Regions, Race and Structural Governance Options To understand the possibilities for and limitations

1
Regions, Race and Structural Governance Options
To understand the possibilities for and
limitations of regional governance in
metropolitan America, one needs to understand
that the structure, power and influence of
Americas local governments is built into the
fabric of American civil society.

• David Young Miller
• University of Pittsburgh
• Graduate School of Public and International
  Affairs
• May, 2005
• dymiller_at_pitt.edu

2
The Foundations of Civil Society

• Townships are the wisest invention ever devised
  by the wit of man Thomas Jefferson, principal
  author of the American Declaration of
  Independence and third president of the United
  States
• Townships have not been invested with
  privileges, but they have, on the contrary,
  forfeited a portion of their independence to the
  state Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in
  America, 1840
• America is organized as people or individuals
  aggregated on different principles than those of
  the centralized state - sovereignty in severalty,
  the sovereignty of local groups and localities
  Michael Zuckerman, Peaceable Kingdoms, 1970
• America has seen the development of a nation of
  territorially based communities that have the
  right to maintain and perpetuate legitimate
  differences, to the extent their residents so
  choose, as well as an equal opportunity for
  access to national resources for their residents
  Dan Elazar, 1975

3
The Foundations of Civil Society

• Townships are the wisest invention ever devised
  by the wit of man Thomas Jefferson, principal
  author of the American Declaration of
  Independence and third president of the United
  States
• Townships have not been invested with
  privileges, but they have, on the contrary,
  forfeited a portion of their independence to the
  state Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in
  America, 1840
• America is organized as people or individuals
  aggregated on different principles than those of
  the centralized state - sovereignty in severalty,
  the sovereignty of local groups and localities
  Michael Zuckerman, Peaceable Kingdoms, 1970
• America has seen the development of a nation of
  territorially based communities that have the
  right to maintain and perpetuate legitimate
  differences, to the extent their residents so
  choose, as well as an equal opportunity for
  access to national resources for their residents
  Dan Elazar, 1975

4
The Foundations of Civil Society

• Townships are the wisest invention ever devised
  by the wit of man Thomas Jefferson, principal
  author of the American Declaration of
  Independence and third president of the United
  States
• Townships have not been invested with
  privileges, but they have, on the contrary,
  forfeited a portion of their independence to the
  state Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in
  America, 1840
• America is organized as people or individuals
  aggregated on different principles than those of
  the centralized state - sovereignty in severalty,
  the sovereignty of local groups and localities
  Michael Zuckerman, Peaceable Kingdoms, 1970
• America has seen the development of a nation of
  territorially based communities that have the
  right to maintain and perpetuate legitimate
  differences, to the extent their residents so
  choose, as well as an equal opportunity for
  access to national resources for their residents
  Dan Elazar, 1975

5
The Foundations of Civil Society

• Townships are the wisest invention ever devised
  by the wit of man Thomas Jefferson, principal
  author of the American Declaration of
  Independence and third president of the United
  States
• Townships have not been invested with
  privileges, but they have, on the contrary,
  forfeited a portion of their independence to the
  state Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in
  America, 1840
• America is organized as people or individuals
  aggregated on different principles than those of
  the centralized state - sovereignty in severalty,
  the sovereignty of local groups and localities
  Michael Zuckerman, Peaceable Kingdoms, 1970
• America has seen the development of a nation of
  territorially based communities that have the
  right to maintain and perpetuate legitimate
  differences, to the extent their residents so
  choose, as well as an equal opportunity for
  access to national resources for their residents
  Dan Elazar, 1975

6
The Foundations of Civil Society

• Townships are the wisest invention ever devised
  by the wit of man Thomas Jefferson, principal
  author of the American Declaration of
  Independence and third president of the United
  States
• Townships have not been invested with
  privileges, but they have, on the contrary,
  forfeited a portion of their independence to the
  state Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in
  America, 1840
• America is organized as people or individuals
  aggregated on different principles than those of
  the centralized state - sovereignty in severalty,
  the sovereignty of local groups and localities
  Michael Zuckerman, Peaceable Kingdoms, 1970
• America has seen the development of a nation of
  territorially based communities that have the
  right to maintain and perpetuate legitimate
  differences, to the extent their residents so
  choose, as well as an equal opportunity for
  access to national resources for their residents
  Dan Elazar, 1975

