DSB Summer Study

1

• DSB Summer Study
• on
• Special Operations and Joint Forces in
• Support of Countering Terrorism
• Friday
• August 16, 2002
• Final Outbrief

For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute
2
Special Operations Joint Forces in Support of
Countering TerrorismDr. Ted GoldMr. Don Latham
Sponsors
USD(ATL)/Commander JFCOM
Prior CT Insights MG Bob ScalesDr. Wick Murray
Advanced CT Technologies SystemsDr. Mim
JohnDr. Ron Kerber
Future Force CapabilitiesGEN Bill HartzogVADM
Dave Frost
We drew on past DSB studies
Intel PanelDr. Joe MarkowitzADM Bill Studeman
Enduring Freedom
Psyops
Unconventional Use of Nuclear Weapons Against
U.S. Dr. Rich WagnerDr. Bill Graham
Managed Information Dissemination
We leveraged current DSB Studies
Precision Targeting
Defensive Information Operations
Biological WarfareDr. Anna SkalkaMr. Larry
Lynn
Discriminant Use of ForceDr. Ted GoldDr. Josh
Lederberg
Others
2
3
The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) A Real War,
A New Type of Adversary

• Committed, resourceful, globally dispersed
  adversary with strategic reach

• A long, at times violent, and borderless war

• Requires new strategies, postures, and
  organization

This study only scratches the surface of what
will eventually be needed
4
Elements of a National Strategy Orchestrate All
Instruments of National Power in a Global
Campaign

• Preemption/proaction/interdiction/disruption/quick
  -response capabilities
• Be proactive in securing partners and help from
  allies, friends, and others
• Hold states/sub-state actors accountable
• Foster information sharing
• Fight forward
• Focus particular attention on WMD
• Sophisticated, aggressive public diplomacy

All the above in parallel with consequence
management and protecting the homeland and DoDs
missions and forces
5
Guidance From Our Terms of Reference

• Focus is overseas military operations
• Military instrument is only part of the necessary
  capabilities
• Examined the role of intelligence in some detail

• Did not address homeland defense explicitly
• But difficult to segment theaters in this war
• We did consider threats to US military force
  projection from the US

6
The Toughest Challenge Identify and Find
Terrorist Networks

• Very small signals hidden in massive clutter
  and noise
• Some similarities with Cold War anti-submarine
  warfare (ASW) efforts
• Extensive differences as well

7
Conducting Military Campaigns in States Harboring
Terrorists

• OEF demonstrated substantial progress toward
  desired force capabilities
• From
• Air, land, sea, space

• To
• Robust connectivity
• Horizontally integrated, pervasive ISR
• Agile ground forces able to operate dispersed
• Effective remote fires
• Adaptive joint command and control
• Assured access and supply (expeditionary mindset)

These emerging capabilities will be critical for
an effective military role in GWOT
8
Characteristics of Afghan Campaign That Will
Persist

• A more central role for SOF and specialized
  capabilities

• Joint integration at very low levels
• Discriminant use of force
• Interagency partners play major roles
• Creative operational arrangements with coalition
  partners

9
Recent DoD Initiatives in the GWOT

• Expanded Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) and
  Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA)
  initiatives
• Interagency Link analysis
• Operational net assessment (ONA) capabilities at
  Combatant Commands
• JFCOM CENTCOM NORTHCOM
• New Campaign Support Group at Ft. Bragg
• Multi-agency Joint Global perspective
  New analysis tools Multi-option
  analysis
• Joint Program Office Special Technology
  Countermeasures Mission Assurance Analysis
• Counter-terrorism Technology Support Office
  Technical Support Working Group
• Physical Security Equipment Action Group
• Special Operations Joint Interagency
  Collaboration Center
• J8 Chem/Bio Warfare Requirements Section
• DoD Support to DEA Special Intelligence
• JFCOM Initiatives
• Standing Joint Force Headquarters Joint
  Interagency Coordination Group
• Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal
  System - Near Term
• Enhanced C4ISR Homeland Operations Center
  Joint National Training Capability
• USN Deep Blue (Navy Operations Group)
• USN/USMC Expeditionary Strike Group Proof of
  Concept
• USMC/SOCOM Integration Initiatives

10
Recent DoD Initiatives in the GWOT

• DARPA projects, e.g.
• Genoa
• Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery
• Translingual Information Detection, Extraction,
  and Summarization
• Babylon
• Human Identification at a Distance
• Modern Internetted Unattended Ground Sensors
• Foliage Penetration Radar (SAR and GMT I)
• Standoff Precision Identification from 3D Data
• Digital Radio Frequency Tags
• Advanced ISR Management
• ACTDs
• High-Altitude Airship
• Pathfinder
• Active Denial System
• Thermobaric
• Adaptive Joint C4ISR Mode

11
Major Concerns

• DoD should take the terrorist threat as seriously
  as it takes the likelihood and consequences of
  major theater war

• DoD still struggling to get joint C4 right

• Pentagon processes overly focused on materiel

• Defense and Intelligence processes and cultures
  remain input- rather than product-oriented

