Anti-Corruption Reforms: Lessons Learned from Africa by Sahr Kpundeh Flagship Course on Governance and Anti-Corruption December 1-3, 2003

1
Anti-Corruption Reforms Lessons Learned

from AfricabySahr
KpundehFlagship Course on Governance and
Anti-CorruptionDecember 1-3, 2003
2
Overview of Presentation

• Introduction
• Main Arguments
• FrameworkProcess vs. Structural Interventions
• Arrangements for Combating Corruption
• Dedicated Institutions
• Four Scenarios of Anti-Corruption Interventions
• Conclusions

3
Introduction

• Africas development discourse reshaped from
  narrow focus on technical dimensions of economic
  policy to notions of good governance
• Shift traced to wave of democratization in early
  1990s
• World Bank President speech on the cancer of
  corruption in October 1996 an important moment
  in the process
• Six years later, data show no systematic
  evidence of decline in corruption between 1996
  and 2002.

4
Contd.

• Some suggest the single most evident consequence
  of the attention to corruption has been a
  resurgence of cynicism among African citizens
• Key question then is was the emphasis on
  fighting corruption misplaced?, or was the
  potentially fatal character of the disease
  correctly diagnosed, only to subsequently
  discover that it has turned out to be incurable?

5
Central Arguments

• Shining the spotlight on corruption was not
  mistaken, nor is the challenge hopeless.
• The error was in presuming that the cure lay in
  narrowly targeted anti-corruption data-collection
  and awareness raising campaigns.
• The crucial lesson over the past six years has
  been that the roots of corruption lie in
  dysfunctional state institutions.

6
Contd.

• Anti-corruption campaigns are not a substitute
  for the difficult task of public sector reform
  and capacity building.
• An emphasis on fighting corruption can play a
  valuable role as part of a virtuous spiral of
  mutually-reinforcing process and structural
  interventions.
• In practice though, little has been done across
  the continent to encourage linkages between
  process and institutional interventions.
• The failure to recognize the benefits of a
  two-pronged reform approach has impeded the
  ability to build a legitimate, credible and
  institutionalized effort to address corruption
  and ultimately sustain change.

7
Process Interventions and Structural Change A
Framework

• Process Interventions inform and educate the
  citizenry about the impact of corruption and are
  often the first steps in changing a culture of
  corruption and weak service delivery.
• Some examples may include moralization campaigns,
  local or citizen efforts to pressure public
  officials to use public resources for civic not
  private purposesprocess of changing the way
  governments act in decision makingsome of such
  decisions may have to address structural issues.

8
Limitations of Process Interventions

• As is increasingly being recognized, the
  disabling weakness of an exclusive reliance on
  process interventions to combat corruption is
  that it presupposes that exhortation and moral
  suasion will be sufficient to transform the
  behavior of both public officials and citizens.
• Some are quick fix measures or moralizing
  campaigns that fail to focus on
  institutionalizing structural reforms or
  establish durable and lasting legitimate
  political processes.
• The effectiveness of efforts to combat
  corruption depends at least as much on the
  quality of the core public institutions and
  processes.

9
Arrangements for combating corruption
Prevention
Detection Enforcement
10
Arrangements for Combating Corruption

• The table distinguishes between the three central
  elements of the fight against corruption
  prevention, detection, and enforcement. As the
  first row of the table highlights, core public
  institutions play a central role in all three.
• Corruption prevention is advanced through
  institutionally structured check and balance
  arrangements, supported by transparency.
• Corruption detection is advanced through
  governance structures which oversee how public
  resources are used, combined with policing and
  prosecutorial services which investigate criminal
  activity.
• Anti-corruption enforcement is the responsibility
  of the justice system.

11
Contd.

• The second row of the table summarizes how
  dedicated anti-corruption agencies engage each of
  these efforts. I will argue later that if the
  core public institutions are in place, these
  dedicated agencies can add value on the margin
  buttressing prevention by intensifying public
  awareness, and strengthening detection by adding
  to the supply of specialist anti-corruption
  investigatory capabilities.
• The more difficult question posed by table 2 is
  what is the value of these dedicated agencies if
  the core public institutions are underdeveloped?

12
Three Possible Responses

• One possible answer could be that these agencies
  add no value because they lack any impartial and
  credible means of enforcement and indeed might
  be of negative value because they detract from
  the need for systemic reforms.
• Alternatively, anti-corruption agencies might be
  argued to add value as a stopgap, an interim
  measure enabling a newly-empowered political
  leadership that genuinely is committed to stamp
  out corruption to demonstrate some results in the
  short-term, even as it embarks on the long-run
  process of institutional reform.
• A third answer derives from considering the
  interaction between process and structural
  interventions from a more dynamic perspective.

