Counterinsurgency Doctrine Whats New and Whats Old

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Counterinsurgency Doctrine- Whats New and Whats
Old

• Dr. James Corum, All Souls College.
• LTC USAR

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US Military and Counterinsurgency-- early 1970s
--2001

• Vietnam syndrome affects whole officer corps (see
  Conrad Cranes study)
  
• Counterinsurgency study shut down in staff
  colleges and war colleges
  
• Open hostility to the subject among senior
  officers
  
• Despite El Salvador and several small wars
  little attempt at higher level to learn lessons
  
• Assumption that conflict has been transformed by
  technology Emphasis on high tech opns against
  enemy states
  
• US policy and doctrine for short, decisive wars
  against conventional states
  

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US View of Future War in mid-1990s
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Iraq War/ Afghanistan. Relearning old lessons
trying to learn new ones

• Army War College- Steve Biddle AWC- Afghanistan
  and the Future of War
  
• US faith in high tech overdone. Only 50 of al
  Qaeda positions at Tora Bora and Anaconda found
  by high-tech recon- See Biddle Study from SSI
  
• Not quite the new way of war advertised in
  2001/2002
  
• Importance of training level of local troops- Key
  to success with high tech US partnership

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The Motivators for Insurgency

• 4 Prime motivators Most insurgencies inspired by
  one or two of these
  
• 1- Ideology- Desire for new political system to
  meet needs
  
• 2- Nationalism- Desire for independence of
  another power
  
• 3- Ethnic Nationalism- Desire for independence or
  autonomy of ones tribe or ethnic group
  
• 4- Religion- Desire to make ones own religion
  supreme, suppress others
  
• WWII- 1990- Most insurgent movements motivated by
  ideology and nationalism.
  
• 1990-Present- Most insurgent movements motivated
  by religion and ethnic nationalism. This makes
  it harder to come to a political settlement or
  peaceful solution and makes a counterinsurgency
  strategy more complex

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Changing Nature of Organization of Insurgencies

• WWII- 1990. Most insurgencies followed some
  variation of a Maoist model with a clear
  political program, central leadership and long
  term strategy.
• 1990 to present. Intifada in Israel/Palestine,
  insurgency in Iraq, conflict in Afghanistan
  Insurgents comprised of a loose network of
  groups often diverse often at odds- often
  without a clear political program. Advantage for
  insurgents- difficult for govt. forces to take
  out the leadership or mount any decisive
  campaign. Disadvantage- groups do not truly
  coordinate activity or resources.
• What were dealing with are several insurgent
  groups and programs. See TX Hammes, The Sling
  and the Stone (2004)

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New US Army Counterinsurgency Manual- FM 3.07.
Oct 2004

• First official US Counterinsurgency doctrine
  since 1965
  
• New tactical lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan
• Most of the traditional tactics and strategies
  still valid (Max Manwaring-- Legitimacy is key)
  
• However, new doctrine still looks upon insurgency
  as a mainly Maoist model the new models not
  addressed
  
• Still- big step forward for US to address the
  subject

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US Army and USAF (Not Marines) forgot extensive
experience in small wars. Photo- US Army in Vigan
PI, 1899.
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US Experience 1899-2001.

• Philippines 1899-1902, Caribbean and Central
  America 1914-1934, Post WWII Greece 1940s, PI
  1946-1953, Vietnam 1961-1973, El Salvador
  1981-1992
• Some sound counterinsurgency doctrine and
  experience, USMC Small Wars Manual, Adderholt,
  Lansdale, Manwaring
  
• US small wars expertise at odds with US military
  culture- esp. post Vietnam

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Something Old Importance of simple equipment for
3rd World allies

• Pentagon preference for expensive and high tech
  equipment hard to maintain and operate
  
• Need for agreements with allies/ licensing and
  manufacturing agreements
  
• Consider producing updated Mi8/Mi 17s with
  allies
  
• Consider building A-10 as counterinsurgency
  aircraft with allied nations
  
• CMATT in Iraq pushes for simple solutions with
  eye to cost/training/ maintenance
  

