Weaponizing Space: Technologies and Policy Choices

1
Weaponizing Space Technologies and Policy
Choices
Disclaimer The views expressed herein are
solely the views of the author and not of her
employer, the Northrop Grumman Corporation, the
RAND Corporation, or of the U.S. Government.

• Dana J. Johnson, Ph.D.
• Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University
• 20 April 2005

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Agenda

• Characterizing the space weaponization debate
• National space policy and the importance of space
  to the U.S.
• Space Control and Force Application missions
• Decision-making rationale and factors for space
  weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others
• Policy choices and conclusions

3
Characterizing the Space Weaponization Debate

• Pro Arguments
• Just as other environments are used for offensive
  military purposes, so will the environment of
  space be used
• Emerging threats to our national interests and
  assured access to space require we develop and
  maintain capabilities to protect our space assets
• The U.S. economy and way of life depend on space
  systems
• The space weaponization debate is a red-herring.
  Space was weaponized long ago by the transit of
  ballistic missiles
• Con Arguments
• Space should remain a sanctuary for peaceful
  scientific uses
• Space weaponization is
• Not inevitable and international agreements
  barring weaponization are possible and desirable
• Pre-mature and the sanctuary status of space is
  in the interests of the United States
• Use of space weapons would create harmful orbital
  debris
• There is no conceivable scenario in which space
  weapons provide a benefit greater than their harm

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Agenda

• Characterizing the space weaponization debate
• National space policy and the importance of space
  to the U.S.
• Space Control and Force Application missions
• Decision-making rationale and factors for space
  weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others
• Policy choices and conclusions

5
National Space Policy (1996)

• The United States is committed to the exploration
  and use of outer space by all nations for
  peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all
  humanity. "Peaceful purposes" allow defense and
  intelligence-related activities in pursuit of
  national security and other goals. The United
  States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any
  nation over outer space or celestial bodies, or
  any portion thereof, and rejects any limitations
  on the fundamental right of sovereign nations to
  acquire data from space. The United States
  considers the space systems of any nation to be
  national property with the right of passage
  through and operations in space without
  interference. Purposeful interference with space
  systems shall be viewed as an infringement on
  sovereign rights.

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National Space Policy (1996) (Cont.)

• National security space activities shall
  contribute to U.S. national security by
• (a) providing support for the United States'
  inherent right of self-defense and our defense
  commitments to allies and friends
• (b) deterring, warning, and if necessary,
  defending against enemy attack
• (c) assuring that hostile forces cannot prevent
  our own use of space
• (d) countering, if necessary, space systems and
  services used for hostile purposes
• (e) enhancing operations of U.S. and allied
  forces
• (f) ensuring our ability to conduct military and
  intelligence space-related activities
• (g) satisfying military and intelligence
  requirements during peace and crisis as well as
  through all levels of conflict
• (h) supporting the activities of national policy
  makers, the intelligence community, the National
  Command Authorities, combatant commanders and the
  military services, other federal officials, and
  continuity of government operations.

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Importance of Space to the U.S.

• Contributed 100 billion to US economy in 2000
• Weather satellites improved severe weather
  predictions
• Communications point to point and broadcast
• GPS
• Navigationcommercial and civil exceed military
  applications
• Ubiquitous timing signalenables global Internet
• Environmental monitoring
• Geodesy
• Mapping
• Terrain Characterization

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Space An Economic Center of Gravity and Thus,
a Vital National Interest

• Today
• Over 600 Active Satellites (200 US Satellites)
• Over 100 Billion US Dollars Invested
• Future Forecast 20 annual growth in space
  investments
• GPS-related products 8 Billion (2001)
  projected to grow to 50 Billion by 2010

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Agenda

• Characterizing the space weaponization debate
• National space policy and the importance of space
  to the U.S.
• Space Control and Force Application missions
• Decision-making rationale and factors for space
  weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others
• Policy choices and conclusions

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Space Missions

• Space Force Support launching satellites and
  day-to-day management of on-orbit assets
• Space Force Enhancement includes all space
  operations aimed at increasing effectiveness of
  terrestrial military operations
• Space Control ensuring our use of space while
  denying the use to our adversaries
• Space Force Application combat operations in,
  through, and from space to influence the course
  and outcome of conflict