13
Virtuous Spiral vs. Burn-Out Populism
Structural Institutions
Goal of process intervention is participatory
structural reforms
Structures empower participation
Process Interventions
14
Linking Process and Structural Interventions

• Viewed in this way, dedicated anti-corruption
  programs emerge as part of a sequence of change
  in which process interventions are linked with
  structural change in a virtuous cycle a means to
  educate and move changes forward, with increased
  participation generating pressure for structural
  interventions which improve public performance.
• In other words, how do we make sure there is
  pay-off to participation? Corruption is not a
  marginal issue, and if it is going to be taken
  seriously, marginal institutions cannot just be
  created. I submit that our thinking should be
  shaped by how we approach the structure/process
  interactions.

15
Contd.

• Put differently, political leaders committed to
  building state capacity over the long-term, might
  nonetheless choose to embark on complementary
  process reforms.
• The regime leader may be committed to
  anticorruption but may lack the leverage and
  power to implement change because of clientelism,
  patronage politics, and the active opposition of
  political elites who want and need to maintain
  the status quo.

16
Contd.

• In such settings, process interventions can be
  useful to push and shake the dynamics within the
  public sector by raising civic awareness about
  the damaging effects of corruption in society, as
  well as highlighting the benefits of good
  governance and improved service delivery, and
  consequently empowerment of citizenry and local
  government.
• Such interventions can be seen as foundations or
  entry points for structural reforms, because they
  engender participatory governance that raises
  awareness about mis-governance in societies, and
  hence helps accelerate momentum for change.
• This is all about expectations citizens have
  about their governments, and how they can
  influence their governments as well. As
  democratization takes root in Africa, we are
  beginning to see how people change their
  expectations of government and look for avenues
  to get their voices heard.

17
Impact of Dedicated A-C Institutions

• Several African countries have developed
  anticorruption agencies as the central platform
  for controlling administrative corruption. While
  a few have produced significant and sustained
  reductions in corruption, most have mixed records
  of success.
• Since many have adopted the specific elements
  proven effective in Hong Kong, Singapore and
  Australia, it is worth asking why these
  anticorruption reform efforts in Africa have been
  unable to replicate their successes.

18
Analysis of A-C Agencies

• I would like to consider this issue through the
  lens of the framework shown earlier by
• exploring first, the extent to which the modest
  record of Africas anti-corruptions programs can
  be linked to weaknesses in complementary core
  state institutions, and
• second, the extent to which these programs have
  played a positive catalytic role in the dynamic
  sequence highlighted earlier.
• But before turning to these issues it is helpful
  to set the stage by looking more closely at the
  key characteristics of some successful agencies
  outside of Africa.

19
Characteristics

• Five characteristics are highlighted using
  illustrations from agencies outside of Africa, as
  benchmarks for assessing their African
  counterparts.
• First, independence is fundamental.
• Second, they are well financed operations and
  have budget predictability.
• Third, key complementary institutions work
  relatively wellworkable justice systems, courts,
  police, etc.
• Fourth, the media plays a critical role in
  raising awareness of the citizenry as well as
  reporting fairly and objectively.
• Fifth, effective anti-corruption agencies are
  themselves accountable for performance (with
  checks and balances to ensure that independence
  is not compromised) -- the process of so-called
  guarding the guardians.

20
Some Features of Anti-Corruption Agencies in
Africa
Country Independence Budget Predictability Workable Core Institutions Free Media Accountability Power of Prosecution
Botswana --- No
Uganda --- xx --- --- Yes
Zambia --- xx--- --- xx --- No
Tanzania --- --- --- --- --- No
Sierra Leone xx xx xx --- No
Malawi --- --- --- --- --- No
Kenya xx --- xx xx xx No
Strong --- Fair xx Weak
21
Four Scenarios of African cases

• Anti-corruption agency as a compliment to state
  institutions.
• Anti-corruption agency as phony populism.
• Anti-corruption agency as a useful short-term
  substitute when state institutions are weak.
• Structure-process cumulative change.

22
Scenario 1

• Compliment to state institutions, e.g. Botswana
• IndependenceIts statute specify that it is an
  independent agency that provides community
  outreach programs to public and private sectors
  on the costs of corruption.
• Core state institutions---they work relatively
  well checks and balances in the system official
  cooperation mandated the DCEC has been
  relatively successful in dealing with cases of
  corruption, most of which have been brought
  before the courts and resulted in prosecutions
  and sentences.
• Budget Predictability ---The total budgetary
  provision for the financial year 2000/2001 was
  approx. U.S.2.4m, as against U.S. 2.2m for the
  previous year an increase in their budget
  civil servants are well paid including DCEC
  officials, in comparative terms to public sector
  employees.
• Media Free media that contributes to awareness
  raising and reports objectively
• Accountability-- strong emphasis on horizontal
  and vertical accountability.

