Critical Infrastructure Protection and Policy


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Critical Infrastructure Protection (and Policy)

• H. Scott Matthews
• March 25 2004

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HW 3 Review (Mean35)
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Threat

• Any circumstance or event with the potential to
  cause harm to a system in the form of
  destruction disclosure adverse modification
  and/or the denial of service.
• Examples Hackers electrical storms
• Need to know likelihood of threats
• Sources National Information Systems Security
  (INFOSEC) Glossary NSTISSI No. 4009 Aug. 1997)
  - generalized form of it

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Vulnerability

• Weakness in a systemor its components (e.g.
  system security procedures design controls)
  that could be exploited by a threat
• Examples Software bugs structural design

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Risk

• The likelihood that a particular threat using a
  specific attack will exploit a particular
  vulnerability of a system that results in an
  undesirable consequence
• Risk Assessment
• Process of analyzing threats toand
  vulnerabilities of a system and the potential
  impact the loss of system would have.
• Resulting analysis is used as a basis for
  identifying appropriate and cost-effective
  counter-measures.
• Computing expected loss functions

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Risk Management

• The process concerned with identification
  measurement control and minimization of
  security risks in systems to a level commensurate
  with the value of the assets protected.

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Classic Warden Defense Model
Leaders
Organic Essentials
Infrastructure
Population
Military
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New Defense Model
Military
Phys. Infrastructure
Leaders
Population
Econo-Tech. Infrastructure
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Strategic Objectives of Plan

• Identify and protect infrastructures and assets
  most critical to society
• Provide warnings for specific imminent threats
• Over time protect other assets through federal
  state local govt and private sector
  collaboration
• Homeland Security a Shared Responsibility
• Source The National Strategy for the Physical
  Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key
  Assets White House Feb 2003.

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To Achieve Strategic Vision

• Understand motivation of enemies
• Understand preferred tactics
• Comprehensive assessment of
• Assets and vulnerabilities
• Challenges of mitigating risk
• Key assets may not be part of critical
  infrastructure but affect prestige morale
  confidence (e.g. WTC Golden Gate Bridge)

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Effects of Attacks

• Direct - loss of service
• Attack on a critical node system function
• E.g. bridge
• Indirect
• Attack leads to behavioral/psychological
• Exploitation
• Using one to destroy another
• May involve interdependencies

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Guiding Principles

• Assure safety confidence service
• Responsibility accountability
• Collaborative partnerships govt/industry
• Market Solutions where possible
• Information sharing
• International cooperation
• Development of technology and expertise
• Safeguard privacy and freedoms

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Responsibility Chain

• Federal Govt - oversee coordinate set
  policies ensure 3 strategic objs
• State and Local - identify and secure their
  assets emergency response act as central points
  for requesting help coordinate information flows
• Private Sector - owns most of CI
• Continue to perform RA/RM reassess
• Help identify vulnerabilities of national concern

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Whats Missing

• Anything non-terrorist
• Natural disasters
• Accidents
• Focus on terrorist-based attacks while timely
  is short-sighted given the range of threats and
  vulnerabilities to CI

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Interdependencies

• A new emphasis on critical infrastructures
• PDD-63 in 1998 after Oklahoma City
• Generally worried about hackers interfering with
  operation of physical infrastructures
• Use of digital to disrupt physical suggests
  interdependency
• There are many non-hacking interdependencies
• Natural events can exploit them too
• Perhaps can be better understood and managed with
  information systems

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Key Questions

• What tools can be used to predict
• How can everyday operation be balanced with
  security concerns
• What are performance measures
• Who are stakeholders
• How to deal with risk and uncertainty

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Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS)

• Collective systemic behavior emergent
• I.e. follows patterns that result from but not
  predictable from nonlinear interactions with a
  large number of subsystems
• Capabilities change over time
• Greater than sum of its parts
• May be possible to model/ manage/ understand via
  agent-based systems
• Software systems where simple decision rules are
  followed and tracked via information given to them

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Six Dimensions of Infras. Interdependencies
(Rinaldi)

• Infrastructure environment
• Coupling
• Response behavior
• Failure types
• Infrastructure characteristics
• State of Operation