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Personalism, Vaticanum II and The Natural Roots of Morality

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... (1985): Card. Ratzinger about moral theology in relation with what he calls the permissive late modern culture P. 88 about GS no 51: ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Personalism, Vaticanum II and The Natural Roots of Morality


1
Personalism, Vaticanum II and The Natural Roots
of Morality
  • Why should our nastiness be the baggage of an
    apish past and our kindness uniquely human? Why
    should we not seek continuity with other animals
    for our noble traits as well?(Stephen Jay
    Gould)
  • Johan De Tavernier, KU Leuven

2
Human Nature after Darwin?
  • The human scientists proclaim that animals are
    irrelevant to the study of human beings and that
    there is no such thing as a universal human
    nature. The consequence is that science, so
    coldly successful at dissecting DNA, has proved
    spectacularly inept at tackling what the
    philosopher David Hume called the greater
    question of all why is human nature what it is?
  • M. Ridley, The Red Queen Sex and the Evolution
    of Human Nature, 1993

3
1. Christian ethics ignoring evolutionary
knowledge
  • The essentialist character of the designed scala
    naturae
  • Boethius (513) Aquinas Est enim persona ut
    dictum est naturae rationalis individua
    substantia
  • The person signifies what is most perfect in all
    nature substantia completa, per se subsistens,
    separata ab aliis (Summa III, Q. xvi, a. 12, ad
    2um)
  • Personalist morals superiority of thought to
    sense, the unique nature of self-conscious
    beings, the person as a unity of mental life and
    will (Knudson, 1927)
  • A. Marc E. Mounier in comparison with all
    other realities the person is an absolute because
    he/she is a free begin that adopts, assimilates,
    lives and affirms values which constitute his
    uniqueness, (Manifesto, 1936)

4
Christian ethics ignoring evolutionary knowledge
  • J. Maritain distinction between the individual
    and the person
  • Individual material component which we have in
    common with animals, plants, microbes
  • Person une substance individuelle complète,
    de nature intellectuelle et maîtresse de ses
    actions covering the spiritual
  • Modernity, having declared the human being as
    sovereign and autonomous, will end in the hands
    of Darwin and Freud (True Humanism, 1936)
  • M. Scheler the person a unity-of-acts-of-differ
    ent-natures (Formalismus, 1916) and can only be
    known in his/her relationships (Mittvolzug) L.
    Janssens the sphere of the entire person is in
    every single act the person is a complex
    totality, existing in a spatio-temporal universe
    (1939).

5
Christian ethics ignoring evolutionary knowledge
  • The person is the supreme principle (free willed
    actions, spiritual being, intelligence,
    self-actualisation, acting morally) the mind is
    never reducible to some material substance
  • Is-ought distinction morality is rooted in
    humans unique unity of mental life and will and
    is therefore an entirely cultural phenomenon
  • How to think about other conditions of being a
    person, f.i. the capacity for psychological
    experiences?
  • Dichotomist view of human being,
    omitting/reducing the physical embodiment of
    human functions and upholding the view that
    emotions are only accidentiae

6
2. Is human morality innate? Darwin vs. Huxley
  • Evolutionary biology morality roots in
    dispositions which are programmed by evolution
    into our nature
  • Darwins dangerous idea all life can be
    explained through insights into the efficiency of
    natural selection results in Natura non facit
    saltum
  • The Descent of Man (1871), Ch. 4 5 analogies
    between human and animal behaviour but also
    differences
  • The following proposition seems to me in a high
    degree probable namely, that any animal whatever,
    endowed with well-marked social instincts, the
    parental and filial affections being here
    included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense
    or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers
    had become as well, or nearly as well developed,
    as in man. () Many animals, however, certainly
    sympathize with each others distress or danger.