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US-supplied T-28 and advisors in SE Asia circa
1962 cheap and simple Laotian T-28s took out
more trucks on Ho Chi Minh Trail than latest US
jet fighter bombers USAF leadership very upset
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Example of the success of the cheap and simple
weapons in counterinsurgency
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CASA 212-- STOL, simple, cheap, effective-- a
good light transport for small air forces-- Very
useful in peace ops such as Somalia
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Cobra Armored Recon Veh.
UNCLASSIFIED
Range 500 km Speed 115 km/hr, 80 km/hr off ro
ad Lethality 12.7mm HMG or other Ballistic Pro
tection 7.62 NATO API, Arty//IED Frag all
round, upgradeable to 12.7mm Mine Protection
- protected against 7 kg TNT
detonation under wheel
- 5 kg TNT under center hull
Field Repair designed to
facilitate field repair
Other- Automotive suspension is HMMWV, NATO c
ompatible, battle tested in similar terrain
against similar threat, supported by regional
country, excellent cross country mobility incl.
Sandy rocky terrain. Cost Estimate 60K to 1
00K
UNCLASSIFIED
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Ratel Light Wheeled APC (U)
UNCLASSIFIED
Range 860 km Speed 105 km/hr, 60 km/hr off ro
ad Lethality 12.7mm HMG or other Ballistic Pro
tection - all round - 12.7 mm
- add on armor to defeat RPGs
Mine Protection - protected
against mines detonation und
er wheel Field Repair designed to facilit
ate field repair Othe
r- designed for 14 days independent opns,
excellent cross country mobility incl. Sandy
rocky terrain. Cost Estimate 35K to 70K
UNCLASSIFIED
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Some lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq-- High
Tech Apache is a great aircraft but still quite
vulnerable to simple weapons Photo 40mm AA round
used against US choppers.
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Apache blades shredded by 20 and 40mm fire in
Iraq April 2003. Similar problems in
Afghanistan in 2001
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Something Old--Importance of HUMINT

• Human Intel capability ignored and downgraded
  post-Vietnam thru Cold War thru 1990s
  
• Belief that high tech would provide frictionless
  battlefield Clausewitzs concept of friction
  no longer relevant (Army 4-star mid-1990s)
  
• Emphasis on counting equipment and conventional
  capability Not as useful in fighting insurgents
  
• Lack of capable HUMINT one of central problems
  post 9/11
  
• Not enough done to build up HUMINT capability
  post 9-11
  
• HUMINT is relatively cheap but expertise takes
  time to build and this goes against Pentagon
  preference for expensive, high tech hardware
  solutions lack of a lobby group for HUMINT

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Something Old--Relearning Basic HUMINT Lessons

• Abu Graibh and torture Big US blunder pressure
  for quick solutions, Lack of understanding of
  basic counterinsurgency Intel techniques at the
  heart of the problem
• Tactical issue-- Torture really doesnt provide
  good Intel
  
• Classic interrogation techniques still valid
  need to have a corps of highly-trained and
  language-qualified interrogators
  
• DOD generally misunderstood the potential for
  insurgency and failed to have the appropriate
  Intel resources available.

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Something New Importance of modern mass media
and media techniques in counterinsurgency

• Television now a major factor in many nations
• US fails to use polling and mass marketing
  techniques to monitor public opinion and
  influence opinion. Little effort in Iraq-
  minimal budget and equipment for the govt. media
• Need for locally-run media program with US
  support
  
• Need to apply civilian skills mass marketing and
  education program with TV, radio, and print
  media
  
• Program will be expensive and require
  coordination with State Dept. and other agencies
  
• Hearts and minds campaign STILL central to
  counterinsurgency need for media campaign
  combined with traditional civic action program

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New US Doctrine- Reliance on Local and Militia
Forces- Backed by High Tech US Support

• Search for quick, cheap solutions
• Desire to minimize US manpower requirements
• Problem- little study of recent experience with
  militias- problems of Colombia etc. ignored
  
• Difficult to control militias
• Low effectiveness of minimally-trained troops
• Problem with militia loyalties
• Difficult to demobilize militias

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ICDC BN Plan as of Spring 2004
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Old Realities Need for well trained local forces

• US policy to train the security leadership AFTER
  the insurgency Not a sound approach
  
• Need to carefully vet and train the mid and
  senior defense civilian and military leadership
  US and Allied effort still much too small
  
• Concentration on training lower ranks and using
  contractors US troops might have been better
  
• Minimal effort to train mid-level and senior
  leaders One of the major problems in Iraq
  planning
  
• Perhaps mediocre Iraqi security performance is
  due to poor leadership

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Conclusions

• New Way of War promised in 2001--Not especially
  successful
  
• Insurgencies STILL last a long time. The
  Pentagon preference for rapid, decisive
  operations meets reality
  
• Wars are STILL expensive. Dont look for the
  cheap war
  
• Counterinsurgency is STILL manpower intensive No
  way around this
  
• Most of the traditional doctrines still
  applicable
  
• New Factor-- Need for an extensive, expensive
  and coordinated media campaign
  
• Counterinsurgency CAN succeed- One can win in
  Iraq but appropriate counterinsurgency
  equipment and training and intelligence doctrines
  needed

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Iraqi Armed ForcesThe Way Ahead