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Metallgesellschaft Risk

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Title: Metallgesellschaft Risk


1
MetallgesellschaftRisk- Crisis Management,
INSR 811Professor Neil A. DohertyOctober, 2005
  • Case Analysis by
  • Federico Chiaromonte
  • Pablo Gentile
  • Jose Miguel Irarrazaval
  • Matthew Kondratowicz
  • Cecilia Rabess

2
Agenda
  • Introduction
  • Description of MGs business plan
  • Analysis of MGs hedging strategy
  • MGs strategy Hedge or Speculation?
  • Hedging Alternatives
  • Outcome
  • Lessons from the case

3
Metallgesellschaft1. Introduction
4
Company Overview
  • Metallgesellschaft A.G.
  • 14th largest corporation in Germany
  • Conglomerate with interests in metal, mining and
    engineering businesses and 15 major subsidiaries
  • Metallgesellschaft Corporation, the U.S.
    subsidiary
  • Trading in U.S. government bonds, foreign
    currency, emerging market instruments and various
    commodities
  • MG Refining and Marketing (MG)
  • U.S. oil trading subsidiary
  • New entrant to US Market, low market share
  • Goal to develop a fully integrated oil business
    in US.

5
MG Refining and Marketing
  • 1989 Obtained a 49 stake in Castle Energy, U.S.
    oil exploration company
  • Helped finance transformation into refiner
  • Purchased output of refined products at
    guaranteed margins on a long term contract
  • 1992, 1993 Signed a large number of long-term
    contracts with independent retailers
  • Delivery of gasoline, heating oil and jet fuel
    oil

6
Metallgesellschaft2. Description of MGs
business plan
7
Purchase Contract
  • MGRM contracts to buy all refined output from
    Castle Energy for 10 years.
  • Guarantees a fixed margin to Castle Energy
  • Estimated volume 126,000 barrels/day (about
    460M barrel over next 10 years)

8
Delivery Contracts
  • MG developed 3 types of novel contract programs
  • Firm Fixed under which customer would agree to
    a fixed monthly delivery of oil products at set
    price. By September 1993, MG was obligated for a
    total of 102M barrels (95 for up to 10 years).
  • Firm-flexible similar to the previous but
    giving customer extensive rights to set the
    delivery schedule. MG was obligated for a total
    of 52M barrels (90 for up to 10 years).
  • Guaranteed Margin under which MG agreed to
    make deliveries at a price that would assure
    customers a fixed margin relative to the retail
    price offered by its geographical competitors. MG
    was obligated for a total of 54M subject to MGs
    renewal, which in the end meant these volume were
    not a firm obligation.
  • 3-5 built in margin per barrel (above spot).
    Estimated value of 640M.
  • Consequence have long-term supply contracts for
    160M barrels over next 10 years at Fixed Prices

9
Delivery Contracts - Rationale
  • MG was a new entrant to the US oil market and
    didnt have a significant market share.
  • MG had no competitive advantage in its cost of
    supply
  • Following US oil market deregulation and
    commoditization in the early 1980s, the situation
    of independent gasoline retailers greatly
    worsened.
  • MG spotted what it thought was a innovative
    marketing strategy to sell financial petroleum
    products to independent and quasi-independent
    retail service stations to help them manage the
    variations in the relationship between retail
    prices in their area of service and the wholesale
    prices at which they purchased their fuel.
  • Result Purchase fixed volume with variables
    prices and resell at fixed prices

10
cash-out options
  • MG embedded a cash out option in its supply
    contracts
  • If energy prices rise above contract price,
    counterparty can sell-back remaining forward
    obligations for ½ difference between near-term
    futures price and contracted futures price
  • Implication Grants customers option (similar to
    default put) if oil prices get too-high
  • Why Put This In?
  • 20 restriction on customers needs (MGs
    protection to customers default risk), creates
    liquidity risk for customer (need to purchase 80
    at spot prices)
  • Liquidity risk offset by cash inflow from
    cash-out option

11
Profit Structure Upside Price Risk
Price to MGRM
  • Created Large Exposure to Upside Oil Price Risk
  • Solution Hedging through Energy Futures and Swaps

Sales Revenue
Purchase Costs
Summer 1993 Prices
Oil Price
12
Risk Adjusted Profit Structure even worse
  • As Prices Drop, increasing default risk from
    customer unwilling to buy at above-spot prices
  • As Prices Rise, cash-out option allows customers
    to exit at fraction of contract value
  • Originally, MGs concern is was about oil prices
    going up, but the overlooked the implications of
    a drop in oil prices.