7
Then How Come..?

• Local Governments are mere tenants at will of
  their respective state legislatures and they
  could be eliminated by the legislature with a
  stroke of the pen but, such an act would be
  so great a folly and so great a wrong Justice
  Dillon, 1868
• The Great Paradox
• Local governments are legally weak (mere
  tenants)
• Local governments are politically and culturally
  strong (so great a wrong)

8
Then How Come..?

• Local Governments are mere tenants at will of
  their respective state legislatures and they
  could be eliminated by the legislature with a
  stroke of the pen but, such an act would be
  so great a folly and so great a wrong Justice
  Dillon, 1868
• The Great Paradox
• Local governments are legally weak (mere
  tenants)
• Local governments are politically and culturally
  strong (so great a wrong)

9
Then How Come..?

• Local Governments are mere tenants at will of
  their respective state legislatures and they
  could be eliminated by the legislature with a
  stroke of the pen but, such an act would be
  so great a folly and so great a wrong Justice
  Dillon, 1868
• The Great Paradox
• Local governments are legally weak (mere
  tenants)
• Local governments are politically and culturally
  strong (so great a wrong)

10
The Paradox

• Two Organizational Notions
• Local government as an association
• Local government as a corporation
• Two Models of Metropolitan Regions
• Region as organic whole
• Polycentric Regions

11
The Paradox

• Two Organizational Notions
• Local government as an association
• Local government as a corporation
• Two Models of Metropolitan Regions
• Region as organic whole
• Polycentric Regions

12
The Paradox

• Two Organizational Notions
• Local government as an association
• Local government as a corporation
• Two Models of Metropolitan Regions
• Region as organic whole
• Polycentric Regions

13
Governments, Governments, and a few more
Governments
14
Governments, Governments, and a few more
Governments
15
Distribution of Regions and Population Size
Small Under 250,000 Medium Small 250,000 to
499,999 Medium 500,000 to 999,999 Medium Large
1,000,000 to 2,000,000 Large over 2,000,000
16
Distribution of Regions and Population Size
Small Under 250,000 Medium Small 250,000 to
499,999 Medium 500,000 to 999,999 Medium Large
1,000,000 to 2,000,000 Large over 2,000,000
17
Distribution of Regions and Population Size
Small Under 250,000 Medium Small 250,000 to
499,999 Medium 500,000 to 999,999 Medium Large
1,000,000 to 2,000,000 Large over 2,000,000
18
Average Number of Governments in Metropolitan
Regions
19
Average Number of Governments in Metropolitan
Regions
20
Average Number of Governments in Metropolitan
Regions
21
Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index