23
Scenario 2

• Phony populism----Sierra Leone and Malawi
• --Sierra Leone
• IndependenceSome operational independence Act
  states it cannot be subject to the control of any
  person or authority
• Core Institutionsvery weak judiciary,
  enforcement agencies compromised, general
  disregard for accountability mechanisms (numerous
  examples of corrupt police, judges officials in
  key government positions) Parliament
  insignificant as an oversight body
• Budget predictabilitykey support from DFID, and
  some from SLG 2002 budget was US.6.5m, a
  decrease from US8.5 in 2001
• Accountability submits annual reports to the
  President requires consent from AG to prosecute
  Advisory Committee appointed by the President
  assists the Commission in performance of their
  dutiesadvise on appointments, discipline, etc.
• Mediarelatively weak, sensationalism and lack of
  professional techniques to do good investigative
  journalism law discourages free flow of
  information to the public.

24
Contrast

• When the Sierra Leone and Malawi cases are
  contrasted with the Botswana case, one can argue
  the following
• the lack of supportive institutional state
  structures in both Sierra Leone and Malawi such
  as the judiciary, parliaments, and other
  democratic accountability mechanisms, coupled
  with the general lack of effective leadership and
  commitment to leverage change in the
  anti-corruption fight resulted in the
  anti-corruption agencies been used as populist
  measures to appease donors.
• Operational constraints demonstrate they are
  meant to be token efforts or their establishment
  are populist moves by the politicians to give the
  impression they are taking steps to improve
  governance and address corruption.

25
Scenario 3

• Effective short-term substitutes----Uganda,
  Zambia, Tanzania
• Uganda
• Independence-- 1995 constitution established the
  IGGs independence
• Accountability reports to Parliament and
  required to submit regular reports.
• Complimentary Institutionsrelatively weak
  judiciary police and other accountability
  institutions are plagued with allegations of
  going after small fry other institutions play a
  roleAuditor General, DPP, etc. Ethics and
  Integrity Directorate established to coordinate
  A-C efforts
• Mediarelatively free and plays a role in
  sensitization against corruption. Access to key
  information is limited, e.g. reports from
  Commissions of inquiry
• Budget predictabilitypoor funding for IGG
  concern that some A-C efforts are duplicated by
  other bodies leading to resource dissipation.

26
Uganda Contd.

• The Uganda case demonstrates the need to have an
  institutional framework in place that complements
  each other in the fight against corruption.
• However, despite the plethora of institutions,
  there has not been much success because the core
  institutions are relatively weak
• Anti-corruption interventions led by the IGG are
  used as a stop-gap measure to raise awareness
  about the ills of corruption while much still
  needs to be done in the areas of detection and
  enforcement.
• There are perennial problems with the proc.
  systems, weak FM, cases of diversion of budgetary
  funds, poor audit coverage, etc.
• There is some evidence of selective impunity
  ranging from cases involving the former VP,
  cabinet ministers censured by Parliament for
  wrongdoing, but later given positions in either
  the Movement or retained as ministers with no
  attempts made to recover allegedly stolen funds.
  

27
Uganda Contd.

• On the bright side, within the Govt.s Strategy
  and Plan of Action to fight corruption, several
  positive steps have been taken to strengthen the
  core institutions, for e.g.
• the legal framework and the capacity of law
  enforcement have been strengthened with the
  enactment and application of the Leadership Code
  2000
• Enactment and application of the IGG Bill 2000
• Enactment and application of the revised Local
  Government Act
• Auditor Generals Act has been revised and
  strengthened
• Case management by DPP has been computerized.
• A new set of Public Finance Procurement
  Regulations (PFPR) has been approved and in use
• A reformed Central Tender Board has commenced
  operation, and Procurement Units have being
  established in all procuring organs of government
• A pay reform proposal is been considered by
  cabinet.

28
Zambia (1)

• The Anti-Corruption Commission in Zambia shares
  similar features with the Uganda and Tanzania
  cases.
• Unlike Uganda and Tanzania where there was
  alleged political support, the Commission under
  former President Chiluba was considered to be his
  tool, with regular interference from politicians
  and relegating its focus only on petty
  corruption.
• The level of investigations and prosecutions were
  comparatively low resources were insufficient
  and there was serious staff shortage.
• The institutional framework was weak--Commission
  has to get the consent of the DPP before
  prosecuting a case he can refuse to give consent
  for prosecution without citing reasons.
• There has been a general lack of predictability
  of the Commissions budget over the years. From
  1998 2000, the Commissions budget was reduced
  from approximately US3.5m to US2.9m. The
  Executive always drastically reduced its proposed
  budget and even the little money allocated in the
  budget is not released in full.
• The picture above makes the case for Zambia to
  belong under the category of phony populism,
  where it I believe it was under former President
  Chiluba.  