Price to MG
Sales Revenue
Purchase Costs
Summer 1993 Prices
Oil Price
13
Hedging Strategy
  • MG hedged the risk of rising energy prices with
    both short dated energy future contracts and OTC
    swaps.
  • MGs total derivative position was about 160M
    (i.e. barrel-for-barrel)
  • Key aspects of MGs Rolling forward hedging
    strategy
  • Concentrated on short-dated futures and swaps.
  • Position had to be rolled-forward (monthly),
    with downward adjustment for delivered oil to
    keep 11 ratio
  • Largest time spread ever undertaken in commodity
    markets

14
Metallgesellschaft3. Analysis of MGs
hedging strategy
15
Basics on Commodity Forwards Storable
Consumption Commodities
  • Because of storage cost and convenience yield
    (opportunity cost of having the physical asset
    instead of the forward), there are bounds for the
    price of commodity forwards determined by the
    no-arbitrage assumption
  • Convenience yield are subjective and depends on
    profitability of each business
  • Prices within these bounds are determined by
    supply and demand

16
Basics on Commodity Forwards Storable
Consumption Commodities
  • BACKWARDATION When spot prices are HIGHER than
    future prices
  • CONTANGO When spot prices are LOWER than future
    prices.

17
Risks of MGs hedging strategy
  • MGs hedging strategy exposed the firm to three
    significant and related risks
  • Basis or Rollover Risk
  • due to the mismatch maturity between its long
    term fixed contracts and its short term futures.
  • Liquidity Risk
  • due to the margin calls associated with the mark
    to market conventions,
  • the need to roll over its futures each month,
  • the embedded cash out options in its contracts.
  • Credit Risk
  • due to the risk of the independent contractors
    default on their long term obligations to
    purchase oil at fixed prices.
  • the non transparency of its supply contracts.

18
1. Basis Risk Was the firm Value hedged?
  • Rolling forward strategy hedge with a maturity
    structure that did not match that of its delivery
    contracts
  • This exposed the firm to a significant amount of
    basis risk, this means variations in the value of
    the short dated futures positions not compensated
    by equal and opposite variations in the value of
    the long-dated delivery obligations
  • For a company to be value hedged means that
    losses on its long term delivery contracts are
    match exactly by an equivalent increase in the
    value of its future positions and vice versa
  • MG hedged its long run supply contracts with a
    one-to-one hedge ratio (h1)

19
1. Basis Risk Was the firm Value hedged?
  • Because of the mismatched maturity between the
    two positions, a h1 could have never hedged the
    value of the contracts perfectly, for the
    following reasons
  • Time Value of Money
  • Volatility of more distant future prices is much
    smaller than the volatility of spot prices
  • As Oil prices dropped in late 1993 due to
    conflicts within the OPEC, the expectation of the
    long term spot price 3 years into the future was
    largely unchanged
  • Therefore, losses on the stack of futures were
    actually matched by little if any, change in the
    capitalized value of the supply contracts
  • In fact, the cumulative increase in the value of
    the supply contracts during 1993 was 479M. Less
    than ½ the total loss on the futures portfolio

20
1. Basis Risk What was the Optimal Hedge Ratio?
  • To value hedge the contracts, MG would have had
    to adjust (tail) its hedge, meaning used a hlt1
  • Taking into account the two factors already
    mentioned, MG should have used a hedge ratio not
    greater than 0.5
  • hedge ratio should be the beta between asset that
    produced the basis mismatch
  • What about the cash-out options?
  • Because the maximum customers could receive was
    only 50 of the gain and because the probability
    that all contracts are exercised at the same time
    would certainly be significantly less than one,
    even after accounting for this option, a h0.5
    would have been closer to the optimal ratio

21
2. Liquidity Risk Was the firm Cash flow
hedged?
  • Three sources of liquidity risk
  • Rollover losses
  • MGs hedging strategy relied on derivative
    positions that were stacked in short-dated
    futures
  • Monthly basis had to be rolled forward to
    maintain those positions. Each month, to continue
    with their one-to-one hedge, MG reduced the
    derivatives positions by the amount of the
    product delivered to customers
  • When markets are in contango (future prices
    higher than spot prices) this strategy results in
    losses. MG would have been force to buy high and
    sell low in rolling its positions
  • Sensitivity analysis shows that it required only
    a period of 14 months of contango to wipe out
    MGs entire profit over its 10 year contracts