12
Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over
Terrorists and Their Sponsors
Tools to handle tough environments and
difficult targets
Adaptive and responsive national-level decision
making
Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations
13
Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over
Terrorists and Their Sponsors
Tools to handle tough environments and
difficult targets
Adaptive and responsive national-level decision
making
Not the focus of our study
Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations
14
Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over
Terrorists and Their Sponsors
2
Tools to handle tough environments and
difficult targets
A much more responsive, flexible, and effective
military capability
Adaptive and responsive national-level decision
making
3
Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations
4
Operationalizing new approaches and
capabilities
15
Discussion Outline

• Organization, context, and themes
• Understanding new adversaries and providing
  actionable intelligence
• Tools to handle tough environments and
  difficult targets and understand our
  vulnerabilities
• Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations
• Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities
• Recap

16
A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective
Military Capability

• Understanding new adversaries and providing
  actionable intelligence deep penetration -
  understanding, finding, and tracking the
  terrorists and their networks
• Tools to handle tough environments and
  difficult targets and understand our
  vulnerabilities
• Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations
• Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities

17
Understanding New Adversaries and Providing
Actionable Intelligence Deep Penetration -
Understanding, Finding, and Tracking the
Terrorists and Their Networks

• - Key Initiatives
• Transformation of HUMINT (and human-technical)
  operations
• Aggressive, proactive, preemptive, operations
• Intelligence surge/unsurge capability
• Expanded analytical capabilities and throughput
  against asymmetrical adversaries
• Understand adversaries as complex adaptive
  systems

18
Transformation of HUMINT Operations

• SecDef (working with DCI) expand overall
  Directorate of HUMINT Services (DHS)/Service
  roles and explore SOF opportunities
• Increase HUMINT forward/operational presence
• Work with DCI to deploy new DoD clandestine
  technical capabilities
• NSA/Combatant Commanders/Services pay more
  attention to support of DoD HUMINT in the field
• SOF continue to work Advance Force Operations
  (AFO)
• Define HUMINT role in Proactive Ops ensure
  Covert Action (CA) and IW/IO connections
• Explore development of USAF/Navy HUMINT
  capabilities (beyond current compartmented
  programs)
• A major covert HUMINT program needs to be made
  joint
• Explore new and more varied HUMINT modes
  described on next chart

19
Classified HUMINT Chart
Transformation of HUMINT Operations
20
Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group
(P2OG)
CLASSIFIED
21
Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations

• Creation of a Proactive Preemptive Operating
  Group (P2OG) of creative subject matter
  operational experts such as
• IW/IO Covert Action Diplomacy Cover
  Deception
• Intelligence Operations PSYOPS HUMINT
  SIGINT SOF
• Improves information collection by stimulating
  reactions
• Enhance operational preparation of the
  battlespace to support preemptive options and
  actions
• Signal to harboring states that their sovereignty
  will be at risk
• Vest responsibility and accountability for the
  P2OG to a Special Operations Executive in the
  NSC who shall
• Define the national strategy
• Coordinate action
• Enunciate policy
• Execute to a plan coordinated with the SecDef and
  DCI and others as appropriate

The position exists in the NSC and is called
National Director and Deputy National Security
Advisor for Combating Terrorism, NSPD-8, Oct.
24, 2001
22
Intelligence Surge/Unsurge Capability

• Maintain a robust global cadre of retirees,
  reservists, and others who are trained and
  qualified to serve on short notice, including
  expatriates
• Make investments now
• Exercise and engage (through gaming) at least
  annually
• Maintain a database of individuals and skills
• Focus on Tier 4 countries where CT operations may
  be necessary
• Contracted roles for industry, universities, and
  think tanks
• Focus on analytic expertise and capabilities,
  CA/SOF issues, scientists and engineers,
  linguists/area experts, and personnel recovery
  skills
• Work with DoD and Congress on unsurge issues,
  particularly related to callups
• Develop innovative data surge capabilities

23
Improving Analytical Capabilities and Throughput

• Create a new and larger analytic workforce with
  skills and innovative tools focused on
  counterterrorism (CT)
• Focus on actionable intelligence, improved
  situational awareness, targeting and reachback
  support and connecting the dots using JWAC-like
  analysis approaches
• Full-time collaborative connections between all
  the critical centers working CT intelligence and
  support
• Analysis components of national intelligence
  organizations physically or virtually collocated
  to improve all-source multi-INT analysis
  collaboration and production
• Support for intelligence collection-related
  target development
• Develop new security/sanitization concepts to aid
  analysts in protecting new sources and methods
• Identify roles for analysts in operational net
  assessment process/joint experimentation,
  vulnerability analysis/Red Teaming, and
  CT-related gaming and simulation

24
Greatly Improving Customer Access to Intelligence
Counterterrorism Information

• SecDef/DCI establish a group to define a future
  path to achieve a truly joint interoperable CT
  Common Operating Picture (COP)
• Improve chat windows and secure collaborative
  means/directories for direct access to relevant
  analysts and related data environments
• Converge large e-gov programs currently underway
  in SIGINT and IMINT for improved customer access
  to intelligence data/collaboration
• Pursue an integrated family of small terminal
  programs for field/small unit access to
  intelligence data (data, imagery, etc.)smart
  push and pull
• DCI/SecDef provide portals, tools and pointers
  for access to unclassified open sources data
  bases, commercial sources etc.
• Develop advanced visualization concepts for
  conveying intelligence and situational
  information

