RSPA PIPELINE SECURITY PREPAREDNESS

1
RSPA PIPELINE SECURITY PREPAREDNESS

• December 2001
• US Department of Transportation
• Research Special Programs Admin.
• Office of Pipeline Safety

2
Immediate Actions after 9/11

• Issued advisories to industry
• Disabled mapping system internet access
• Worked with FAA to ease restrictions on pipeline
  aircraft patrols
• Confirmed RSPA statutory and regulatory
  authorities for potential improvements

3
Assessment Response

• RSPA is working with state pipeline safety
  organizations and industry to assess the
  industrys readiness to prepare for, withstand
  and respond to a terrorist attack on the nations
  pipeline infrastructure

4
Assessment Response

• Preparing for, withstanding and responding to an
  attack
• As individual companies, and
• the pipeline infrastructure as a whole

5
Assessment Response

• OPS contacted 25 major hazardous liquid and
  natural gas pipeline operators and 14 local
  distribution companies about their security
• API and INGAA Survey

6
Assessment Response What are operators doing?

• Many are
• Controlling access
• Using intrusion detection
• Reviewing electronic systems against
  cyber-terrorism
• Some are
• Preplanning with FBI/military
• Hiring armed guards

7
Industry Security Task Forces

• OPS ask industry to assist in detailed assessment
  of security readiness
• Five Industry Task Forces formed
• Oil Pipelines (AOPL/API)
• Natural Gas Transmission (INGAA)
• Natural Gas Distribution (AGA/APGA)
• LNG for Transmission (INGAA)
• LNG for Distribution (AGA/APGA)

8
Industry Security Task Forces

• Identify process for assessing pipeline system
  and facility vulnerabilities
• Develop uniform definitions of security
  conditions
• Develop graduated set of countermeasures for each
  security condition level

9
Direct Action Groups State Agency Interaction

• DAG chartered by Secretary of Transportation to
  gather operator, state pipeline safety agencies,
  labor and environmental group views and concerns
• Similar calls made to state pipeline safety
  organizations

10
Key Findings of Pipeline DAG and State Calls

• Pipeline operators want a more coordinated
  federal approach to pipeline security and more
  specific threat information to make protective
  action decisions
• Pipeline operators need closer ties to law
  enforcement and emergency management agencies at
  state/local level
• Strong support for government/industry
  partnership to address security needs.

11
Key Pipeline Security Issues

• Pipeline operators need help to provide armed
  protection from terrorist attack at key critical
  facilities

12
Key Pipeline Security Issues

• Preplanning is needed to support rapid
  restoration of pipeline service following an
  attack/sabotage.
• Operators need to rapidly build around damaged
  facilities on a temporary basis.
• Land ownership and state/local land use and
  permitting requirements make rapid action
  difficult.
• Are additional federal emergency powers needed to
  facilitate restoration of services?

13
Assessment Response

• Planned Actions
• Improve process for delivering threat warnings
• Improve coordination with other federal agencies
  (OPS as federal point of contact for pipelines)
• Implement security exercise program
• Adopt standardized security conditions

14
Assessment Response

• Planned Actions
• Seek law enforcement assistance for surveillance
  and protection of key critical assets during
  higher threat levels
• Evaluate pipeline RD for security applications
• Work to enhance emergency powers to facilitate
  restoration of service

15
Information Protection and Distribution

• Key issue is how best to balance right-to-know
  versus need-to-know
• New Aviation and Transportation Security Act may
  provide some protection from FOIA based on
  security needs
• Information voluntarily submitted by industry is
  protected

16
Information Protection and Distribution

• Planned Actions
• Developing a system for rapid and secure
  communication with industry security contacts
• Potential for government assistance on protection
  from cyber-threats
• Working with DOE on background checks for
  selected state and pipeline personnel

17
Securing our People and Facilities

• Updating OPS Continuity of Operations Plan
• Upgrading OPS manager clearances and providing
  for secure communications
• Expand security and response training for federal
  and state inspectors

18
For More Information

• Office of Pipeline Safety, security issues Jim
  OSteen [phone]
• RSPA Public Affairs Jim Mitchell [phone]