22
2. Liquidity Risk Was the firm Cash flow
hedged?
  • 2. Margin Calls
  • Future contracts are marked to market. This
    means that gains and losses are settled daily and
    the holder pays/receives an amount equal to the
    daily change in the futures price
  • Therefore, when prices fall, MG is obliged to
    incur in daily negative cash flow to fund margin
    calls

23
2. Liquidity Risk Was the firm Cash flow
hedged?
  • 3. Cash-out options
  • The cash-out options embedded in the forward
    supply contracts could generate negative cash
    flows that increase the liquidity risk
  • The cash payments depend on spot prices
  • These options would be in the money for the
    customer only if the cash-out payment were
    greater than the net present value of the
    remaining forwards deliveries on the contract
  • But, if liquidity constrained, customer could
    still exercise

24
2. Liquidity Risk Was the firm Cash flow
hedged?
  • Between June and December 1993, MGRM had to fund
    900 millions to maintain its hedge positions
  • Even though there is some evidence that
    backwardation is a permanent feature of energy
    markets (it happens 67 of the times in crude-oil
    futures), MGs assumption was somewhat naïve and
    reckless for the following reasons
  • The sensitivity of its strategy to a period of
    contango was too high. 14-months string of
    contango, though unusual, were not without
    precedent.
  • The cash-out options could have caused MG to end
    its hedging strategy unexpectedly without being
    able to offset all its rollover losses
  • To obtain the expected long term roll over gains,
    MG implicitly assumed it could fund whatever
    rollover losses it sustained in the short term

25
3. Credit Risk
  • If energy prices dropped, MG faced an increasing
    risk of default from its customer thus
    potentially leaving the firm with an uncovered
    position of the forward market
  • Lack of transparency, creditors unable to
    evaluate level of counterparty risk embedded in
    forward delivery contracts
  • Substantial Non-performance risk, due to long
    duration of contracts
  • Cumulative default rates. Probability of
    default rises with time
  • Sufficiently diversified?
  • As a consequence, MG lacked the ability to use
    supply contracts as collateral to fund its
    liquidity needs

26
Another Theory Was MGs position too big?
  • MG could only find sufficient liquidity in the
    short term market
  • Size matters. MG's positions reached 20 of the
    open interest outstanding in the NYMEX oil
    contracts (equivalent to 85 days of all Kuwait
    output)
  • Consequently, MG itself became one of the
    dominant variables in the backwardation -
    contango equation
  • There is evidence that MG's need to roll over its
    large long contracts became a factor that by
    itself helped to push crude oil prices into
    contango

27
Another Theory Was MGs position too big?
  • There is evidence in the Commitment of Traders
    reports that speculators jumped into the market
    against MG. The traders systematically took large
    net short positions in the WTI contract,
    effectively exploiting MG's position
  • Futures term structure has been strongly
    influenced by speculators' net positions a
    strong net long position tends to contribute to
    backwardation, a strong net short position to
    contango
  • These relationships are intuitively reasonable.
    If speculators are strongly net long, they are
    contributing to strong prompt demand for crude.
    If they are strongly net short, they are
    contributing to strong prompt supply.

28
Metallgesellschaft4. MGs Strategy Hedging or
Speculation?
29
MGs Strategy hedge or speculation?
  • MGs business plan provides significant clues
    that the management motivation under its
    derivatives strategy was speculative rather than
    hedging
  • it is important to recognize that if a hedge
    program is carefully designed to lock in a
    favorable basis between spot and futures prices,
    hedging can generate trading profits which can
    substantially enhance the operating margin
  • With the existence of the energy futures market
    we can create a paper refinery by taking
    advantage of the inefficiencies created in the
    illiquid contract months in the futures market
  • The rolling stack was a bet on the common
    backwardation exhibited by the energy markets
  • One-to-one ratio was not the minimum variance
    hedge ratio.