25
Understanding Adversaries as Complex Adaptive
Systems

• Further expand and enhance Joint Warfare Analysis
  Center (JWAC)-like capabilities
• Expand the number of countries/actors as well as
  the factors considered
• Address non-physical as well as physical
  dimensions
• Address money flow, cronies, family,
  intra-military, other

• The capabilities must be coupled closer to
  campaign planning and execution (effects-based
  operations)
• To influence as well as respond
• Support information/influence ops in
  peace/crisis/war as well as more traditional
  maneuver/fires

• These capabilities are also needed to
• Focus information collection efforts
• Provide context to better understand collected
  data

26
Recommendation Proactive Operations

• Cost
• 100 new people
• 100M/yr for operations and support

• Recommendation
• Develop an entirely new capability to
  proactively, preemptively evoke responses from
  adversary/terrorist groups
• Form a new elite Counter-terrorism Proactive
  Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG) at the NSC
  level
• Highly specialized people with unique technical
  and intelligence skills such as information
  operations, PSYOP, network attack, covert
  activities, SIGINT, HUMINT, SOF, influence
  warfare/deception operations
• Reports to NSC principal level

• Lead Responsibility
• NSC lead with DCI, SecDef, State, Justice
  participation

27
Recommendation Improve Intelligence

• Cost
• 1.7 Billion/FY beginning in FY-04 and continuing
• 100M/yr for exercises, engagement in the form of
  gaming, and real operations

• Recommendation
• Develop new capabilities, sources, and methods to
  enable deep penetration of adversaries
• DO/DHS develop new modes and methods for covert
  operations See classified chart on HUMINT
• Increase emphasis on CT CA to gain close target
  access
• Develop new clandestine technical capabilities
• Create a surge capability in intelligence to
  preempt and deal with rapidly emerging crises in
  the GWOT
• Maintain a robust cadre of retirees reservists
  and specialists, qualified to serve on short
  notice
• Contract roles for industry universities and
  think tanks

• Lead Responsibility
• DCI Lead SecDef/CJCS
• ASD(C3I) and DCI Community Management Staff
  (CMS)
• DCI/DoD co-shared lead

Supports CIA DO/DDST initiatives
28
Recommendation Improve Intelligence (cont.)

• Cost
• 800M/yr for technical capabilities development
  and 500 new staff

• Recommendation
• Expand counter terrorism and asymmetric adversary
  analytical capabilities and throughput
• Increase Service and intelligence agency analytic
  specialties, unique to CT challenges, by 500
  people over the next 18 months to add depth of
  expertise
• Focus on understanding effects of globalization,
  radicalism, cultures, religions, economics, etc.,
  to better characterize potential adversaries
• More virtual collaboration architecture for
  analyst support and customers interaction

• Lead Responsibility
• CMS shared lead with ASD(C3I)

29
Recommendation Gain Deeper Understanding of
Terrorist Organizations and Their Supporters as
Complex Adaptive Systems

• Cost
• Add to existing initiatives up to 100M per FY as
  appropriate
• 100M initiative at JFCOM, CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, and
  DARPA

• Recommendation
• Establish additional centers of excellence to
  handle the greatly increased work load and to
  augment JWAC to support targeting (in the
  broadest sense) of terrorist organizations and
  their supporting infrastructurethese activities
  will draw upon intelligence feeds, Red Teaming,
  and a great variety of subject matter experts
  (regional, cultural, psychological, soft and hard
  sensors)
• Pursue and expand JFCOMs operational net
  assessment activity employed in millennium
  challenge

• Lead Responsibility
• JFCOM

30
A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective
Military Capability

• Understanding new adversaries and providing
  actionable intelligence deep penetration -
  understanding, finding, and tracking the
  terrorists and their networks
• Tools to handle tough environments and
  difficult targets and understand our
  vulnerabilities
• Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations
• Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities

31
Tools to Handle Tough Environments and
Difficult Targets and to Understand Our
Vulnerabilities

• - Key Initiatives -
• Tough Environments Urban Warfare
• Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction
• Theater and CONUS protection
• The consequence management challenge
• In-theater
• CONUS
• Finding terrorists and WMDpersistent ISR
• The Red Team
• Asymmetric Adversaries and Force Projection

32
Inadequate Attention and Resources Devoted to
Improving Capabilities to Operate in Urban
Environments

• URBAN OUR FOCUS Most likely terrorism
  environment and the one for which we are the
  least prepared
• Shortfalls in doctrine, training, and technology
  for urban operations
• Doctrine JFCOM Executive Agent in FY03
• Put priority and resources behind the effort to
  create joint urban operations doctrine and
  address DOTMLPF challenges
• Training Current urban ops training facilities
  inadequate
• Include an urban facility in the Joint National
  Training Capability Initiative
• Technology Develop urban-specific technologies
  including
• Knowledge systems
• Movement capabilities
• Precision fires
• Special sensor systems
• Communications unique to urban environment
• Integrated system solutions

