SURPRISE, SECRECY, AND DECEPTION

1
SURPRISE, SECRECY, ANDDECEPTION

• Topic 12

2
Preface Dilbert on Tactical Warning
3
Surprise Attack

• Nations are often surprised and/or successfully
  deceived in international relations.
• German Strike in the West, May 1940
• German Strike in East, June 1941 (Operation
  Barbarossa)
• Pearl Harbor, December 1941
• Korea War
• North Korean invasion of South, June 1950
• Inchon Landings, September 1950
• Chinese intervention, November 1950
• Cuban Missile Crisis
• SU surprised US prior to October 14, 1962
• US surprised SU on October 22, 1962
• Israeli pre-emptive attack on Egyptian Air Force,
  Six-Day Way
• Egyptian attack on Israeli forces at Suez Canal,
  Yom Kippur War
• Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, August 1990
• 9/11 attacks on US

4
Signals vs. Noise

• Why do surprise attacks (etc.) so often succeed?
• A few signals are buried in a lot of noise.
• Signals in this context, bits of information
  giving advance indications about an upcoming
  attack (or other surprise).
• Noise (or static) the much more numerous bits of
  information that are essentially random or
  meaningless, in any case
• are not advance indications of anything unusual
  or threatening.
• Signal are typically (and naturally) hidden in
  or camouflaged by noise.

5
Kermit Tyler RIP 1913-02/24/2010
6
Signals, Noise, and Expectations

• Because of noise, a variety of expectations about
  the immediate future are plausible, and
• usually the most plausible one is that the
  immediate future will be the same as the present
  (and recent past).
• Decision makers usually have premises/predispositi
  ons/mind sets) that lead them to overlook signals
  inconsistent with the most plausible expectation.
• It is difficult to look at evidence with an open
  mind,
• contrary to the doctrine of immaculate
  perception.
• Things must be believed to be seen quickly.

7
Signals, Noise, and Expectations (cont.)

• US before Pearl Harbor Japan would be crazy to
  directly tangle with the U.S.
• SU before Barbarosa We have a non-aggregation
  with Germany and Germanys main lesson from WWI
  was dont get into a two-front war.
• US before Chinese intervention in Korea The
  Communist regime needs time to consolidate its
  rule.
• US before Missile Crisis SU would not run the
  risk of stationing nuclear weapons outside of the
  SU.
• Also Cuban refugee reports had been crying wolf
  for months.
• Such expectations sometimes work the other way.
• US in Vietnam China intervened unexpectedly in
  Korea they may do the same in Vietnam.

8
Signals, Noise, and Expectations (cont.)

• The signals vs. noise distinction can also work
  in the opposite fashion.
• What may be interpreted as signals of hostile
  intent may really just be meaningless noise.
• In the middle of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a US
  U2 spy plane accidently overflew the Chukotka
  Peninsula (eastern Siberia).
• This can lead to self-fulfilling prophecy of
  hostile intent.
• The Spiral Model
• Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August origins of
  WWI
• Rationale for appeasement prior to WWII.
• Historical controversy regarding origins of the
  Cold War.
• Stable vs. Unstable Nuclear Deterrence.
• War-by-Accident scenarios Failsafe, Dr.
  Strangelove.
• Schelling, Arms and Influence, Chapter 6 (The
  Dynamics of Mutual Alarm)

9
Warning and Decision

• In summary, it is hard to pick signals out of
  noise (to connect the dots) in advance,
• though it may be easy to identify and connect
  them out later.
• And, on the whole, a false sense of security is
  more prevalent than a false sense of insecurity.
• To avoid spiral model look ahead and reason
  back thinking of ExCom in Cuban Missile Crisis.

10
Secrecy

• We saw earlier that a player may have (though
  does not always have) an incentive to keep his
  strategy (plan of action) secret from the other
  player,
• particularly in a non-strictly determined
  zero-sum game.
• In the D-Day Game, the Allies wanted to deceive
  the Germans as to where the invasion would take
  place and therefore needed to keep their actual
  plans secret.
• In a Chicken Game, a player may be ostensibly
  committed to a stand firm strategy,
• but if this really is a bluff, this fact must be
  kept secret.
• So while there is tendency toward natural
  deception resulting from the signal vs. noise
  distinction, there are also incentives for
  artificial player-made deception as well,
• that is, to damp down signals indicative of
  their intentions.

11
Signals vs. Indices

• Another pair of concepts is relevant to
  consideration of secrecy and deception.
• Signals vs. Indices,
• due to Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in IR.
• Unfortunately, the term signal is used here in
  a somewhat different sense from in the signals
  vs. noise distinction.
• Signals and Indices are both means that can be
  used by a player (an actor in IR) to project an
  image of itself that induces preferred
  perceptions and actions by other players.

12
Signals

• A signal is conveyed by words, actions, or other
  communi-cations the meaning of which is
  established by convention, i.e.,
• tactic or explicit understandings among players.
• In game theory, signals are now commonly referred
  to as cheap talk,
• because it is as easy project a false image when
  using signals as it is to project a true image.
• Examples of signals in IR include
• words such as public speeches and messages,
  diplomatic notes, press releases, confidential
  messages sent through intermediaries, etc., and
• actions such as expelling diplomatic personnel,
  extending or breaking diplomatic relations, good
  will visits, conspicuous military maneuvers, etc.