• A new way to study local governing in the United
  States

22
Theoretical Comparison of Diffusion of Power
Measures in Two Regions
23
Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index 2002
Small Under 250,000 Medium Small 250,000 to
499,999 Medium 500,000 to 999,999 Medium Large
1,000,000 to 2,000,000 Large over 2,000,000
Highly centralized 1.0 to 2.0 Moderately
centralized 2.0 to 3.0 Slightly decentralized
3.0 to 4.0 Moderately decentralized 4.0 to
5.0 Highly decentralized 5.0 to 7.5 Super
decentralized over 7.5
24
Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index 2002
Small Under 250,000 Medium Small 250,000 to
499,999 Medium 500,000 to 999,999 Medium Large
1,000,000 to 2,000,000 Large over 2,000,000
Highly centralized 1.0 to 2.0 Moderately
centralized 2.0 to 3.0 Slightly decentralized
3.0 to 4.0 Moderately decentralized 4.0 to
5.0 Highly decentralized 5.0 to 7.5 Super
decentralized over 7.5
25
Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index 2002
Small Under 250,000 Medium Small 250,000 to
499,999 Medium 500,000 to 999,999 Medium Large
1,000,000 to 2,000,000 Large over 2,000,000
Highly centralized 1.0 to 2.0 Moderately
centralized 2.0 to 3.0 Slightly decentralized
3.0 to 4.0 Moderately decentralized 4.0 to
5.0 Highly decentralized 5.0 to 7.5 Super
decentralized over 7.5
26
Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index
Highly centralized 1.0 to 2.0 Moderately
centralized 2.0 to 3.0 Slightly decentralized
3.0 to 4.0 Moderately decentralized 4.0 to
5.0 Highly decentralized 5.0 to 7.5 Super
decentralized over 7.5
27
Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index
Highly centralized 1.0 to 2.0 Moderately
centralized 2.0 to 3.0 Slightly decentralized
3.0 to 4.0 Moderately decentralized 4.0 to
5.0 Highly decentralized 5.0 to 7.5 Super
decentralized over 7.5
28
Metropolitan Diffusion Index Group Membership
29
Metropolitan Diffusion Index Group Membership
30
Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index Trends 97-02
31
Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index Trends 97-02
32
Millers Criteria for Successful Regions
Contains a fiscally and managerially
sound center city/county
Makes and enforces housing, land use, education
and tax policies
Mechanisms to bring key regional leaders
together to take unified economic and
community development action
Minimizes the ability of one part of the region
to grow at the expense of another part of the
region
33
Millers Criteria for Successful Regions
Contains a fiscally and managerially
sound center city/county
Makes and enforces housing, land use, education
and tax policies
Mechanisms to bring key regional leaders
together to take unified economic and
community development action
Minimizes the ability of one part of the region
to grow at the expense of another part of the
region
34
Millers Criteria for Successful Regions
Contains a fiscally and managerially
sound center city/county
Makes and enforces housing, land use, education
and tax policies
Mechanisms to bring key regional leaders
together to take unified economic and
community development action
Minimizes the ability of one part of the region
to grow at the expense of another part of the
region
35
Millers Criteria for Successful Regions
Contains a fiscally and managerially
sound center city/county
Makes and enforces housing, land use, education
and tax policies
Mechanisms to bring key regional leaders
together to take unified economic and
community development action
Minimizes the ability of one part of the region
to grow at the expense of another part of the
region
36
Millers Criteria for Successful Regions
Contains a fiscally and managerially
sound center city/county
Makes and enforces housing, land use, education
and tax policies
Mechanisms to bring key regional leaders
together to take unified economic and
community development action
Minimizes the ability of one part of the region
to grow at the expense of another part of the
region
37
Four Forms of Regionalism

• Coordinating
• Administrative
• Fiscal
• Structural

38
Four Forms of Regionalism

• Coordinating
• Administrative
• Fiscal
• Structural

39
Coordinating Regionalism (you and your MPO)

• How current and relevant is the regional plan?
• How much can a regional council oversee local
  government compliance with the regional plan?
• require changes in local land-use plans and
  developments to insure consistency with the
  regional plan?
• control over the development of regional
  infrastructure?
• Does it have plan review authority?
• The extent of regional revenue sharing
• Regional bodys governing board are selected
  (democracy gap)
• Demographic representativeness (for Senate
  Models)
• One person-one vote representativeness (for House
  Models)

40
Coordinating Regionalism (you and your MPO)

• How current and relevant is the regional plan?
• How much can a regional council oversee local
  government compliance with the regional plan?
• require changes in local land-use plans and
  developments to insure consistency with the
  regional plan?
• control over the development of regional
  infrastructure?
• Does it have plan review authority?
• The extent of regional revenue sharing
• Regional bodys governing board are selected
  (democracy gap)
• Demographic representativeness (for Senate
  Models)
• One person-one vote representativeness (for House
  Models)

41
Coordinating Regionalism (you and your MPO)

• How current and relevant is the regional plan?
• How much can a regional council oversee local
  government compliance with the regional plan?
• require changes in local land-use plans and
  developments to insure consistency with the
  regional plan?
• control over the development of regional
  infrastructure?
• Does it have plan review authority?
• The extent of regional revenue sharing
• Regional bodys governing board are selected
  (democracy gap)
• Demographic representativeness (for Senate
  Models)
• One person-one vote representativeness (for House
  Models)

42
Coordinating Regionalism (you and your MPO)

• How current and relevant is the regional plan?
• How much can a regional council oversee local
  government compliance with the regional plan?
• require changes in local land-use plans and
  developments to insure consistency with the
  regional plan?
• control over the development of regional
  infrastructure?
• Does it have plan review authority?
• The extent of regional revenue sharing
• Regional bodys governing board are selected
  (democracy gap)
• Demographic representativeness (for Senate
  Models)
• One person-one vote representativeness (for House
  Models)

