Regulatory Plant Pathology

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Regulatory Plant Pathology
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Federal Statutory Authority for Regulation of
Plant Pests Plant Quarantine Act of
1912 enacted after dual disasters white pine
blister rust ca. 1905 chestnut blight ca.
1906 Quarantine 1 restricted importation of 5
needle pine Additional quarantines imposed on
importation of Ribes spp. Plant Protection Act
of 2000 Supersedes and repeals most of Plant
Quarantine Act
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Federal Regulation
Plant Protection Act of 2000
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International Regulation
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC)
is an international treaty whose purpose is to
secure a common and effective action to prevent
the spread and introduction of pests of plants
and plant products, and to promote appropriate
measures for their control. Administered under
UN FAO 1. Adopt international phytosanitary
standards 2. Harmonize international
phytosanitary regulations 3. Transparency, ie
phytosanitary regulations are not used as trade
barriers
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IPPO
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State Regulation
Plant Pest Regulatory Agencies State Departments
of Agriculture, Natural Resources, Plant Industry
etc Interstate Coordination National Plant
Board Regional and National Organization of State
Plant Regulatory Agencies
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PURPOSE Purposes of the National Plant Board as
stated in its constitution include 1. To
represent the regional plant boards at the
national level and to carry out instructions
issued by the regional plant boards. 2. To bring
out greater uniformity and efficiency in the
promulgation and enforcement of plant quarantines
and plant inspection polices and practices in the
various states. 3. To act as a national
clearing-house for information in plant
quarantines and plant inspection polices and
procedures. 4. To promote harmony and uniformity
in the field of plant pest regulation. 5. To
maintain contacts with the United States
Department of Agriculture and other federal and
state agencies concerning quarantine policies
that have national, regional or individual state
effects.
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Eastern Filbert Blight Quarantine 1921 H. P.
Barss of OSU, former Botany and Plant Pathology
Chair argued before the western plant board for
a quarantine against movement of American wild
hazel (C. americana) or European hazels (filbert)
from the territory included within the natural
range of the native C. americana The disease is
evidently natural to and presumably everywhere
present on this species of wild hazel, on which
however, it is a parasite of only minor
consequence, producing only a slight twig
blight... The protection of the growing
filbert industry of the Pacific coast has to
depend, therefore, upon the effective enforcement
of the exisitng regulations which prohibit the
importation of plants, cuttings, or other
propagative material of either the American wild
hazel or the cultivated filbert from the
territory included within the range of Corylus
americana.
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Perspectives

• State regulators
• Oregon Department of Agriculture
• Other State Ag Departments
• Federal regulators
• USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
  (APHIS)
• Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ)
• Home Land Security
• Customs and Border Protection

Pitch Canker in Monterey, CA
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Purpose

• Protect US agricultural and horticultural
  products and US natural resources
• Enhance or maintain the value of US agricultural
  and horticultural products

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Protection

• State Level
• Quarantines
• Control area orders
• Administrative directives
• Federal Level
• Quarantines
• Management Plans

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State quarantine

• Controls the import export of plants to prevent
  the spread of pests to Oregon
• Applies to pests exotic to Oregon
• Done at the request of industry or other agency
  (Regional or National Plant Board)
• Prevent spread from state to state /or county to
  county
• Does not apply to other countries

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When is a state quarantine written?
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Identifying a quarantine pest
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Control area order

• Applies to diseases already established in Oregon
• Imposed to limit /or slows the spread of the
  disease
• Done at the request of industry
• Requires inspection by ODA

Dwarf Mistletoe on Monterey Pine
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Administrative directive

• For a specific farm or area
• Dictates how a specific crop or host can be
• Grown on that farm or in that area
• Requires a specific treatment on that farm or in
  that area
• Used in situations that do not warrant a
  quarantine or CAO
• Can be used in support of an eradication effort
• Requires inspection by ODA

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State quarantine

• Sudden oak death
• Caused by Phytophthora ramorum
• First reported in Europe in 1993, CA in 1995, OR
  in 2001
• Attacks gt22 hosts in 12 plant families
• Spreads via rain-splash, plant material, soil
• Origin unknown
• Affects both natural resouces and agricultural
  commodity plants

Infected tan oak
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Aerial survey discovers SOD

• Initial detection
• ODF/USFS aerial survey detects nine disease
  centers (2001)
• A total of 40 acres infected
• All within a 9 mi2 area near Brookings, OR

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Is the quarantine valid?

