On the Offensive: The Reagan Doctrine and the Fall of th

1
On the Offensive The Reagan Doctrine and the
Fall of the Soviet Union

• PO 326 American Foreign Policy

2
The Carter Administration

• Carters approach to foreign policy seems at the
  outset to represent an important break from
  predecessors
• General view Détente and SALT proved that
  amicable relations between US and USSR were
  possible US had responsibility not to perpetuate
  Cold War by overtly antagonizing USSR
• Desires to reduce defense budget eliminate
  nuclear weapons take new diplomatic approach
  reflecting the diminished importance of US-Soviet
  rivalry
• In the wake of increasing interdependence Carter
  sought to construct a foreign policy that took
  seriously the humanitarian welfare of 3rd world
  countries
• Choice of staff (Vance Brzezinski Young)
  reflects the goals of human rights protection
  economic interaction and humanitarian aid etc.
• Moralistic foreign policy (Wilsonian)

3
The Carter Administration

• This change in approach was problematic from the
  outset. In essence Carters turn away from
  containment was complicated by indications that
  the traditional (containment) approach was still
  necessary
• Communist involvement in Angola Ethiopia
  elsewhere in 3rd World reinforces longstanding
  notion that communism is dangerously expansionist
• Rise of anti-Americanism and Fundamentalist
  Islam culminating in Iranian Revolution and
  Embassy crisis also indicates that greater focus
  on 3rd World is more demanding than expected
• Several problems regarding Soviets
• Problems with Carters human rights stance in 3rd
  World
• Problems with continued China normalization
• In SALT II initially unwilling to submit to
  far-ranging bilateral cuts in nuclear arsenals
  compromise leads to domestic opposition
• The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979
  discredits the initial notion that Soviet
  aggressiveness is largely imaginary

4
The Carter Administration

• The Soviet invasion combined with Iranian
  hostage crisis and domestic pressures leads
  Carter to revert to a much tougher approach to
  the USSR and the world
• Personal animus at betrayal leads to increased
  defense spending diminished economic assistance
  and resumed arms race with USSR
• Provision of Afghan rebels with arms
  establishment of rapid deployment force and naval
  presence in Persian Gulf economic sanctions in
  retaliation to OPEC embargo
• In the end despite resulting in some successes
  outside of the US-USSR rivalry (Camp David
  Accords) Carters overall approach to FP is seen
  as a dismal failure Reagans overtly hard-line
  view of the East-West rivalry resonates

5
The Reagan Revolution

• From the outset Reagans approach to foreign
  policy is reminiscent of the early Cold War
• Treatment of Soviets as monolithic enemy that
  must be defeated through increased military
  preparation negotiation (including SALT) seen
  as in NSC 68 as means to buy time
• Vast increase in defense spending domestic
  ramifications
• Radical conservatism evangelical approach to
  the rivalry
• Interestingly Nathan and Oliver note that the
  groundwork for the Reagan Revolution was laid
  by Carters reversion (including Persian Gulf
  policy)

6
Reagan and the Soviets

• Reagan sought to revive the notion that the
  Soviets were irresponsible at best and that they
  sought only conquest and domination
• Questioned intentions in international
  negotiation (SALT) and weapons development made
  severe demands and overstated actual Soviet
  military buildup
• Portrays KAL shootdown as indicative of Soviet
  barbarism provides fuel for rhetoric
• Fostered belief that nuclear war was more likely
  increased international (impact on NATO) and
  domestic preparations (MX FEMA)

7
Reagan and the Soviets

• Given the view that USSR was a dangerous nuclear
  threat and that parity had been reached Reagan
  seeks to gain an advantage via SDI (Star Wars)
• Success highly improbable but absorbed most of
  Defenses discretionary funds and 48 of research
  budget
• Violation of ABM Treaty destroyed stability
  provided by MAD
• In the end Reagans approach solidified Soviet
  insecurities about US and relative capabilities
  led a nearly bankrupt country to devote more
  resources to buildup
• When Gorbachev comes to power advocating
  glasnost perestroika Reagan can no longer play
  the evil empire card
• Soviets accept US SALT demands and Reagan is
  forced to negotiate portrays Soviet change as
  resulting from American pressure (psychology)
• Demise of USSR thus largely credited to Reagan

8
Reagan on the Periphery The Enterprise

• Reagans old-style view of containment extended
  to the periphery as well and he sought to
  actively defeat communist elements without
  reverting to large-scale intervention. However
  his approach was problematic and in some cases
  illegal
• Communist movements in other regions (esp. Latin
  America) were symbolic of Soviet strength must
  be countered
• Decisional Autonomy CIA others bolstered
  given greater discretion in action little
  accountability
• Secretive manipulated flow of information

9
Reagan on the Periphery The Enterprise

• In Nicaragua and elsewhere Administration
  conducted covert conflict waged domestic
  propaganda campaigns and backed authoritarian
  leaders to stem communist tide
• CIA mining of Nicaraguan harbors backing and
  bolstering of Contras (unsavory) backing
  continued even after defeat certain
• Actions lead to destabilization of friendly
  governments in region (Honduras)
• Even after Congress cuts off funding
  Administration continues effort illegality and
  Iran-Contra
• Nearly destroys Administration colors
  posteritys view

10
American Foreign Policy in the Cold War A Review

• American foreign policy in the Cold War is
  seemingly consistent but appears to be a
  confusing mélange of realist power politics
  idealistic Wilsonianism and overtones of
  traditional isolationism
• Beginning with Kennan and NSC 68 the necessity
  of countering Soviet expansionism is undoubtedly
  the top priority of nearly all US administrations
• By and large the general foreign policy outlooks
  of each postwar president are very similar
  (strong shared worldview) the only real
  variation we see is in approaches which are
  determined by factors such as the level of Soviet
  activity economic concerns and domestic
  pressures

11
American Foreign Policy in the Cold War A Review

• However Wilsonianism occupies an uneasy position
  in this outlook the moral responsibility of
  American foreign policy is alternately ignored
  thrust to the fore or used for power political
  purposes
• American contestation of USSR is from the Truman
  Doctrine predicated on the threat it poses to
  free peoples though the form of that contest
  is power political
• To confuse matters even when humanitarianism is
  the stated keystone of foreign policy plans (as
  with Carter) its implementation is unpopular and
  counterproductive when it ignores or minimizes
  the importance of the US-USSR power rivalry
  which is itself (at least theoretically) based on
  the ideal of safeguarding freedom
• American involvement in the periphery is
  seemingly predicated on power politics in the
  larger rubric of containment but the
  justification for these actions derives from
  Wilsons idealistic view of a world safe for
  democracy
• When it cannot be used as justification (e.g.
  when the US must back authoritarian regimes to
  counter Soviet expansion) Wilsonianism is left
  aside ideals such as self-determination are
  sacrificed in the name of power politics

12
American Foreign Policy in the Cold War A Review

• When specific approaches to the rivalry prove
  costly especially limited war we see popular
  opposition that is largely based on a weaker
  version of isolationism
• Example of general opposition to Vietnam War is
  between Vietnamese and US has no place
  inherently isolationist
• In sum though the US successfully defeats USSR
  without war the microfoundations of USFP are
  muddled this problem becomes more pronounced
  when the US lacks a powerful identifiable enemy
  in the 1990s and beyond