Business Continuity /Disaster Recovery Panel

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Business Continuity /Disaster Recovery Panel
STA Annual Conference 2006
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A High Level Summary of the Lessons Learned from
Hurricane Wilma by Franklin Templeton
Investments
Wayne Behrens Director Business Continuity
Planning
Prepared for the Securities Transfer
Assocation Amelia Island Meeting on Oct 20, 2006
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Wilma Agenda

• Franklin Templeton Investments
• Who was Wilma
• Impact of Wilma
• What Went Right
• Crisis Management Lessons
• Business Continuity Lessons
• Technology Lessons
• Facility Lessons

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Franklin Templeton Investments

• Parent Franklin Resources Inc.
• Approx 500 Billion in Assets Under Management
• Major Brands
• Franklin
• Templeton
• Mutual Series
• Fiduciary Trust
• Darby Overseas
• Bisset (Canada)
• Employees Approx 8,000 in 29 countries. In the
  Florida Area
• St. Petersburg (1,200)
• Ft. Lauderdale (466)
• Nassau (49)
• Miami (16)

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Who the Heck was Wilma?

• Hurricane Wilma is the lesser known cousin of
  Katrina. However, Wilma was the most intense
  hurricane ever recorded in the Atlantic basin.
  It devastated parts of the Yucatán Peninsula as
  well as southern Florida.
• There were 62 deaths attributed to Wilma and
  damage is estimated at 12.2 billion in the U.S.,
  making Wilma the sixth costliest storm in U.S
  history.
• When Wilma reached Ft. Lauderdale, she was a
  category 2 hurricane with sustained winds of 110
  mph to 130 MPH.

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Impact of Wilma on Franklin

1. Wilma reached Ft. Lauderdale early Monday
   morning, October 24th. By Monday afternoon, we
   had received preliminary damage assessments
   indicating that hundreds of windows primarily on
   the north west section of the building were blown
   out.
2. We were unable to occupy the building from
   October 24 through November 18.
3. No loss of life and no injuries to employees.
   Some damage to a few employees homes. Many
   employees homes were without power for days or
   weeks.
4. 500 employees were impacted, with over 230 being
   relocated to other sites Toronto, St.
   Petersburg, Miami, New York, Short Hills, San
   Mateo, and Rancho Cordova.   

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What Went Right

1. In general, our Crisis Management, Business
   Continuity and Technology Disaster Recovery plans
   worked well.
2. Wilma caused virtually no disruption to our
   customers.
3. The Ft. Lauderdale Emergency Management Team took
   charge of the situation in Ft. Lauderdale.

• All business units were able to follow their
  business continuity plans and recover their
  operations.
• Technology operations were restored to include
  two critical applications.

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Crisis Management Lessons

1. When the local Emergency Management Teams (EMTs)
   are in the midst of the incident and working
   literally in the dark, they do not always have
   the ability to fully coordinate the recovery of
   business operations away from the site.
2. Each of the major roles in our crisis management
   teams need to have a specific checklist.

1. We need to put in place a pre-plan to track and
   deal immediately with the relocation of employees
   to other sites.
2. You cannot over communicate. Despite the fact
   that we tried very hard to be proactive on
   communicating to our employees, we still heard a
   number of complaints in this area.

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Business Continuity Lessons

1. Over 40 laptops were left in the FTL office when
   the hurricane hit. There had been so many
   hurricane threats during the year that many
   employees did not feel that Wilma would really
   hit or cause this much damage if it did.

• The standard for Business Continuity Plans needs
  to be expanded to address a month long outage
• Shifting work to alternate sites for the first
  3-5 days without moving employees
• Plan for an incident to last over a month to
  include a month end
• A number of issues arose in regards to employees
• Pay during the outage
• Childcare and school closures
• Bonus for extraordinary efforts
• Relocation of children elders

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Technology Lessons Learned

1. We were surprised by the number of business units
   that still relied upon hard copies of faxed
   documents to stand alone fax machine. We have
   worked on a better process and documentation of
   FAX rerouting requirements.
2. Better written procedures for forwarding 800
   numbers.