• Must show pest is not already present
• Surveys in 2000 did not detect P. ramorum
• ODA adopts emergency quarantine in January 2001
• Permanent quarantine adopted March 2001

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Continuing Quarantine for SOD?

• Potential responses
• Maintain quarantine
• protect against new races
• protect from further introductions
• Change quarantine to CAO
• Official control program
• Drop quarantine

Infected Douglas fir (photo by D. Rizzo)
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Oregons response in Curry County

• Oregon opted to
• Maintain quarantine
• Place infection centers under quarantine
• Attempt eradication
• Administrative directives issued
• Hosts destroyed
• Sites monitored for 2-yr

Photo by F. Arnold
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SOD in Nursery Stock

• Nursery Inspection program
• May be a regulatory incident or interception
• Interception
• Return to sender
• Destroy
• Maintain quarantine
• Incident
• Destroy
• Detective work
• Maintain quarantine

Infected Viburnum bodnantense
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Federal agencies

• USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
  PPQ
• Write federal regulations
• Controls the import export of plants to prevent
  spread of pests
• Applies to pests exotic to the U.S.
• Protects the U.S. its territories
• Regulates country-to-country and state-to-state
  movement
• Federal regulations supercede state regulations
• Management plans for established exotic pests
• Department of Homeland Security CPB
• Inspections at borders and ports of entry
• Inspects incoming shipments, international trade

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Federal quarantine

• Chrysanthemum white rust
• Caused by Puccinia horiana
• Deforms and stunts infected plants
• Teliospores can infect mums 0.25 - 0.5 mi away
• Native to China Japan
• Established in FL, EU, AUS, SAm, AFR

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Federal response to CWR

• Site placed under quarantine
• Delimitation survey
• Bury all infected host plants
• Continue to survey surrounding area for 2-yr
  after burial

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Federal quarantine for SOD

• Adopted 2/14/02
• Controls movement of host materials from
  quarantined areas
• Certification program
• Supercedes ODAs quarantine

China Camp State Park, CA
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Federal management plan

• For pests already established in US (e.g., gypsy
  moth)
• Goal is to slow spread
• Survey detection
• Control efforts in infested states
• Eradication in non-infested states

Before GM
After GM
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GM federal management plan

• Lymantria dispar
• State coordinates activities
• Survey and detection
• Trapping program
• Visual inspections
• Eradication
• Spray program (Btk)
• Monitor for 2-yr after treatment

Gypsy moth egg masses
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Protection Enhancement

• Survey detection programs
• Eradication control programs
• Certification programs

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Survey detection program

• Plum Pox Virus
• Virus certification program
• Various symptoms, reduces fruit value
• Spread by aphids, in infected plants
• Established in EU, reported in CAN Pennsylvania
• Eradication underway in U.S.

