DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment

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• DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment
• Background, Requirements, and Overview

• Steve Bennett, Ph.D.
• Risk Assessment Program Manager
• Department of Homeland Security
• Committee on Methodological Improvement to the
  Department of Homeland Securitys 2006
  Bioterrorism Risk Assessment
• 28 August 2006

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A Brief History of DHS Bioterrorism Risk
Assessment

• Spring 2003 DHS (and NBACC) stand up
• Fall 2003 Requirement for a Biological Threat
  Assessment provided to the Biological Assessment
  Support Center (BASC) within NBACC.
• November 2003 March 2004 Multiple Criteria
  Decision Analysis (MCDA) approach kicked off to
  produce the required threat assessment
• 2 large subject matter expert (SME) workshops (
  200 SMEs)
• 4 taxonomically-divided workshops (50 SMEs each)
• Extensive biological threat agent data collected
• Extensive lists of biological agent experts for a
  number of biological threat agents generated and
  stored.
• April 2004 HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st
  Century published

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A Brief History of DHS Bioterrorism Risk
Assessment (cont.)

• Based on HSPD-10, a new process was initiated

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Bioterrorism Risk Assessments are an Integral
Part of the DHS Biodefense Mission

• We need to adopt a risk-based approach in both
  our operations and our philosophy. Risk
  management is fundamental to managing the threat
  The most effective way to apply risk-based
  approach is by using the trio of threat,
  vulnerability and consequence as a general model
  for assessing risk and deciding on protective
  measures we undertake.
• - Michael Chertoff, Secretary, DHS
• the United States requires a continuous, formal
  process for conductingassessments to guide
  prioritization ofinvestments in
  biodefense-related research, development,
  planning, and preparedness.
• - Biodefense for the 21st Century

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Bioterrorism Risk Assessments Must Include Both
Likelihood and Consequence Components
Likelihood is defined as the probability that an
adversary acquires, produces, and disseminates a
biological weapon
Consequence is defined as the expected public
health impact of a biological attack
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Current Bioterrorism Risk Assessments Must Build
Upon Previous Assessments

• United States CDCs Public Health Assessment of
  Potential Biological Terrorism Agents based
  largely on public health consequence
• United States Army Medical Risk Assessment of the
  Biological Threat focused on force health
  protection and included only medical/public
  health criteria

Bioterrorism risk assessments must be
end-to-end, integrating likelihood and
consequences of bioterrorism events
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Bioterrorism Risk Assessments Must Incorporate a
Wide Range of Inputs and Accommodate Significant
Uncertainty
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Overview of the 2006 DHS Bioterrorism Risk
Assessment Approach
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The DHS Integrated Bioterrorism Risk Assessment
Is Anchored by a PRA-based Approach

• Ability to adjust parameters to address different
  questions
• Ability to query system at consequence level of
  interest

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The Risk Analysis Produces a Family of Risk
Curves That Can Be Summarized in a Number of Ways
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The Risk Assessment Generates Three Primary
Products
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Biological Threat Agents Can Be Evaluated by
Comparing Relative Risk
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Overview and Structure of the Committee Meeting
Presentations
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The National Academies Will Play an Important
Role in the Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Program

• DHS is committed to a transparent process that
  provides for iterative update and improvement to
  its risk assessment approaches.
• NAS/NRC review of the risk assessment is
  important to ensure a quality product and provide
  critical recommendations for future assessments.
• NAS/NRC review and evaluation of the 2006
  assessment
• Near-term comments and recommendations needed in
  time to impact the 2008 assessment.
• Longer-term review will impact the program as a
  whole as well as specific assessments starting in
  2010 and beyond.

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