33
Challenges for Military Operations in Urban
Terrain

• Urban terrain presents unique challenges in
• Precision strike to avoid collateral damage
• Command and control communications limitations
• Need for diverse, manpower intensive operations
• Standoff weapons advantages diminish
• The need to call for and control supporting arms
  at platoon and squad levels

• To meet the unique urban challenge, we need
  better capabilities in
• Ground and aerial surveillance (GPS-guided UAV
  helos)
• Situation awareness (persistent layered ISR)
• Urban training and development (dedicated center)
• Command, control and communications (DARPA
  SUO/SAS system)
• Low level combined arms maneuver
• Precision supporting fires
• Detecting and preempting WMD threats

34
Progress USMC Project Metropolis

• USMC battalion-sized MAGTF experiment
• Concept
• Penetration, thrust
• Combined arms to squad level (infantry, tank,
  helo, etc.)
• 4-5 weeks intense training
• Packaged combat support teams
• Bounding overwatch
• Spherical security
• Schedule
• Victorville, California Summer 02
• Urban ground reconnaissance
• Rotary-wing tactics
• Command and control
• Small unit logistics

35
The Way Ahead

• Develop an urban strategy on the strategic and
  operational levels
• We dont do cities
• We do cities into rubble
• We have some good ideas for new urban warfare
  operations
• Develop a dedicated joint urban training and
  development center
• Part of joint West Coast training centers
• Subordinate to JFCOM
• Develop specialized tools for urban environments
• Many good ideas
• Develop joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
  (TTPs) emphasizing
• Urban intelligence preparation of the battlespace
  (IPB) techniques
• Small unit action
• Leadership initiative and flexibility
• Low level call for and control of supporting
  fires
• Develop a precise urban environment representation

36
Urban Point Position Database(CityMap)

• Creation
• Theater-based sensors (LADAR, IFSAR) update a
  priori maps
• Semi automated feature extraction to model
  structures
• Update/revisit rate much higher than traditional
  maps
• Urban context added to basic geometry using other
  sources (e.g., building plans, Integrated Survey
  Program, )

• Utility
• Gridlock sensor and report data for fusion and
  handoff
• Precisely locate targets for remote fires
• Perform accessibility analysis to find routes in
  and around city
• Coordinate movement and position of forces
• Construct urban IPB

• Precision 3D representation of
• Structures (windows and doors)
• LOCs (minor streets and alleys and underground)
• Obstacles (power lines)
• Critical infrastructure elements (water, power,
  comm)
• Database of supporting information
• Addresses, occupants, functions, more

37
Urban OPS Are Enabled by Precise Environment
Representation

• Gridlock of sensor data
• Enable HD multi-sensor processes
• Locate and track targets for long epochs

• Gridlock of report data
• Fuse disparate INT types precisely
• Locate targets for remote precision fires

• Urban C2
• Coordinate movement
• Select / prioritize targets for remote precision
  fires

• Mission planning and rehearsal
• Critical node analysis
• Accessibility analysis (ground and air)

• Precision 3D representation of
• Structures
• LOCs (minor streets and alleys and underground)
• Obstacles (power lines)
• Critical infrastructure elements (water, power,
  comm)
• Database of supporting information
• Addresses
• Occupants
• Functions
• More

38
Finding the Enemy and WMD in Complex Environments
39
The Integrated Battlespace
Space
ISR SIGINT Imagery of Earths Surface

Air
Navigation / Position Fixing

Precision Time


ISR SIGINT Imagery of
Ballistic Missile Launch Warning

Ground and Sea

Weather

Airborne Object Detection /
Tracking / ID

Atmospheric Sampling

Localized Weather
Terrestrial / Ocean Surface

ISR SIGINT, EO / IR, Acoustic, Seismic, Magnetic

Terrain Man-made Feature Data
Undersea

Weather

Oceanographic Data

ISR

Internet World Wide Web

Oceanographic Data

Weapons of Mass Destruction Data Warning

Other
40
Improved and Persistent Battlefield ISR
Capabilities

• Capable of search, synoptic coverage, and space,
  air, ground sensor dwell (persistent ISR)
• Balanced space, air and ground capabilities to
  create a layered capability and an integrated ISR
  battlespace
• Optimize resource allocation to achieve
  localized, persistent, high density coverage
• Address the unique urban ISR problems
• Include ground-based improved tagging, tracking,
  locating (TTL), close and clandestine
  technologies
• More centralized planning and coordination of
  architectures, technology, and capabilities
  Joint SIGINT Avionics Architecture (JSAA) program
• Acquisition of system-of-system
  (strategic-operational-tactical) ISR
  architectures and systems Multimission Command
  and Control Constellation (MC2C)
• New approaches to acquisition, architecture
  development and systems engineering
  capabilities-based approach being used in the MDA