Photo courtesy of Penn State
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Imported timber inspections

• Protect Oregon timber and agricultural interests
  from exotic pests
• Monitor pathway for entry
• Untreated logs lumber
• Untreated SWPM
• Fee-based program

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Control eradication program

• Dutch elm disease
• Caused by Ophiostoma ulmi and O. novo-ulmi
• Causes tree mortality
• State quarantine supports county/city programs
• Established in five counties all states except
  AK, AZ, FL, HI, LA, NV, NM, UT, WA

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CAO to enhance value

• Rapeseed (canola) production
• Produced for food, industrial, seed markets
• Oilseed quality
• Oilseed purity
• Limit or prevent cross-pollination
• Industry/grower support required
• ODAs role is limited

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Certification programs

• Grass seed certification
• Nematodes
• Fungi
• Debris
• Endophyte certification
• Vegetable seed certification
• Mint certification
• Virus-free certification

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Grass seed certification

• Anguina agrostis (Nematode)
• Found only on Agrostis spp.
• Causes galls on flowers and is a vector for
  Corynebacterium (Rathayibacter) rathyi (bacterial
  head blight of orchardgrass)
• Seed-borne
• Found in GER, UK, AUS, NZ, Scandinavia, US, CAN,
  and RUS
• International quarantines for this pest

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Mint certification

• Verticillium on mint
• CAO is for any Verticillium spp.
• Causes stunting, twisting curling of upper
  leaves, eventually death
• Issue phytosanitary certificates for clean
  plants
• Inspect plants not eligible for OSU certification
  

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P. ramorum certification program?

• Must meet federal requirements
• For nursery and Xmas tree plantations
• Visual surveys
• Laboratory testing
• Direct plating
• PCR
• For timber situations
• Visual survey

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Regulatory Plant Pathology

• Protection
• Federal quarantines
• State quarantines
• Control area orders
• Administrative directives
• Protect Enhance
• Survey Detection
• Control eradication
• Certification

Sudden oak death, Kent Lake, CA (photo by S.
Frankel)
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• Problems with Regulatory Pathology as Currently
  Practiced
• 1. Reliance on species lists of identified pests
• 2. Emphasis on systems approach in risk
  mitigation assumes combinations of partially
  effective risk reduction measures are additive
• 3. Reliance on exporters for compliance
• Reliance on inspections to detect noncompliance
• Border protection emphasizes bioterroism, not
  biosecurity
• 5. Conflicting mission protect agriculture and
  natural resouces and facilitate commerce
• 6. Reluctance to impose penalties other than
  loss of commodity
• 7. It has not worked very well, has it?
• 8. Based on sound science?

