST WILL - U.S. REFLAGS 11 TANKERS
  (JUL)
  
• M/V BRIDGETON STRIKES A MINE (as did two other
  vessels)
  
• IRAN AJR CAUGHT LAYING MINES (SEP 87)
• USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS STRIKES MINE (APR 88)
• OPERATION PRAYING MANTIS - Response against the
  Iranian Navy

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USS Vincennes IncidentSeven Minutes that
Stunned the Navy
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USS Stark IncidentHistorical Background (Review)
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USS Vincennes (CG-49)Combat Information Center
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Commander, Joint Task Force, Middle East Chain
of Command
Combatant Commander (COCOM)
Component Commander (OPCON)
Warfare Commanders (TACON) O-6
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USS Vincennes Case StudyAir Warfare PID Criteria

• Kinematics (course, speed, altitude ??, CPA)
• Point of origin
• Composition (Quantity)
• ESM
• IFF
• Position relative to COMAIR routes
• Published AOG Flight Schedules
• Intel Reports (Indications and Warnings)
• Voice comms (Queries and Warnings)

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USS Vincennes Case StudyPeacetime Rules of
Engagement (ROE)

• COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
• Officers in command are not only responsible for
  ensuring that they conduct all combat operations
  in accordance with the law of armed conflict
  they are also responsible for the proper
  performance of their subordinates.
• While a commander may delegate some or all of
  his authority, he/she cannot delegate
  responsibility for the conduct of the forces
  he/she commands.

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USS Vincennes Case StudyPeacetime Rules of
Engagement (ROE)

• INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE - permits the use
  of force in self-defense against armed attack or
  threat of imminent armed attack subject to the
  following
• NECESSITY - use of force must be IRT a hostile
  act or demonstration of hostile intent.
  
• PROPORTIONALITY - use of force must be limited
  in intensity, duration, and scope.
  
• HOSTILE ACT - deliberate attacks by opposing
  forces.
  
• Examples actual attacks, laying mines in
  international waters, etc.
  
• HOSTILE INTENT - the threat of imminent use of
  force by opposing forces.
  
• Examples training weapons systems, energizing
  fire control radars, maneuvering to launch
  position.

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USS Vincennes Case StudySequence of Events 03
Jul 88Surface Engagement

• VINCENNES IN GULF ENROUTE PVST BAHRAIN
• 0711 MON hears reports of 5-7 explosions near a
  Liberian tanker MON directed by GS to proceed
  away from the tanker VIN directed to vector
  SH-60B to investigate
• 0742 OL25 observers gunboats circling a German
  cargo ship
  
• 0915 OL25 reports being fired upon by IRG
  gunboats
  
• 0939 VIN requests permission to engage
  gunboats
  
• 0941 GS gave permission to engage boghammers
  with guns
  
• 0942 Iranian gunboats turn inbound toward VIN
• 0943 VIN/MON commenced fire with 5in/54 guns
• 094530 IA655 launches from Bandar Abbas
• 1003 VIN/MON ceased fire (119 rounds expended)

UNCLASSIFIED
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USS Vincennes Case StudySequence of Events 03
Jul 88Air Engagement

• 094530 IA655 launches from Bandar Abbas
• 0947 VIN gains radar contact (SPY-1A) (47 nm)
• 0949 VIN issues initial warning over MAD to TN
  4131 (40 nm) Ten warnings given in next five
  minutes (3 IAD / 7 MAD)
  
• 0950 VIN reports inbound F-14 to GB (32 nm)
• 0951 VIN states that intentions are to engage
  contact at 20 nm if the contact does not turn
  away (now 30 nm)
  
• 0951 VIN forward 5in gun jams (MT51) - ship
  turns violently
  
• 0952 VIN issues several warnings to TN 4131
  (25nm)
  
• 0952 VIN requests and receives permission to
  illuminate (20 nm)
  
• 0953 TN 4131 was at 16nm SPD 371 kts, ALT
  11,230 ft
  
• 095405 VIN engages TN 4131 at 10 nm (salvo size
  two)

UNCLASSIFIED
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USS Vincennes Case StudyArtershocks

• Formal Board of Inquiry was convened by RADM
  Fogerty 13 Jul 88.
  
• Official parties to the inquiry
• RADM Less (principal)
• CAPT Rodgers (principal)
• LCDR Scott Lustig (Air TAO)
• LCDR Vic Guillory (TAO)
• Findings
• during the formal portion of the inquiry, the
  board found no grounds for disciplinary or
  punitive action.

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USS Vincennes Case StudyInvestigation - Synopsis
of Facts

• IRAN AIR ACTUAL FLIGHT PROFILE
• Always ascending
• Only mode III IFF squawk
• Within airway Amber 59
• Maximum air speed of 385 knots
• AEGIS WEAPON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
• No Aegis weapon system equipment deficiencies
  existed during the engagement. Link-11 was down
  for 28 seconds.
  
• PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE
• With little time and under combat stress during
  the surface engagement, watchstanders
  misinterpreted some tactical information.

UNCLASSIFIED
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USS Vincennes Case StudyFundamental
Considerations that the Vincennes Could Not
Control

• ISSUES FACED BY CAPTAIN RODGERS
• Ongoing surface engagement.
• The unidentified assumed hostile contact had
  taken off from a civilian-military airfield.
  
• Heading directly toward Vincennes, relentlessly
  closing.
  
• No definitive radar emissions.
• Unanswered warnings.
• Short decision window.
• No proof that the contact was not related to the
  ongoing surface fight.

UNCLASSIFIED
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CRISIS LEADERSHIPKey Lessons

• MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY
• be willing to show flexibility do not be tied
  to inflexible policies of the past that may not
  apply to the fast-moving situations of the
  present.
• be open to suggestions on how to solve crises
• AVOID TASK FIXATION
• someone needs to be looking at the big picture
• AVOID SCENARIO FULFILLMENT BIASES
• dont neglect to search for disconfirmatory
  information.
  
• KEEP THINGS SIMPLE
• ask people to do things that they are already
  trained to do.

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USS Vincennes Case StudyEpilogue

• CAPT Rodgers
• Completed remainder of scheduled deployment,
  returning to San Diego in 24 Oct 88.
  
• July 1989 assumed command of TACTRAGRUPAC
• Retired Aug 1991 and is now a consultant
• RADM Less
• Subsequently promoted to VADM and appointed
  COMNAVAIRPAC.
  
• LCDR Vic Guillory and LCDR Scott Lustig
• Both promoted to CDR and completed successful XO
  tours aboard new-construction Aegis Cruisers.