United States Strategic Command Fact File,
http//www.stratcom.mil/factsheetshtml/spacemissio
ns.htm
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Space Control
Protect
Surveil

• Detect, Identify and Track Man-made Space Objects
• Worldwide Network
• Radar
• Optical Trackers
• Infrared

• Ensure Use of Space Assets
• Enhance Survivability
• Maneuver
• Harden
• Redundancy

Negate
Prevent
Disrupt, deny, degrate, deceive or destroy
adversary space capabilities
Prevent Adversaries From Exploiting US or Allies
Space Services
GROUND SEGMENT

• Encryption
• Shutter Control

Link
SPACE SEGMENT
Assure Freedom of Action in Space and Deny Same
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Space Control ASAT Concepts
Types of Negation
ASAT Systems

• Direct Ascent (Ballistic Trajectory)
• Ground-launched
• Air-launched
• Co-orbital
• Interceptor
• Space mine
• Directed Energy Weapons
• Ground-based
• Air-based
• Space-based
• Electronic Warfare
• Ground-based
• Space-based

• Conventional explosive
• Nuclear warhead
• Pellet cloud
• Aerosols
• Hit-to-kill
• Induced fragmentation
• Component burnout
• Power disruption
• Jamming
• Takeover
• Physical tampering

Source Nicholas L. Johnson, Soviet Military
Strategy in Space, Janes, 1987, p. 138.
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Legacy ASAT Development

• Project SAINT (SAtellite INTerceptor)
  (1950s-1962)
• Early Spring conventional ASAT, Polaris launch
  (1960s)
• Program 505 prototype Nike Zeus DM-15S ABM
  (1962-1966)
• Program 437 Thor launch, Mk 49 nuclear warhead
  (1964)
• Program 922 Thor IRBM launch, non-nuclear
  suborbital ASAT in development (late 1960s)
• May 1972 signing of SALT I Treaty prohibited
  interference with NTM
• SPIKE suborbital conventional ASAT air-launched
  from F-106 MHV with non-nuclear kill capability
  (1970s)
• Conventional ASAT low-risk, off-the-shelf
  technology alternative using pellets (1970s)
• USB platform for space-borne weapons, crewed,
  Proton launch (late 1970s/early 1980s)
• Air-Launched Anti-Satellite Missile F-15
  launch, 2-stage MHV, successful intercept 1985
  (1977-1980s)
• Terra-3 ground-based laser, Sary Shagan
  (1970s-1980s)
• RP space-based rocket interceptor (similar to
  US Brilliant Pebbles) (1980s)

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Legacy ASAT Development (Cont.)

• Zenith Star prototype space combat satellite
  using Alpha laser (1987)
• KS space station with military free-flying
  autonomous modules dispensing nuclear warheads
  (1980s)
• Polyus combat satellite testbed using Energia
  launcher launch failure in 1987 (1985-1987)
• KE ASAT Army direct ascent kinetic energy ASAT,
  with kinetic kill vehicle launched by rocket
  booster (1989-1990s)
• Gun-launched ASAT supergun design by Gerald
  Bull for Iraq, for blinding Western satellites
  (1995)
• Star Lite space laser concept, to be launched
  on Titan 4 (1991)
• HERTF High Energy Research and Technology
  Facility, Kirtland AFB, NM, high-powered
  microwave and advanced technology weapon system
  development
• Space-Based Laser Operational SBL Orbital
  Vehicle, chemical laser system, part of SDI
  program (1996)
• Space Laser Demo concept (1996)

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Polyus (USSR)
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Space Control Protecting Space Assets

• Detect and report threat/attacks
• Identify, locate, and classify threats
• Withstand and defend
• Reconstitute and repair
• Assess missions impact

Functional Capabilities
Operational Needs

• Hardening/shielding of system components
• Developing robust battle management
• Improving system maneuverability
• Attaining adequate force protection
• Developing adequate defensive information
  operations
• Threat warning and assessment reporting
• Space weather sensor systems
• Mobile mission processors
• Diagnostics and repair technology
• Quick launch recovery
• Modeling and simulation