29
Zambia (2)

• Under the current President, the Commission has
  received a much higher profile, because he has
  used his leadership to leverage change in the
  fight against corruption with a policy of zero
  tolerance for corruption immediately after
  elections.
• He dismissed or demoted a number of senior govt.
  officials associated with corruption under the
  previous and his own govt. including his former
  VP, the AG, Minister of Information, the Foreign
  Minister, and the Permanent Secretary of the
  Ministry of Finance.
• The budget of the ACC was increased significantly
  and its facilities were upgraded.
• Complementary institutions such as the DPP and
  the judiciary also responded to these signals by
  moving aggressively on corruption cases, putting
  close allies of former President Chiluba under
  investigation.

30
Analysis of Cases

• The cases show three different roles of A-C
  agenciesbut the important question then becomes
  under what conditions do ACC contribute to
  building momentum against corruption or becoming
  phony populist moves to generally appease donors
  or domestic critics?
• One possible answer may be when there is strong
  leadership that uses their power to leverage
  change--regular political pronouncements coupled
  with their support for strengthening the capacity
  of institutional mechanisms.
• Alternatively, in situations where the A-C
  efforts are used to stir up activism that leads
  to burn out, the leadership, as in Sierra Leone
  and Malawi lacks the political clout to leverage
  change primarily because of the nature of the
  political dynamics as well as the immaturity of
  the existing democratic accountability
  mechanisms--crony politics, nepotism, patronage
  politics, and the presence of an elite group who
  may want to maintain the status quo.

31
Scenario 4Cumulative Change

• Structure-process cumulative change 3 phases
• First Phase--1991 donor coordinated action paved
  the way for 1992 multi-party general elections
• Second phase--was Dream Team phase (1997-2000)
• -- civil society mobilization, media, TI-Kenya
  (building pressure)
• --Parliamentary Select Committee (List of Shame
  Report) APNAC making sure corruption issue
  stayed on agenda and picked up by donors 24
  committed members last year, 12 got re-elected t
  the house and 8 are in cabinet
• Third Phase 2002 election phase
• -- electoral change (inquiries on past major
  corruption, e.g. Goldenberg)
• -- legal FrameworkEconomic Crimes Bill, Ethics
  and Code of Conduct Bill (declaration of assets)
  new Ministry of Justice and Constitutional
  Affairs new KACC with prosecutorial powers
• -- public sector reformscapacity building to
  strengthen accountability and complimentary
  institutions--supporting capacity building in the
  Ministry of Finance that will lead to
  improvements in expenditure management and
  accountability systems auditing is being
  introduced in the Internal Audit Department,
  IFMIS is being implemented that will lead to
  better budget execution and accountability.
• An example of how cynicism and regime change can
  highlight the hazards of anti-corruption as an
  entry point for reform, emphasizing the
  structure-process cumulative change example.

32
Several Conclusions

• The experiences of African anti-corruption
  agencies suggest that the state in these
  countries either lack the know-how or the
  political will to control corruption.
• The ineffectiveness that characterizes
  anticorruption institutions are artificial
  political problems created deliberately as
  instruments of political management whose
  intentions are twofold one, to ensure
  structurally ineffective reform agencies and
  two, to openly demonstrate to donors that the
  government has taken action.

33
Contd.

• A glass half-empty view on the impact of anti
  corruption activities in Africa in the 1990s a
  pessimistic perspective--the 1990s seen to have
  begun with a wave of popular revulsion against
  corruption and mis-governance, culminating in the
  emergence in many countries of new political
  leaders who asserted their readiness for a new,
  clean beginning.
• A glass-half-full angle of vision highlights
  the dynamic, cumulative nature of the governance
  change process. The clamor against corruption was
  a first necessary step which transformed the
  development discourse across the continent
  extravagant efforts at self-enrichment could no
  longer hide behind soothing, empty affirmations
  of selfless commitment to national development.

34
Contd.

• Certainly, the initial expectation was naive that
  the problem would be solved merely by exposing
  corruption and campaigning against it, even to
  the point of committing to zero tolerance. But
  the emerging lesson that a reduction against
  corruption depends upon stronger core state
  institutions is an important one.
• The above discussions highlights both the risk
  and the opportunity of bringing the fight against
  corruption to the top of the development
  discourse.
• The risk is that an exclusive reliance on process
  interventions can lead to burn out populism
  and apathy.
• The opportunity is that, if used skillfully by
  political leaders, a commitment to fight
  corruption can unleash the civic energy needed
  for sustained institutional change.

35
QA and Discussion