1. There is a desire from the business for a better
   disaster recovery solution for email and
   Blackberry servers.
2. Environmental monitoring of server rooms needs to
   be tied into a central control point to insure it
   is remotely accessible.

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Facilities Lessons Learned

1. We should have drilled more rigorously on damage
   assessments. For the first couple of days, the
   damage assessments were verbal and led us to
   believe the damage was much more extensive than
   it was. It turned out only 15 to 20 of the
   work areas were damaged.
2. Conversely, our repair and re-occupancy time
   estimates were wildly optimistic.

• Based on initial reports, we planned for a
  week long disruption. We were out for almost a
  month.
• Need to have working knowledge prior to the
  incident of what local agencies will require to
  re-occupy a building.
• Keep in mind the fire marshal and the building
  inspectors are not always in sync.

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Wilma Closing
In the end it was the knowledge, flexibility and
perseverance of our people who really carried the
day and made the recovery a success.
Questions?
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Franklins Approach to Planning for a Pandemic
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Pandemic Agenda

• Goal of this presentation
• Likelihood of a Pandemic
• Basic Business Continuity Strategy
• Why plan
• How will a pandemic differ
• Basic elements of our plan
• Crisis Management
• Business Continuity Planning
• Technology
• General Services
• Human Relations
• Corporate Communications
• What our plan does not cover

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Pandemic Background
1. Goal To provide an overview of Franklins
current approach and thinking in regards to
planning for a possible Pandemic. 2. Likelihood
of a pandemic occurring The question is more
like earthquakes in California. It is not a
question of if, but rather when and how bad. Some
data points such as the 1918, 1957 1968
pandemics and SARs. But, no good data on
frequency or severity.
3. Strategy Our basic disaster planning strategy
is to shift our operations to other sites for 3
to 5 days, after which we will then need to start
to shift people to alternate sites. However,
this will not work in a pandemic situation.
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Pandemic Background (Continued)
4. Why plan if civilization is going to collapse
We used a reasonable worst case
scenario. A scenario which we think is likely
to occur. This is not a worst case scenario
which anticipates the general breakdown of
society and services.

• 5. How will a pandemic differ from our normal
  incidents
• - Many sites are likely to be impacted
• at approximately the same time
• - Will not be able to shift people
• between sites
• Site might be impacted, but not
• incapacitated
• - Sites affected for months not hours
• Affects people directly not facilities or IT.
• Employees may choose not to come to work.
• No clear beginning or end.

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Pandemic Plan Outline

• Our pandemic plan is broken down into
• 1. Crisis Management
• - Framework to address a pandemic
• - Tabletop exercises
• 2. Business Continuity Planning
• - Guidance to business units on how to review
  their business continuity strategies and
  workflows against a
• pandemic type scenario
• 3. Technology
• Steps to reduce the impact of a
• pandemic on our data centers
• - Increased remote work capabilities
• - Reviewing other strategies

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Pandemic Plan Outline (Continued)

• 4. General Services
• Best practices for employee hygiene program and
  procedures for facility
• managers to follow in the event of a pandemic
• 5. Human Relations
• Global HR policy framework to provide
  recommendations to local HR
• groups to address issues that are likely to
  arise in a pandemic
• 6. Corporate Communications
• Integrated communication plan
• 7. Plan Does not currently include
• PPE such as Masks gloves, Etc.
• Antiviral Drugs such as Tamiflu
• Vaccines

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Pandemic Closing
Questions?
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All Disasters are LocalRegionalizing Business
Continuity

• Securities Transfer Association
• 2006 Annual Conference
• Brian Tishuk
• ChicagoFIRST Executive Director
• October 20, 2006

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Government Services
Energy
Critical Infrastructures
Public Health
Emergency Services
Chemical Industry
Telecommunications
Financial Services
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The Financial Sector
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Federal Financial Partnership

• Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure
  Committee (FBIIC)
• (formed January 2002)
• Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council
  (FSSCC)
• (formed June 2002)