13
Indices

• An index is a statement or action that carries
  with it some inherent evidence that the projected
  image is a true one,
• because the index is believed to be inextricably
  linked to the capabilities and/or intentions of
  the actor.
• Example of indices in IR include
• intercepted private messages
• major actions involving high costs or risk, e.g.,
• putting US soldiers in West Berlin or South
  Korea,
• putting a US Navy quarantine around Cuba.
• Homely examples of signal vs. index
• In driving, turn signal vs. slowing down/shifting
  lanes, etc.
• Pitchers mannerisms indicating next pitch.

14
Indices Can Evolve into Signals

• Do actions speak louder have more credibility
  than words?
• Deeds/indices may evolve into mere signals,
• e.g., car with hood up
• expelling diplomatic personnel, etc.
• Using signals, it is as easy to lie as to tell
  the truth.
• Using indices, it is harder to lie than tell the
  truth,
• but it is not impossible, and so
• indices may be manipulated.

15
Signals Can Evolve into Indices

• In some contexts, what would be otherwise be a
  mere signal becomes an index,
• especially in the context of repeated play of a
  game in particular
• because the actor has an established reputation
  for telling the truth (even in awkward
  circumstances), or
• because the actor would be subject to severe
  social or other penalties for being found out as
  lying.
• This is exemplified within established (and
  non-dysfunctional) families, work groups,
  academic departments, circles of friends, etc.

16
Lying vs. Deceiving

• Using signals, it as easy to lie as to tell the
  truth.
• This does not mean that it easy to deceive using
  signals,
• precisely because others recognize that you may
  have an incentive to lie and it is easy to do so.
• An actor cannot deceive by signals, if he has a
  reputation for lying.
• Moreover, an actor cannot tell the truth and be
  believed by signals ,if he has a reputation for
  lying.
• The boy who cried wolf
• Fire alarms, etc.
• If you want to believed in the future, honesty
  is the best policy for the present.
• Also, if you want to deceive in the future,
  honesty is the best policy for the present.

17
Lying vs. Deceiving (cont.)

• Games with incomplete information
• Players dont know each others payoffs/preferences
  .
• You suspect someone A is lying and trying to
  deceive you.
• A may be either of two types
• someone who wants to tell you the truth, or
• someone who is trying deceive you.
• You ask A Are you telling the truth?
• As answer is uninformative, because As best
  reply (answer) will be the same (yes)
  regardless of his type.
• However, asking this question may produce
  somewhat informative indices.
• Mannerisms, evident tension or embarrassment,
  etc.
• polygraph tests.
• A diplomat is a man who's sent abroad to lie for
  his country.
• JFK/Gromyko talks, October 18, 1962

18
Indices and Intelligence

• Especially good indices of As intentions are
  intercepted and decoded signals among members of
  As team.
• They are playing a zero-conflict coordination
  game in which there is no incentive to lie.
• If B can intercept and decode As internal
  signals, B can get a big advantage.
• Baseball signals (coded vs. uncoded)
• MAGIC (disclosed 1960)
• Enigma Machine / Ultra-Secret (disclosed 1974)
• Venona Project (disclosed 1995).
• Radio phones (vs. runners, etc.) on battlefield
• Navajo Code Talkers (disclosed 1985)

19
Using Secret Intelligence

• Breaking an enemy code
• may seem to present marvelous opportunities, but
• it also generates many paradoxes, dilemmas, and
  risks requiring strategic choices.
• Having broken the codes, what do you do?
• Keep the fact that you have broken the code
  secret.
• The is the purest kind of national security
  ultra-secret.
• What must be kept secret from the enemy is not
  his decoded messages but the fact that you are
  reading them.
• If the enemy discovers you have broken his codes,
  his most obvious (though not necessarily best)
  response is to change his codes.
• So you cannot disclose your achievement
  publically
• U-571 movie (fictionalized)
• A few weeks before D-Day, US forces capture a
  U-boat with its Enigma Machine and codes intact.
• The US forces almost wish they had not done this.
• They have to keep secret from the Germans the
  fact that the U-Boat was captured, not sent to
  the bottom, or else the Germans are likely to
  change their codes just before D-Day.

20
Using Secret Intelligence (cont.)

• You must keep the fact that you have broken the
  code secret
• and also the intelligence derived,
• not only from the press and public
• but also almost everyone in the government.
• For example, the MAGIC decrypts were distributed
• to only about a dozen people
• only in Washington, and
• they were then shredded and burned.
• This made it hard to see broad patterns and to
  connect the dots.