30
MGs Strategy hedge or speculation?
  • There is ample evidence of MG being actively
    involved in trading
  • Actively unbinding existing positions, instead of
    waiting for futures to expire.
  • Alternating subjacent assets (heating oil,
    gasoline or crude oil) to exploit seasonality
    differences in the backwardation pattern among
    the energy commodities.
  • Emerging Markets Group already was taking
    positions in stock and debt instruments on EM in
    1993 added corporate finance group

American Metal Market, June 21, 1993 MG adds
unit for financing NEW YORK --
Metallgesellschaft Corp., the New York trading
arm Metallgesellschaft AG, is adding a corporate
finance unit to the company's emerging markets
unit, company officials said. The new unit will
consist of a team of investment bankers formerly
associated with CS First Boston and will advise
clients on principal investments. The MG emerging
markets unit specializes in the trading of debt
and equities of emerging economies with high
growth potential.
31
MGs Strategy hedge or speculation?
  • In general, it is not optimal to rely upon only a
    single hedging instrument. The very fact that MG
    employed only the nearby contract strongly
    suggests that they were not interested in hedging
    alone, but were also speculating on movements in
    the term structure.
  • Basis variability in the oil market is quite
    high. The very fact that MG put such a large bet
    on the oil basis is a further prove of its
    underlying speculative motives

There were at least 4 periods were spot prices
fell relative to the future prices by amounts and
durations similar to MGs relevant period
Period were MGs Strategy was in place
32
Metallgesellschaft5. Alternatives
33
Alternative 1 use lower hedge ratio
  • Pros
  • Minimize cash flow variance (liquidity risk)
  • Take into account basis risk (use correlation of
    assets as hedge ratio)
  • Cons
  • Dynamic adjustments could be expensive (high
    transaction costs)

34
Alternative 2 hedge with longer maturity forwards
  • Pros
  • Minimize basis risk
  • Cons
  • Less liquid market
  • Cash-out option is calculated with spot price, so
    hedge with short term forward has more sense

35
Alternative 3 include options as part of hedging
strategy
  • MG could have used options to limit downside
  • Long zero cost collar
  • Limit downside
  • Give up upside when probably cash-out option
    would be already exercised
  • No initial cost
  • Use stream of long call options with similar
    maturity
  • No downside
  • All upside
  • Up-front cost

36
Alternative 3 include options as part of hedging
strategy
  • Profit with different hedging strategies

37
Alternative 4 sell delivery contracts
  • Pros
  • Transfer all the risk to a third party
  • Obtain an origination fee (profit for sure)
  • Cons
  • Give up most of the expected profits
  • Complex contracts could be hard to sell (non
    transparency problem counterparty risk, embedded
    option, long term maturity contracts, etc.)

38
Alternative 5 Physical storage
  • They had a large network of storage facilities
    through Castle
  • Cons
  • Costly (storage cost)
  • Not very practical to store oil for 10 years!

39
Alternative 6 do not hedge
  • Pros
  • Do not expose the company to liquidity risk on a
    downward movement of prices
  • Cons
  • Company is highly exposed to price changes
  • High liquidity risk of prices are up and cash-out
    options are executed

40
Metallgesellschaft6. Outcome
41
Outcome What happened?
  • Total MGs losses amounted to aprox. 900M in a
    period of only 12 months since the hedging was
    set in place. Note however, that prices did move
    in favor of MG for the first 5 months
  • Plus aprox. 106M loss (net of unrealized gains)
    in its swaps contracts not shown here
  • If one admits that liquidity strains reduce firm
    value, this total loss of 1.06 Billion
    understates the true total loss suffered by MG

42
Outcome What happened?
43
Outcome What happened next?
MGs new Supply Contracts
MGstarts selling off business as part of its
rescue plan
  • MGs 2nd restructuring plan.
  • Changes name to GEA
  • Focuses on new business line

MGs Rollover and Canceling Losses
44
Outcome What happened next?
  • American Metal Market, Jan 13, 1994
  • Metallgesellschaft asked its 120 creditors to
    accept the rescue plan swiftly and "as a
    whole."Self-interest dictates the need for an
    agreement Creditors could only expect to
    receive 40 to 50 percent of their 9 billion DM in
    loans to the company if it declared insolvency
  • American Metal Market, Jan 17, 1994
  • Big German banks have saved the destitute mining
    and metals giant Metallgesellschaft AG from
    bankruptcy, ending weeks of uncertainty with a
    clear pledge to help the company back to its
    feet. The company immediately announced plans on
    Saturday to sell several unprofitable
    subsidiaries and cut its annual payroll by
    one-sixth, or 700 million Deutsche marks (400
    million).
  • American Metal Market, Jan 29, 1996
  • In April last year and more recently in the
    December-January period, customers exercised the
    blowout option Metallgesellschaft Corp., the
    U.S.-based trading arm of Germany's
    Metallgesellschaft AG, is restructuring its
    energy marketing business, ending long-term
    supply contracts with blowout clauses."