41
An Integrated Joint C2/BM Capability Supported
Through A Network Centric Information
Infrastructure (NCII)
Synchronous Orbit Relay Satellite
Optical Link
Intel Data / CONUS Commands
Communications Node with Multi-Beam Antenna and
Data Switching Capability
Optical Links
Broad-Area Surveillance Radar UAV
Airborne Command Center
Covert Uplink Multiple RF Circuits
Forward deployed data to everyone
Low-Altitude UAVs
Ground/Maritime Sensors
Forces
Attributes

• All entities people, platforms, sensors, weapons
  are interconnected
• All entities can pull data in real time
• All entities have access (as appropriate) to
  relevant data at all times

42
New Sensor Capabilities Are Needed for Locating
People and WMD
43
Tracking Individuals

• Many ideas are in the laboratory phase
• Passive/active
• Line of sight/non-line of sight
• Cooperative/non-cooperative
• Emphasis is on tags vs. systems/emplacement/enviro
  nment
• Spectrum of ideas/options
• Short term (6 mos.)/long term (years)
• Physical tags
• Remote biometrics
• Need coordinated program to provide a toolkit of
  capabilities and operationalize concepts,
  especially in placement and exfiltration schemes

44
Priority Challenge for Counter-WMD Warfare
Detecting, Identifying, and Localizing WMD

• Needed
• Standoff detection and tracking at kilometer
  ranges
• Active interrogation high-resolution,
  high-efficiency devices
• Passive spectral systems with kms stand-off
  range for detection
• Low false alarm
• Remotely emplaced sample collection and retrieval
  
• Handheld units for ID characterization in seconds
  to minutes with low false alarms
• Emplacement, networking, data processing,
  exfiltration all clandestine

45
WMDThe Way Ahead

• Remote sensing has not proved outseems to
  require in place sensors
• Sensor systems should be considered end-to-end,
  but initial work should focus on phenomenology
  and sensing techniques
• Network monitoring and analysis of inferential
  signatures (e.g., deliveries, manifests, people
  movement) should be undertaken
• Stimulated emissions may hold promise for nuclear
  choke point monitoring
• Energize followup on the Zebra Chip
  recommendation
• No matter the sensing, agent defeat is critical
  and requires additional resources

46
WMDThe Way Ahead
Network and Inferential Signature Analysis
Precision Sensor (Stealth) Deployment
Sensor Physics/Chemistry
(LPD) Data Exfiltration
Choke Point Monitoring
Agent Destruction
Attack Sensing
Chem
Consider Provocative Deployment CONOPS
Nuclear
Proposed
Relative
Bio
Investment
Among N, C, B
47
An Expanded In-Theater and CONUS Counter-WMD
Consequence Management Capability

• The Counter-WMD Force Element expanding on
  todays capabilities
• A joint, deployable counter-WMD force element,
  trained and equipped for CONUS or overseas
  force/base protection, quarantine ops, WMD ISR,
  helping to plan counter-WMD offensive ops, search
  and render-safe

• Must address consequence management capabilities
  and serious shortfalls
• CONUS
• National Guard has civil support teams in 32
  locations today
• Greatly expand role of National Guard and
  Reserves and improve training and equipage
• The 50 states need to define their roles and
  budgeting for this mission and other disaster
  relief missions
• Overseas
• Any use of WMD in-theater directly impacts host
  nation as well as US forces
• A coalition developed plan for consequence
  management is needed country by country with
  US assistance
• No plans, and little capability, in place today

48
Counter-WMD Mission and Relation to CONUS
Protection

• Create a special WMD Red Team dedicated to
  planning, as terrorists might, ways to attack the
  US homeland and forces overseas
• Establish specialized sub teams with knowledge in
  WMD mischief making and terrorist cultural
  beliefs
• Scenarios are made widely accessible to analysts
  and collectors who derive observables from
  scenarios and focus collection on these
• Major reach out to creative people outside
  government for their ideas, scenarios, and
  postulated adversary capabilities
• Major intelligence analytic support on
  counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, and WMD

49
Assessing DoD Force Projection Vulnerabilities in
a GWOT Environment

• DoD GWOT force projection capabilities are
  highly dependent on both commercial and Defense
  Department infrastructure
• Approximately 450 DoD bases involved in some
  aspect of force projection
• (Unknown numbers) of commercial sites are
  involved as well

• No systematic mapping of this infrastructure and
  associated vulnerabilities to mission
  requirements exists
• Currently multiple DoD entities have some
  responsibility for assessing site-by-site
  vulnerabilities
• Local installation/base commanders
• Joint Program Office-Special Technology
  Countermeasures (JPO-STC) at Dahlgren with NIMA
  and DTRA in support
• Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment
  (JSIVA) with DTRA in support
• Others responsible based upon the attack vector

• The responsibilities for DoD force projection
  risk assessment effort must be clarified
• DoD asset vulnerabilities must be ranked in
  importance and reported to the appropriate levels
  within DoD
• The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
  NORTHCOM must add the DoD critical commercial
  infrastructure required for force projection to
  their critical national infrastructure protection
  priorities