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FBIIC FSSCC
PUBLIC SECTOR
PRIVATE SECTOR
Presidents Working Group on Financial Markets
Treasury - Lead Agency (PDD 63)
US Treasury Assistant Secretary for Financial
Institutions FBIIC CHAIR
Assistant Secretary for Financial
Institutions SECTOR LIAISON Rhonda MacLean SECTOR
COORDINATOR
Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure
Committee (FBIIC) US Treasury Department Commodit
y Futures Trading Commission Conference of State
Bank Supervisors Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Federal Housing Finance Board Federal
Reserve Board of Governors Homeland Security
Council National Association of Insurance
Commissioners National Credit Union
Administration New York Federal Reserve
Bank Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight Office of Thrift Supervision Securities
and Exchange Commission
Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council
for CIP/HLS Financial Services Trade
Associations Institutes New York Stock
Exchange The Clearinghouse FS/ISAC Securities
Industry Automation Corporation The Options
Clearing Corporation ChicagoFIRST NASDAQ AMEX ASIS
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• The Role for Regional
• Public/Private Partnerships

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The Missing Piece

• To increase the resilience of financial services
  in the event of a regional disaster in
  collaboration with the city, state, and federal
  agencies.

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All Disasters are Local

• How will that jurisdiction prevent, prepare for,
  and respond to incidents?
• Do your business continuity plans incorporate
  government response plans?
• How can coordination be fostered among
  jurisdictions?
• Regional partnerships can strengthen the business
  continuity plans of participating firms

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Regional PartnershipsFormed and Forming

• Miami (FloridaFIRST)
• San Francisco (BARC FIRST Bay Area Response
  Coalition)
• Los Angeles (SoCal FIRC Financial Institutions
  Recovery Coalition)
• Minneapolis (MN-ISAC MN Security Board)
• Tampa Bay Region of FloridaFIRST
• HoustonFIRST
• PhiladelphiaFIRST
• ColumbusFIRST
• Alabama Recovery Coalition for the Financial
  Sector
• Chicago (ChicagoFIRST)
• Washington, DC
• Detroit
• Alaska
• Seattle
• Jacksonville
• Las Vegas
• New Orleans (still thinking about it)

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RPC FIRST

• Fostering Collaboration among Partnerships
• ChicagoFIRST leading the formation of a Council
• Council would share best practices
• Council would help one another with
  administrative questions
• Council can plug into FSSCC
• RPC Regional Partnership Council
• FIRST Financial Industry Resilience, Security,
  and Teamwork
• Formed in early 2006

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• The ChicagoFIRST Approach
• (formed May 2003)

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ChicagoFIRSTs Primary Objectives

• Obtain a seat at Chicago's 911 Center in the
  event of a crisis that affects Chicago's
  financial community
• LaSalle Bank/ABN AMRO
• Create permits/passes for essential personnel to
  safely access business facilities in the event of
  a general evacuation of the city (credentialing)
• Northern Trust Bank
• Develop and communicate standard evacuation
  procedures for industry personnel to exit city
  limits in the event of a disaster
• JP Morgan Chase

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Members

• ABN AMRO / LaSalle Bank
• Allstate Insurance Company
• Aon
• Archipelago
• Ariel Capital Management
• Bank of America
• Chicago Board Options Exchange
• Chicago Board of Trade
• Chicago Federal Home Loan Bank
• Chicago Mercantile Exchange
• Chicago Stock Exchange
• Fidelity National Financial

• Global Electronic Trading Company
• Harris Bank
• JP Morgan Chase
• Man Financial
• Mesirow Financial
• Mizuho Securities USA
• Northern Trust
• The Options Clearing Corporation
• PrivateBank and Trust
• UBS
• Washington Mutual
• William Blair Company

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Strategic Partners (pg. 1 of 2)

• Chicago Office of Emergency Management and
  Communications
• Chicago Police Department
• Commodity Futures Trading Commission
• FBI / InfraGard
• Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
• Federal Emergency Management Agency
• Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
• Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure
  Committee
• Financial Services Information Sharing and
  Analysis Center
• Financial Services Roundtable / BITS
• Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council
• Futures Industry Association

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Strategic Partners (pg. 2 of 2)

• Great Lakes Partnership
• Illinois Department of Financial and Professional
  Regulation
• Illinois Emergency Management Agency
• Illinois State Police
• Illinois Terrorism Task Force
• National Futures Association
• Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
• Securities and Exchange Commission
• Securities Industry Association
• United States Attorneys Office for the Northern
  District of Illinois
• United States Department of Homeland Security
• United States Department of the Treasury
• United States Secret Service