45
Outcome What happened next?
  • American Metal Market, Apr 5, 2000
  • LONDON (CNNfn) - Germany's Metallgesellschaft is
    facing legal claims that could cost it as much as
    1 billion, after 17 oil companies filed suit in
    New York for breach of contract, according to
    published reports Wednesday.
  • The suit says the German company's former
    U.S. subsidiary MGRM terminated contracts
    unilaterally after oil trading activities in the
    U.S. almost bankrupted Metallgesellschaft in
    1993. Since then the parent company has
    restructured to focus on engineering and
    chemicals.
  • As of today
  • In 2005, Metallgesellschact AG, changed its name
    to GEA, which stands for Global Engineering
    Alliance
  • In 2004, the groups disposed of the vast majority
    of its chemical activities
  • Most of the proceeds were used to pay the groups
    debt
  • Company restructures its business focusing on
    process engineering and equipment, especially for
    the food, pharmaceutical and petrochemical
    industries

46
Outcome Did MG cut its hedge too soon?
  • In retrospective, MG supervisory board made its
    decision when WTI prices reached their lowest
    level (less than 14), and when MG's ongoing
    losses were at their peak.
  • Critics, like Merton Miller, say that MGs board
    cut the hedge too soon.
  • With the benefit of hindsight, we know from Dec.
    17, 1993, when the new management team took
    control, to Aug. 8, 1994, crude oil prices
    increased from 13.91 to 19.42/bbl.
  • However, this post-event analysis doesnt take
    into account that had MG remained in the futures
    markets in such large volumes, the price recovery
    and return to backwardation that did occur likely
    would have been slower.
  • By the fall of 1993, some traders had come to
    anticipate the rollovers of MG's positions. At
    that point, MG had entered into a "can't win"
    situation. It was big enough to have its needs
    noticed, but not big enough to impose its will on
    the market.

47
Metallgesellschaft7. Case Lessons
48
Case Lessons
  • The importance of Value hedging Cash flow
    hedging
  • A hedge with mismatched maturity can create
    enormous risks
  • It is a flaw to set up a hedging strategy without
    a careful regard for the financing it may require
  • Both cash flow patterns and firms value should
    have been the main concern in MGs strategy and
    not an after thought.
  • In times of distress, cash is king
  • MGs delivery contracts were highly illiquid and
    difficult if not impossible to sell at a
    reasonable price
  • Since the strategy wasnt self-financing, MG had
    to reach into its general borrowing lines to pay
    its liquid market debts and avoid bankruptcy

49
Case Lessons
  • Financial Markets are too efficient for naïve and
    simple strategies to give sure profits
  • Prices reflect all up to date information
  • They are populated with astute traders whose
    business is processing information and profiting
    from it
  • There is too much competition in the markets for
    any spread bet (in the case of MG, a time spread)
    to consistently make money
  • In the end, market fundamentals prevail. The drop
    in oil prices was a consequence of an external
    OPEC supply shock which completely disrupted MGs
    bet on backwardation.

50
Case Lessons
  • A big position in the markets never goes
    undetected
  • When a single company commands such a large share
    of open interest, markets can become
    dysfunctional in one of two ways
  • the company can obtain the power to squeeze other
    participants, if those participants remain
    fragmented and disorganized
  • or the company itself can be squeezed, if other
    market participants begin to trade against the
    company in an organized manner
  • With their huge short delivery positions,
    specialists in the oil markets knew that MG
    would have to roll their expiring positions.
    These traders were waiting eagerly when they did
    so.
  • It is very costly to move a big position
    particularly when everyone is watching

51
Case Lessons
  • Complexity Matters for Risk Management
  • While MGs strategy was relatively simple, its
    implementation and analysis was not
  • The complex delivery contracts and cash-out
    options, and the huge size of their derivative
    positions made a simple evaluation of the
    economics of MGs oil trading very difficult
  • Complexity creates obscurity and this makes a
    business vulnerable the more obscure and complex
    a business is, the more difficult it is to
    finance
  • Complexity makes Risk Management all the more
    difficult

52
Case Lessons
  • Agency costs can have a substantial impact on a
    firm
  • MG traders and the US Subsidiary management were
    employees of MG however, that doesnt mean their
    interests were aligned with the interests of the
    shareholders
  • Instead of putting in place a reasonable hedging
    strategy to secure the firms operations, MG
    traders saw a big bonus opportunity and pursued a
    very reckless speculative strategy turning MG
    from an oil company into a financial intermediary
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