50
Responsibilities for Force Projection Risk
Mitigation

• Responsibilities for mitigation of identified
  force projection risks must be clarified
• The Combatant Commander does not have the
  resources to fix the problem
• Resources must flow from who owns the site day
  to day, not the gaining command
• At the base level, risk assessment and mitigation
  funding competes with other installation
  sustainment demands
• SecDef should consider establishing a new line
  item in each Service and Agency budget for force
  projection risk mitigation
• Segregates the funding
• Enables assessments to be matched against
  mitigation efforts
• Provides senior DoD leadership better visibility
  into this issue

51
Missiles Made in Tucson
The following list of missiles are manufactured
in Tucson, Arizona

• AIM-9X
• AMRAAM
• EKV (Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle for the BMD
  system)
• ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow)
• Javelin
• Maverick
• Phalanx

• Phoenix
• RAM
• Sparrow
• Standard Missile
• Stinger
• TOW (anti-tank missile)
• Tomahawk

All of Raytheons missiles except Hawk and
Patriot (Massachusetts)
52
Classified
Sustainability Enables Force Projection
53
Recommendation Take Urban Environment
Seriously by Building on Emerging Activities

• Recommendation
• Create infrastructure to enable new capabilities
  in urban operations
• New urban-like facility able to support
  battalion-size forces to train, exercise, and
  experiment realistically
• Replicates different types of urban environments
• Large numbers of structures some high rise
• Networked to other ranges/facilities
• Mission rehearsal capability
• Equipment evaluation
• Develop urban-unique modeling and simulation
  tools
• Develop the Urban Point Positioning Database
• DARPA develop a major RD thrust
• Provide guidance and resources to JFCOM in their
  new role as Executive Agent for Joint Urban
  Operations
• Develop new concept at operational level
• Integrate Service efforts
• Conduct and sponsor experiments, exercises, and
  ACTDs
• Work with allies and draw lessons learned
  fostering urban-relevant MS

Cost 300M/yr for POM period

• Lead Responsibility
• JFCOM with Army, USMC
• DARPA
• NIMA

54
Recommendation Improve ISR

• Cost
• 1.6 Billion/FY over FY-04 POM period
• IOC in FY-06
• FOC in FY-09

• Recommendation
• Significant improvement in battlespace ISR and
  supporting analysis
• Develop the capability to employ a 24/7
  Persistent ISR in a designated area for days or
  weeks
• A layered architecture from space, air, and a
  rich set of new ground sensor capabilities for
  now, next and after-next ISR systems
• Overlay with Network Centric Information
  Infrastructure (NCII) for support of network
  centric and gridlock capabilities

• Lead Responsibility
• ASD(C3I) and CMS

55
Recommendation Scenarios, Plans, and Templates
An Important Initiative For a Red Team

• Lead Responsibility
• DCI with support from SecDef and CJCS

Cost Hiring/finding the two dozen
skilled people Resources to reach out to
non-government skills Operations support cost of
20M/yr

• Recommendation
• For the WMD issues, there should be a dedicated
  team of smart, creative individuals dedicated to
  planning, as terrorists might, ways to attack the
  US homeland and forces overseas
• Collect and collate terrorist MOs from previous
  incidents
• Establish specialized sub teams with knowledge in
  WMD mischief making
• Scenarios are made widely accessible to analysts
  and collectors who derive observables from the
  scenarios and focus collection on these
• Includes comprehensive tagging, tracking and
  locating critical componentry
• Includes monitoring of support structures
• Monitoring individuals and institutions with
  critical know-how
• Provide the systems support so that the notional
  components can be stored and recombined, and can
  index into intelligence reports
• Avoid premature focus on one or several
  end-to-end scenarios
• Reports to Director CIA

56
Recommendation Develop and Implement a
Comprehensive Counter-WMD Plan

• Lead Responsibility
• USD(ATL), ATSD(NCB)
• Services, SOCOM
• SOCOM
• Services

Cost 1B/yr 500M/yr

• Recommendation
• Execute consolidated oversight and funding of an
  aggressive and coordinated RDTE program
• Create and exercise WMD operational decision
  support systems
• Push RD on WMD sensors, sampling, and retrieval
  concepts
• Develop networked C4ISR systems specific to WMD
  targets
• Get serious about acquiring a WMD agent, device,
  and/or delivery defeat
• Provide resources for near-term staffing and
  equipage for an expanded Counter-WMD Force
  Element
• Joint, deployable CONUS or overseas
• Force protection, offensive action, consequence
  management

57
Recommendation Identify and Redress Force
Projection Vulnerabilities
Cost gt 100M Personnel costs. Need to
coordinate multiple groups conducting
vulnerability assessments 150M/year

• Recommendation
• Increase tenfold (over three years) the people
  and resources devoted to assessing
  vulnerabilities of our DoD force projection
  capabilities and critical infrastructure
• Support with extensive Red Teaming and RD on new
  analysis techniques
• Assign Assistant Secretary of Defense for
  Homeland Security ASD(HLS) as Executive Agent
  for DoD Critical Infrastructure Protection and
  assure the vulnerabilities are addressed
• Task NORTHCOM and ASD(HLS) to coordinate the
  vulnerability assessments and develop a plan to
  redress the vulnerabilities
• Move funding for the JPO-STC to a new NORTHCOM
  funding line

