FUTURE BUSINESS GROUP

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The UKs Approach to Theatre Ballistic Missile
Defence
David Bush, Future Business Group (Strike),
Defence Procurement Agency UK MOD
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Outline of Presentation

• UKs historical approach to TBMD
• Current UK policy to TBM and strategic BMD
• UK studies
• Potential outcomes
• Summary

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History
Use of V2 against London 1944-5
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Policy Background

• Continue to monitor the threat.
• Premature to decide on acquisition.
• Keep future options open.
• Gain better understanding of defensive
  technologies.
• Continue to work with allies

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UK Programmes

• Pre-Feasibility Study 1995-6
• Balance of Investment Study 1996
• Policy review 1997
• Intercept study 1997-8
• Technology Readiness and Risk Reduction Programme
  (TRRAP) 1998-2001
• Applied Research Studies 2001-2002
• Assessment of possible acquisition options
  2002-2006

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(No Transcript)
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TRRAP Purpose

• Monitor developments in both potential threats
  and responses
• Establish a position from which an active BMD
  system could be developed if necessary
• Sustain expertise in UK industry and DERA
• Establish intelligent customer status
• Maintain links with US

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TRRAP Purpose
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UKs APPROACH TO BMD

• Directorate of Equipment Capability (Theatre
  Airspace) - Applied research to support decision
  making on way ahead for TBMD.
• Directorate of Strategic Technologies (Ballistic
  Missile Defence) - Strategic issues advice to
  policy staffs on ST research.

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DEC(TA) Responsibilities

• Control and denial of theatre airspace
• Concerned with the following classes of threats
• Fixed and rotary wing aircraft
• Uninhabited Air Vehicles (UAVs)
• Stand-off missiles
• Cruise missiles
• Theatre Ballistic Missiles

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STUDIES

• NATO Feasibility Study into active TBMD (Reports
  end 2002).
• Applied research programme studies (report end
  2002).
• Assessment of possible acquisition options
  (initial report 2004, final report 2006)

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Capability Analysis

• Assess significance of the capability gap
• The type, scale and size of the threat,
  likelihood of use etc.
• Identify full range of potential options.
• Examine costs, benefits and balance of
  investment.
• Inform decision making on UK policy and equipment
  planning.

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TBM Threat assessment

• Four time points now, 2010, 2020, 2030
• Deployed forces, host nation, coalitions
• Full range of SAG scenarios in which there is a
  BM threat
• Provide baseline

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Concept Studies

• Total System - deterrence, active, passive,
  counterforce, battlefield management BMC4I
• Allied capabilities
• Whole life costs, operational aspects, etc.
• EIAD

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Research Studies

• Have addressed the areas of
• Biological decayInteroperability of employed
  architecturesEffectiveness of WMD treaties and
  export controlsEffectiveness of hit to kill
  intercepts..

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Capability Working Group
NATO Feasibility study
ACCS Air Command Control Systems
DEC(TA) DEC Theatre Airspace
CBW Pol Chemical Biological Warfare Policy
DEC (CCII) DEC Command Control Information
Infrastructure
CWG Capability Working Group
DST Directorate of Strategic Technologies (BMD)
DEC (ISTAR) DEC Intelligence, Surveillance,
Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
DEC (NBC) DEC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
DEC(AWB) DEC Above Water Battlespace
OTHERS
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Methods

• Scenario planning
• Modelling
• Rules of engagement
• Real world scenarios
• Current and future equipment procurement plans

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Measure of Effectiveness

• Traditional measures such as military
  casualties unlikely to provide the full story.
• Many socio-political aspects.
• Actually, not grossly different from many other
  equipments in this respect.

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Potential Outcomes

• Equipment capability options, individually or in
  combination
• Rely on current equipment and allies.
• Passive protection needed.
• Good early warning, ISTAR and BMC3I required.
• Any counter-force capability needs to be
  effective.
• Active TBMD system(s) might be required.

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Rely on current equipment and Allies

• Nations have limited capabilities
• Could we develop European system?
• Encourage UK/European industry to contribute to
  US development programmes
• Could they protect our forces?
• Would they agree to protect our forces?

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Passive Protection

• Is better NBC protection achievable for our
  forces?
• What about local civilian from the host nation?
• Gulf war experience

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Good Early Warning, ISTAR and BMC3I

• Sensors to detect BM assets
• Intelligence
• Quantify the threat
• What is available
• Where it is
• Is being prepared to be used against us?
• Look for opportunities to disrupt/destroy

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Active Counterforce

• Needs to be early into theatre
• Able to neutralise the threat.

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Active TBMD Systems

• Deployable flexible system
• How many layers?
• How many assets
• Sensors
• BMC3I
• Launchers

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Summary 1

• The UK continues to seek more information and
  knowledge on BM defence.
• When decisions have to be taken, the UK will be
  in the best position to ensure they are fully
  informed.
• No decisions on BM defence have been taken yet.

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Summary 2

• The threat from BMs and the need to counter them
  is a sensitive and emotive issue
• But can also be regarded as just another threat
  to be countered with air defences.
• Need to combine dispassionate research and
  analysis of potential counters with wider
  economic, political and military factors.
• Financial technological constraints - will need
  to work closely with NATO Allies to identify and
  find solutions.

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Questions?