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Space Force Application

• Currently no weapons in Space
• DoD Space Policy (1999) tasks US military to plan
  for Force Application from space
• International law treaties prohibit weapons of
  mass destruction in space
• Conventional weapons are not prohibited

Apply Force From Space
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Space Force ApplicationInfluencing the
Terrestrial Battlespace

• Defined as
• things intended to cause harm that are based in
  space or that have an essential element based in
  space. The degree of harmmay range from
  temporary disruption to permanent destruction or
  death.
• Generic alternatives
• Space-based directed-energy and kinetic-energy
  weapons against missile targets
• Kinetic-energy weapons against ground targets
• Conventional weapons against ground targets

Preston, et. al., Space Weapons Earth Wars,
RAND, 2002, p. 23.
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Comparison of Weapon Types and Their Operational
Utility
Mass-to-Target Weapons
Directed Energy
Laser, RF, particle beam, etc.
Kinetic energy against missile targets
Kinetic energy against surface targets
Space-based conventional weapons
Soft, located from the surface to space, any speed
Hardened targets above 60 km moving at great speed
Hardened fixed or slow-moving targets on Earth
Hardened targets, either fixed or moving at
moderate speeds, surface or air
Targets
Effects
Lethal impact
Vertical, limited-depth penetrator
Inherited from conventional munitions
Range from nonlethal jamming to lethal heating
finite, inherently thin defense
Responsiveness
Seconds
A few minutes
A few hours
About 10 mins plus time it takes weapon to reach
target after delivery from space
Number of Weapons in Constellation
Several dozens for each needed to reach a
particular target in desired time
Several dozens
About 6 in reserve for each needed to reach a
particular target in desired time
About 6 in reserve for each needed to reach a
particular target in desired time
Source Preston, et. al., Space Weapons Earth
Wars, RAND, 2002.
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Agenda

• Characterizing the space weaponization debate
• National space policy and the importance of space
  to the U.S.
• Space Control and Force Application missions
• Decision-making rationale and factors for space
  weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others
• Policy choices and conclusions

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Emergence of Space Competitors?

• Currently, no peer in space to threaten U.S.
  national interests
• However, concern for developments in
• China
• Human spaceflight
• Navigation, communications, remote sensing,
  weather, oceanography, microgravity, science and
  astronomy, and microsatellites
• KE ASAT, jammers, parasite satellites,
  ground-based lasers
• Russia long-standing interests and capabilities
• Nuclear proliferation and weapons delivery
  programs in North Korea, Iran, Libya, Pakistan
• Continued transfer of ballistic missile-related
  technology by Russia and China
• Bottom line
• Technically challenging but doable
• Legal constraints on WMD do not prohibit space
  weapons
• Countermeasures are possible asymmetric
  strategies by competitors, allowing competition
  without having to become space-faring nations

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Concern for Vulnerability of U.S. Space-Based
Assets

• If U.S. is to avoid a Space Pearl Harbor it
  needs to take seriously the possibility of an
  attack on U.S. space systems
• What might be a Space Pearl Harbor?
• Lethal actions, such as
• Debilitating/destroying attack on U.S. and allied
  space assets through electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
  event staged by hostile forces in orbit
• Non-lethal actions (i.e., for a limited period of
  time, for specific objectives)
• Jamming, spoofing, blinding

Report of the Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and
Organization (January 2001)
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If the U.S. Were to Acquire Space Weapons, How
Might It Happen?

• Under what circumstances might the U.S. decide to
  acquire?
• Deliberately
• Incidentally
• Once the decision is made, how might the
  transition occur?
• Possible strategies
• Possible consequences

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Possible Circumstances Requiring Purposeful
Decision-Making

• Responding to threat(s) by undeterred adversaries
• Responding to another nations decision to
  acquire, whether adversaries or allies
• With another nation(s), to forestall, control, or
  influence their independent acquisition of space
  weapons
• Unilaterally, in absence of compelling threat, to
  demonstrate global leadership, protect U.S. and
  allied economic investments, improve efficiency
  and effectiveness of military capabilities, etc.