• Lead Responsibility
• JPO-STC

58
A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective
Military Capability

• Understanding new adversaries and providing
  actionable intelligence deep penetration -
  understanding, finding, and tracking the
  terrorists and their networks
• Tools to handle tough environments and
  difficult targets and understand our
  vulnerabilities
• Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations
• Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities

59
Preparing for SOF-Centric Operations
Traditional
SOF
Allied Conv. Forces
US Conventional Forces
Combat Support Combat Service Support
60
Preparing for SOF-Centric Operations

• - Key Initiatives -
• Provide operational command flexibility
• Increase SOF capabilities
• Couple SOF and conventional forces more tightly
• Enhance the contributions of conventional forces
• Make SOF more central in our military planning
  with our Allies

61
Provide Operational Command Flexibility

• Prepare SOF to be the supported command in at
  least some phases of future campaigns
• Enhance the robustness of the theater special
  operations commands and joint special operations
  task force (JSOTF) headquarters (level/resources,
  skills, C4)
• Expand exercises and training with conventional
  forces
• Provide for seamless transition of
  supported/supporting commands during a campaign
  task JFCOM and SOCOM to
• Develop transition phasing experiments and
  exercises
• Ensure interoperable situational awareness
  capabilities among SOF and conventional forces

62
Increase SOF capabilities

• A greater role in preparing the battlefield
• Focus SOF worldwide day-to-day presence to
  exploit human and geographic access in potential
  crisis locations
• Exploit SOFs inherent intelligence collection
  capabilities
• Modest increase in personnel
• 2 per year ( some additional growth from
  transfers possible)
• CENTCOM crisis response element
• Substantial increase in equipage
• Blue force tracking
• Sensor emplacement
• Common Operating Picture
• Communications and other equipment
• Upgrade special mission aircraft, maritime and
  ground mobility

63
Couple SOF and Conventional Forces More Tightly

• More training and rehearsal for both SOF-led and
  conventional-led operations
• Standardize TTPs between SOF and conventional
  forces for SOF-initiated operations
• Command relationships
• Enhanced institutional and unit education
• Tailor force packaging to enhance
  pre-conflict/post-conflict capabilities
• Identify packages of engineers, civil affairs,
  military police, and medical personnel that can
  be coupled to in-theater SOF
• These resources reside mostly in Reserve
  Component (RC)

64
Enhance Conventional Forces Contributions in the
GWOT

• Improve selected conventional capabilities to
  support SOF-centric operations
• Night vision/night flying/tactical resupply
• Sea-basing
• Fire support
• Foreign internal defense (training)
• Accelerate development and fielding of
  specialized capabilities in selected conventional
  forces
• Includes changes to training, professional
  military education, equipage, personnel practices
• Operate dispersed and distributed
• Leverage remote fires and aerial ISR
• Use language and cultural awareness as force
  multipliers
• Leverage indigenous ground forces
• Have conventional forces with requisite
  capabilities assume missions currently being
  performed by SOF
• E.g., USMC MEU(SOC)

• Explosive ordnance disposal
• Consequence management
• Force protection
• Combat service support

65
Make SOF More Central in Military Engagement
Planning With Our Allies/others

• One of few areas where allies can be near peer
  partners
• JSOTF-South in OEF provides a model forces of
  eight nations
• Focus efforts at early stages of emerging crisis
• Center Allied and coalition planning operations
  at Combatant Command level
• Prioritize engagement opportunities
• Aggressively fund combined exercises and training
  events

66
Recommendation Preparing For More, Larger and
More Complex Operations in Which SOF (and
SOF-like) Capabilities Play a Central Role

• Recommendation
• Provide operational command flexibility
• Increase SOF capabilities
• Couple more tightly SOF and conventional forces
• Enhance the contributions of conventional forces
  in
• Warfighting
• Shaping
• Make SOF more central in our military planning
  with our Allies and coalition partners

Cost 10s of M Billions 10s of M 100s of
M 10s of M

• Lead/Supporting Responsibility
• SecDef/JFCOM
• SecDef/SOCOM
• CJCS/JFCOM SOCOM/Services
• SecDef/JFCOM/Services
• SecDef/ASD(SO/LIC)

67
A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective
Military Capability

• Understanding new adversaries and providing
  actionable intelligence deep penetration -
  understanding, finding, and tracking the
  terrorists and their networks
• Tools to handle tough environments and
  difficult targets and understand our
  vulnerabilities
• Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations
• Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities

68
Operationalizing New Approaches and Capabilities
- Key Initiatives - Business as usual puts us at
risk of not having capabilities when needed.
Achieving capabilities will require

• Extensive joint experimentation, training, and
  doctrine development
• Adaptive joint C4 systems
• Interoperability at low levels
• Hard-headed assessment of real world operations
  and experiments