43
Coordinating Regionalism (you and your MPO)

• How current and relevant is the regional plan?
• How much can a regional council oversee local
  government compliance with the regional plan?
• require changes in local land-use plans and
  developments to insure consistency with the
  regional plan?
• control over the development of regional
  infrastructure?
• Does it have plan review authority?
• The extent of regional revenue sharing
• Regional bodys governing board are selected
  (democracy gap)
• Demographic representativeness (for Senate
  Models)
• One person-one vote representativeness (for House
  Models)

44
Four Forms of Regionalism

• Coordinating
• Administrative
• Fiscal
• Structural

45
Administrative Regionalism

• Regional Special Districts
• Win a battle, lose the war
• The Emerging Urban County
• Inter-local Agreements
• Regional enhancing (redistributive-like)
• Local protectionist (market model)

46
Administrative Regionalism

• Regional Special Districts
• Win a battle, lose the war
• The Emerging Urban County
• Inter-local Agreements
• Regional enhancing (redistributive-like)
• Local protectionist (market model)

47
Administrative Regionalism

• Regional Special Districts
• Win a battle, lose the war
• The Emerging Urban County
• Inter-local Agreements
• Regional enhancing (redistributive-like)
• Local protectionist (market model)

48
Administrative Regionalism

• Regional Special Districts
• Win a battle, lose the war
• The Emerging Urban County
• Inter-local Agreements
• Regional enhancing (redistributive-like)
• Local protectionist (market model)

49
Four Forms of Regionalism

• Coordinating
• Administrative
• Fiscal
• Structural

50
Fiscal Regionalism

• Cultural Asset Districts
• Denver, Kansas City
• Tax-Base Sharing
• Minnesota, Dayton
• Peaceful Coexistence Strategies
• Louisville, Michigan

51
Fiscal Regionalism

• Cultural Asset Districts
• Denver, Kansas City
• Tax-Base Sharing
• Minnesota, Dayton
• Peaceful Coexistence Strategies
• Louisville, Michigan

52
Fiscal Regionalism

• Cultural Asset Districts
• Denver, Kansas City
• Tax-Base Sharing
• Minnesota, Dayton
• Peaceful Coexistence Strategies
• Louisville, Michigan

53
Combining Assets and Tax-Base Sharing Act 77
New Revenue
Share of Pool
Asset Finance
Local Governments
displace
redistribute
Regional Assets
Freed-Up Activities
54
Four Forms of Regionalism

• Coordinating
• Administrative
• Fiscal
• Structural

55
Structural Regionalism

• City-County Consolidations
• Annexations
• Mergers and Consolidations
• Disincorporation

56
Structural Regionalism

• City-County Consolidations
• Annexations
• Mergers and Consolidations
• Disincorporation

57
Structural Regionalism

• City-County Consolidations
• Annexations
• Mergers and Consolidations
• Disincorporation

58
Annexations from 1940 to 1990 in Selected
American Cities
59
Structural Regionalism

• City-County Consolidations
• Annexations
• Mergers and Consolidations
• Disincorporation

60
Structural Regionalism

• City-County Consolidations
• Annexations
• Mergers and Consolidations
• Disincorporation

61
Does Governance Structure Matter?

• Yes it does!

62
Regional Economic Competitiveness
When state-local relations are
Regional Economic Performance is
total
decentralized
centralized
fair 1.64
Worst -.73
diffused
When power in the region is
best 5.12
better 3.67
fair 1.97
unified
better 3.44
total
63
Regional Economic Competitiveness
When state-local relations are
Regional Economic Performance is
total
decentralized
centralized
fair 1.64
Worst -.73
diffused
When power in the region is
best 5.12
better 3.67
fair 1.97
unified
better 3.44
total
64
Two Dimensional Scale for Identifying Competitive
Position of Municipalities in a Metropolitan
Region
Rates of taxation as seen by the voter
High
Undesirable
Proactive
Available services as seen by the consumer
High
Low
Ideal
Reactive
Low
65
Two Dimensional Scale for Identifying Competitive
Position of Municipalities in a Metropolitan
Region
Rates of taxation as seen by the voter
High
Undesirable
Proactive
Available services as seen by the consumer
High
Low
Ideal
Reactive
Low
66
Fiscal Stress Rankings of Municipalities in 1981
and 1998
67
Fiscal Stress Rankings of Municipalities in 1981
and 1998
68
Comparison of Changes in Resources Available for
Quality of Life Expenses 1981 to 1994
69
Comparison of Changes in Resources Available for
Quality of Life Expenses 1981 to 1994