7
2. Is human morality innate? Darwin vs. Huxley
  • Thomas Huxley while accepting that evolution has
    an impact on the nature of human condition,
    humans are capable of controlling it. They are
    able to act competently and ethically, based on
    explicit rational choices and free will.
  • Human morality is a victory over brutal
    evolutionary processes (1894)
  • Seen the immense difference in mental powers
    between the highest ape and the lowest sauvage,
    morality is completely distinct from animal
    behavior
  • But evolutionary knowledge explains the hybridity
    of who we are and the ambivalence in human
    condition

8
3. Nature vs. nurture? Evolutionists /
gradualists vs. saltationists
  • Saltationists like G.C. Williams see morality NOT
    as an accidental capability produced, in its
    boundless stupidity, by a biological process that
    is normally opposed to the expression of such a
    capability (1988).
  • Evolutionists de Waal, Ruse, E.O. Wilson,
    Korsgaard saltationism a veneer theory of
    morality (2009) the roots of morality have to be
    situated in emergent emotional, social and
    cognitive capacities
  • R. Joyce two different ways of understanding
    that human morality is INNATE
  • Evolution designed us to be social, friendly,
    benevolent, fair (moral behavior adaptive)
  • Human behavior is outcome of psychological
    mechanisms that are adaptations but behavior
    itself is not adaptive

9
3. Nature vs. nurture? Evolutionists /
gradualists vs. saltationists
  • Sociobiologists Ruse and E.O. Wilson morality
    serves inclusive fitness goals (upholding
    reciprocal fairness, fulfilling duties, being
    loyal, accepting social control, sacrificing
    ourselves, etc.)
  • Hobbes is wrong by qualifying the natural
    condition as a war of all against all, in which
    there is no room for mercy, altruism and empathy
  • Moral systems are the result of the need to
    manage conflicts, guaranteeing personal security
    and promoting social cohesion
  • Even altruistic behavior (reciprocal altruism
    kin altruism) could have evolutionary roots
    (Trivers Axelrod tit-for-tat strategies)
  • Emotions are lubricants creating cooperation
    honor if we keep promises, shame if we are
    unmasked as cheats, guilt if we misuse someones
    trust

10
3. Nature vs. nurture? Evolutionists /
gradualists vs. saltationists
  • De Waal morality development of social
    instincts (reciprocity, fairness, community
    concern, conflict resolution) and emotions
    (shame, anger, being touched, compassion,
    consolation, fidelity, protest) builing blocks
    of morality/proto-morality
  • Moral behavior relies on underlying, innate
    psychological mechanisms that are adaptations,
    but the behavior itself is not necessarily
    adaptive (Joyce)
  • Innate emotional, social and cognitive faculties
    result in open-ended plasticity, having shaped
    memory capacity, a kind of will, a capacity for
    understanding and reflection (Ayala)
  • Emergence of capacity for suffering and idea of
    vulnerability for suffering explain why humans
    are interested in morality (Damasio)
  • E.g. primordial autochtony

11
4. Christian ethics on evolutionary roots of
morality
  • Morality seems to be a mixture of culture and
    nature vs cultural deterministic positions
  • Cultural positions on morality (the human person
    as image Dei, created co-creator) are not the
    whole truth about moral behavior
  • The biblical doctrine that human beings are
    created in Gods image suggests that human beings
    differ in kind and not just in degree from other
    animals (Arnhart)
  • Fixed moral code? Pope the evolutionary process
    provides an emotional and cognitive constitution
    characterised by general proclivities, desires,
    or preferences, not a fixed moral code
  • It helps us understanding the often limited
    impact of both ethical reasoning and moral
    judgements on concrete behavior (a more realistic
    view?) natural moral sentiments enable us to
    learn moral traditions (Arnhart)