69
Creating an Organizational Center for Developing
Joint and Special Operations in GWOT

• SecDef/CJCS should formally and visibly recognize
  JFCOMs new focus
• As their executive agent for joint doctrine,
  training, experimentation, and joint integration
  to meet GWOT requirements
• Linchpin for integration of joint and special ops
  efforts by services, USSOCOM, and other Combatant
  Commands
• Relieved of geographic and homeland defense
  responsibilities
• Transition to NATO functional Supreme Allied
  Commander-Transformation or divest SACLANT

70
Accelerate Maturation of JFCOM to Fulfill Joint
Doctrine, Training, Experimentation Roles

• Create and sustain continuous experimentation/spir
  al development capability
• flexible to connect to real world operations
• New responsibility for joint doctrine
• Establish closer links to other Combatant
  Commands and Services
• Enlarge interagency and multinational initiatives
• Serve as Executive Agent for improving Joint
  Urban Operations
• Joint training capability

71
Accelerate Development and Fielding of More
Adaptive and Capable Joint Command, Control,
Communication, and Computer Systems

• Provide, through spiral development, continuous
  improvement of joint C4 systems (including Joint
  Headquarters) at the Regional Combatant
  Commanders
• Work closely with
• Regional Combatant Commands to tailor to theater
• SOCOM to empower SOF-centric operations
• The new STRATCOM in their potential role as
  provider of global sensors and comms

72
Empower JFCOM to Ensure Jointness and
Interoperability at Appropriate Levels

• Establish Service acquisition program standards
  for processing/formatting (not just interface)
• Make JFCOM effective gatekeeper for
  interoperability for all Service requirements
• Accelerate integration of common operational
  pictures

73
Turning Lessons into Lessons Learned and Acted
Upon

• Needed a standing process for development and
  top-down direction of lessons learned
• Make Joint Center for Lessons Learned subordinate
  to JFCOM
• Collect from operations, experiments, and
  training events (US and others)
• Create synthesis capability
• Develop an integrated electronic library
• Facilitate horizontal dispersion
• Create action plan
• Routinely report high priority lessons to
  SecDef/CJCS
• Result Greater likelihood of discovering
  weaknesses before our adversaries do

74
Resourcing Jointness to Support the GWOT

• Create a program (set of program elements) to
  provide JFCOM the resources (through control of
  the funds) to fulfill the responsibilities we
  have laid out for
• Joint training, doctrine development, and
  experimentation
• Providing of joint C4 at the Combatant Commands
• Ensuring interoperability at all joint levels
• Joint urban operations
• Joint Center for Lessons Learned
• Should include funds and contracting authority
  for limited acquisition of products and other
  opportunities in support of this mission
• Should make maximum use of existing acquisition
  and procurement organizations in carrying out
  these responsibilities
• Provide JFCOM additional intellectual resources
• JFSC and NDU
• A formal relationship with counterpart activities
  in the Services (TRADOC, NWDC, AFDC, MCCDC/MCWL)
• Establish a premier system-of-systems engineering
  and integration capability to support JFCOM

75
Recommendation Creating an Organizational Center
for Developing Joint and Special Operations in
GWOT
Cost

• Lead Responsibility
• SecDef/CJCS

• Recommendation
• Create a program to provide JFCOM the resources
  (through control of the funds) to fulfill the
  responsibilities we have laid out
• Provide them premier system engineering and
  integration support
• Assign NDU/JFSC to JFCOM to ensure more influence
  of Service institutional counterparts

76
What Will You Get If You Implement Our
Recommendations

• Understanding of the adversary
• Proactive operations for Intelligence
• Deeper understanding and broader coverage
• A new and new kind of expansion of HUMINT
• Intelligence surge capability
• Understanding the enemy as a complex adaptive
  system (beyond physical dimensions)
• Deeper, broader, and more expert analysis
• Customer and query-driven analysis
• More capabilities for tough operations
• Facilities for urban operations, experiment,
  training, and mission rehearsal/planning
• 3D maps of urban environments
• Responsive ISR, persistent focus
• Tagging, tracking, and locating even of people
• Sensors for WMD
• A red team to anticipate the terrorists
• A SWAT-like team to contain WMD weapons
• Powerful SOF-centric military options tailored to
  the GWOT
• Greater contributions from the conventional
  forces
• Robust, adaptive, and flexible operational-level
  C4

77
What It Will Mean

• Much better able to anticipate terrorist behavior
  and react to bolts-out-of-the-gray
• Much richer set of proactive/preemptive options
• More responsive, flexible, and effective military
  instrument to prosecute the GWOT
• better prepared for simultaneous campaigns
• more capable in tough environments and against
  difficult targets
• Allies much more capable (and perhaps willing) to
  contribute militarily
• DoDs missions much less vulnerable to terrorist
  disruption
• A catalyst for a broad and deep transformation of
  DoDs capabilities and practices

78

• Americans should not expect one battle, but a
  lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever
  seenWhat is at stake is not just Americas
  freedom. This is the worlds fight. This is
  civilizations fight. This is the fight of all
  who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance,
  and freedom.
• President George W. Bush
• September 20, 2001