Title: Personalism, Vaticanum II and The Natural Roots of Morality
1Personalism, Vaticanum II and The Natural Roots
of Morality
- Why should our nastiness be the baggage of an
apish past and our kindness uniquely human? Why
should we not seek continuity with other animals
for our noble traits as well?(Stephen Jay
Gould) - Johan De Tavernier, KU Leuven
2Human Nature after Darwin?
- The human scientists proclaim that animals are
irrelevant to the study of human beings and that
there is no such thing as a universal human
nature. The consequence is that science, so
coldly successful at dissecting DNA, has proved
spectacularly inept at tackling what the
philosopher David Hume called the greater
question of all why is human nature what it is? - M. Ridley, The Red Queen Sex and the Evolution
of Human Nature, 1993
31. Christian ethics ignoring evolutionary
knowledge
- The essentialist character of the designed scala
naturae - Boethius (513) Aquinas Est enim persona ut
dictum est naturae rationalis individua
substantia - The person signifies what is most perfect in all
nature substantia completa, per se subsistens,
separata ab aliis (Summa III, Q. xvi, a. 12, ad
2um) - Personalist morals superiority of thought to
sense, the unique nature of self-conscious
beings, the person as a unity of mental life and
will (Knudson, 1927) - A. Marc E. Mounier in comparison with all
other realities the person is an absolute because
he/she is a free begin that adopts, assimilates,
lives and affirms values which constitute his
uniqueness, (Manifesto, 1936)
4Christian ethics ignoring evolutionary knowledge
- J. Maritain distinction between the individual
and the person - Individual material component which we have in
common with animals, plants, microbes - Person une substance individuelle complète,
de nature intellectuelle et maîtresse de ses
actions covering the spiritual - Modernity, having declared the human being as
sovereign and autonomous, will end in the hands
of Darwin and Freud (True Humanism, 1936) - M. Scheler the person a unity-of-acts-of-differ
ent-natures (Formalismus, 1916) and can only be
known in his/her relationships (Mittvolzug) L.
Janssens the sphere of the entire person is in
every single act the person is a complex
totality, existing in a spatio-temporal universe
(1939).
5Christian ethics ignoring evolutionary knowledge
- The person is the supreme principle (free willed
actions, spiritual being, intelligence,
self-actualisation, acting morally) the mind is
never reducible to some material substance - Is-ought distinction morality is rooted in
humans unique unity of mental life and will and
is therefore an entirely cultural phenomenon - How to think about other conditions of being a
person, f.i. the capacity for psychological
experiences? - Dichotomist view of human being,
omitting/reducing the physical embodiment of
human functions and upholding the view that
emotions are only accidentiae
62. Is human morality innate? Darwin vs. Huxley
- Evolutionary biology morality roots in
dispositions which are programmed by evolution
into our nature - Darwins dangerous idea all life can be
explained through insights into the efficiency of
natural selection results in Natura non facit
saltum - The Descent of Man (1871), Ch. 4 5 analogies
between human and animal behaviour but also
differences - The following proposition seems to me in a high
degree probable namely, that any animal whatever,
endowed with well-marked social instincts, the
parental and filial affections being here
included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense
or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers
had become as well, or nearly as well developed,
as in man. () Many animals, however, certainly
sympathize with each others distress or danger.
72. Is human morality innate? Darwin vs. Huxley
- Thomas Huxley while accepting that evolution has
an impact on the nature of human condition,
humans are capable of controlling it. They are
able to act competently and ethically, based on
explicit rational choices and free will. - Human morality is a victory over brutal
evolutionary processes (1894) - Seen the immense difference in mental powers
between the highest ape and the lowest sauvage,
morality is completely distinct from animal
behavior - But evolutionary knowledge explains the hybridity
of who we are and the ambivalence in human
condition
83. Nature vs. nurture? Evolutionists /
gradualists vs. saltationists
- Saltationists like G.C. Williams see morality NOT
as an accidental capability produced, in its
boundless stupidity, by a biological process that
is normally opposed to the expression of such a
capability (1988). - Evolutionists de Waal, Ruse, E.O. Wilson,
Korsgaard saltationism a veneer theory of
morality (2009) the roots of morality have to be
situated in emergent emotional, social and
cognitive capacities - R. Joyce two different ways of understanding
that human morality is INNATE - Evolution designed us to be social, friendly,
benevolent, fair (moral behavior adaptive) - Human behavior is outcome of psychological
mechanisms that are adaptations but behavior
itself is not adaptive
93. Nature vs. nurture? Evolutionists /
gradualists vs. saltationists
- Sociobiologists Ruse and E.O. Wilson morality
serves inclusive fitness goals (upholding
reciprocal fairness, fulfilling duties, being
loyal, accepting social control, sacrificing
ourselves, etc.) - Hobbes is wrong by qualifying the natural
condition as a war of all against all, in which
there is no room for mercy, altruism and empathy - Moral systems are the result of the need to
manage conflicts, guaranteeing personal security
and promoting social cohesion - Even altruistic behavior (reciprocal altruism
kin altruism) could have evolutionary roots
(Trivers Axelrod tit-for-tat strategies) - Emotions are lubricants creating cooperation
honor if we keep promises, shame if we are
unmasked as cheats, guilt if we misuse someones
trust
103. Nature vs. nurture? Evolutionists /