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• Achieving Our Goals

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Formal 911 Center Seat

• Obtained seat at 911 Center in fall 2003
• Primarily for government agencies
• May use seat when Center is activated
• Enhancements to seat at emergency operations
  center
• Set of individuals to staff the seat (with
  Chicago Fed help)
• Handbook with protocols for using the seat,
  activating our crisis communicator, and contact
  information
• Private component of web site created and
  configured to provide a message board for posting
  and recording critical information
• Information about the membership, including
  critical locations and essential employees, on
  the computer at the seat

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Informal Information Sharing

• Seat at 911 Center will be used rarely
• But the relationships with the city and state are
  invaluable
• Spring 2004 information about leaning
  transmission tower
• August 1, 2004 threats against financial
  institutions
• LaSalle Bank fire, December 2004

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Credentialing and Evacuations

• Credentialing
• Discovered city and state each seeking
  credentialing systems, but not coordinating
• City adopted credentialing pilot in which
  ChicagoFIRST participates
• Evacuations
• Illinois Department of Transportation tabletops
  in 2004, 2005, and 2006
• September 7, 2006 evacuation drill in the Loop

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• Additional Achievements

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Working Groups

• Security Working Group
• Coordinating training needs and opportunities
• Coordinating physical security and options
• Piloted NC4 Situation Awareness Service
• Power Working Group
• Understanding electricity in multi-tenant
  buildings
• Sharing ComEd information among members

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Working Groups

• Telecommunications Working Group
• Educating membership
• GETS
• TSP
• SBC call forwarding
• Surviving a central office failure
• TeleContinuity
• LEMKO
• Sprint IP network

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Working Groups

• Pandemic Planning Working Group
• Free exchange of HR, legal, BCP information,
  without NDAs
• Coordinating with state and local health
  departments
• Coordinating with sector-wide efforts
• Evaluating hiring a public health advisor for
  ChicagoFIRST
• Tabletop scheduled for November 2, 2006

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Working Groups

• Public Relations Working Group
• Single point of contact for the media
• Firms leverage membership with press
• ChicagoFIRST increases media understanding
• Crisis Communications Working Group
• Quarterly tests of the 911 Center procedures
• Quarterly tests of Dialogic (notification data)
• Quarterly tests of TeleContinuity and GETS

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2004 Milestones

• Testified before House Financial Services
  Committee on ChicagoFIRST as a partnership
• 9/11 Commission legislation identifies
  ChicagoFIRST as a model
• GAO Report on Financial Market Preparedness
  praises ChicagoFIRST
• Treasury handbook identifies ChicagoFIRST as
  model
• Tabletop on citys response to Chicago financial
  community

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2005 Milestones

• Tabletop focused on futures and options markets
• Public television features ChicagoFIRST
• Fund Illinois Terrorism Task Force (ITTF) video
  for the citizens of Illinois
• Co-chair Private Sector Committee of the ITTF

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2006 Activities

• Mutual aid among the members
• Credentialing critical supplies like cash
• Evacuation drill
• City of Chicago camera program
• Provided testimony on pandemic preparedness to
  the House Financial Services Committee

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ChicagoFIRST Model Works

• The model is the partnership approach, not the
  goals or organization of ChicagoFIRST
• FloridaFIRST covers the entire state, with
  several regions
• BARC FIRST and SoCal FIRC split California
• MN-ISAC has Target, Best Buy, 3M as members
• Leverage partnership to encourage public sector
  information sharing and improvements
• Seats in EOCs
• Credentialing
• Access protocols for critical supplies

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The Value Proposition

• LaSalle Bank fire
• Mizuho futures
• Cooperation vs. competition on employee safety
  and business continuity (mutual aid established
  after the fire)
• Government appreciates single point of contact
• NC4 and TeleContinuity

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Contact Information

• Brian Tishuk
• Executive Director
• ChicagoFIRST
• 312-322-4441
• brian.tishuk_at_chicagofirst.org
• www.chicagofirst.org