21
Using Secret Intelligence (cont.)

• Even if you do not (deliberately or in
  advertently) disclose your intelligence coup,
• if you make too good use of the intercepted
  messages,
• your enemy will conclude that you have broken his
  code, and
• therefore will change his code (or generate
  deceptive messages).
• So you probably should not exploit the
  intelligence as fully as you might.
• You need to continue to make normal mistakes in
  order not to arouse suspicion.
• Down the road, more Monday morning
  quarterbacking.
• Controversy and recriminations regarding bombing
  of Coventry, England, November 14, 1940.
• Ditto some Merchant Marine convoys.
• Cuban Missile Crisis great effort to maintain
  normal routines prior to October 22.

22
Deception The Man Who Never Was

• After clearing German forces from North Africa,
  the most obvious next Allied target was Sicily
  a stepping-stone to Italy.
• But the Allies wanted to convince the Germans
  that Sardinia and Crete were the next targets,
• so the Germans would defend Sicily less strongly.
• Allied intelligence planted fake documents and
  identity papers on a body floated ashore in
  Spain.
• German found the documents and evidently believed
  them, and therefore interpreted Allied
  preparations to invade Sicily (which could not be
  hidden) as an attempted deception.

23
Deception (cont.)

• The Allies had an intelligence network in
  occupied Holland.
• The Germans got control of this network.
• The Allies discovered that their network was
  actually under German control.
• The Allies put naïve allied agents into Holland,
• with orders to get information about German
  forces in the Calais area,
• which the Germans would interpret as more
  evidence that the D-Day landings would be in
  Calais.

24
Cycles of Deception Interception

• Suppose your opponent learns that you have broken
  his codes and are intercepting his messages and
  he believes (correctly) that you dont know this.
• Now your opponent has his own ultra-secret.
• Since you regard intercepted messages as highly
  credible indices, your opponent can now turn the
  tables on you.
• While your opponent can merely change his codes,
• he can also start generating out deceptive coded
  messages.
• But again they cannot exploit this opportunity
  too much, because
• you will figure out
• that they have found out
• that you have broken their codes
• and you will therefore no longer believe their
  coded messages.

25
Cycles of Deception Double (etc.) Agents

• A has an agent X spying on B
• B finds out that X is an enemy agent
• B can arrest X but also
• B can (try to) turn the agent into a double
  agent feeding (partially) false messages to A
  through X.
• If A finds out his agent has been turned,
• A will discount all the information coming from
  X, but
• A should stay in contact with X, because it is
  useful for A to know what B wants A to believe.
• But if B finds out that A knows X has been
  turned, B can feed true information though X,
  expecting that B will discount it.

26
Cycles of Deception Double (etc.) Agents (cont.)

• Jervis, Logic of Images in WWII there was a
  French colonel in Algeria working as a German
  agent.
• The Allied discovered he was a German agent.
• The Allied turned him and used him to feed
  false information to the Germans.
• After a while, the Germans figured out he had
  been turned.
• The Germans kept in contact with him, because it
  was useful for them to know what the Allies
  wanted you to believe.
• Shortly before D-Day, the Allies discovered that
  the Germans knew the colonel had been turned.
• The Allies had the colonel tell the Germans that
  the D-Day landings would take place at Normandy
  on June 5, 6, or 7.
• To the German, this was conclusive proof that the
  landings would take anywhere except Normandy and
  any time except June 5-7.
• On June 7, the colonels credibility shot up with
  Germans.
• The Allies to resumed feeding false information
  through the colonel.

27
The Double-Cross System

• In the early days of WWII, British (counter)
  intelligence identified (many) German agents in
  Britain.
• Rather than arresting these agents, the Twenty
  Committee turned and ran these agents.
• This had to be very carefully orchestrated, so
  the German would not realize their agents had
  been turned.
• The Double-Cross System had to feed some true and
  useful information to the Germans.
• This obviously created difficult relationships
  with Allied military decision makers.

28
The Double-Cross System (cont.)

• The XX Committee ran the system conservatively,
  because the expected the Germans to check
  information from Double-Cross agents against
  information from other agents not under British
  control.
• In fact, after the war it was discovered that the
  Double-Cross System controlled all German agents
  in Britain.
• Once the XX Committee deliberately ran an agent
  to show that he was under British control,
• in order the give German intelligence a false
  impression of how the British would run
  double-agents.
• But the Germans continued to regard the agent as
  reliable.
• The XX Committee shot its wad leading up to
  D-Day, but the Double-Cross System still didnt
  collapse.

29
The Double-Cross System (cont.)

• Some ironies
• The success of the Double-Cross System and
  similar deception operations gave the Allies a
  large stake in the influence of German
  intelligence on German decision making.
• But Hitler made the final choices,
• and did so more on the basis of intuition that
  intelligence.
• The Allies were fearful that defectors from
  German intelligence would inform the Allies about
  German agents in Britain,
• whom the Germans would then expect to be arrested.

30
A Bodyguard of Lies

• In war-time, truth is so precious that she should
  always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.
  Winston Churchill
• Virtually all Allied deception efforts built up
  for the great (tactical) deception for D-Day.
• That it would occur later rather than sooner.
• That it would be in the Calais area, not
  Normandy.
• That after a first attack, the main blow would be
  elsewhere.
• Some forces were identified as landing in
  Normandy (as they did).
• An entire phantom 3rd Army was built up in
  southeast England.