The Spirit of Democracy

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The Spirit of Democracy

• The Global Boom, Recession, Renewal

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The Democratic Boom

• In 1974 there were only about 40 democracies in
  the world (27 percent of all independent states)
• By 1984, there were 60 (36)
• By 1990 there were 76 (46)
• Then the Berlin Wall came crashing down
• 1991 91 democracies (50
• 1995 117 democracies (61)
• 1999 120 democracies (63)

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A Tidal Wave of Transitions

• Since 1974, 97 countries (of a total of 196 that
  have existed in this period) made transitions to
  democracy.
• 64 of the existing authoritarian states in 1974
  (58) became democracies during this period
• 21 of the 27 new, postcolonial states became
  democracies (78)
• 12 of the 20 new post-communist states (60)

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Transitions to Democracy, 1974-2007
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The Globalization of Democracy

• During this period, democracy became a global
  phenomenon. Today
• 31 of 33 Latin Am states are democracies (94)
• 18 of 28 in Eastern Europe and FSU (64)
• 8 of 25 in Asia (32) (9 of 12 Pacific Island)
• 23 of 48 in Sub-Saharan Africa (48) (or less?)
• But only 2 of 19 in the Middle East
• And there are no Arab democracies today in the ME

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Democracy by Region, 2007
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Freedom by Region, 1974 and 2006
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Freedom Scores of 43 Muslim-Majority States
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Some Facts About Democracy Development (2008)

• Of the 22 countries ranking low on the latest
  UNDP Human Development Index (HDI, for 2005), 9
  (41) are democracies
• Of the next 37 countries (low-medium HDI), 14
  (38) are democracies
• In all, 39 (23 of 59) relatively poor countries
  are democracies today

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The Democratic Recession

• Since 1999, the proportion of democracies in the
  world has essentially stagnated, oscillating
  between about 60 and 62.5 percent.
• But the number of democratic breakdowns has
  increased. Of the 23 democratic breakdowns since
  1974, 15 (2/3) have occurred since 1999.
• These have come in some very strategic states
• Pakistan, Russia, Nigeria, Venezuela. In 2007
  Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Kenya.

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Ratio of Gains to Declines in Freedom, 1991-2007
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Oil Democracy Dont Mix

• About 23 countries derive more than 60 percent of
  their exports earnings from oil and gas exports
• 12 of these are in the Middle East, 7 in Africa
  (e.g. Nigeria, Angola, Chad, Gabon, and Sudan),
  and also Russia, Azerbaijan, Brunei, and
  Venezuela.
• Not a single one of these 23 is a democracy.

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Public Support for Democracy 1Broad but thin

• who say Democracy is Always Preferable
• 62 in Africa (2005, 18 countries) (69 in 2000)
• 60 in East Asia (ca. 2002)
• 64 in South Asia (2004)
• 53 in Latin America (2007)
• 53 in Eastern Europe (2004)

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Public Support for Democracy 2

• Broad rejection of military rule
• 73 in Africa, 83 in E Asia, 60 in S. Asia,
  62 in Latin America
• But significant percentages in many countries
  entertain authoritarian options
• Only about half in East Asia and Africa reject
  all authoritarian options

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Support for Democracy-Latin Am 1 Democracy
Always Maybe Authoritarianism
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Support for Democracy Lat Am 2 Democracy Always
Maybe Authoritarianism
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Support for Democracy Africa 2005
Botsw S Afr Kenya Seneg Ghana Nigeria
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How People View Democracy 3Satisfaction with
democracy

• Africa 45 in 2005
• (52 in 02, 58 in 2000)
• E Asia 61 in 2002
• Latin Am 38 in 2006 (31 in 2005)
• East Europe 38 in 2004
• Compared to established democracies
• Orig EU 15 66 in 2006

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How People View Democracy 4Low Trust in
Institutions
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The Philippines in TroubleDecline in Public
Support 2001 to 2005

• Democracy is always preferable 64 to 51
• Democ is suitable for our country 80 to 57
• Satisfaction w/way democ works 54 to 39
• Reject authoritarian strong leader 70 to 59

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Nigeria in TroubleDeclines In Public Support,
2000-2005
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Why Democracy is in Danger

• Weak Rule of Law
• Corruption, abuse of power
• Abuse of ind rights, impunity
• Violence, criminality, lawlessness
• 2. Poor Economic Performance
• Poverty, inequality, injustice

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Why Democracy is in Danger 2

• 3. Ethnic religious divisions
• 4. Weak Ineffective Political Institutions
  (parties, parliaments, systems of horizontal
  accountability)
• 5. Weak constraints on authoritarian leaders
  (civil society, intl actors)
• ? BAD GOVERNANCE

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Renewing Democratic Progress Consolidating
Fragile Democracies

• Key Goal Foster Good Governance
• State Capacity
• Commitment to the Public Good
• Transparency and Accountability
• Rule of Law
• Participation and Dialogue
• Social Capital (Civil Society)

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Key Challenges

• Consolidate Emerging democracies
• to become more effective, accountable, lawful,
  responsive, legitimate, and therefore stable.
• Democratize (electoral) authoritarian regimes
• Halt the backlash vs. democracy democ promotion
  
• Russia, Venezuela, Bolivia
• Reverse the slide toward state decay and failure
• Stabilize rebuild failed states
• Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan

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Political Will The Essential Condition

• Political will is the commitment of a countrys
  rulers to democratic and good governance reforms,
  and their readiness to incur the costs necessary
  to adopt and implement these reforms.
• In badly governed states, the central challenge
  is to generate the political will to improve
  governance, control corruption, and generate real
  development

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Getting SeriousStrategic Principles for Intl
Actors

• 1. Overall levels of international assistance
  must be linked more clearly to a countrys
  development performance and its will to reform.
• 2. Good performers must be tangibly rewarded
• 3. Rewards must be granted for demonstrated
  performance, not for promises made and broken.

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Strategic Principles, cont.

• General budgetary support for governments should
  be conditioned on good governance, or
  implementation of institutional reforms.
• Where the will to reform is completely lacking,
  assistance to governments should be sharply
  reduced and channeled mainly through NGOs or
  direct projects.
• DO NOT SUBSIDIZE systemic corruption and bad
  governance.

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Strategic Principles cont.

• International donors, bilateral and multilateral,
  must coordinate their policies and strategies to
  enhance the incentives for good governance and
  the penalties for bad governance.
• Aid NGOs, think tanks, and associations working
  to monitor and improve the quality of governance
  in recipient countrieswith a high priority on
  controlling corruption.
• Where committed reformers can be identified
  within the state, work with them.

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Strategic Principles cont.

• Enhance state technical and administrative
  capacity, but not in states that lack the
  political will to improve governance. (Study the
  record of judicial reform).
• Strengthen the international rule of law close
  off corrupt flows of money, crack down on
  international criminal networks, build the ICC.

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Strategic Principles, cont.

• Increase funding for democracy assistance
  programs, and increase overall development
  assistance, but set tough standards dont grade
  on a curve
• Craft a viable and sustainable strategy for
  promoting democratic reform in the Arab world.
  This must include serious leverage (e.g.,
  conditioning aid to Egypt) and talking to
  moderate Islamists who commit to the democratic
  rules of the game.

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Strategic Principles, cont.

• Physician Heal Thyself the U.S. and Europe
  must improve the quality, fairness, and
  transparency of their own democracies, so that
  they become more worthy of emulation.
• rein in abuse of power
• fight corruption more vigorously
• make elections more competitive
• transcend partisan polarization