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The Net Leaks
USDA RECALLS INDIAN PINE CONES WASHINGTON, Dec.
19, 2003--The U.S. Department of Agricultures
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service is
announcing a national recall on pine cones
originating in India. Recent imports of these
pine cones have been found to contain serious
quarantine pests warranting the removal of these
items from store shelves. The infested pine
cones have been found in Franks Nursery, K-mart,
Target, Walmart, JoAnn Fabrics, Lowes, Dollar
Tree and Safeway stores nationwide. The recall
applies to items with the following UPC codes
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Plant Diseases that have been spread by movement
of plant material Pathogens White pine blister
rust Chestnut blight Dutch elm disease Dogwood
anthracnose Pitch Canker Port Orford cedar root
disease Sudden oak death Other pests Asian
gypsy moth Asian longhorn beetle Citrus
longhorn beetle Emerald ash borer Sirex noctilio
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Some recent detections
Sirex noctilio and Amylosterum areolatum
New York Feb 2005 Indiana, July 2002
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Sirex damage to Monterey Pine
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Amylostereum basidiocarp
Mycangia of Sirex noctilio
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Preventing Exotic Pathogen Threats to Forests - A
Sideways Scientific Look Clive Brasier We have a
prevention system that is Systematic
International Well regulated and policed
Nonetheless, Sudden Oak Death is just another
symptom of a historical problem Although the
current system of prevention is often excellently
and expertly carried out by regulatory agencies
- The system cannot succeed, because it is not
yet properly science based.
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- The system cannot succeed, because it is not
yet properly science based.
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Biological weaknesses List dependent.
Essentially a list system derived from 'Noahs
ark' and from Linnaean systematics and routinely
based on the morphospecies (pathogen looks like x
- therefore it is x), not the species and
genotypes of modern population biology. Leaves
both legal and identification loopholes.
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C.M. Brasier 2001Biosicence 51123-133
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Non Darwinian. Not yet caught up with 1850s
science. Evolutionary theory warns us that the
greatest threat is from organisms that have
evolved in 'other' biogeographical zones, but
have not yet escaped and so are still 'waiting'
to cause serious damage on new hosts. These
threats need to be anticipated.
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What else is out there?
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Brasier et al 2004. Mycological Research108
1172-1184
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15-Mayo- 2007
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Another new Phytophthora disease?
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Reactive not proactive. The present schedules,
however, tend to cover mainly those pathogens
that have already escaped outside their original
evolutionary zone and are already causing
noticeable damage on new (non co-evolved) hosts
as they spread (DED, Chestnut blight, Pinewood
nematode, Plane wilt, Cypress canker, Dogwood
anthracnose...).
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Structural rigidity. Present system, being
largely list, not process, driven may lack the
flexibility to embrace major new risk processes
related to or even arising directly from it,
including Trojan horse syndrome Fungistatic
compounds widely used by plant trade temporarily
mask disease symptoms on exported stock. Promotes
effective spread of exotic pathogens (SOD?
Includes many exotic Phytophthoras). Typhoid
Mary syndrome Non-host carriers. Organisms
threatening to forests are exported on apparently
innocuous plant 'carriers'. (cf Rhododendrons and
SOD). A classic Darwinian scenario (no evolved
resistance in the threatened tree hosts)
Hybridisation syndrome Rapid evolution of new
hybrid pathogens and new diseases is promoted by
the present trade structure. These hybrids are
neither detected, nor properly covered by the
current system.
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Market forces and policy Weakest link. Within
multi-state ecopoltical units such as the EU, the
system may operate at the level of weakest state,
which promotes risk. This is the very antithesis
of how living organisms evolved to restrict the
spread of diseases via multiple compartments or
'fire walls' ie it is a non-Darwinian structure.
Non-Keynesian. System not 'responsible
economics' based. Lacks central environmental
Keynesian principle that 'polluter pay'.
Therefore- no feedback loop on the economic or
the regulatory system. Institutionalisation. A
lack of market pressure in favour of progressive
and sustainable bioprotection policy can allow
markets and regulators to become entrenched and
conservative. Become part of the problem, not
part of the solution? (Fisheries protection
issues come to mind) Nelsonian approach. A
consequence of defensiveness from regulators over
unspoken weaknesses of a system can be resistance
to policy changes and to strategic thinking. And
resistance to funding of research that could
further expose the weaknesses. Better - inaction
or avoidance "I see no risks..."
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Diagnosis A scientific health check indicates
the present prevention system itself is a
threat. Treatment? Evolutionary biology - 1850s
science - argues that the present system needs to
be better balanced and in parts reversed
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More science process led. Both economics and
bioscience. Proactive approach. Identify and
test the risk levels of pathogens in their
centres of origin before they escape. Modern
technology and infrastructure can allow us to do
this. Needs international Rio-style agreements.
Fully apply precautionary principle.
Significantly reduce the risk from plant imports
by Regulating plant introductions like animal
introductions Importing only meristem cultures
or seed Encouraging local propagation of forest
trees, shrubs and ornamentals Update Noah.
Routinely apply risk protocols to pathogen
genotypes, varieties and unnamed taxa as well as
to morphospecies.
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"Liberté, egalité..." Develop regular and
periodic policy review systems science based,
open to changes in scientific knowledge,
responsive to informed criticism, open to public
debate.
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Effective intelligence and scientific insight are
our first line of defence. Globally and locally
correct regulatory protocols, based on these
insights, are our second.
Clive Brasier Emeritus Mycologist, Forest
Research Agency, Farnham, Surrey GU10 4LH, UK
clive.brasier_at_forestry.gsi.gov.uk