Intro to DNS - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Intro to DNS

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ping yahoo.com. Pinging yahoo.com [66.218.71.198] with 32 bytes of data: ... Our NS would cache the wrong name, and this can propagate over ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Intro to DNS


1
Intro to DNS
  • SOEN321 - Information Systems Security

2
Contents
  • Intro to DNS and Security

3
DNS
  • Domain Name System
  • a distributed naming service for the entire
    Internet (including WWW)
  • provides unified host-name-to-network-address and
    vice-versa lookup needed for remote computing

ping yahoo.com Pinging yahoo.com
66.218.71.198 with 32 bytes of data Reply
from 66.218.71.198 bytes32 time113ms TTL244
4
DNS
  • Other capabilities
  • Info about Name Servers
  • Canonical host names
  • Mail Exchange (MX) records

5
DNS
  • Hierarchy

root
net
org
com
mydomain
amazon
yahoo
www
6
DNS Tools in UNIX
  • Tools
  • host
  • dig
  • nslookup (deprecated)

7
DNS Tools Example
haida.mokhov host -a www Trying
"www.cs.concordia.ca" -gtgtHEADERltlt- opcode
QUERY, status NOERROR, id 3704 flags qr aa
rd ra QUERY 1, ANSWER 1, AUTHORITY 5,
ADDITIONAL 4 QUESTION SECTION www.cs.concor
dia.ca. IN ANY ANSWER
SECTION www.cs.concordia.ca. 86400 IN
CNAME spider.cs.concordia.ca. AUTHORITY
SECTION cs.concordia.ca. 86400 IN
NS clyde.concordia.ca. cs.concordia.ca.
86400 IN NS Jerome.McRCIM.McGill.EDU
. cs.concordia.ca. 86400 IN NS
pollen.cs.concordia.ca. cs.concordia.ca.
86400 IN NS manitou.cs.concordia.ca. c
s.concordia.ca. 86400 IN NS
alcor.concordia.ca. ADDITIONAL
SECTION alcor.concordia.ca. 81883 IN
A 132.205.7.51 clyde.concordia.ca.
81827 IN A 132.205.1.1 pollen.cs.conc
ordia.ca. 86400 IN A
132.205.44.61 manitou.cs.concordia.ca. 86400 IN
A 132.205.4.3 Received 243 bytes from
132.205.64.6353 in 3 ms
8
Name Serves
  • Manage certain part of the name space
  • Help clients to find info within the hierarchy
  • DNS Query - returns list of name servers
  • One of the NS resolves clients query
  • If name not found, pass on to another NS
  • The one that has the answer, sends it back, and
    the previous NS caches it for the future.

9
DNS Threats
  • Recall from firewalls and the rest (D. Probst)
  • Filtering DNS How does one prevent DNS
    contamination (corruption)? Mail can be rerouted,
    passwords captured, etc. We need separate DNS for
    inside and outside.
  • Tunneling over DNS is used to gain command-line
    access to remote utilities. With a proxy-based
    firewall, deny external DNS access to anything
    other than your proxy server. If you are using a
    packet filter, your options for blocking a DNS
    tunnel are limited.

10
DNS Cache Poisoning
  • Was more actual in the past
  • A NS doesnt have a name for a requested host
  • Asks another NS, another NS may have been weak
    and compromised, or for some other reason had
    invalid name for the host requested.
  • Our NS would cache the wrong name, and this can
    propagate over
  • So, real amazon.com might have been redirected to
    elsewhere, get the consequences...

11
DNS Cache Poisoning
  • Attack types DNS spoofing, host name spoofing
  • One of the reasons earlier versions of bind
    simply had bugs servers trusted by ltname, IPgt
  • Solution
  • DNS triple ltname, IP, public keygt

12
Host Name Spoofing
  • PTR records
  • Mapping IP to a domain name
  • All the transactions a legitimate
  • DNS server according to the protocol tries to
    resolve a query using legitimate DNS Server, but
    the PTR deliberately was made to point elsewhere.

13
DNS Spoofing
  • In combo with hostname spoofing
  • Messing up the PTR
  • And forcing the NS to have invalid resource
    record (RR) in their cache.
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