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Possible Circumstances Involving Incidental
Decision-Making

• Commercial or civil development of technologies
  with applicability to military purposes
• Incremental decision hedging strategy as way to
  shape security environment
• Monolithic decision and implementation reactive
  strategy to deal with emerging threat that may be
  defensive and stabilizing in nature

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Transition Period (1)

• Ideally, no consequences for U.S. deployment
• Worst case
• Adversaries take lethal action to deny U.S.
  ability to launch and deploy first space weapon
• Adversarys options are numerous
• Deterrent capability, possibly nuclear, leading
  to possible launch on warning/launch under attack
  policy
• Physical attack on launch sites
• Burying targets
• Developing/deploying silver bullets, such as
  ASATs
• Seize moral high ground against U.S. hegemony

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Transition Period (2)

• Responses by allies
• Potential political pressure
• Potential fallout in other non-space-related
  areas (e.g., foreign policy issue of great
  importance to U.S. interests)
• Adversary attempt at coercive behavior to
  influence ally
• Commercial companies reaction to possible
  orbital debris that, depending on orbits, may
  last forever
• World may view U.S. acquisition and deployment
  decision as risky behavior, with long term
  consequences for U.S. global leadership

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Policy Context for Deciding to Acquire and Deploy
Space-Based Weapons

• From a narrow, operational viewpoint
• Technical feasibility
• Strategic desirability
• Cost

• However, other sensitivities
• Political will
• Legal restrictions and ramifications
• Reactions of allies, neutrals, and adversaries

• Some sensitivities have underpinning them the
  notion of space as a sanctuary
• U.S. has most to lose because of dependence on
  space assets
• Absence of imminent threats to U.S. freedom of
  space could lead to perceptions of U.S.
  aggressive behavior
• Potentially trigger arms race in space
• Others argue that U.S. inhibitions against space
  weapons deployment do not necessarily apply to
  others
• U.S. needs to press ahead with development and
  deployment

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What If Others Decide to Acquire Space Weapons?

• Range of others
• Peer competitors
• U.S. friends and allies
• Non-peer competitors
• Neither friend nor foe
• Non-state coalition of entities (possibly
  state-assisted)
• Decisions will be driven by national interests
• Security, e.g.
• Regional threats requiring long-range force
  projection
• Overcoming competitors military strengths
• Economic and technological
• Political
• National prestige, peer recognition
• Global reach and power projection
• Enhanced freedom to act regionally/globally
• Promotion of internal security

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Agenda

• Characterizing the space weaponization debate
• National space policy and the importance of space
  to the U.S.
• Space Control and Force Application missions
• Decision-making rationale and factors for space
  weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others
• Policy choices and conclusions

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Policy Choices Facing the United States

• Continue to maintain consistency in long-held
  space-related principles, yet be prepared to
  acquire and deploy space-based weapons should
  circumstances change
• Move now, through explicit policy, programmatic,
  and budgetary decisions, to deploy space-based
  weapons based on national interests and emerging
  threats
• Prepare for the inevitable pursue a deliberate,
  long-term hedging strategy

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Impact of Security Challenges Facing U.S. Defense
Planning in 2006 QDR
Higher

• Irregular
• Unconventional methods adopted and employed by
  non-state and state actors to counter stronger
  state opponents. (Erode our power)

• Catastrophic
• Acquisition, possession, and possible employment
  of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects
  against vulnerable, high-profile targets by
  terrorists and rogue states. (Paralyze our
  power)

VULNERABILITY
Lower

• Disruptive
• International competitors developing and
  possessing breakthrough technological
  capabilities intended to supplant U.S. advantages
  in particular operational domains. (Marginalize
  our power)

• Traditional
• States employing legacy and advanced military
  capabilities and recognizable military forces, in
  long-established, well-known forms of military
  competition and conflict. (Challenge our power)

Higher
Lower
LIKELIHOOD
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Conclusion

• Space will become yet another environment for the
  full spectrum of human activities, including
  conflict
• Not a matter of should space weapons be deployed,
  but when
• Prudent approach to protect U.S. national
  interests is a proactive strategy for shaping
  political, technological, diplomatic, and
  security environment