12
4. Christian ethics on evolutionary roots of
morality
  • Acceptance by Christian ethics of evolutionary
    accounts of morality not necessarily discredits
    the moral enterprise
  • Christian ethics can profit by recognizing the
    functional value of morality without presuming
    that morality is only meaningful for its social
    functionality
  • Knowledge about evolutionary impact could help to
    understand human behavior, the often limited
    impact of ethical reasoning on behavior and the
    way we morally judge (f.i. the difficulty of
    realizing distributive justice, of eradicating
    prejudices, of changing eating behavior, the
    attractiveness of ethnic culture for belonging)
  • Unscientific worldview of the classics is maybe
    closer to truth than modern ethics
  • Children are born with a range of fairly
    indeterminate abilities, powers and capacities
    which are gradually shaped by training,
    instruction, and habituation to become the
    adults second nature, that is, the virtues or
    vices that constitute character (Pope)

13
4. Christian ethics on evolutionary roots of
morality
  • Biological predisposition has to be understood as
    an open program
  • Proper knowledge about evolved emotional and
    mental inclinations will urge Christian ethics to
    emphasize their moral ambiguity (e.g. kin
    altruism, male desire for sexual variety,
    uncritical obedience, desire to preserve
    self-esteem, preference for conformity)
  • Understanding the evolutionary roots of morality
    emphasizes the need for properly coaching and
    tutoring evolved emotions
  • Moral life constantly directing natural
    inclinations and emotions towards a virtuous
    living
  • Habitual action shapes and organizes emotional
    states and their neurochemical profile (Damasio)

14
4. Christian ethics on evolutionary roots of
morality
  • If we take the passions as being inordinate
    emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that
    in this sense perfect virtue is without the
    passions. But if by passions we understand any
    movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain
    that moral virtues, which are about the passions
    as about their proper matter, cannot be without
    passions. The reason for this is that otherwise
    it would follow that moral virtue makes the
    sensitive appetite altogether idle whereas it is
    not the function of virtue to deprive the powers
    subordinate to reason of their proper activities,
    but to make them execute the commands of reason,
    by exercising their proper acts. (Summa I.II Q.
    59 art. 5)

15
4. Christian ethics on evolutionary roots of
morality
  • Evolutionary knowledge allows us to see the human
    transcendence of our evolutionary past (without
    abandoning it)
  • Transcending our fitness interests loving others
    for their own sake, acting like a good Samaritan
    (Holmes Rolston)
  • Christian ethical ideals of universal solidarity,
    including love of enemies and option/preferential
    love for the poor, renunciation of revenge,
    adoption of non-relatives, etc. surpass the kind
    of morality provided by natural selection

16
4. Christian ethics on evolutionary roots of
morality
  • Christianity should remember her own long held
    tradition that morality has a natural basis
    (Gensler)
  • Humans are ethical beings by their biological
    nature (Ayala)
  • The natural law tradition recognizes that natural
    inclinations which we share with other animals
    (desire for food and sex, eager to learn,
    companionship) are not only biologically
    significant but could also be considered as
    morally good when ordered properly (Scholasticism
    vs Cathars)
  • The idea of free will as uncaused cause treats
    the human will as unconditional, transcendental
    power beyond the natural world a Gnostic idea?
  • The human being as person is NOT seen in major
    part of Catholic tradition as counterpart of
    nature

17
4. Christian ethics on evolutionary roots of
morality
  • Grace perfects rather than destroys nature
  • Balanced reciprocity will always be an easier
    attainable ethical goal than the benevolent
    willingness to give without counting the cost.
  • Christian ethics prefers to describe the origins
    of immorality rather in religious terms than in
    natural terms, e.g. the distraction of the will
    and intellect by both original and personal sin
  • It is theologically improper to assume that
    nature is ordered either by God or by the
    evolutionary process for Christian ethics its a
    mistake to force a choice between either
    religious or biological roots (spiritualist vs.
    naturalist/reductionist view)
  • Neither direction accepts that God works in and
    through human nature, that is divinely created,
    habituated in the moral life, denigrated by sin,
    and healed by grace

18
5. Nature or/and Person Reception of Gaudium et
Spes no 51
  • 1. A new FOCUS humanum or personhood (GS no 11
    solutions that are fully human)
  • 2. Another WORLD VIEW historical consciousness,
    wherein time, place, context and circumstances
    play a role (GS part II signs of times)
  • 3. A new METHOD from deduction to induction (GS
    no 46 reading the signs of the times in the
    light of the gospel and of human experience)

