After Victory: Towards a New Military Posture in the Persian Gulf

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After Victory Towards a New Military Posture in
the Persian Gulf

• Christopher Preble
• Director of Foreign Policy Studies
• Cato Institute, Washington, DC
• May 2, 2003

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TROOP DEPLOYMENTS AND TERRORISM
The stationing of U.S. forces in the holy land of
Saudi Arabia has been Osama bin Laden's
principal recruiting device, even more than the
other grievances he cites. I can't imagine anyo
ne here wanting to . . . be there for another 12
years to continue helping recruit terrorists.
- Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,
March 2, 2003
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TROOP DEPLOYMENTS AND TERRORISM
The great probability of further terrorism is
an inescapable consequence of the role we have
assigned to ourselves as the principal guarantor
of security and stability in the region.
- Former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia Richard
Murphy, June 27, 1996
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TROOP DEPLOYMENTS AND TERRORISM
Regardless of the outcome of the Iraqi scenario,
the United States will need to maintain forces in
the region. - Richard D. Sokolsky, Distinguished
Research Fellow, Institute for National
Strategic Studies at the National Defense
University, 2003
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TROOP DEPLOYMENTS AND TERRORISM An Alternative
View
The most important reason to withdraw U.S.
troops is to eliminate a source of antagonism
that has fostered the sort of virulent terrorism
seen on September 11. - Doug Bandow, The Cato In
stitute, March 20, 2002
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TROOP DEPLOYMENTS AND TERRORISM An Alternative
View
The United States could substantially reduce the
chance of catastrophic terrorist attacks if it
lowered its military profile overseas.
Ivan Eland, The Cato Institute, December 17,
1998
Bringing home the military units in the region
would not only eliminate many costs and risks,
it would greatly diminish popular resentment of
the presence of U.S. troops.
Barbara Conry, The Cato Institute, November 10,
1994
A longterm U.S. presence in the Middle East will
simply fan the flames of Pan Arabism and weaken
the Americanposition. It will make the United
States a lightning rod for all the rage and
frustration of that troubled region.
- Christopher Layne Ted Galen Carpenter, The
Cato Institute, November 9, 1990
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U.S. Troop Deployments in the Middle East, Prior
to Operation Iraqi Freedom
Model from CNN, http//www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2002/i
raq/deployment.map/index.html troop data from
Defense Link, http//www.defenselink.mil/pubs/alma
nac/almanac/people/serve.html as of 12/31/2001.
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Cost of U.S. Forces in the Region As much as
60 billion per year
Wolfowitz estimated the U.S. cost of Iraqi
containment during 12 years of U.N. sanctions,
weapons inspections and continued U.S. air
patrols over the country at slightly over 30
billion. - Washington Post, March 2, 2003
An estimated 30 billion to 60 billion a year
has been expended to safeguard Middle East oil
supplies Donald Losman, The Cato Institute,
August 1, 2001
The annual expense of maintaining forces
directed at protecting Saudi oil is estimated
at 50 billion by Georgetown Universitys Earl
Ravenal. Cato Handbook for the 108th Congress,
2003
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Where does the U.S. get its oil?- Consumption by
Region of Origin
Data compiled from Energy Information
Administration, www.eia.doe.gov, for 2001.
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Where does the U.S. get its oil?- Consumption by
Nation of Origin
Data from Energy Information Administration,
www.eia.doe.gov, for 2001.
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Number of Troops Protecting Oil Interests
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Number of Troops Protecting Oil Interests
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Conclusion
Now that Saddam Hussein is gone, we can remove
one of the primary justifications used by Osama
Bin Laden to recruit would-be terrorists the
presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia.
But the Bush administrations wise decision to
shift U.S. forces out of the kingdom should be
the first of several steps to substantially
reduce the U.S. presence throughout the region.
U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf are unnecessary.
They are costly. And they do nothing to make the
United States safer and more secure.
Thank You, Christopher Preble Director of Foreig
n Policy Studies
The Cato Institute