gradualists vs. saltationists
- De Waal morality development of social
instincts (reciprocity, fairness, community
concern, conflict resolution) and emotions
(shame, anger, being touched, compassion,
consolation, fidelity, protest) builing blocks
of morality/proto-morality - Moral behavior relies on underlying, innate
psychological mechanisms that are adaptations,
but the behavior itself is not necessarily
adaptive (Joyce) - Innate emotional, social and cognitive faculties
result in open-ended plasticity, having shaped
memory capacity, a kind of will, a capacity for
understanding and reflection (Ayala) - Emergence of capacity for suffering and idea of
vulnerability for suffering explain why humans
are interested in morality (Damasio) - E.g. primordial autochtony
114. Christian ethics on evolutionary roots of
morality
- Morality seems to be a mixture of culture and
nature vs cultural deterministic positions - Cultural positions on morality (the human person
as image Dei, created co-creator) are not the
whole truth about moral behavior - The biblical doctrine that human beings are
created in Gods image suggests that human beings
differ in kind and not just in degree from other
animals (Arnhart) - Fixed moral code? Pope the evolutionary process
provides an emotional and cognitive constitution
characterised by general proclivities, desires,
or preferences, not a fixed moral code - It helps us understanding the often limited
impact of both ethical reasoning and moral
judgements on concrete behavior (a more realistic
view?) natural moral sentiments enable us to
learn moral traditions (Arnhart)
12 4. Christian ethics on evolutionary roots of
morality
- Acceptance by Christian ethics of evolutionary
accounts of morality not necessarily discredits
the moral enterprise - Christian ethics can profit by recognizing the
functional value of morality without presuming
that morality is only meaningful for its social
functionality - Knowledge about evolutionary impact could help to
understand human behavior, the often limited
impact of ethical reasoning on behavior and the
way we morally judge (f.i. the difficulty of
realizing distributive justice, of eradicating
prejudices, of changing eating behavior, the
attractiveness of ethnic culture for belonging) - Unscientific worldview of the classics is maybe
closer to truth than modern ethics - Children are born with a range of fairly
indeterminate abilities, powers and capacities
which are gradually shaped by training,
instruction, and habituation to become the
adults second nature, that is, the virtues or
vices that constitute character (Pope)
134. Christian ethics on evolutionary roots of
morality
- Biological predisposition has to be understood as
an open program - Proper knowledge about evolved emotional and
mental inclinations will urge Christian ethics to
emphasize their moral ambiguity (e.g. kin
altruism, male desire for sexual variety,
uncritical obedience, desire to preserve
self-esteem, preference for conformity) - Understanding the evolutionary roots of morality
emphasizes the need for properly coaching and
tutoring evolved emotions - Moral life constantly directing natural
inclinations and emotions towards a virtuous
living - Habitual action shapes and organizes emotional
states and their neurochemical profile (Damasio)
144. Christian ethics on evolutionary roots of
morality
- If we take the passions as being inordinate
emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that
in this sense perfect virtue is without the
passions. But if by passions we understand any
movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain
that moral virtues, which are about the passions
as about their proper matter, cannot be without
passions. The reason for this is that otherwise
it would follow that moral virtue makes the
sensitive appetite altogether idle whereas it is
not the function of virtue to deprive the powers
subordinate to reason of their proper activities,
but to make them execute the commands of reason,
by exercising their proper acts. (Summa I.II Q.
59 art. 5)
154. Christian ethics on evolutionary roots of
morality
- Evolutionary knowledge allows us to see the human
transcendence of our evolutionary past (without
abandoning it) - Transcending our fitness interests loving others
for their own sake, acting like a good Samaritan
(Holmes Rolston) - Christian ethical ideals of universal solidarity,
including love of enemies and option/preferential
love for the poor, renunciation of revenge,
adoption of non-relatives, etc. surpass the kind
of morality provided by natural selection
164. Christian ethics on evolutionary roots of
morality
- Christianity should remember her own long held
tradition that morality has a natural basis
(Gensler) - Humans are ethical beings by their biological
nature (Ayala) - The natural law tradition recognizes that natural
inclinations which we share with other animals
(desire for food and sex, eager to learn,
companionship) are not only biologically
significant but could also be considered as
morally good when ordered properly (Scholasticism
vs Cathars) - The idea of free will as uncaused cause treats
the human will as unconditional, transcendental
power beyond the natural world a Gnostic idea? - The human being as person is NOT seen in major
part of Catholic tradition as counterpart of
nature
174. Christian ethics on evolutionary roots of
morality
- Grace perfects rather than destroys nature
- Balanced reciprocity will always be an easier
attainable ethical goal than the benevolent
willingness to give without counting the cost. - Christian ethics prefers to describe the origins
of immorality rather in religious terms than in
natural terms, e.g. the distraction of the will
and intellect by both original and personal sin - It is theologically improper to assume that
nature is ordered either by God or by the
evolutionary process for Christian ethics its a
mistake to force a choice between either
religious or biological roots (spiritualist vs.