19
5. Nature or/and Person GS no 51
  • 2 schools of interpretation faith ethics
    promoting a relatively distinct Christian ethics
    autonomous ethics in Christian context
  • Debate on relationship Christianum and humanum
    (cf. J. Fuchs)
  • Focus on interpretation GS no 51 Hence when
    there is question of harmonizing conjugal love
    with the responsible transmission of life, the
    moral aspects of any procedure does not depend
    solely on sincere intentions or on an evaluation
    of motives, but must be determined by objective
    standards. These, based on the nature of the
    human person and his acts (McCormickobjectivis
    criteriis ex personae ejusdemque actuum natura
    desumptis Janssens objectivis criteriis in
    eadem personae humanae dignitate fundatis)
  • L. Janssens all human activities have to be
    considered from the perspective of the human
    person, adequately considered

20
5. Nature or/and Person GS no 51
  • The Ratzinger Report (1985) Card. Ratzinger
    about moral theology in relation with what he
    calls the permissive late modern culture
  • P. 88 about GS no 51 Whereas the reflections of
    the Council were based on the unity of person and
    nature in man, personalism began to be understood
    in opposition to naturalism (as if the human
    person and its needs could enter into conflict
    with nature). Thus an exaggerated personalism led
    some theologians to reject the internal order,
    the language of nature (). This indeed is one of
    the reasons that Humanae Vitae was rejected and
    that it is impossible for many theologies to
    reject contraception

21
5. Nature or/and Person GS no 51
  • Exaggerated personalism? Ratzinger separation
    between nature and person has led to the
    conviction that norms could be known through
    rationality/experience From this erroneous
    point of departure, they arrived unavoidably at
    the idea that morality was to be constructed
    solely on the basis of reason and that this
    autonomy of reason was also valid for believers.
    Hence no more Magisterium, no more God of
    Revelation with his Decalogue.
  • Alternative? A morality of ends! (
    consequentialism)
  • In order to counter permissivity, a return to
    fixed reference points is proposed landmarks
    which can neither be removed nor ignored without
    breaking the bond that Christian philosophy sees
    between Being and the Good.

22
5. Nature or/and Person GS no 51
  • Proportionalism consequentialism? Veritatis
    Splendor (1993) no 74But on what does the moral
    assessment of mans free acts depend? () Is it
    the intention of the acting subject, the
    circumstances - and in particular the
    consequences of his action, or the object
    itself of his act?
  • Certain ethical theories, called teleological,
    claim to be concerned for the conformity of human
    acts with the ends pursued by the agent and with
    the values intended by him. The criteria for
    evaluating the moral rightness of an action are
    drawn from the weighing of the non-moral or
    pre-moral goods to be gained and the
    corresponding non-moral or pre-moral values to be
    respected. () This teleologism, as a method
    for discovering the moral norm, can thus be
    called consequentialism or proportionalism.

23
5. Nature or/and Person GS no 51
  • Intrinsece malum? The teleological ethical
    theories (proportionalism, consequentialism) ()
    maintain that it is never possible to formulate
    an absolute prohibition of particular kinds of
    behaviour which would be in conflict, in every
    circumstance and in every culture, with those
    values (no 75).
  • Do personalists deny the existence of intrinsic
    evil? What is the difference between
    proportionalists and consequentialists?

24
  • THANK YOU!


  • Speltheorie zero-sum en non-zero-sum spellen
  • Geen onvoorwaardelijke altruïsme in de natuur,
    wel wederkerig altruïsme
  • Voorbeelden van tit-for-tat strategieën (R.
    Trivers, R. Axelrod) kin altruism
  • Moreel gedrag wortelt in emoties bv. de eer om
    beloftes na te komen
  • Mensen trachten de moraal te rationaliseren maar
    het begint met gevoel
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