POINT LISAS PORT AND INDUSTRIAL ESTATE DISASTER RESPONSE AMMONIA SPILL

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POINT LISAS PORT AND INDUSTRIAL ESTATE
DISASTER RESPONSE AMMONIA SPILL
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Ammonia Inhalation

• Immediate specialist medical attention required
• Short Term Exposure Limit is 35 ppm for ten (10)
  minutes
• 500 ppm immediately dangerous to life and health
• Severe chemical burns (mucus membrane,
  respiratory tract etc..) may be life threatening
  if not treated correctly in a timely manner

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RESPONSIBILITIES

• Port Manager
• Initiates response Management of incident

• Alternate incident commander
• OC Marine

• Alternate Safety Officer
• Security Manager

• Safety Officer
• Emergency response
• Initiate relevant safety resources
• Formulate rescue teams

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RESPONSIBILITIES

• Officer in Charge, Marine
• All radio communications

• Security Manager
• Traffic Management
• Security

• Assistant Port Manager
• Evacuation of all Personnel
• Coordination of all vehicles for response effort

• Senior Customs Officer
• Assigned statutory functions

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ORGANISATION CHART EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM
PLIPDECO PORT
Public Relations
Media
TTEMAS
Other Agencies
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The ScenarioAmmonia Release - Savonetta Pier I

• Date 28 June 1996
• Time 1000 hours
• Location Loading Terminal
• Activity Loading of an Ammonia Tanker
• Incident Release of high concentration of
  Ammonia

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Ammonia Release - SP I

• Cause
• Malfunction of the loading arm end (coupling)
• Loading Rate 1,000 tonnes per hour
• Duration of Release 5 minutes
• Quantity Released 85 tonnes
• Wind direction speed West to East at 10 mph
• Areas Affected
• Port Estate (Plants include TTMC, Arcadian,
  Shell Lubricants), portion of California
  (residents south of Gilbert Park)

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Ammonia Release - SP I

• Population at risk 955
• Port - 230
• Arcadian - 180
• Shell Lubricants - 25
• TTMC II - 40
• LCL /CES - 55
• California Govt School - 350
• California Residents - 75

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Ammonia Release - SP I

• 1000 Loading arm uncoupled
• 100005 Operator at SP I, Visual
  observation of incident, Calibrator
  Alarms at Control Rm
• 100030 Operator, Control Room SP I, sounds
  alarm button at Port, Incident Commander
  alerted
• 100045 Control Room monitors alerts
  Operator at Plant, simultaneously initiating
  TTEMAS Grid

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Ammonia Release - SP I

• 1001 Informs Ammonia Operator by hand radio,
  Port Incident Commander activates Emergency
  Response Team
• 1004 Valve shut off at source
• 1005 Lines free of NH3

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Ammonia Release - SP I

• Control Room Operator observes 3 employees on
  pier overcome by Ammonia inhalation
• Ammonia observed to be travelling over Port
  heading eastwards
• Observations relayed to Incident Commander (Port
  Manager)
• Casualties taken to first stage triage point
• First Aiders report to triage area
• All available vehicles report to triage area

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Ammonia Release - Communication

• TTEMAS Communication Grid initiated by Operators
  radio call to NGC channel
• Fire Services
• Police
• NEMA
• Hospitals
• PLIPDECO Senior Management
• Key personnel at Estate Plants
• Couva Regional Council
• ALL MEDIA RELEASES VIA OFFICE OF PLIPDECO PRO

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Evacuation Land Sea

• 1004 Land Evacuation of Port commences
  supervised by Evacuation Coordinator
• 1004 Sea Evacuation commences supervised by
  Senior Tug Engineer
• 1004 Evacuation/safety plans of individual
  companies commences (Arcadian, Shell, TTMC II,
  CES/LCL)
• Emergency Traffic Management/Control Plan
• Community evacuation plan by Regional Corporation
• 1013 Complete evacuation of Port and affected
  areas on Point Lisas Estate

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Estate Emergency Resources

• Six (6) Ambulances owned and operated by Tenants
• Four (4) Tugs (2 fire fighting)
• Six (6) Fire Tenders
• Six (6) pickups, 2 maxis (37 person capacity)
• Medical Services
• Four (4) First Aid Stations
• Two (2) On Call Doctors
• Four (4) Nurses
• Two (2) Paramedics
• Forty (40) First Aiders

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Report on Incident

• Failure of loading arm equipment
• 3 persons died instantly at SP I
• 12 critically injured, 5 died while awaiting
  treatment
• Severe traffic congestion and accidents
• Community not fully evacuated

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Assessment

• Communication
• no clear warning communicated to residents
• visitors did not know how to respond to
  sirens/alarms
• Emergency Response (Medical)
• inadequate personal protective equipment
• response time for medical attention inadequate
• inadequate specialized medical personnel
• inadequate triage equipment and facilities

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Assessment

• Emergency Response (Protective Services)
• Inadequate training equipment to handle
  industrial emergencies
• Evacuation
• Community not evacuated in a timely manner
• inadequate resources training to evacuate
  community
• Traffic Management
• Congestion at BC Roundabout affecting emergency
  personnel required on the Estate, as well as
  persons evacuated

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Health Facility Response Comparison
10 mins
25 mins
55 mins
35 mins
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Recommendations

• Communication installation of sirens and public
  address warning system for community
• Develop testing of emergency plan with
  Community involvement
• Public education for communities on emergency
  response evacuation procedures
• Need for Off-site Emergency Command Centre
• A Twenty Four (24) Hour Medical Facility
  Providing General Emergency Care Services to
  Victims of Industrial Accidents

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Recommendations

• Fire station built and fully equipped to handle
  industrial incidents
• Highly specialized HAZMAT Team available to
  handle industrial incidents
• Adequate personnel protective equipment for
  employees
• Preventive maintenance plan for equipment
• Safety Orientation for visitors to Estate and
  Port
• Restrict access to Estate

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Recommendations

• Emergency traffic management/control plan
  (removal of all traffic flow impediments BC
  Roundabout and island on SMR)
• Periodic testing of Emergency Plans for Estate
  and individual Plant