naturalist/reductionist view) - Neither direction accepts that God works in and
through human nature, that is divinely created,
habituated in the moral life, denigrated by sin,
and healed by grace
185. Nature or/and Person Reception of Gaudium et
Spes no 51
- 1. A new FOCUS humanum or personhood (GS no 11
solutions that are fully human) - 2. Another WORLD VIEW historical consciousness,
wherein time, place, context and circumstances
play a role (GS part II signs of times) - 3. A new METHOD from deduction to induction (GS
no 46 reading the signs of the times in the
light of the gospel and of human experience)
195. Nature or/and Person GS no 51
- 2 schools of interpretation faith ethics
promoting a relatively distinct Christian ethics
autonomous ethics in Christian context - Debate on relationship Christianum and humanum
(cf. J. Fuchs) - Focus on interpretation GS no 51 Hence when
there is question of harmonizing conjugal love
with the responsible transmission of life, the
moral aspects of any procedure does not depend
solely on sincere intentions or on an evaluation
of motives, but must be determined by objective
standards. These, based on the nature of the
human person and his acts (McCormickobjectivis
criteriis ex personae ejusdemque actuum natura
desumptis Janssens objectivis criteriis in
eadem personae humanae dignitate fundatis) - L. Janssens all human activities have to be
considered from the perspective of the human
person, adequately considered
205. Nature or/and Person GS no 51
- The Ratzinger Report (1985) Card. Ratzinger
about moral theology in relation with what he
calls the permissive late modern culture - P. 88 about GS no 51 Whereas the reflections of
the Council were based on the unity of person and
nature in man, personalism began to be understood
in opposition to naturalism (as if the human
person and its needs could enter into conflict
with nature). Thus an exaggerated personalism led
some theologians to reject the internal order,
the language of nature (). This indeed is one of
the reasons that Humanae Vitae was rejected and
that it is impossible for many theologies to
reject contraception
215. Nature or/and Person GS no 51
- Exaggerated personalism? Ratzinger separation
between nature and person has led to the
conviction that norms could be known through
rationality/experience From this erroneous
point of departure, they arrived unavoidably at
the idea that morality was to be constructed
solely on the basis of reason and that this
autonomy of reason was also valid for believers.
Hence no more Magisterium, no more God of
Revelation with his Decalogue. - Alternative? A morality of ends! (
consequentialism) - In order to counter permissivity, a return to
fixed reference points is proposed landmarks
which can neither be removed nor ignored without
breaking the bond that Christian philosophy sees
between Being and the Good.
225. Nature or/and Person GS no 51
- Proportionalism consequentialism? Veritatis
Splendor (1993) no 74But on what does the moral
assessment of mans free acts depend? () Is it
the intention of the acting subject, the
circumstances - and in particular the
consequences of his action, or the object
itself of his act? - Certain ethical theories, called teleological,
claim to be concerned for the conformity of human
acts with the ends pursued by the agent and with
the values intended by him. The criteria for
evaluating the moral rightness of an action are
drawn from the weighing of the non-moral or
pre-moral goods to be gained and the
corresponding non-moral or pre-moral values to be
respected. () This teleologism, as a method
for discovering the moral norm, can thus be
called consequentialism or proportionalism.
235. Nature or/and Person GS no 51
- Intrinsece malum? The teleological ethical
theories (proportionalism, consequentialism) ()
maintain that it is never possible to formulate
an absolute prohibition of particular kinds of
behaviour which would be in conflict, in every
circumstance and in every culture, with those
values (no 75). - Do personalists deny the existence of intrinsic
evil? What is the difference between
proportionalists and consequentialists?
24- THANK YOU!
- Speltheorie zero-sum en non-zero-sum spellen
- Geen onvoorwaardelijke altruïsme in de natuur,
wel wederkerig altruïsme - Voorbeelden van tit-for-tat strategieën (R.
Trivers, R. Axelrod) kin altruism - Moreel gedrag wortelt in emoties bv. de eer om
beloftes na te komen - Mensen trachten de moraal te rationaliseren maar
het begint met gevoel